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ABSTRACT
The thesis analyses the evolution of Hong Kong as an autonomous international actor 
and how that has been sustained under Chinese sovereignty, in the context of the wider 
debate on paradiplomacy and the increasing international participation of Non-Central 
Governments (NCG). The opening chapter offers a review of the literature on non-state 
actors (NSA) and emphasises the limitations of the new literature on NCGs that emerged 
in the 1990s which fails to deal with the heterogeneity of NCGs, the specific 
characteristics that differentiate them from other NSA and their impact on the 
international system. The next two chapters examine the factors behind the process of 
HK’s emergence as an international player in the early 1960s: textile trade interests and 
reaction to proteccionism; HK elite bureaucracy legitimisation strategy; flexibility of the 
international system for what accounted the Dominions’ historical precedent and the 
pragmatic interests of influential states. HK’s emergence as an international financial 
centre, the development of a system of external representation in the 1970s and the 
creation of the new framework for external relations inserted in the 1984 Joint 
Declaration, further contributed to consolidate and expand HK’s autonomy into new 
areas, including political ones, at the same time they introduced a note of ambiguity in 
HK’s international status. Fresh insights into the negotiation of the JD international 
affairs chapter are offered. Chapter Four examines HK’s post-1997 implementation of 
the new external relations’ framework and how far external autonomy was preserved 
demonstrating that the level of external autonomy HK enjoys is determined not merely 
by the relation with the Central Government but by the interplay between this, HK’s 
own strategy and actions and the attitude of external players. The logic of “autonomy 
cum isolation” that prevails in HK-Beijing relations, deviant practices concerning 
“specific authorisations” and excessive govemmentalisation of external affairs are 
identified as the main risks for future autonomy in a context where the SAR has been 
able to preserve the core of its external autonomy in relation to China. Chapter Five 
deals with HK’s legitimacy basis and sources of influence as an international player 
looking at its participation in WTO. To assert its influence HK uses not one but a 
combination of sources of influence, namely technical expertise, economic power, and 
above all the performance of a systemic broker role associated with its dual identity. The 
final chapter discusses the research results and concludes that, unlike other NCG, HK 
has been able to have a direct impact on the international system, namely through the 
participation in the process of international rules-making in trade and financial matters. 
This capacity is determined by the triangle “external autonomy-legitimacy-influence” 
which conditions the ability of NCG to take advantage of the opportunities created by 
the globalisation-localisation process to enhance their international role and contribute to 
a better global governance.
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INTRODUCTION
The Hong Kong (HK) handover on 1 July 1997, a high profile event which commanded 
wide international interest, constituted the apex of the internationalisation of the HK 
question and at the same time a puzzling situation for the entire international community 
insofar as it was about to witness an act which apparently runned counter the logic of the 
post-Cold War era. In fact, not only the end of a colony was delinked from the creation 
of a new state and the exercise of the right of self-determination, but also a prosperous 
and strategic international capitalist centre was being handed over peacefully and 
voluntarily to a socialist state. Moreover, the new HK Special Administrative Region 
was going to operate according to the “one country, two systems” model in which the 
capitalist and socialist systems coexist inside the same state, an innovation without 
precedent in the international system.
The presence of a very large number of states and the high international visibility of the 
event was to a great extent justified by HK’s role as a major international trade and 
financial centre strongly founded on its capacity to act on its own internationally, with 
whom the states present are used to deal directly with. Understandably, the far reaching 
transference of sovereignty from Britain to China raised doubts about the ability of HK 
to preserve its international status and external autonomy, particularly in a context 
marked by a growing economic integration with China, and how far China would 
respect its commitments enshrined in the Joint Declaration and allow HK freedom on the 
international stage. Similarly, questions could be raised about the potential influence of 
HK on the PRC system and how far it could induce changes on specific aspects of 
China’s foreign policy.
As an autonomous international actor, HK, being a non-sovereign entity, is apparently 
an anomalous case in an international system still strongly influenced by a state-centric 
perspective that sees states as the dominant and only relevant international actors. 
However, the emergence of HK as an international player associated with a complex 
process of decolonisation and the interplay between the complex forces of globalisation, 
seems to be the expression of an inherent flexibility and adaptability of the international
system, often overlooked. In this context the HK international experience is useful to 
understand better under what conditions and through which processes the international 
system has accommodated this unorthodox phenomenon as well as the limits of this 
flexibility.
Interestingly, HK’s “anomaly” has been attenuated as a consequence of the increasing 
international participation of other Non-Central Governments (NCG), particularly in the 
course of the 1990s, which has been called “paradiplomacy” and equated with a process 
of localisation of foreign policy1. This phenomenon is considered by the body of theory 
on “paradiplomacy” to be the result of the acceleration of globalisation2, which created 
favourable conditions for a greater presence of NCGs and other Non-state actors (NSA) 
on the international stage, associated with important qualitative changes, namely the 
diversification of the issue-areas where they participate, direct contributions to shape 
emerging international regimes and the development of new sources of influence3. 
Evidence suggests, however, that it was not globalisation alone but a more complex 
process involving the interaction between globalisation-localisation that explains the 
phenomenon, although this trend of localisation has been largely neglected by the 
literature4. Interestingly, localisation has in some ways paved the way to advances in 
economic globalisation, namely in terms of the localisation of comparative advantages 
of firms, as demonstrated by the clustering approach5, insofar as in order to compete
1 Hocking, Brian. Localizing Foreign Policy -  Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy. 
St.Martin’s Press, London, 1993. Duchacek used the concept of paradiplomacy, “Perforated 
sovereignties”, in Michelmann, Hans and Soldatos, P. (eds.), Federalism and International Relations -  The 
role o f subnational units. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 15-27.
2 There is not a uniform but different views on the essence o f the concept of globalisation. On the different 
understandings see Higott and Underhill who identify four different meanings Richard Higott and G. 
Underhill (eds) Non-State actors and authority in the global system. Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 2-6.
For a taxonomy o f the literature on globalisation see Richard Higott and Reich, 1998, “ Globalisation and 
sites o f  conflict: towards definition and taxonomy” CSGR Working Paper no. 1/98.
3 For an analysis of the different sources o f influence o f non-state actors see Josselin and Wallace (eds.) 
Non-state actors in World Politics. Palgrave, London, 2001, p. 253.
4 There are some exceptions like Rosenau who although not mentioning explicitly localisation argues that 
the globalising world is both integrating and fragmenting, what he calls “fragmegration” -  see James 
Rosenau “ Governance in a New Global Order” in David Held and McGrew (eds.) Governing 
Globalization -  power, authority and global governance. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 70-86.
5 OECD, Enhancing SME Competitiveness -  the OECD Bologna Ministerial Conference.Paris. 2001. 
Background paper for workshop 2, Michael Enright and others, pp. 115; OECD. Innovative clusters, 
drivers of national innovation systems OECD,Paris. 2001 ;OECD, Boosting innovation -  the cluster 
approach. OECD,Paris 1999.
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globally firms require a local base where they consolidate innovation processes, skills 
and knowledge.
This greater international participation of NSA and NCGs in particular, added to the 
complexity of the international system characterised in the globalisation era by its 
multilevel governance, where there is the coexistence and interplay between 
supranational, regional, national and sub-national levels, not the monopoly of the global 
level6. Furthermore, besides greater complexity this generates also greater ambiguity in 
the international system, namely about the exact location of authority, its fragmentation 
and the management of overlapping jurisdictions and rules, thus having an impact on 
HK insofar it changed the context in which it was used to operate.
The links between HK and the phenomenon of paradiplomacy include two inter-related 
aspects that deserve to be researched, the more so as, surprisingly, HK has been 
neglected by the “paradiplomacy” literature. On the one hand, how far the activities of 
NCGs affected HK international action and created new opportunities and challenges to 
which HK has to respond. On the other, how far the HK case has a potential impact on 
other NCGs and is relevant to understand better the nature of NCGs as international 
actors in this more complex global system, particularly key aspects which have not been 
sufficiently explored: the specific characteristics of NCG that differentiate them from 
other types of NSA; the basis of autonomy and legitimacy to act internationally; NCGs’ 
sources of influence and their impact on the international system. The relevance of the 
HK case for this research can be justified on different grounds. Firstly, HK is a pioneer 
among NCGs in terms of “paradiplomacy” activities and therefore it enables us to 
understand the causes and how relevant has been the precedent set by HK. Secondly, it 
is claimed that HK has a high profile international status and is one of the most active 
and powerful non-sovereign actors in the international stage7. If this is the case, the HK 
case is relevant not only because of the potential demonstration effect on other NCGs
6 This is recognised by David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), op. cit.. p. 9 and by Josselin and 
Wallace, op. cit. p. 259.
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but also to understand the sources of influence open to this category of actors. Thirdly, 
HK has been a strategic player in the process of globalisation and performed extremely 
relevant roles for the regional and global economies7 8. In this context it is a particularly 
interesting case to shed light on the globalisation-localisation paradox and the challenges 
it poses to NCGs.
The main concern of this thesis is to analyse the factors behind and the dynamics of the 
evolution of HK as an autonomous international actor and see how autonomy has 
worked, and how sustainable it has proved to be, under Chinese sovereignty. The 
interest of this perspective is clearly demonstrated by the circumstance that never before 
a relation between a NCG and its Central Government has been subject to such an 
intense international scrutiny, reflecting not only the importance of HK to the 
international system but also the significance of this relationship to the international 
community as a test to assess China’s international posture and credibility as an 
emerging global power.
It should be noted that, although the HK-Beijing relationship is an important dimension, 
the analysis of the HK experience is approached from a broader perspective exploring 
the theoretical ties with NSA and NCGs in particular, and not through the prism of the 
Chinese concept of “one country, two systems” as this would involve a more restrictive 
Chinese-centred perspective and limited comparisons with Macao and Taiwan, thus 
presenting limitations in terms of capturing the richness of HK’s status as an 
international actor and the possible impact of its action on the international system.
The thesis is organised in six chapters. Chapter I considers the views of the International 
Law theory and International Relations theory on the nature and position of NSAs in the 
international system and carries out a review of the IR literature on non-state actors, with
7 James Tang, “Hong Kong's international status” in The Pacific Review, voi.6. no.3, 1993, pp.205-215 
and Roda Mushkat One country. Two International I.eeal Personalities -  the case of Hone Kong. HK 
University Press, HK,1997
8 Michael Enright, Edith Scott (eds.) The Homi Kona Advantage. Oxford University Press, New York, 
1997.
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particular emphasis on the analysis of NCGs and paradiplomacy, proposing a new 
framework to analyse NCGs’ capabilities as international players.
Chapter II analyses the origins and process of emergence of HK as an autonomous 
player in the international system and explains the factors that pressed HK to act 
internationally on its own on the one hand, and facilitated the international community’s 
acceptance of this unorthodox phenomenon, on the other.
Chapter III examines the impact of the transition from British to Chinese sovereignty on 
HK’s international status and autonomy, with particular emphasis on the development of 
the new formal framework that regulates HK’s external relations and establishes the 
boundaries of its external autonomy in its relation with the sovereign power.
Chapter IV principal task is to analyse, in the context of the post-1997 reality, the 
foundations and scope of HK’s external autonomy and the constraining factors that 
condition in practice its evolution, including the relationship with the Central 
Government, by looking at the practical implementation of the new external relations 
framework and the HKSAR’s interaction with external players.
Chapter V looks at HK’s participation in WTO, a priority international organisation for 
the HKSAR, namely at the pattern of interaction with other members, and offers an 
analysis of HK’s sources of influence, explaining why and how HK acquired a high 
profile and has been able to play an active role in the process of rules-making in the 
international trading system. On the other hand, the chapter enquires how far HK’s lack 
of sovereignty poses any limitations to its participation in WTO.
Chapter VI discusses the research results taking into account comparative references of 
other NCGs cases, particularly Catalonia, Quebec and Greenland, highlighting both the 
differences and similarities with the HK case, and reflects prospectively on the 
potentialities of NCGs as international actors and the roles they can perform in the 
international system.
i)
CHAPTER ONE
NON-STATE ACTORS AND NON-CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS AS 
INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS -  A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The participation and influence of non-state actors in the international system has been 
growing since World War I. This phenomenon has challenged the validity of the state­
centric approach and gradually showed that it was no longer possible to understand the 
evolution of the international system nor the behaviour of States without taking into 
account the role of non-state actors.
The main objectives of this chapter are, on the one hand to analyse the evolution of the 
debate in the International Relations literature on non-state actors, in particular during 
the 1990, and how far it has contributed to consolidate a new paradigm alternative to the 
state-centric one. On the other, it intends to contribute to better define the distinctive 
features of HK as an international player in the context of the analysis of the features of 
non-state actors. Section one is concerned with the International Law perspective on 
non-state actors, in particular the debate on the nature of their international personality. 
Section two addresses the evolution of the IR literature since the 1970s and carries out a 
comparative analysis of the most influential positions, with particular attention to the 
heterogeneity of non-state actors. Section three is devoted to the analysis of Non-Central 
Governments, as a specific type of non-state actor, and the development of their 
paradiplomacy as international players. Finally, section four proposes a new framework 
for the analysis and differentiation of NCGs as international players combining the 
domestic and external dimensions.
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1.1. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NON-STATE ACTORS
International Law theory has been dominated by the traditional state-centric school9 , 
which considers States are the exclusive and only legitimate subjects of International 
Law thus denying international personality to non-state actors. However, the analysis of 
the International Law theory reveals the existence of alternative and more flexible 
approaches that challenge the view of the traditional school and criticise its rigidity 
admitting, under special circumstances, non-state actors can possess international 
personality.
The traditional school
This theory is based on two fundamental assumptions. On the one hand it assumed that 
international personality derives from sovereignty and therefore sovereign states are the 
sole international persons. On the other, it considered non-state entities’ participation in 
the international system as absolutely exceptional with no significant impact on the 
nature of the system.
sovereign states. Sovereignty, including both its internal dimension, associated with 
supremacy in relation to any other power within the borders of a territory, and external 
dimension, associated with independence from other entities, is at the core centre of the
approach, and as a consequence of the predominance of the principle of formal equality 
between states, international personality tends to be an absolute, uniform and static 
concept. There is only one kind of personality shared by all actors and unlikely to
definition of international personality. In addition, g 
and sufficient condition to become an international
gaining sovereignty is a necessary 
il person. Under this state-centred
change over time.
1 For one o f  the most influential works see Oppenhei 
7'1' ed. (U. Lauterpacht). Longmans, L ondon, 1948. •ni. Lhassa Lawrence, International t aw -  A treatise.
Moreover, it assumes that all states have equal influence over both the processes of 
rules-making and rules-enforcing. This highly formal approach tends to overlook the 
actual differences in power and capabilities between states namely how they differ in 
terms of the intensity of international participation and the capacity to influence the 
regulation of the international system.
The second basic assumption is that non-state actors participation in the international 
system is not only exceptional but when it occurs has no structural consequences in 
terms of changing the basic features and rules of the system. Consequently, there is no 
need for International Law to regulate non-state actors when acting in the international 
system, both their behaviour and status, as they were considered to be governed 
exclusively by the national law of the country of “residence” which follows them when 
acting internationally.
The “dual personality” theory
A second school of thought has emerged more recently in International Law, the “dual 
personality theory”, which puts forward the thesis that non-state entities can have indeed 
international personality but of a different kind from the one possessed by states. This 
approach adopts a more flexible view of international personality and regards it more as 
a relative rather than an absolute phenomenon.
In spite of these differences the “dual personality theory” insofar as it accepts the idea 
that the international personality of the state is the model and there is a primacy of states 
as subjects of international law, is still relatively close to the traditional school and 
cannot be considered a radical breakaway from it.
Developed by influential authors such as Brownlie10, Shaw11 and Starke12, this second 
school establishes a fundamental distinction between two types of international 
personality, "objective” and “qualified” personality to use Shaw’s terminology13.
10 Brownlie, Jan, Principles of Public International I aw. 4,h edition , Oxford, Clarendon Press 1990, pp.58- 
70
11 Shaw. Malcolm.. International Law . (4,h edition). Cambridue University Press. Cambridge, 1997.
In what concerns the concept of international personality, the definition proposed by 
Brownlie as the “capacity to possess international rights and duties and to maintain its 
rights by bringing international claims”12 *4, although conventional and circular, 
contributes to clarify the distinction between the concept of international personality as 
such and the indicia of international personality.
The absence of a clear distinction has been rightly pointed out by Starke when he drew 
attention to the fact that in the literature four different meanings of “subject of 
international law” tend to be interchangeably used: (i) incumbent of rights and duties 
under international law (ii) holder of a procedural privilege of prosecuting a claim 
before and international court (iii) possessor of interests for which provision is made by 
international laws (iv) capacity to conclude treaties with states and international 
organisations. This generates an obvious confusion and lack of accuracy.
The definition adopted by Brownlie links international personality with the two first 
meanings that correspond to the core contents and rejects the other two, which are 
deemed to be mere indicia. For Brownlie there are four fundamental indicia of legal 
personality: (i) treaty making powers (ii) capacity to present international claims (iii) 
liability for the consequences of breaches of international law (iv) enjoyment of 
privileges and immunities in relation to the national jurisdictions of states15.
This concept of international personality introduces an element of flexibility and points 
to the idea that the extent of rights and obligations is not static and fixed but on the 
contrary can be variable. The elasticity of the concept is an important characteristic that 
leaves open the question if to be recognised international personality it is sufficient to
12 Strake, J. G. Introduction to International I aw ] l"' ed (revised by I.A. Shearer), Butterworths, London,
1994, pp.51-62
15 Shaw, op.cil. p.181-182.
14 Brownlie, op.cit.. p. 58.
15 Academic du Droit International, International Law at the 50'1' anniversary of the UN, collected courses
1995.
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possess one right or obligation disregard of its relevance, or if a minimum core of rights 
and obligation is necessary to be considered an international person.
The distinction between objective (or automatic), and qualified (or restricted), 
international personality is an important contribution of this school. Objective 
personality is associated with the possession of a wide range of international rights and 
obligations which entitles the entity to be accepted automatically, on the basis of 
Customary Law, as an international legal person and is opposable erga omnes. States 
and International Organisations are considered to enjoy this more complete and stable 
type of personality.
Qualified personality is considered to be not only more restricted but also dependent on 
the recognition by entities possessing objective personality. It can only operate in 
personam, that is to say can be opposable not to all international persons but only to 
those who accepted voluntarily to recognise this type of personality.
It should be noted that the difference between objective and qualified personality is not 
merely quantitative, in the sense that qualified personality involves necessarily a more 
limited range of rights and duties, but essentially qualitative in three important respects. 
First, objective personality is opposable erga omnes since it is founded in International 
Customary Law, while qualified personality, founded on the voluntary recognition by 
objective international persons, is only valid for those recognising it. Second, objective 
international persons have the capacity to affect the process of creation of new 
international persons, and thus the expansion or contraction of the international system, 
which qualified persons lack. Third, objective persons can influence and play a direct 
role in the rules-setting process at the international level, something which is 
theoretically not possible for qualified persons who generally can only exert indirect 
influence.
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For the debate on the status of non-state entities the important innovation introduced by 
this new approach is the consideration that they can possess a qualified international 
personality which will be valid for those recognising it16.
It should be noted that this is still regarded as an exceptional phenomenon which has to 
be analysed on a case by case basis and therefore there are no general rules or criteria 
regarding the kind of entities which are in principle able to be considered as qualified 
international persons. It is possible that non-state entities, for example two international 
NGOs, belonging to the same category of actors and with similar degrees of 
international involvement possess different international personality status.
The decisive criterion is finally the existence of a link, however marginal, with the 
international legal system by which a non-state actor acquires rights and obligations 
under International Law. There are no minimum standards so that even if the entity 
acquires one single right or obligation it is deemed sufficient to substantiate the 
acquisition of international personality. Although the vast majority of authors consider 
that, in principle, individuals do not have international personality, this logic admits that 
a specific individual who committed crimes against humanity can be judged by an 
international penal court thus acquiring international personality as a consequence of 
becoming directly subjected to international duties. Similarly, if an agreement between 
a state and a Transnational Corporation (TNC) is subject to rules of International Law, 
the TNC will acquire international personality because it will enjoy international rights. 
Qualified personality is considered not as a stable and permanent characteristic but as a 
fluid phenomenon in the sense that it is elastic and reversible.
In spite of the flexibility introduced by the qualified personality approach it presents 
some limitations and can be subject to three major criticisms. First, there is a confusion 
between two concepts which are clearly distinct: personality i.e. the potential capability
16 A good example of the w ay this system operates is the 1991 “F.uropean Convention on the recognition 
of the legal personality of International NtiO's" of the Council of Europe article 2(1).
to bear rights and duties, and capacity, which is the concrete measure, the actual range of 
rights and duties a specific actor possesses.
Personality and the determination of the substantive criteria that justifies its possession 
are, logically, previous to the exact determination of what specific rights and obligations 
are integrated. However, in the analysis of qualified international personality the logic is 
reversed as personality is identified with, and determined by the concrete capacity. As a 
consequence this approach does not explain the substantive factors which justify 
granting international personality to non-state entities and why it should be granted to 
some and not to others.
Secondly, there is a tendency to deal with non-state entities as if they were a 
homogeneous group. It seems inaccurate to consider that the same kind of international 
personality applies to non-state actors with a permanent participation and a stable, 
diversified and significant range of rights and duties, recognised by the majority of 
objective international persons, and actors which have sporadic contacts and possess a 
very small number of rights and obligations, sometimes merely on a transitory basis, 
recognised only by one or a few states.
Consequently, it is necessary to acknowledge the heterogeneity of non-state entities and 
to introduce a greater differentiation in terms of the categories of international 
personality. The introduction of a third category could contribute to make clear the 
distinction between a more structured, stable and rich personality of non-state entities 
and sporadic manifestations of international personality. I would argue that three 
categories of international personality should be adopted: objective personality (states 
and I.O., based on customary law), qualified personality (more restricted but still rich 
and permanent) and precarious personality (applied to transitory and rather weak 
manifestations of personality).
Thirdly, the “dualistic school” fails to address the fundamental question of the 
international regulation of the behaviour and status of non-sovereign entities. Although
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it is widely recognised that under International Law there are no rules governing the 
establishment, behaviour, immunities or responsibilities of non-state actors such as 
international NGOs or TNCs, this school does not take a position de jure constituendo, 
on the need to develop an international legal framework to regulate their status and 
activities.
It should be noted that this issue constitutes the other side of the coin of the fragility of 
non-sovereign actors’ personality. In fact, the more there is a deficit of regulation of an 
area which should be regulated, the more fragile and less consistent tends to be the 
international personality of the non-state entities to the extent that the definition of 
international codes of conduct for NGOs or TNCs would directly impose on them rights 
and duties and increase their accountability when acting at the international level.
The third school, which can be named the “Transnational Law school”, while relatively 
marginal, has nevertheless contributed an interesting perspective that is closely related to 
the problem of regulation. Based on Jessup’s seminal work17 it argues that a new body 
of legal rules resulting from the blend of public and private International Law should be 
developed resulting in what is called “transnational law” aimed at regulating actions or 
events which go beyond national frontiers.
This would imply a far-reaching structural change in the international system. 
Transnational Law would replace International Law and as a consequence non-state 
actors acting across borders would become subjects of transnational law rules and thus 
acquire transnational personality. This body of rules is to be determined objectively 
rather than subjectively, in the sense that it applies to acts and events and not to actors, 
to what they do and not to what they are. As a result the legal status of states and non­
states actors would tend towards equalisation, as they would be submitted to the same 
body of rules.
17 Jessup. Philip. Transnational l aw Yale University Press. New Haven. 1956.
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In sum, International Law has clear difficulties in dealing with the phenomenon of non­
state actors and in addressing the challenges posed by their increasing participation in 
the international system. If it is true that the legal system is in general slow to adapt to 
changes in social reality, it is also true that the dominance of the traditional school 
exarcebates the problem. The dual personality school represents a step forward in 
bringing international law closer to the reality of the international system. However, 
even if it admits that non-state actors can possess international qualified personality this 
is still regarded as exceptional, depending on the formal recognition by states rather than 
on objective criteria. The concept of qualified personality, although not completely 
satisfactory, is a useful instrument for the analysis of the international status of non-state 
actors.
1.2. NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE
The issue of non-state actors and their role in the international system has been 
traditionally a marginal theme in the International Relations (IR) literature and research 
agenda as a result of the predominance of a state-centric view of world affairs. 
Consequently, there is neither a consistent line of research within IR on the experience 
of, nor a theory of non-state actors which are simply defined negatively as those lacking 
the attributes of sovereignty.
Looking at the evolution of IR literature in more recent times it is possible to distinguish 
three different periods. The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a fresh interest in the 
phenomenon of non-state actors leading to the first body of IR literature developed 
around the new theories of transnational relations and interdependence.
In the 1980s there was a clear decline in the attention devoted to this topic with the 
exception of a few studies conducted on federated states and external relations of federal 
systems. This is apparently contradictory with the predominance of neo-liberal thinking 
during this period. Interestingly, while challenging the position and advocating the role
back of the state at the domestic level, neo-liberals have not challenged to the same 
extent the dominance of states at the international level.
A third period was initiated in the early 1990s when the study of non-state actors 
gradually regained interest and became again a relevant topic in IR literature. This 
section will analyse in more detail the first and third periods trying to identify the main 
differences between them.
The 1970s debate
The earlier debate on transnational actors in the 1970s is a consequence of the interplay 
between a structural crisis in the world economy marked by the end of the golden years 
of economic growth, the internationalisation of US multinational corporations and a 
rapid increase of FDI and the emergence of the first wave of international NGOs.
In this context a new body of IR literature emerged in the 1970s centred on transnational 
relations and interdependence. The most relevant contributions were made by Keohane 
and Nye18, Mansbach and Lampert'9 and Rosenau20. There are some areas of 
convergence but also important differences between them.
On the convergence side there are three common points. First, a critical assessment of 
the dominant “state-centric view” of world politics stressing its limitations and the 
invalidity of its two basic assumptions -  that states are the sole relevant players in the 
international system and they operate as unitary and monolithic actors -  and the fact it 
considers as irrelevant the behaviour of non-state actors. This does not mean the state- 
ccntric approach does not acknowledge the increasing participation and influence of 
non-state actors, but rather that it sees their participation as subordinated to the
18 Keohane, R. and Nye, J.(eds), Transnational Relations and World Politics (5lh Edition} , Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1981 and Power and Interdependence: world nolitics in transition. Little, 
Brown, Boston, 1977.
|l' Mansbach, Richard and Lampert, D. and Ferguson, Y. (eds) The w eb of world nolitics -  non-state actors 
in the elobal system. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1976.
:o Rosenau, J.Thc study of Global Interdependence. Frances Pinter Publis., London 1980.
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requirements of states and with no capacity to alter the basic structure of the system, 
namely the monopoly of instruments of coercion and violence.
Secondly, there is a consensus that states remain the dominant actors in the international 
system and their position has not been, and is unlikely to be, seriously challenged, 
although it is admitted their behaviour is influenced and constrained by non-state actors. 
To use Rosenau’s words “.. .international relations conducted by governments have been 
supplemented [not supplanted] by relations among private individuals, groups and 
societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of events”21.
Thirdly, they all treat non-state actors as a homogeneous group failing to understand the 
diversity of strategies, patterns of behaviour and strength of different types of actors. 
Even when there is an attempt to distinguish between different categories of actors, as in 
the case of Mansbach, this does not lead to any operational consequences22.
There are also interesting differences between these three contributions, which should be 
analysed in more detail, as they were seminal in launching different lines of research 
taken up and developed in the 1990s.
Keohane and Nye
The contribution of Keohane and Nye is clearly the one which goes further in terms of 
trying to analyse the interaction between states and non-states actors in a unified system. 
The main goal of their research is to understand “the contamination of inter-state 
relations by transnational relations” which contributes to overcome the dichotomy 
between state-centric vs. society-centric as alternative approaches.
However, if we look at the two fundamental research questions which drive their 
enquiry - assess the impact of transnational relations on the power of states, namely if 
they have weakened it, and see to what extent transnational relations contribute to
21 Rosenau, on.cil. p.l
22 Mansbach. on.cit.. pp.39-41.
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aggravate the inequalities between states - we conclude that this is not a balanced 
exercise. Although the behaviour of non-state actors is taken on board, the entire 
analysis takes the state system as the point of departure and reference which means that 
non-state actors become relevant only insofar their behaviour has concrete impact on 
state power or disturbs the equilibrium of the state system. Consequently, the interest in 
non-state actors is “instrumental” leaving aside the analysis of areas where there is no 
interaction with states.
In any case a new analytic framework is proposed to replace the state-centric approach 
paradigm of world politics, which combines traditional international politics with 
bureaucratic politics and transnational relations. An interesting innovation has been the 
incorporation of Allison’s bureaucratic politics approach23 in the analysis, which 
challenges the idea of states as unitary actors.
Keohane and Nye take bureaucratic politics a bit further in two interesting ways. First, 
by calling attention to the functioning of bureaucratic politics at the international level 
thus expanding the original analysis centred on the domestic process of foreign policy 
decision-making. They introduced a new category of interactions named 
“transgovemmental”, defined as interactions between governmental sub-units across 
state boundaries, basically bureaucracies which have international links with other 
bureaucracies not controlled by political decision-makers. Secondly, by considering that 
bureaucratic politics apply also to non-governmental actors which should not be seen 
either as unitary actors. This contributed to launch a new line of research which, 
unfortunately, has not been very much explored. As a result this new framework covers 
and combines three types of relations and their interactions: transnational relations 
(between non-governmental actors), interstate relations (between states) and 
transgovemmental relations (between bureaucracies across the borders)24.
3  Graham Allison. Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Little Brow n, Boston. 1971. 
:4 Keohane and Nye. Transnational Relations op. eit. pp. 3S2-383
Another interesting feature of Keohane and Nye’s work is the fact it is focused on the 
consequences of non-state actors’ behaviour on states and the international system, and 
devotes little attention to the causes and nature of their increasing influence. This 
contrasts with Rosenau’s approach which, as we will see, focus more on the causes and 
dynamics of the transnationalisation of world affairs.
Keohane and Nye consider the issue of “loss of control” of states is misleading, taking 
into account the existence of other causal factors besides transnational relations and the 
fact the loss is not uniform, varying with the sector of state activity, more intense in 
economic than in security matters. They argue that this loss of control is not 
fundamentally explained by non-state actors’ action and reject a causal link between 
increasing influence of non-state actors and a weakened nation-state.
The most innovative contribution that makes their work still relevant, is the conclusion 
that transnational relations and actors contribute to aggravate inequalities between states. 
Their main argument is that the intensity of activities and capability of non-state actors 
is unequally distributed, probably more skewed than the formal power of states, in the 
sense that stronger non-state actors are based on the stronger and more developed states 
while weaker states tend to be associated with less structured and capable transnational 
actors. Thus transnational relations tend to widen the existing gap between strong and 
weak states.
This has two crucial implications. First, for Keohane and Nye transnational relations 
and actors should be seen as one of the basis of state power. In this sense they not only 
question the view that non-state actors’ growing influence necessarily weakens the state 
but also argue that, in some circumstances, non-state actors contribute to strengthen state 
power as “transnational organisations are particularly serviceable as instruments of 
governmental policy whether through control or willing alliance”25.
Keoliane and Nye. Transnational Relations on.cit. Introduction pp. xxi.
Secondly, there is an explicit recognition of the more complex nature of relations 
between state and non-state actors by stressing that besides relations of conflict and 
confrontation there are also relations of cooperation, alliances and coalitions. This shift 
in perspective sets the stage for a more complex analysis of state vs. non-state actors 
relations rejecting the view that those could be reduced to a zero-sum game.
Rosenau
Rosenau’s analysis while sharing the same critique to the “state-centric framework” 
differs in some respects from Keohane and Nye’s approach. The first aspect is the fact 
his analysis takes the phenomenon of interdependence as the point of departure and 
consequently the relations between states and non-state actors are regarded as one of the 
dimensions of a wider process that none of them control but which determines their 
options. Anticipating some aspects of the current analysis of globalisation, Rosenau sees 
interdependence as an all powerful and pervasive process, driven by technological 
innovation and sustained by advances in communications and transportation.
The second aspect is that besides conflict and co-operation, which presupposes 
interaction, a third hypothesis is considered, the existence of a sphere of independent and 
autonomous behaviour of non-state actors in specific areas where there is no interaction 
with states. This is an important contribution towards recognising the need to study non­
state actors independently and not only as a function of state behaviour.
Thirdly, Rosenau’s conclusion that the position of the state and its authority has been 
weakened as a whole is more negative and assertive than the one reached by Keohane. 
The decline in state power is regarded as a result of the dynamics of interdependence, 
through two different channels, the nature of interdependence issues and the 
development of new sources of loyalty, and not as a consequence of a purposeful action 
on the part of non-state actors. In this respect Rosenau becomes closer to Keohane when 
he recognises that the influence of non-state actors was not the predominant factor 
behind the “loss of control” of states.
Fourthly, Rosenau’s analysis focuses more on the causes than on the consequences of 
the emergence of non-state actors. He argues that to understand this upward trend it is 
necessary to look more at the issues that became predominant in the international agenda 
than at players. Insofar as the nature of the issues brought to the forefront of the agenda 
become more technical, they offered new opportunities for non-state actors to assert 
their influence in specific areas due to their superior management experience, technical 
knowledge and expertise in those areas when compared to central governments.
As a result a mixed picture tends to prevail in which an objective division of areas of 
influence becomes apparent with states remaining predominant in specific issue-areas 
and non-state actors gaining influence in others. As a consequence the increasing power 
and influence of non-state actors is not global and uniform but partial varying with the 
issue-area.
The decline in state power is also explained by institutional and social changes. One of 
the interesting contributions made by Rosenau is the consideration that the emergence of 
new sources of loyalty (distinct from authority) associated with non-state actors, which 
compete with the traditional loyalty basis used by States, nationality, is one of the 
fundamental structural changes which can deeply undermine the legitimacy and 
authority of states and simultaneously contribute to consolidate non-state actors as real 
authority structures.
Mansbach and Lampert
Mansbach and Lampert’s research has clear differences with the other two approaches. 
Although they start by acknowledging the limitations of the “state-centric model”, their 
final conclusion is somewhat contradictory. Contrary to Rosenau and Keohane/Nye, 
they conclude that this model is still partially valid and therefore do not advocate it 
should be abandoned altogether. To justify this position it is argued that the relevance of 
the state-centric approach varies with the type of behaviour being particularly relevant to 
explain co-operative behaviour in the international system.
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Secondly, the main concern of Mansbach’s study was to assess the level of involvement 
and interaction of state and non-state actors with particular emphasis on the processes of 
violence and conflict in the international system. The most striking conclusion is that 
“non-state actors are more prone to conflict and violence than nation states”26 and their 
responsibility for violence in the system is greater than states, taking into account their 
role in civil wars. From there, Mansbach concludes that “the more conflictual the 
behaviour the less the state-centric model can explain, the more co-operative the 
behaviour the more the state-centric model can explain”27.
Thirdly, Mansbach and Lampert made an important contribution to the recognition of 
the heterogeneity of non-state actors, identifying four different categories out of the total 
six main types of global actors (interstate non-govemmental actor, governmental non­
central actor; interstate non-govemmental actor; individuals), contrasting with Keohane 
and Rosenau’s uniform approach. Nevertheless, this was still a limited effort because 
besides identifying the categories it did not produce any relevant result regarding an in 
depth analysis of the specific characteristics, strategies, patterns of behaviour and impact 
of each type of actor.
The 1990s and non-state actors
A renewed interest in non-state actors and their participation in the international system 
marked the 1990s. This was the result of the perception that non-state actors gained 
increasing influence in the new post-Cold War context and played an active role in the 
two dominant phenomena which marked the new era: the acceleration of economic 
globalisation and the expansion of democratic values and political transitions.
The 1990s IR literature on non-state actors is still influenced by the 1970s debate on 
transnational relations presenting a strong element of continuity rather than the 
introduction of a major shift in paradigm. Yet, it is characterised by some distinct 
features, namely a greater concern with empirical studies, the rejection of a simplistic
26 Mansbaeh, op.cit. pp.285 
21 Ibidem, p.278.
dichotomy between state-centric vs. society-centric visions of the international system, 
and a move towards a more differentiated analysis of various types of non-state actors.
This led to more attention being devoted to identify the specific characteristics of each 
category of non-state actors, what particular channels they use to participate in the 
international arena and the impact of their actions. One case in point has been the 
recognition of Non-Central Governments (NCGs) as an autonomous category.
In spite of the recognition of non-state actors’ diversity, there is an important element of 
continuity since the analysis is still heavily concentrated on relations between states and 
non-state actors neglecting the interactions between different non-state actors.
Particular attention should be devoted to two of the most influential works presenting 
contrasting perspectives: Susan Strange’s analysis28 which argues an increasing 
influence of a particular kind of non-state actor, TNCs, and a significant shift in power 
in their benefit leading to the weakening of the state; and Risse-Kappen analysis29 which 
does not support the idea of states loosing power and stresses the cooperative 
interactions between states and non-state actors.
Risse-Kapen: the complementarily approach between States and Non-state actors
Risse-Kappen’s main concern is to examine how states interact with transnational non­
state actors and under which domestic and international conditions can the former 
influence and change state policies. His main argument is that the capacity of non-state 
actors to influence policies is basically determined by two variables, the differences in 
domestic structures and the level of international regulation and institutionalisation of 
specific issue-areas. On the basis of the evidence collected it is argued these factors 
operate according to the following rules: the stronger the state and its control over 
domestic structure the more difficult for non-state actors to exert influence; the more
28 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State -  the diffusion of Pow er in the World Fconomv. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge, 1996.
29 Risse-Kappen. Thomas (ed.) Briiminu Transnational relations back in -  Non-State actors. Domestic 
Structures and International Institutions . Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1995.
internationally regulated the issue-area, the greater the access of transnational actors to 
national politics, the more legitimate their actions and the greater their influence30.
One of the consequences of this approach is that it makes less relevant the consideration 
of the subjective characteristics of different types of non-state actors to assess their 
influence in the international system since the determinant factors are objective and 
external. In this sense it reinforces the tendency to see non-state actors as a 
homogeneous whole, assuming they act internationally in similar ways which is not 
helpful to deepen our understanding of non-state actors.
A fundamental assumption behind Risse-Kappen’s argument is that the main purpose of 
non-state actors is to influence state policies since the fundamental channel for them to 
influence the international system is by acting domestically, through states. This reflects 
the conviction that the state system is still dominant and the power of states is basically 
unaffected by non-state actors’ international activities. This view can be criticised on the 
grounds that it ignores the autonomous interventions of non-state actors that surpass the 
state and are exactly aimed at escaping state control. Non-state actors have certainly 
other objectives than to influence national state policies and can act directly in the 
international system, opposing or supporting international regulation, mobilising public 
opinion or making deals with other non-state actors to ensure control over economic 
resources or to challenge state decisions.
Finally, Risse-Kappen criticises the analysis prevailing in the 1970s arguing there was 
an excessive concentration on confrontation between states and non-states actors and 
points out the need to take into account also co-operation and “coalition building” 
relations, but falls ironically in the same trap in the opposite direction when it ignores 
the confrontational dimension and concentrates exclusively on relations of co-operation.
Rissc-Kapen. op.cit. pp.25-32
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Strange and the redistribution of structural power in favour of Non-State actors
A contrasting view is presented by Strange who puts more emphasis on the interaction 
and confrontation between states and what she considers the most relevant non-state 
actors, TNC’s, and the outcomes of this process namely in terms of redistribution of 
“structural power”31.
Her main conclusion is that the power of states is declining, while paradoxically state 
intervention is growing, as a result of the integration of world economic structures32. For 
Strange structural changes led to shifts in power in three different ways: “upwards”, 
from weak states to stronger states; “sideways” from states to non-state authorities, 
mostly TNCs; some of the power lost by states has simply “evaporated”, nobody is 
exercising it. Because of their role in the process of technological change, TNCs were 
the main recipients of the power lost by states and as a result reinforced their influence 
in the international system.
However, it should be noted that this conclusion does not mean that Strange supports the 
thesis of the collapse of the state. Instead, she recognises that TNCs have not taken over 
from states, the former still possess a strong position in the system despite the diffusion 
of authority. The new context is marked by the fact TNCs exercise a parallel authority 
alongside governments in questions of economic management which is particularly 
intense in four strategic domains: location of industry and investment; direction of 
technological innovation; management of labour relations and taxation33.
On this point Strange follows Rosenau’s analysis which considered interdependence, the 
name given to globalisation in the 1970s, to be the main factor behind the state “loss of 
control”. The only difference is that Strange identifies clearly a recipient of the power 
lost by States and attributes greater relevance to the economic dimension of
31 Stmctural power is defined in opposition to relational power based on Nye’s distinction between “hard"
and “soft” power. Structural power is defined as “power over” structures (in opposition to “power from") 
which can be exercised only by “being there”, a sort of indirect and uncounscious pow er which is not 
associated with an apparent use of means of coercion but is based on the dominance of basic structures. 
Strange, op.cit. pp 25-27.
33 Ibidem, p. 14.
globalisation, whereas Rosenau did not identify a recipient and tended to emphasise 
more the political and institutional dimension of interdependence, namely the emergence 
of new sources of loyalty.
Secondly, for Strange the specific features of different types of non-state actors matter 
and determine their capacity to act and influence outcomes. TNCs are considered to be 
the strongest actors with a significant impact on the international system because of the 
ways in which they operate, their size and the economic basis of their power. While it is 
true that Strange restricts her analysis to TNCs and does not consider other types of 
actors, with the exception of the Mafias, her position implicitly recognises heterogeneity 
of non-state actors and the relevance of a differentiated analysis of the characteristics 
and capabilities of each category. Furthermore, it is explicitly recognised the need for 
more in-depth and innovative work on non-state authority3 4.
Thirdly, Strange has a very different position regarding the relationship between non­
state actors and international regulatory systems. Whereas Risse-Kappen implicitly 
argues that more dense international regulation is welcomed by non-state actors as it 
reinforces their influence over national systems, Strange shows that more regulation is 
likely to weaken and countervail excessive power of TNCs, not reinforce it, and 
therefore tends to be resisted, particularly with respect to financial markets. This is a 
clear example of the limitations of Risse-Kappen’s approach resulting from its neglect of 
the differences between categories of non-state actors. It seems clear that while INGO’s 
see international regulation positively as a means of strengthening their position, TNCs 
tend to see it as a problem.
On the other hand, Risse-Kappen does not explain why some issue-areas are more 
submitted to international regulation than others and avoids any normative consideration 
on the sufficiency or desirability of such regulation. This contrasts with the more 
normative position adopted by Strange who points out the current deficit of global
33 Ibidem, p.46.
34 Strange, op.cit. p.xvi (preface).
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governance “we have now a ramshackle assembly of conflicting sources of authority”, 
and the danger for the international system of the absence of an “opposition” or 
“countervailing powers” which makes the more urgent the development of sources of 
“negarchy”35.
Finally, Strange’s contribution while stressing the dominance of economic factors does 
provide a more integrated and articulated analysis between economic and political 
factors. Two interesting political elements are pointed out as structural seeds for 
increasing power of TNCs and weakening legitimacy of the state: the proliferation of 
new and alternative sources of loyalty and identity which challenge the monopoly of 
identity based on citizenship and nationalism, an argument which was developed by 
Rosenau in the 1970s; the lack of democratic legitimacy of TNCs and the fact they are 
not accountable to anyone, in particular democratic governments, potentially imposes a 
severe limit to democracy.
Although there are clear divergences between these two perspectives there are also some 
common points which are worth underlining. First, both Strange and Risse-Kappen 
restrict their analysis to the relations between states and non-state actors, which is an 
important, though not exclusive, dimension of their international participation. The state 
is the main reference and non-state actors’ activities tend to be seen as relevant only if 
and when they have a direct impact on states. In short, relations between non-state actors 
are still to a large extent neglected.
There are short references to potential conflicts between INGOs and TNCs, visible in 
areas such as the environment, in Risse-Kappen, recognising that sometimes INGOs 
challenge and press TNCs and side with Governments to impose international 
regulations, but this avenue is not explored. Similarly Strange when talking about the 
damage of the absence of countervailing power to balance arbitrary authority of TNCs, 
suggests that transnational movements of NGOs might constitute an emerging source of
°  Strange borrows the concept created by Daniel Deudney which means the power to negate, limit or 
constrain arbitrary authority. Strange, op.cit. p.198
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opposition36 37thus highlighting the importance of relations between different categories of 
non-state actors. The challenge for the research on non-state actors is to correct this 
imbalance through a more in-depth analysis of the differences and similarities between 
diverse categories of non-state actors and their different roles in the international system.
1.3. NON-CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS AS INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS
One of the most important contributions of the 1990s IR literature to the study of non­
state actors has been the increasing attention devoted to, and the research produced on 
Non-Central Governments (NCGs) as a specific category of non-state actors. Among the 
most important contributions the works of Brian Hocking and Hans Michelmannn and 
Panayotis Soldatos , based on the analysis of the experience of Federal States, are 
particularly interesting and influential because of the richness of the empirical material 
and the relevance of the research questions formulated.
Both Hocking and Michelmann consider the increasing international activities of sub­
national political entities as a new and relevant phenomenon in the international system 
that constitutes a response to the challenges of globalisation. Moreover, both see it as a 
result of the interaction between two opposite but mutually reinforcing processes: “from 
within out”, reflecting the fact local governments go out to promote local interests and 
reduce the risks of international threats; “from without in”, by which NCGs become the 
focus of attention and suffer the pressures of both foreign governments and non-state 
actors.
However, Hocking and Michelmann present also differences in relation to four dominant 
themes addressed by this body of literature: the definition of the nature of NCGs as
36 Strange, op. cit. p. 198.
37 Hocking, Brian. Localizing Foreign Policy -  Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy. 
St.Martin’s Press, London, 1993 and Hocking (ed) Foreign Relations and Federal States. Leicester 
University Press. London, 1990.
’8 Michelmann. Hans and Soldatos. P., Federalism and International Relations -  The role of subnational 
units. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1990.
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international players; the causes of their increasing international participation; its 
consequences, particularly for national foreign policies; and the nature and pattern of 
relations between NCGs and Central Governments in the sphere of international affairs.
The causes of NCGs increasing international participation
As far as the causes of the increasing international involvement of NCGs are concerned, 
different authors emphasised different factors grouped under three basic criteria: internal 
vs. external causes; economic vs. political causes; and global vs. specific causes.
Hocking considers there are two determinant causes of the “localisation of foreign 
policy”. First, the increasing economic interdependence led NCGs to become more 
active internationally in order to overcome central government ineffectiveness and 
respond to an expanding foreign policy agenda. Concurrently, Central Governments 
faced with increasing complex tasks that overstrech institutional capacity decided to 
decentralise by encouraging sub-national governments to get internationally involved in 
certain areas.
The second major factor is of a socio-political nature, “social activism” reflecting the 
fact that civil society groups increasingly active in local politics cultivate international 
links and solidarity to overcome a sense of frustration and deficit of participation 
associated with representative democracies. In other words, they search for more 
international participation to compensate for an unsatisfactory level of domestic 
participation.
As to Michelmann’s analysis there is not a clear conclusion on what are the determinant 
causes of the “paradiplomacy” of federated states. Although Michelmann considers the 
role of economic causes, related to NCGs greater proximity with local economic agents 
and problems, in particular with small and medium-sized enterprises, in the end he 
attaches more importance to political factors related to political leaders’ search for 
visibility and the motivations of opposition parties to enhance their domestic profile and 
counterbalance foreign policy priorities of the ruling party. Reference is also made to a
more radical political motivation, subnational units seeking political independence, but 
that is considered to be exceptional.
In contrast, Soldatos distinguishes between internal and external causes and argues that 
the external ones became the “stronger stimulus” for paradiplomacy since the mid - 
1970s, in particular a growing global interdependence, while before that internal causes 
played a more important role. With respect to internal causes he suggests a distinction 
between causes related to federal states structures, namely constitutional uncertainties 
and grey areas associated with the division of competencies between Central 
Governments and NCGs, and causes specific to federated units.
In sum, different perspectives coexist. Hocking attaches more relevance to global, 
external and a combination of economic and political causes whereas Michelmann is 
more inclined to emphasise internal, specific and political factors. Soldatos adopts a 
middle ground position and suggests a greater balance of internal vs. external factors, 
political vs. economic factors and general vs. specific factors.
The nature of NCGs as international players
The second central issue discussed in the literature is the nature and characteristics of 
NCGs as international players. Two fundamental positions can be identified: the first, 
supported by Michelmann and Soldatos, sees NCGs simply as non-states actors sharing 
all their fundamental features; the second, supported by Hocking, sees NCGs as a new 
and autonomous category of actors different both from states and non-state actors.
Hocking makes a stimulating and original contribution to the debate by stressing the 
hybrid nature of NCGs as international actors, combining features of states and non-state 
actors39. They are regarded as a tertiwn genus, between states and non-state actors, 
which possess four main specific characteristics: (i) promotion of regional interests (ii) 
concentration on economic agenda (iii) high fluctuation in the intensity of their
" 1 locking. I.ocalbinsi Foreiun Policy pp. 44-47.
international participation (iv) close links with regionally based non-state actors40. This 
is potentially an important step forward in the attempt to grasp the essence of sub­
national units which, unlike other non-state actors, are also polities, some even 
possessing a democratic legitimacy.
It is still open to question whether this political dimension is sufficient to substantiate 
the creation of a third category of players or if it only justifies the consideration of 
NCGs as an autonomous sub-category of non-state actors. Much depends on whether in 
spite of the hybrid nature it is believed that non-state features are still dominant. Clearly 
the most important limitation of blocking’s analysis is the fact it fails to discuss and 
explain the implications of this hybrid nature. Besides the reference to the fact NCG 
have an ambivalence as they can act both as “primary international actors”, through 
direct international action, and as “mediating actors”, through their influence over 
national governments, there is no other consideration of the practical implications of 
hybridism, namely in terms of international personality, the channels of participation or 
the pattern of relations with other players.
Furthermore, while there is a reference to the fact NCGs are not homogeneous actors 
and present clear differences not only between Federal systems but also within the same 
system, there is no attempt to try to identify different models of NCGs. Hocking’s final 
conclusion that generalisations about NCG are not possible is somehow questionable 
and clearly contradictory with his attempt to identify specific characteristics of NCGs.
However, independently of the validity of the tertium genus thesis, Hocking’s 
contribution is very important insofar as it highlights the political nature of this type of 
actors and forces us to look at the question of the deficit of accountability generally 
associated with non-state actors, as mentioned by Strange, with different eyes: instead of 
undermining democracy the participation of NCGs might, on the contrary, strengthen it.
4,1 Ibidem., p.47.
Relations between NCGs and Central Governments in managing external affairs
The third main issue in the debate on NCGs is the relationship between sub-national 
units and central governments, the articulation between the international participation 
and national foreign policy and the autonomy enjoyed by these entities as international 
actors. A comparative analysis of the two approaches indicates that one position 
considers cooperation as the dominant pattern of relations while the other sees the 
predominance of conflict.
As far as relations with Central Government are concerned, Hocking tends to support an 
idea of harmony and the prevalence of co-operation between the two levels and criticises 
the “perforated sovereignty approach” of Duchacek41. As a consequence he argues that 
the level of autonomy is much lower than believed and that NCGs are not separate 
diplomatic players, instead they should be “ brought into the mainstream of 
contemporary multilayered diplomacy” and to traditional foreign policy processes.
The predominance of co-operative relations is justified on two different grounds. 
Firstly, the fact central Governments have an interest in profiting from local bureaucratic 
expertise in specific areas and using NCGs as channels to get access to local interests. 
Secondly, he claims NCGs have also a self-interest in developing co-operation with the 
centre in order to strengthen their bargaining power abroad and to prevent potential 
adverse reactions on the part of foreign states towards emancipated sub-national units.
In this context the key issue becomes co-ordination and the efficiency of the “linkage 
mechanisms” involving consultation prior to negotiation and participation in actual 
negotiations which Hocking assumes not only to be the dominant form of interaction but 
also efficient to ensure coherence. According to this view, the significance of NCGs’ 
international participation is not so much related to their capacity to act directly and 
autonomously in the international arena but rather their capacity to influence domestic 
foreign policy processes which is believed to vary with the type of issue and the stage of 
the policy-making process. In sum, their ability to act through states is the key question
41 Hocking, op.cil.. p.46.
and therefore the conditioning factors of their external involvement are considered to be 
mainly internal: constitutional rules, in general restrictive; NCGs local influence and 
capacity to articulate local interests; level of economic development of each sub-national 
unit.
A different view was developed by Michelmann and Soldatos who stress a greater 
autonomy of NCGs in the international arena and the challenges posed to national 
foreign policy. However, Hocking’s argument that this approach is too conflict-prone is 
somehow inaccurate as it ignores some modulations and differentiation between various 
degrees of international activity. Even in Duchacek’s analysis there is a distinction 
between three forms of “paradiplomacy”: transborder regional paradiplomacy 
(transborder relations between contiguous NCG); transregional paradiplomacy (between 
non-contiguous NCG belonging to geographically close states) and global 
paradiplomacy (contact with distant states and centres)42. Interestingly, the first two 
types involve exclusively relations between NCGs on “low politics” issues while the 
third one involves relations between NCGs and central governments of foreign states 
and might cover also “high politics” areas. The level of conflict with central 
governments is significant only at the level of global paradiplomacy but almost non­
existent in transborder regional paradiplomacy or very low in transregional 
paradiplomacy. Duchacek even argues that the dominant scenario is one marked by a 
mixture of co-operation in some areas and competition with central governments in 
other areas. Hocking is thus referring to only one level of international involvement and 
even there takes the most radical example, termed “proto-diplomacy”, to refer to global 
paradiplomacy actions conducted by NCGs motivated by a project of separatism and 
self-determination.
Furthermore, Soldatos sees paradiplomacy not necessarily as a source of conflict and 
considers co-operation as a more important and relevant dimension in centre-region 
relations, arguing that segmentation should be seen as a “rationalisation process”, a 
positive development as “ ...decentralisation could enhance unity and efficiency in
42 Duchacek, “Perforated sovereignties", in Michelmann led.), on. cit.. pp. 15-27.
external relations and become a remedy for the crisis of the nation-state in foreign 
policy”43 the more so as actor segmentation does not necessary imply policy 
segmentation. On this matter the proximity with Hocking’s position is greater than 
anticipated.
There are, however, some formal differences. To start with, Soldatos develops a more 
detailed and complex analysis of the domestic relations between NCG and central 
governments, which constitutes an important contribution and a useful framework to 
better understand this crucial dimension. He presents a more complex set of relations 
between NCG and Central Governments identifying two main types of relations. Firstly, 
co-operative action (supportive) which can be developed either in co-ordination with 
central governments or as joint actions between central and local governments which 
imply a greater degree of integration and coherence. Secondly, parallel action (or 
substitutive), a more autonomous dimension which can be either developed in harmony 
or in disharmony (leading to fragmentation). It is only in this last case that conflict with 
central government becomes a dominant feature.
By proposing this framework Soldatos, unlike Hocking who restricts relationship to 
cooperative action conducted on the basis of active co-ordination, enlarges the range of 
possibilities of interaction between NCGs and the centre. Differing from Hocking’s view 
that if there is not cooperation the actors are bound to conflict, Soldatos suggests that 
there are other types of non-conflictual relations that are consistent with a more 
independent pattern of international interventions of NCGs.
Furthermore, while Hocking seems to assume that co-ordinated actions are sufficient to 
overcome the problem of foreign policy coherence, Soldatos believes that, in spite of the 
dominance of co-operation relations, problems of coherence still persist and have to be 
addressed through different channels. This last position is probably more in tune with
J’ Soldatos, “An explanatory framework for the Study of Federated States as Foreign-policy actors", in 
Michelmann (ed). op.cit.. p.42.
reality in particular if we bear in mind that co-ordination between bureaucracies is a very 
costly and difficult process.
The consequences of NCGs international participation
The fourth dominant theme in the literature on NCGs is the consequences of their 
international participation for national foreign policy. On this question two contradictory 
positions emerge. A negative view, the “chaos scenario” which considers the 
paradiplomacy of sub-national units as a dangerous derogation of state power and a clear 
threat to the coherence and unity of foreign policy. NCGs are regarded as trespassers 
and their behaviour as deviant.
A more positive view sees the international involvement of NCG as an important 
development that contributes to advance démocratisation of foreign policy and promote 
greater participation of citizens in areas which have an increasingly important impact on 
their daily lives. This change reflects the expansion of foreign policy to include what 
was termed “private foreign policy” developed by non-state actors.
Both Hocking and Michelmann reject the view that NCGs’ international participation 
undermines national foreign policy. Rather, they emphasise the changes in the nature of 
foreign policy and the increasing complexity that characterises it as both the state and 
NCGs are no longer regarded as unitary actors. It is also argued that NCGs activities are 
still mainly concentrated in “low politics areas”, although their incursion in “high 
politics” is acknowledged44, and for that reason there was not a significant threat to the 
core “high politics” areas of foreign policy.
However, Hocking does not explicitly subscribe the alternative view that NCGs 
activities promote démocratisation of foreign policy. Michelmann is more enthusiastic 
about the positive political impact of paradiplomacy in strengthening democracy and
44 This point is particularly illustrated by Hocking with examples taken from Australia, namely the 
opposition of the New South Wales Government to the visit o f nuclear ships and from the US, namely the 
adoption o f economic sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa because of human rights
, ' S
subscribes the conclusions of Kincaid who turns the argument upside down arguing that 
paradiplomacy not only strengthens democracy and pluralism in federal states but its 
suppression might undermine the vitality and stability of the state45.
Although the evidence presented by Hocking and Michelmann does provide a solid basis 
to reject the “threat-theory”, one should not rule out the hypothesis that central 
governments, and more so central bureaucracies, still perceive NCGs’ actions as a 
potential threat to the unity of foreign policy, fuelled by the fear NCGs’ autonomous 
voice might be used by foreign states to cause domestic instability and weaken the 
state’s bargaining position.
In conclusion, based on the experience of Federal States, the research on NCGs as 
international players was consolidated in the 1990s. The analysis of the most relevant 
contributions yields a number of interesting conclusions. Firstly, NCGs increasing 
international activities are considered to be a lasting and structural phenomenon in the 
international system which results from the interplay between economic, namely a 
growing economic interdependence, political and institutional factors. Secondly, to act 
internationally they can use two different channels either indirect action, through 
influence exerted on the Central Government, or direct access to the international arena. 
When they choose the second format their participation can be characterised as being 
mainly concentrated in low politics areas (though not exclusively) driven by economics, 
subject to fluctuations and associated with the use of informal instruments.
Thirdly, various analysis suggest that paradiplomacy is a phenomenon closely associated 
with democratic systems and developed countries. The extent to which democracy and 
wealth (as resources are needed to finance external activities) are necessary pre­
conditions for sub-national units’ external participation is still to be tested.
violations by various American States, starting with Michigan (1984), before federal sanctions were 
adopted -  Hocking, Localizing Foreign policy, op.cit.. pp. 18; 65-68.
41 Kincaid, “Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Polities and the Nation-state: conflict and Co-operation" in 
Michelmann and Soldatos (eds.). op, cit.. p.56.
Finally, in terms of the consequences of the phenomenon and impact on foreign policy, 
although there is still some concern that paradiplomacy might reduce coherence and 
efficiency of national foreign policy, the dominant position in the literature is that 
positive effects tend to prevail and NCGs’ participation can indeed contribute to greater 
democracy and citizen participation and a more flexible, agile and robust foreign policy, 
helping central government to deal more effectively with an increasing complex external 
environment.
Although the literature on NCGs provides important insights to understand the nature of 
this kind of international player it is not immune to criticisms as it presents some 
vulnerabilities and limitations. Reference can be made here to four main aspects.
Firstly, the analysis has been mostly restricted to Federal systems and to the experiences 
of federated states and failed to take into consideration other experiences in unitary 
states in order to grasp the similarities as well as the differences. In this context the case 
of HK is ignored although it is probably the best example of NCGs’ international 
participation and the entity with the strongest international status.
Even within Federal States, there is an exclusive concentration on federated states thus 
neglecting the cases of lower levels of government (local government) which are also 
becoming internationally more active. This clearly shows that the scope of analysis 
must be broadened in order to be able to test if the conclusions are specific to federal 
systems or can also be applied elsewhere.
Secondly, the analyses neglect the relations between NCGs and other non-state actors, 
with the exception of relations with other NCGs in the context of transborder relations, 
as most of the attention is concentrated on the relations between NCG and their own 
central governments. The relations of NCGs with other non-state actors as TNCs or 
INGOs is extremely important per se and also to understand the pattern of relations with
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central governments. It is in the analysis of this direct interaction that the differences and 
similarities between non-state actors can be grasped.
Thirdly, there is a tendency to attach more attention to processes and institutional 
aspects of NCGs’ international participation and less to outcomes and assessment of the 
effectiveness of NCG international activities. Similarly, whereas there is some 
discussion of the domestic impact of NCG international activities on Federal systems, 
there is no discussion of the impact of NCGs’ participation in the international system, 
namely the extent to which they have contributed to introduce new practices, or changed 
the relations between states. This is an important issue which deserves more attention.
Fourthly, there is a tendency to see NCGs both as a homogeneous group and unitary 
actors. Indeed, the various contributions, although mentioning here and there some 
differences between sub-national units, fail to engage in a more systematic and rigorous 
analysis of those differences and to identify and characterise different types of NCGs. 
Hocking’s attempt to point out the distinctive characteristics of NCGs, although 
important to sustain the view that NCG are an autonomous category of international 
players, overlooks the differences within the category itself.
On the other hand, these analyses criticise the view of sovereign states as unitary actors 
but fall in the same trap in relation to NCGs. Just like central governments, NCG are 
characterised by complex decision-making processes where the roles of bureaucracies, 
pressure groups and civil society institutions have to be taken into account. The 
“bureaucratic politics” approach has to be applied also to NCGs, as suggested by 
Rosenau.
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1.4. TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR NCGs AS 
INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS
The research on NCGs as international players is still in its early days. Despite recent 
progress, the current level of understanding of this phenomenon, as demonstrated in the 
previous section, is not completely satisfactory. Much attention has been devoted to 
formal aspects and to prove and illustrate that NCG act autonomously at the 
international level. What is now required in order to move forward is a more thorough 
analysis and assessment of the real dimension, intensity and quality of that international 
participation. It is also important to highlight the heterogeneity of NCGs and to 
distinguish between different categories on the basis of their real capacity for 
international action. This requires the selection of relevant criteria which are obviously 
non-coincident with criteria that might be used to assess other aspects of NCGs’ status.
From a methodological point of view, a comparative analysis of NCGs’ behaviour 
cannot be restricted to a mere “ad hoc” listing, based on empirical observation, of 
“factual differences”, which might or might not have any significance. Any comparative 
analysis can only lead to a meaningful result if there is a previous definition of relevant 
criteria that set the parameters of what we are comparing and for what purpose.
One possible criterion has been suggested by Roda Mushkat, the domestic or 
international nature of the genetic act of creation of the NCG46. According to this view 
it is possible to distinguish between NCGs which are a result of a process of domestic 
devolution of powers (decentralisation) and NCGs which are created by international 
treaty as a result of the will of the international community. This last category is 
associated with the example of “internationalised territories” created either for security 
reasons or as a result of the relevant international functions performed.
?ee Mushkat’ R° da- “Hong Kong as an International leual person" in Emorv International Law Review, 
vol.6. 1992, pp. 104-170 ( 109-110). ------------------------------------
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A second criteria has been suggested by the 1980 Report of the Institute for Procedural 
Aspects of International Law (PAIL) on models of autonomy prepared for the US 
Department of State, the model of State in which the NCG is integrated leading to the 
identification of different categories: (i) Federated States integrated in federal system (ii) 
regions or provinces from unitary states (iii) associated states (micro-states which have 
delegated competencies in foreign affairs and defence to a primary state)47.
Both criteria are highly formal and not really helpful to capture the essence of the real 
involvement of NCGs at the international level and to differentiate them. They leave out 
the informal dimensions of NCGs’ international action, particularly important for this 
category of actors, and tend to concentrate on the relations between NCGs and Central 
Governments, assuming this is the determinant factor of their international status.
The identification of relevant criteria to assess NCG as international players is still an 
issue that needs to be addressed. With a view to contribute to the debate this study 
proposes the adoption of a composed criteria, which combines in an interactive manner, 
two fundamental parameters: the level of autonomy and the density of international 
personality. In so doing we will be combining the domestic (autonomy) and 
international (international personality) levels and exploring the intersection between the 
two. This analysis incorporates simultaneously the perspectives and inputs from 
International Law and International Relations as it looks both at norms, institutional 
environment and practices.
Autonomy in international relations
The concept of autonomy in international affairs is the object of some debate and is 
clearly difficult to define. However, the contributions from an International Law 
perspective tend to converge in identifying autonomy as self-government and 
independence in political decision-making and action at the domestic level48 stressing
47 Hannum, Hurst and Lillich, R. “The concept o f autonomy in International Law” in Yoram Dinstein (ed) 
Models of autonomy. Transaction hooks. London, 1981. pp.215-254.
4S Hannum and Lillich. op.cit. pp.24S.
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the idea of separateness49 and exclusive control over internal affairs. It is regarded 
basically as a political reality underpinned by legal norms and limited to the internal 
order.
A second attribute has been stressed by Tamanaha50 who considers that autonomy also 
means non-interference by the “principal entity”(Central Government) in the sphere of 
self-government. This could be regarded as “negative autonomy” adapting to the realm 
of autonomy the distinction between “positive sovereignty” and “negative sovereignty” 
suggested by Jackson51. This rightly points out that autonomy does not only affect the 
autonomous entity but also affects and constrains the Central Government’s behaviour 
imposing a self-restraining mechanism. This is a very important component because 
generally speaking it is the subtle interference of Central Governments that mostly 
undermines autonomy.
I would argue that there is a third attribute which has been neglected. In fact autonomy 
must also involve the right to participate in wider political decision processes controlled 
by the Central Government which might affect the interests of the autonomous entity. 
This implies co-operation and negotiation concerning the management of matters of 
mutual interest. So, whereas the two first components emphasise separation, boundaries, 
demarcation and potential conflict, the third one involves interaction and co-operation.
In sum, autonomy involves interaction between three different dimensions: (i) self- 
government, exclusive control on internal affairs (ii) non-interference from Central 
Government (iii) participation in global decisions and co-management of matters of 
mutual interest. Furthermore it is noteworthy that autonomy is not necessarily restricted 
to internal affairs and sometimes also covers external relations.
49 Crawford, J. “The criteria for Statehood in International Law” in British Yearbook of International 
Law. 48 (1976-77), pp.93-182.
^  Tamanaha, “Post-1997 Hong Kong: a comparative study of the meaning of high degree of autonomy” 
in. California Western International Law . Inum ai voi 20, 1989, p.44.
'' Jackson. Robert, Quasi-States -  Sovereignty International Relations and the Third World Cambridge, 
Cambridge Ihiiversity Press, 1993.
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However, as mentioned earlier, the fact autonomy in many NCG is limited to internal 
affairs does not mean that in practice the external affairs sphere is excluded and there are 
no interaction between the two levels. In fact, as foreign policy agenda expands into 
“low politics” areas and the boundaries between domestic and international affairs 
become loose, the issue of the “external extension of internal competencies” of NCGs , 
generates increasing tension and pressure for autonomous external action. In short, the 
separation between these two levels of autonomy is artificial and the total absence of 
autonomy in external relations can potentially undermine and weaken domestic 
autonomy52 3. In any case, even when powers for autonomous external relations are 
granted, autonomy is predominantly seen as a domestic process and evolving primarily 
according to internal circumstances and political power struggle.
The assessment of the real degree of autonomy enjoyed by a specific NCG is a difficult 
task. It cannot be based solely on the formal rules regulating autonomy but has also to 
take into account the way the autonomy system operates in practice looking at the three 
dimensions of autonomy analysed above.
Hannum, in his comparative study of autonomous entities, defines the minimum 
conditions for an entity to be considered a “fully autonomous territory” which include 5 
main aspects: (i) a locally-elected legislature with some independent legislative power in 
the areas of autonomous competencies; (ii) a locally-chosen chief executive; (iii) an 
independent judicial power; (iv) exclusion of discretionary powers regarding limitations 
to local power which have to be explicit and specific in areas of special concern to the 
principal government; (v) power-sharing arrangements between the central and
52 Jean Salmon mentions that one of the pressing dillemas Federal States have to face is “comment 
concilier le fait que l'on octroi des competences exclusives a une unite federee dans les domaines 
particuliers sans lui conférer en meme temps leur prolongement externe, ou a l'inverse comment concilier 
que l'on octroie a l’autorité centrale le pouvoir de traiter avec les autres puissances sur des matières 
relevant des entites federees sans lui donner les pouvoirs necessaires pour en assurer les prolongements 
internes” - Institut de Sociologie, Les Etats Fédéraux dans les relations internationales. Actes du colloque 
de Bruxelles, Editions Bruylant, Université de Bruxelles, 1982, p. 506.
v' This point is also made by Michael Dardzinsky in the Hong Kong transition section , American Society 
of International Law, Proceedings of the 91s’ Annual Meeting (9-12 April 1997) pp.193.
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autonomous governments in specific areas (police powers, exploitation of natural 
resources, implementation of national / central legislation )54.
Although these criteria are useful to assess the extent to which an entity passed or not 
the threshold of autonomy, they do not enable us to assess the exact level of autonomy 
enjoyed. For this, attention must also be paid to more informal aspects related to the 
way the autonomy system operates in practice, in particular the nature and action of 
autonomous entity’s political parties (if they are simply extensions of national parties or 
locally-based parties); the budgetary independence and size of autonomous sources of 
revenue crucial to finance and underpin the implementation of autonomous policies and 
the extent to which the entity is dependent on financial transfers from the central 
government; the “de facto” ability to act internationally, even when no powers to 
conduct external relations are formally granted.
International personality
Regarding international personality, it constitutes the fundamental expression of the 
international community’s recognition of NCGs’ international action and more than that 
the legitimacy of their external involvement in pursuance of specific interests.
International personality is regarded in this context not as a potential capacity to possess 
international rights and duties, as the dominant approach tends to see it but rather as the 
“actual attribution” of international rights and duties, in line with Shaw’s view55. Thus, 
the assessment of the density of NCG’s international personality is based on concrete 
rights and duties effectively acquired and exercised. Secondly, given the wide range of 
rights and duties involved, it must be selective and has to be based on the most relevant 
parameters.
I would argue there are four decisive questions should be considered to assess the 
density of NCG’s international personality: (i) treaty making powers translated in
54 Hannuni and Lillich. op.cit. pp.250-251.
55 Sliavv. op.cit.. p. 186.
46
effective negotiation and signature of international bilateral treaties or agreements; (ii) 
autonomous participation in international multilateral organisations, both governmental 
and non-governmental, which reflects an important collective recognition of the capacity 
to be an international actor; (iii) external representations, jus legationis, in foreign 
countries and accreditation of representatives and offices of foreign states in NCGs; (iv) 
capacity to bring claims regarding the violation of obligations by other parties and to be 
held responsible at the international level for violating its own international obligations.
This framework is based on the assumption that NCGs’ qualified international 
personality is a variable and elastic concept based on concrete facts. It aims at defining a 
more balanced basis to assess NCGs international personality in three areas. Firstly, 
balance informal and formal aspects of NCGs external actions through the inclusion of 
relations with other NCGs and non-state actors, instead of limiting analysis to state 
actors. Secondly, to balance the entitlement to rights and obligations with the actual 
exercise of those rights and obligations, thus involving the operational side of 
international personality. It should be noted that the fact rights are exercised and duties 
performed consolidate and deepen international personality while the simple possession 
without implementation tends to weaken it. Thirdly, to balance collective/multilateral 
with bilateral recognition from states and other international actors.
In addition, a dense international personality implies not only the coverage of these four 
areas but also a reasonable degree of diversification within each one of them. In fact a 
mere quantitative assessment of the number of treaties /agreements signed or the number 
of representation offices abroad opened by a specific NCG is not appropriate and can be 
misleading. A more qualitative approach is required, involving diversification and 
continuous manifestation.
In fact, it is not possible to say that a certain NCG possesses a highly dense international 
personality if, in spite of being a party to many international agreements or to 
International Organisations, they are all concentrated in one single sector or if, in spite 
of possessing a reasonable number of representation offices abroad they are concentrated
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in a very limited number of countries and do not develop any substantial work. A 
diversified international participation in a wide range of issue-areas or sectors is an 
essential requirement of a highly-dense international personality.
Similarly, the assessment of the density of international personality is also subject to a 
“clause of actualisation”, meaning that a dense international personality cannot rest on 
activities exercised sometime in the past, particularly if since then the NCG has been 
internationally inactive and did not exercise the majority of its rights and obligations. 
International activity must be developed and treaty-making powers exercised in the 
present. Unlike the international personality of States, which is irreversible even if the 
state’s international involvement is minimal, the qualified personality of NCG’s is 
reversible and has to be permanently justified and exercised.
Categories of NCGs
The framework proposed in this chapter makes an original contribution to the analysis of 
NCGs as international players which derives from the fact it combines two criteria -  
international personality and autonomy - which are usually either analysed as entirely 
separate questions or, on the contrary, unified as being one and the same thing. For 
instance, Mushkat focuses on international personality and regards autonomy as one of 
its foundations, whereas Hannum focuses on autonomy and sees international 
personality as a part (and projection) of the autonomy status56, suggesting international 
personality is basically determined by domestic factors and the degree reached in this 
sphere is one of the elements to characterise the level of autonomy. Both these views 
are inappropriate.
The argument put forward is that autonomy and international personality are 
independent factors and therefore each of them has no capacity to determine the other. 
However, this does not mean that they are not inter-related. A variety of interlinkages do
>b Hannuni and Lillich. on cit.. pp. 232-235
exist and these are important factors to explain the evolution of NCGs international 
status.
The possession of international personality by a NCG may contribute to strengthen its 
domestic autonomy status and reinforce its bargaining power vis-à-vis the Central 
Government, but it is also true that many other factors account for the actual level of 
domestic autonomy, namely those pertaining to internal political processes, NCG 
leadership or economic strength. By the same token, a high level of domestic autonomy 
may have a positive impact in strengthening the degree of international personality, by 
giving the NCG the means and creating a more positive attitude on the part of other 
international actors to engage in autonomous relations with the NCG. However, the 
degree of international personality depends mainly on the attitude and recognition of the 
international community and is mostly influenced by other fundamental external factors.
Consequently, there is no necessary correspondence between the degree of external 
autonomy and the degree of international personality enjoyed. It is perfectly possible 
that a NCG possesses a high degree of autonomy but only a low-density international 
personality. On the other hand, a NCG possessing a limited degree of domestic 
autonomy may be able, by using informal channels, to obtain a reasonable degree of 
international personality, which in turn might be used to press for an expansion of its 
autonomy status.
On the other hand, a high degree of domestic autonomy does not lead necessarily to a 
highly dense international personality and vice-versa. In theory we can only accept the 
hypothesis that both these factors tend to be more relevant as “negative limits”, in the 
sense that a relatively weak domestic autonomy can be a potential impediment for 
external action and a weak international personality might as well in the long term 
undermine the sustainability of a high degree of autonomy.
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The framework proposed in this chapter is a valid instrument to analyse NCGs as 
international actors and to build a meaningful differentiation among them. The use of the 
actual degree of autonomy and the density of international personality, as defined in this 
section, originates the following matrix of possible combinations:
PERSONALITY
DENSITY LEVEL AUTONOMY
HIGH MEDIUM LOW
HIGH Robust Robust Trespassers
MEDIUM Robust Trespassers Trespassers
LOW Restrained Restrained Non-Robust
On the basis of the intersection of both parameters it is possible to propose a 
classification of NCGs which includes four main categories:
a) Robust
Robust NCGs are a category of international players that possess a mutually reinforcing 
combination of a high or medium degree of autonomy and a highly dense international 
personality (diversified, actual exercise). Their international participation tends to be 
consolidated, stable and diversified and oriented towards the pursuance of NCGs’ own 
specific interests. Their action extends beyond low politics and is likely to cover also 
“high politics” areas. Relations with the central Government are relatively formalised 
and the level of conflict over external relations is relatively low. Although this category 
of NCGs tend to concentrate on parallel actions, they also cultivate co-operative 
relations with the Central Government in external affairs as they are more relaxed about 
the risks of central interference which could curtail their autonomy and thus more 
willing to capture potential benefits deriving from Central Government’s support at the 
international level. Probably the closest example to a robust actor is HK. The research 
carried out in the next chapters on HK’ external relations will provide the evidence to 
confirm or not this view.
b) Trespassers
This category is characterised by the coexistence of a medium dense international 
personality and a low/medium level of autonomy. The emergence of a strong 
international personality resulted either from international factors (performance of 
international useful functions) or the capacity to take advantage of a domestic crisis or 
the weakness of the Central Government and its inability to conduct an effective foreign 
policy. In general it depended upon the exploration of informal channels in order to 
overcome restrictive formal rules. The level of conflict with the Central Government 
tends to be high. Parallel actions predominate and there is little room for co-operation 
with the centre. Trespassers seek to use their international recognition to press internally 
for greater autonomy but, in the long term, a limited domestic autonomy and a high level 
of conflict might undermine the sustainability of a dense personality. International
participation risks to be affected by instability and even some negative reactions on the 
part of some members of the international community. To a certain extent, this is a 
transitory category in the sense that the structural tension is sooner or later resolved 
either in the direction of greater autonomy, moving up to become a robust NCG, or in 
the direction of an eroded international personality to become a non-robust player.
The Quebec is an example of this category of actor taking into account that it has a 
medium to low level of autonomy if we consider the external autonomy dimension, but a 
medium dense international personality and a high level of conflict with the Canadian 
central government. Another example, although characterised by a lower level of 
conflict with the Central Government, would be Catalonia that has a medium level of 
autonomy as it has no autonomous powers in external affairs but a medium dense 
international personality.
c) Restrained
Restrained NCGs are marked by a high/medium level of autonomy and a low dense 
international personality. To some extent they are the opposite of trespassers and 
correspond to relatively weak international players. The extensive autonomy, which 
does not necessarily include powers to conduct external relations, is not used to build a 
strong international status. This is a consequence of either the lack of recognition and 
interest on the part of the international community, or the incapacity (political, 
institutional or even economic) to act internationally. Sometimes the NCG has the 
required conditions but lacks the motivation to become an autonomous international 
player in particular when it has already a strong influence over the Central Government 
and its foreign policy and is therefore able to pursue its specific interests through the 
centre. The level of conflict with the Central Government is low and co-operative 
relations predominate. This type of NCG is less driven by the pursuance of its own 
objectives and more willing to respond positively to the Central Government’s requests 
for the NCG to be instrumental and act internationally to complement its efforts and 
contribute to the implementation of national foreign policy objectives. This weak 
international personality is likely to undermine the domestic autonomy status.
As examples of this category could be cited some of the Canadian Provinces like the 
New Brunswick or some of the Spanish autonomous regions like the Basque region, 
which despite medium level of domestic autonomy have a low dense international 
personality. Another example would be Greenland, which assumed an international 
identity as the best example of protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, possessing 
however, in spite of the fact it was the only part of a member state to have ever left the 
EU57, not a very dense international personality as its rights and obligations are 
restricted to the fisheries area. However, although the level of conflict with the central 
government has traditionally been limited and co-operation prevailed, in recent years it 
has increased significantly and so Greenland status is changing and becoming closer to a 
trespasser.
H3 Non-Robust
Non-Robust NCG combine a low level of autonomy with a low dense international 
personality. Conflict with the Central Government over external relations is low but 
there is also little room for interaction and cooperation in this field. NCGs have little 
capacity to influence foreign policy and tend to act internationally simply as Central 
Governments’ agents for specific purposes. Their international participation covers only 
a limited range of low politics areas and is often geographically restricted (transborder or 
sub-regional) and concentrated on relations with other NCGs. This type of actors face a 
considerable risk to find themselves involved in a declining spiral which can further 
weaken their fragile position. Their qualified international personality can easily 
degenerate in a precarious personality which, in turn, contributes to compress their de 
facto autonomy. Examples can be found in some of the French regions as the Midi 
Pyrenees, mainly involved in transborder relations with other NCGs.
Greenland has joined the EU in 1973 with Denmark but after a referendum abandoned the EU in 1985 
after signing a tieaty of withdiawl, because of the concern of loosing control over the fisheries and of the 
contradiction between an integration policy vis-à-vis Brussels and a devolution policy vis-à-vis 
Copenhagen.
The role of HK as an international player has been the object of interest since the 
signature of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. The international personality of HK 
has been the subject of some debate among lawyers58 and International Law specialists, 
in particular by Mushkat59, who considers there is a solid foundation for international 
personality based on five fundamental factors: the possession of “factual stately 
attributes” and the consequent proximity to sovereign states, with the exception of 
constitutional independence; the international recognition granted to HK through the 
accreditation of HK representative offices and HK’s admission to multilateral 
organisations; the “international legal entitlements”, i.e. HK’s “right to self- 
determination”, regarded as a fundamental basis for its international personality; the 
“membership in the international civil society”, its participation in international 
organisations and multilateral treaties, and the strong links it maintains with other non­
state actors; the special international functions performed as a prominent economic and 
financial centre both for the global and regional economies.
I would argue that Mushkat’s analysis of HK’s international personality is opened to a 
major criticism. It reveals a tendency to see the similarity with States as the main 
foundation of HK’s personality. This logic was pushed even further by others who 
qualify HK as a “quasi-state”60, or more precisely a reversed form of the Jacksonian 
concept61. Mushkat and Tang neglect a more promising avenue, the exploration of the 
essence of HK as a non-state actor, whose personality has a different nature from that 
possessed by sovereign states, as noted above.
58 For example International Commission of Jurists. Countdown to 1997. Report to a mission to Hong 
Kong (Geneva, ICJ, 1992)
59 Mushkat, Roda, Hong Kong as an International Legal Person” in Emory International Law Review,
vol 6, Spring 1992, nl pp. 105-170 and One country. Two International Legal Personalities -  the case of 
Hone Kong. HK, HK University Press, 1997, (chapter 1)
6U James Tang “Hong Kong’s international status” in Pacific Review, vol 6 (3) 1993, pp. 205-215 
Jackson s analysis takes as the point o f  departure the distinction between “negative sovereignty” 
(freedom from outside interference, non-intervention) which is a formal legal entitlement, and “positive 
sovereignty (capabilities to control resources and deliver economic development securing the satisfaction 
of the population s needs), a substantive dimension which determines how far governments can be their 
own masters and take advantage o f independence. Jackson's argument is that "quasi-states” possess the 
latter but not the former. In this light Hong Kong has positive sovereignty but lacks negative sovereignty 
which is the opposite o f  a “quasi state" status.
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As far as HK’s autonomy is concerned there are few analysis available. One of the most 
comprehensive exercises was carried out by Tamanaha62, using Hannum’s criteria and 
comparative elements of other NCGs, who argues that the HKSAR does not possess a 
high degree of autonomy for its legislative and executive independence are relatively 
restricted. HK presents a mixed picture characterised by considerable autonomy in some 
areas, namely in economic, monetary, fiscal and judiciary matters and even, although 
more moderate, in the legislative area, but restrictions in others areas, namely the 
executive powers and the designation of the Chief Executive. In light of these 
considerations, HK should be best characterised as having an expanding “medium 
degree of autonomy” which can evolve to a high degree of autonomy.
The application of this new framework to the HK case is particularly interesting as it 
enables us to understand the strengths and limits of the international status of one of the 
most active and high profile NCGs and how far HK is a robust international actor.
w Tnmanaha. op.eit.. pp.57-58
CHAPTER TWO
THE EMERGENCE OF HONG KONG AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
PLAYER: CAUSES AND PROCESSES
2.1. SELF-GOVERNMENT AND DOMESTIC AUTONOMY IN POST- 
1945 HONG KONG
As a British colony Hong Kong (HK) has always been regarded as sui generis, not only 
because the British sovereignty seemed somehow transitory and particularly constrained 
by the special relationship with China, considering that the majority of the territory 
belonged to another state and was controlled under a system of 99-year contractual 
lease, but also because the majority of the population was of Chinese origin with a 
strong cultural identity.
One of the most striking aspects of post-1945 HK’s history has been its apparent 
immunity to the decline and disintegration of the British Empire which accelerated 
during the 1950s, and to the winds of change of decolonisation63. It remained stable and 
prosperous in contrast with the political turmoil that characterised many parts of the 
Empire. HK is also a rather unique case because it was untouched by the wave of 
political reforms aimed at promoting the development of colonies towards self- 
government, the main orientation of British colonial policy after WW II formulated by 
the Labour government (1945-51 )64.
63 On decolonisation see John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization -  the retreat from Empire in the Post- 
War World. London. Macmillan Press, 1988.
64 Ronald Hyam (ed.) British documents on the End o f the Empire -  the Labour Government and the end 
of the Empire 1945-51. Part I. London. I1MSO. 1992.- doc.71. Cmd 7433. 1948.
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However, HK was not completely immune to changes elsewhere contrary to what is 
suggested by conventional analysis. The process of decolonisation and disintegration of 
the Empire also had an important impact in HK but its manifestation was very different 
from other colonies. Its impact was not to be found in formal constitutional changes to 
the political system, but rather in the informal changes leading to an increased de facto 
autonomy both in internal matters, notably financial matters, and later in external affairs, 
with the transfer of power from the sovereign being made not to local elected politicians 
but rather to bureaucrats and local business groups.
HK and self-government
In HK there was not a development towards self-government but rather to self­
administration. The origins of the self-government model date back to the Dominions’ 
experience65 - the self-governing settlers colonies named as such in 1907, including 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Irish Free State - between 1900 
and the early 1930’s when they acquired independent sovereignty66.
In the context of the Dominions, the self-government concept implied initially a full 
autonomy in domestic affairs while foreign affairs and defence remained strictly 
reserved to London as Britain tried to secure a unified Imperial foreign and security 
policies. Under this system the Dominions acquired already in 1900 considerable powers 
translated in the capacity to amend their constitutions, to make laws with little 
interference from Westminster, to control immigration or establish their own tariffs and 
define their trade policy.
65 On the increasing autonomy of the Dominions to engage in foreign relations, in particular with border 
countries see Frederick Madden and John Darwin, Selected documents on the Constitutional history of the 
British Empire and Commonwealth vol VI, The Imperial Association : the emergence of the 
Commonwealth and the evolution of Dominion Status 1900-1965, Greenwood Press Publications, 1993
66 On the Dominions evolution see Judd Denis, Empire -  the British Imperial experience from 1765 to the 
present, Fontana Press, Harper Collins, 1997, pp. 287-296 and Carter Gwendolen, The British
Commonwelath and the International Security; the role of the dominions 1919-1939, Greenwood Press. 
Publishers Westport. 1947.pp.xv-xx.
After World War I, following the increasing international recognition of their autonomy 
status demonstrated by their participation in the 1918 Peace Conference and admission 
to the League of Nations, the Dominions expanded their autonomy status into the sphere 
of foreign affairs, acquiring limited powers mainly related to the ability to negotiate 
commercial treaties but still with no interference in the conduct of foreign policy and 
diplomatic representation67. This process is particularly interesting not only because it 
shows the flexibility of Britain and of the international system vis-à-vis non-sovereign 
entities, but above all because it set a precedent relevant for the emergence of HK’s 
autonomy in external affairs, as will be argued later.
In the late 1940s a dualistic perception of HK started to emerge in London. First, a 
vision of HK as a strategic spot, the “Berlin of the East”68, mainly adopted by the 
Foreign Office and to a lesser extent the Ministry of Defence, more pessimist, tended to 
stress the risks and vulnerability of HK and was prepared to let it go if costs became too 
high69. Second, an economic perspective adopted by the Colonial Office (CO), saw HK 
as the crucial entrepot for trade with China and a regional base for British businessmen 
in the East70, more optimistic, stressed the strength and potential of HK and regarded 
political change and self-government as an effective mechanism to consolidate British 
presence. These two conflicting views led to two different strategies on how to preserve 
British presence and interests: one supporting the preservation of the status quo; another 
advocating the promotion of self-government and political development in HK.
HK was never formally granted any degree of self-government. However, although full 
self-government leading to independence was never an option envisaged for HK71, there
67 Judd Denis, op.cit. p.290. The first precedent o f autonomous negotiation of an international agreement 
by a Dominion was set in 1923 when Britain allowed the Canadian Government to negotiate the Halibut 
Fisheries Treaty on its own.
68 See CAB 131/17 DC1(57)3, 31.1.1957
69 This perception became less pessimistic only when Britain was able to engage the US in HK defence in 
1956 through a secret agreement between Macmillan and Eisenhower according to which Britain accepted 
not to press for the PRC admission in the UN and in return the US regarded HK as a joint defence problem 
- see Alastair Horne. Macmillan 1957-86. London, Macmillan Press, 1989, p. 56.
70 PRO CO 1030/859. This point was explicitly made in a Report prepared by the Colonial Office and the 
Board o f Trade to the Prime Minister in 1957 on the costs and value of 1IK to Britain.
71 Ronald Hyam (ed). op. cit.. vol II. doc 192 CAB 129/71 C(54) 307. 1 1.50.54 (Report by the Official 
Committee on Commonwealth membership- appendix). In this document 11K w as included in a list o f 20
was some openness on the part of Britain to grant a limited degree of self-government 
and constitutional advancement to HK between 1945-5272 following London’s 
endorsement of the 1946 Young Plan for political reform as an antidote to a scenario of 
losing HK seriously considered by London, namely in the Kitson Report73, since China’s 
Kuomintang Government request for the return of the New Territories in the context of 
the 1942 Anglo-Chinese negotiations for the abolition of extraterritorial rights in 
China74. Contrary to what is generally believed, HK was not completely excluded from 
the new British colonial policy. Interestingly, one can argue that the consideration of the 
HK constitutional reform preceded the debate on the new colonial policy.
This trend would be aborted and the Young Plan, which included some democratic 
elements, would never be implemented. Not only the Plan was abandoned in 1949 but 
the whole idea of constitutional advancement was dropped altogether in 1952 because of 
the changes in geo-strategic conditions as conventionally explained75, but above all as a 
result of domestic resistance, associated with Governor Grantham’s action, who opposed 
the Plan, and the opposition of the old “hongs” (HSBC, Swire, Jardine Matheson), which 
considered democratic reforms could created considerable political risks to their own 
economic interests76. I would argue that one factor which has not been sufficiently 
emphasised was the opposition of the HK elite bureaucracy as it feared démocratisation 
would weaken its own power. This is a relevant element to understand better 
Grantham’s position, himself a cadet in the beginning of his career. The elite 
bureaucracy was probably the real driving force behind the opposition to reform. It was 
not a coincidence that the 1952 Urban Council reform finally adopted was nothing else 
than a new version of the 1946 Hazlerigg proposal.
colonies for whom independence was impossible, alongside Malta, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Falkland Islands, 
Fiji and Mauritius. This was mainly explained for security and strategic reasons.
72 Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved:Great Britain, China and attempts at constitutional reform in Hong 
Knnn 1945-52. Oxford University Press, New York, 1988.
7j PRO FO 371/53635. The Kitson memorandum of July 1946 proposed opening negotiations and puts 
forward different options, including the possibility o f retrocession and recognition of Chinese sovereignty 
in exchange for a new lease and the continuation of British administration 
74 See FO 371/31662 , FO 371/31665 , CO 129/58823-4.
73 Endacott, Government and people in Hone Koin»:1841-1962. a Constitutional history, Hong Kong
University Press, 1964.
7<’ Steve Tsang, op.cit.. p. 211.
Although formal self-government powers were not granted, an unorthodox and informal 
process of devolution of powers to HK did take place. The main difference with the 
general self-government policy is that these powers were transferred to the hands of the 
HK elite bureaucracy and the business community and not to LegCo and elected 
politicians.
Financial devolution
The commitment of the HK bureaucracy and Governor Grantham to gain greater 
autonomy to HK was clearly illustrated by the process of financial devolution in 1955- 
56. Some official documents77 provide the details of an interesting debate that developed 
between HK and London, inside the Colonial Office (CO) and between it and other 
departments. It should be recalled that historically HK after having gained some 
financial autonomy in the course of the XIX century, was submitted to direct financial 
control of the Treasury after WWII until 1948, when responsibility for supervision was 
returned to the CO which laid down the new rules for financial control over HK in the 
1948 despatch no. 302 of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Creech Jones.
In 1955 Governor Grantham raised with the CO the question of the degree of financial 
autonomy, protesting against the limited level enjoyed by HK and pressing for greater 
autonomy. His main argument was the discrimination HK was being subject to, when 
compared with African colonies. In his view there was no justification for HK, an 
important trade centre, to enjoy far less financial autonomy than underdeveloped African 
colonies with fragile economies.
This claim caused an internal debate within the CO on whether HK should be granted 
financial devolution similar to the African Colonies and the 1948 despatch changed. 
Three different positions emerged inside the CO: a position against devolution and for 
the enforcement of the 1948 despatch78; a middle-way position that supported the
77 See PRO CO 1030/392.
7a PRO C O 1030/392. pp.3-4 1 his position w as supported by Mr. \\  licatly
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solution of revising the despatch in order to adapt it to the new circumstance and to 
legitimise some of the current practices, but not going as far as to grant full financial 
devolution79; finally a position which supported granting full financial devolution to HK 
as the existing de facto autonomy had not caused any problems and HK managed its 
finances responsibly . It is interesting to note that all officials involved in the decision -  
making process recognised that HK enjoyed already a substancial de facto financial 
autonomy.
This last position was finally endorsed by the Secretary of State and the 1948 despatch 
was revoked according to the terms agreed with Governor Grantham. The new despatch 
introduced important changes. Firstly, it puts all the emphasis on the mechanism of 
consultation and not in control and gives priority to semi-official, informal exchanges of 
information between the HK Government and the Colonial Office. Secondly, the 
requirement of budget estimates and supplementary expenses’ approval by the Secretary 
of State was abolished. Thirdly, the need for approval was limited to loans with more 
than one-year maturity, and thus abolished for short-term loans . In compensation the 
HK Government should formally inform the Secretary of State on financial legislation 
and proposals on banking.
In sum, under pressure from HK, London formally granted financial devolution to the 
colony. This set in motion a sui generis process, without parallel in the British Empire, 
by which HK progress towards self-administration, not self-government, was informal 
and flexible. As a consequence of the lack of clear rules, this process enabled HK to gain 
in practise higher levels of autonomy than colonies where a self-government policy was 
applied.
7<) PRO CO 1030/392, p.7
s" PRO CO 1030 392, pp. 19.This position was supported by Mr. Johnston. 
Lyttelton despatch CO 1030/392.
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2.2.THE EMERGENCE OF HONG KONG’S INTERNATIONAL AUTONOMY :
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE DIMENSION
The expansion of domestic autonomy preceded and paved the way to the emergence of 
external autonomy although it was not the determinant factor. This section will address 
the role of other factors responsible for the emergence of HK as an international actor. 
The hypothesis that will be tested is whether this was determined by HK’s trade identity 
and the exercise of treaty making powers, by the development of an external 
representation system or by its role as a financial centre based on monetary autonomy.
The Lancashire Agreement and the divergence of economic interests
One of the key turning points to understand the emergence of HK’s autonomy in 
external affairs, was the signature of the Lancashire Agreement between the HK Textile 
Negotiating Committee (of textile industries) and the UK Cotton Board, on 31 
December 1958 and entered into force on 1 February 1959, by which the HK 
Association of Textile Industries accepted “voluntary export restrictions” on cotton 
textiles.
Although signed between two private organisations, the agreement was in reality 
negotiated between the UK and HK governments and represented a settlement of 
divergent interests. The textile industry was the leading sector of the labour-intensive, 
export-led industrialisation strategy adopted by HK. Textile exports increased rapidly, 
namely to the UK market, benefiting from the colonial preference system and in 1958 
HK was already the second major source of imports to the UK of grey cotton cloth82. 
The new competition from HK entailed a strong reaction from the British industry.
The signature of the Lancashire Agreement was the result of a long process between 
1955-58 during which the conflict of interests between the UK and HK became
“  Sr  Hr s  Kn° ”g Üe,KTcl C1T ber o fC «  The First H a lf-a .ev .ew  of , , r  
Undertakim;. Brown and Sons Ltd., Hull. 1960.p 1 ] ------- — ■ — ■ L
increasingly apparent and the pressure of London grew while HK tried to resist 
protectionist measures against its exports.
The origins date back to 1955 when the first signs of a campaign against imports of 
cotton yam, grey cloth and shirts from HK became visible in Britain led by Lancashire 
business interests. The protests were based on the argument of unfair competition 
because of the low wages in Asia, and specifically HK, already pointing to the idea of 
“social dumping”. The Lancashire interests pressed for the imposition of trade barriers to 
HK and India exports in order to protect domestic industries. The British government 
resisted this pressure and ruled out this possibility. As a consequence the strategy 
changed and instead of import restrictions it was considered that the solution was to 
press HK (and India) to accept voluntary limitations of exports. In order to convince HK 
to accept this, a delegation from the UK Cotton Board, led by Sir Clegg, travelled to HK 
in early 1957, to try and obtain an agreement. HK businessmen, supported by the HK 
Government, rejected the Clegg proposal and in May the HK Cotton Spinners 
Association declared publicly that it could not accept any limitation of exports 83.
HK’s initial resistance did not demobilise Britain and the pressure intensified in the 
subsequent years. The 1957 visit to HK of F. J. Erroll, MP Parliamentary Secretary to 
the UK Board of Trade, marked the beginning of a new phase of political pressure and 
the direct intervention of the British government in this process which until then had 
been basically informal and conducted by the private sector. The pressure intensified in 
1958 because the HK case became more closely interlinked with the Indian case. In fact 
in 1958 Clegg successfully reached an agreement with India on voluntary restriction but 
its validity was dependent on Britain reaching similar agreements with HK and Pakistan.
Later on political pressure gained momentum when, under pressure of Lancashire 
industries, the House of Commons debated in May 195884 the problem of HK labour
8' Hong Kong Annual Report 1956. HK Government
r  Pa;1,an;ooCa,y T ™ 0^ , 5'1958 mcn,ioned in Frank Welsh. A l listorvofH onnK on, Ha,per Col,ns 
London. 199,. pp. 4?7-458. The attack was made by the Labour MP truest Thornton from Farnsworth 
Lancashire.
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standards which were strongly criticised and considered as “disgraceful”. The subtle 
message that was being sent to HK businessmen was that if they kept on refusing any 
limitation, Britain as the sovereign power could impose through legal means higher 
labour standards in HK with a structural impact on labour costs, likely to damage HK’s 
competitiveness.
A few months later HK finally accepted to start negotiations with a view to limit 
exports. In September 1958 a delegation of the UK Cotton Board, led by its Chairman 
Lord Rochdale, arrived in HK to start negotiations that were conducted between the UK 
Cotton Board and an HK “ad hoc” Textiles Negotiating Committee headed by J.D. 
Clague, Deputy Chairman of the Federation of HK Industries in representation of the
Of
HK industry , expressly set up for that purpose with the help of the HK Government. 
An Agreement was signed on 31 December 1958 and entered into force on 1 February 
1959. Formally it was an Undertaking given by the HK Textile Negotiating Committee 
to the UK Cotton Board according to which HK industries agreed to limit cotton textile 
goods to the UK to a maximum of 118 million square yards per year. The agreement, 
valid for 3 years was regarded by HK industry as an exceptional and transitory 
arrangement to give Lancashire industry a breathing space for restructuring. Contrary to 
HK expectations, the Lancashire Agreement was not going to be terminated in 1962. 
The pressure for extension of the agreement was very strong in the following years and 
the Agreement was extended several times.
The Lancashire Agreement marked an extremely important shift, preparing the stage for 
HK gaining autonomy in running external affairs in trade matters. Besides giving the 
first signal of the new wave of trade protectionism that was going to come, it had three 
fundamental implications.
Firstly, it brought into the open the profound conflict of interests between Britain and 
HK in trade matters. It made clear that although London was responsible for the welfare 
of HK it was prepared to sacrifice its interests to defend the UK ones. This difference of
Hong Kong Report 1959. HK Government.
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interests led London and HK to adopt two diametrically opposite trade policies: Britain, 
a protectionist trade policy, clearly in tension with GATT rules; HK a free trade policy, 
which would become a key characteristics of its emerging international personality.
Secondly, although an intra-Empire question, the Agreement had an important 
international impact insofar as it created a precedent that was used by third countries to 
impose similar restrictions to HK exports. This effect was clearly identified by the HK 
General Chamber of Commerce86 which anticipated the problem and went as far as to 
argue already in 1960 that American private interests made much reference to 
Lancashire and used it as an important argument when lobbying the US Government to 
press HK to limit its exports to the US market. This link between the Lancashire 
Agreement and the US-HK negotiation process in the early 1960s is the more relevant as 
the latter, as will be argued below, was decisive in the emergence of HK’s autonomy in 
external affairs.
Thirdly, the Lancashire Agreement left the UK in an unsustainable position to defend 
internationally the interests of HK against the various countries trying to impose 
restrictions to HK exports. Britain had no conditions, no credibility or moral standing to 
oppose third countries doing exactly the same thing it had done to its colony. The 
inhibition of the UK to act internationally on HK’s behalf in this matter created space for 
HK to defend its interests on its own and to act autonomously in the international stage.
The next section will analyse the characteristics and dynamics of this crucial process for 
the emergence of HK s international personality and identity. This process had two very 
distinct but complementary phases, a bilateral phase and a multilateral phase.
UK. General Chamber of Commerce, op. cit. p 13. The connection betw een the Lancashire Agreement 
and the US piessuie and position w as also mentioned by the Governor of UK in a teleeram to the 
Secretary o f  State for the Colonies. 9.5.1061 -  IIKRS 270 5 32, CR 12 5905 56.
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Bilateral Agreements on voluntary limitations on exports of cotton textiles
During the bilateral phase HK acted internationally under pressure and engaged directly 
in negotiations with a series of sovereign states to regulate bilateral trade of cotton 
textiles. Adopting a trade policy radically different from that of Britain, this process 
contributed for HK to acquire an increasing de facto autonomy in managing 
international affairs in trade. It is particularly important to understand how this came 
about, what factors favoured HK’s autonomy and why did Britain accept losing control 
and tolerated autonomy.
The negotiation process between HK and the US initiated in 1959 constituted the major 
turning point and was decisive in the genesis of this new autonomy in external affairs, 
not only because it contributed to change London’s attitude in relation to the 
management of external affairs but also because it set a precedent to other countries. 
This clearly justifies looking in more detail at the US negotiation process.
HK-US Negotiations
The American pressure on HK to limit cotton textile exports to the US market started in 
1959 immediately after the signature of the Lancashire Agreement. As early as 
February 1959, when the Agreement entered into force, the Assistant Secretary for 
International Affairs of the US Department of Commerce, Mr Kearns, visited HK to 
obtain a limitation of HK textile exports. Its timing and purpose is a clear illustration of 
the powerful international demonstration effect of the Lancashire Agreement. The 
pressure further increased in November when Mr Kearns made his second visit to 
formally request a voluntary restriction of exports of cotton garments from HK.
The impact of this visit was analysed in an exchange of telegrams between the Governor 
of HK and the Colonial Secretary87 where the Governor recognised that pressure was 
strong and that HK was having difficulty in resisting it since the visit caused a split
8 HK PRO HKRS 270 5/31. CR 12 S90S Sf, n t'.n mn c r „c . re , . .i , u' - 6 "-PP- '00-Savingram from the HK Governor to the
SecretaryofStatelortheColom es.no 194] 27 11 19S9
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inside the HK industry. Negotiations began aimed not at reaching a government to 
government agreement but, inspired by the Lancashire model, an agreement between 
HK and US industries. HK industries accepted to restrict exports and offered a 3 years 
voluntary undertaking88, but this was not accepted by the American industry. The US did 
not take any unilateral action and so the whole question died away.
The second US attempt to press HK was in 1961 following the election of President 
Kennedy. The main factor behind this was the fact that Kennedy, responding to the 
pressure of American textile industry, had assumed during the campaign strong political 
commitments to protect the US textile industry from foreign competition.
The attitude of the Kennedy Administration was also explained by two other factors. 
Firstly, pressure from Congress intensified as it threatened to take unilateral action and 
impose import restrictions, an outcome the Administration wanted to prevent. Secondly, 
pressure from Japan, the most dynamic exporter to the US market, which, in the context 
of US-Japan Textile Restriction Agreement, refused to cut exports if HK was not also 
pressed to limit its exports to the US market.
The approach adopted by the US to start talks was rather different from the 1959 process 
in two important respects: the initiative was co-ordinated this time by the State 
Department and not by the Commerce Department; the US contacted London and did 
not approach HK directly. This had a clear meaning: the US Government wanted to treat 
it as an international issue and at the governmental level and no longer as a mere 
industry to industry private negotiation. The first meeting to discuss the problem of the 
HK textiles was held in Washington in the State Department in April 196 1 89 involving 
only the UK and US Governments with no participation of HK representatives.
Although this was still an exploratory meeting it had two important implications for 
subsequent negotiations. First, Britain, possibly as a strategy to alleviate pressure,
88 HK PRO HKRS n 270 5 31, CR 12 5905/56. pp. 155. Memorandum of the Association of 22.12.59.
The document was published in the HK Govt Daily Information Bulletin o f 28.12.1959. 
s<' See 11KPRO HKRS 270 5 33, CR 12 5905 56 Ml. doc.4. Minutes of the Meeting.
argued that HK had a significant autonomy and was not “governed from London” and 
so, given the fact it would be impossible to impose any measure against its will, HK had 
to participate directly in the negotiations. Secondly, the US clearly established a link 
between wider US-UK trade negotiations and the HK question in the sense that if Britain 
did not press HK to solve the textile problem it would not get results in trade issues 
which were exclusively of the UK interest90. In other words, the UK own trade interests 
could be damaged if London did not press HK to limit its exports.
After this meeting and with a view to prepare the participation of HK in the next stage of 
talks, the HK Government promoted a co-ordination meeting between the Financial 
Secretary, John Cowperthwaite, and representatives of HK industries held in May 1961 
in the Commerce and Industry Department91. In the meeting two decisions were taken. 
First, the Financial Secretary and the Director of Commerce and Industry should attend 
the meeting in London in representation of HK. Second, that they should not enter into 
final negotiations but should say to the Americans that an agreement with HK industry 
was not out of the question.
A similar meeting was held two weeks later where the Financial Secretary informed the 
industry about the results of the London talks. This close consultation and co-ordination 
between the HK Government and the private sector was from the beginning a 
fundamental trait of HK’s international participation and indeed one of the ingredients of 
the success of its external action as a NCG. This contributed not only to create a 
legitimacy basis for the HK Government to act externally representing HK interests, but 
also to make its action more effective.
The London negotiations
The negotiations held in London on 15-16 May 1961 on HK textiles were of utmost 
significance in the process of HK gaining autonomy in external trade matters. Although
The Deputy Dilector of the Office o f  International Resources, Mr Nichols told the UK delegation that 
"... but if on wider tiade policy grounds the UK wished for some progress to be made perhaps a little 
pressure could be brought to bear on IIK.” Record of the meeting HKRS 270 5 73 doc 4 
‘M Minutes ol the meeting in 11KRS 270 5 33 -  C'R 12 5905 56 III doc. 8. pp.t-6. ’
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a UK delegation was formally present at the meetings, the negotiations with the US were 
conducted directly by the HK representatives which adopted an autonomous strategy 
aimed at resisting the American pressure and postponing any agreement on export 
restriction.
The three sessions of the talks -15 May (morning), 15 May (afternoon) and 16 May 
(morning) - were different in nature and contents. The minutes of the meetings92 are an 
extremely interesting document to illustrate and explain a fundamental change in the 
relationship between London and HK in the management of HK’s external affairs and 
the beginning of HK’s autonomy in international matters.
The 15 May meetings were attended by the UK, the US, Canada and HK delegations, 
being HK represented by the Financial Secretary, Sir John Cowperthwaite and the 
Director of Commerce and Industry, Mr Angus. The morning meeting was dominated by 
the introductory remarks made by the UK delegation, Mr Melville from the CO, who 
emphasised two crucial points that set the tone for the negotiations. On the one hand he 
stressed HK’s autonomy and pointed out that although HK had formally an “old 
fashioned Constitution” and many powers concentrated in the hands of the Governor, in 
practice he could not impose HK’s industry to accept an agreement. This was a 
recognition of HK’s de facto autonomy and Britain’s limitations to solve directly the 
problem.
On the other hand, Melville used the Cold War argument stressing the common British 
and American concern about HK vulnerability as the “Berlin of the East”. This 
required, he argued, a careful consideration of the negative impact of measures that 
could weaken HK and undermine its stability. In short, the British intervention was 
confined to political aspects and sent a clear message that the US had to deal directly 
with HK.
IIKPRO HKRS 270,5 33. CR 12 5905 56 III. docs.38 and 39.
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The two most important sessions were the 15 May afternoon session and the 16 May, 
which were dominated by direct exchanges between HK and the US. On 15 May 
afternoon the exchanges between the HK representative, Cowperthwaite and the 
American chief negotiator, Schaetzel, focused on the justification for the restriction of 
HK textile exports93.
The HK position in this meeting was structured around three points. Firstly, to 
deconstruct the idea that the Lancashire Agreement was a precedent which could 
legitimise the US request for export restriction. Because Lancashire was indeed, as 
argued above, a factor which weakened HK’s bargaining position, Cowperthwaite 
decided to take the initiative and from the start raise directly the question as a pre­
emptive strike to undermine a potential American line of argument. He argued that 
Lancashire could not be seen as a precedent because there was a special situation in the 
relation between HK and Britain which did not apply to third countries, the fact that all 
HK exports entered the British market duty free because of the Commonwealth 
preference, already an important UK concession. Therefore the starting point was quite 
different and the situation was not comparable.
Secondly, Cowperthwaite tried to question the justification for the American request on 
the grounds that there were no clear signs of disruption of the American industry, as 
production had not decline, and that the US had rejected the 1959 voluntary undertaking 
offered by HK industry. This meant that restrictions were not after all really necessary. 
Furthermore, a limitation of exports to US and Canada could have very negative 
repercussions for HK, because it would create a precedent leading other countries to 
request similar limitations, but for the US as well.
Thirdly, refrain the American impetus to reach an immediate agreement and strengthen 
HK bargaining position by arguing the HK Government had no mandate to negotiate as 
the Government could not impose its will on HK businessmen and therefore any 
decision had to obtain the consent of the industry.
IIKPRO 1IKRS 270 5 33. CR 12 5905 56.III doc. 38. (minutes)
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In response Schaetzel made clear that there was this time, unlike in 1959, a clear 
political determination to act, in particular because President Kennedy had a political 
commitment to solve the problems of the US textile industry. Cowperthwaite reacted to 
this by challenging the veracity of the assumption that HK exports caused damage to US 
production and pressed the American negotiator to make the “demonstration of the 
damage”, clearly showing HK was not intimidated and was determined to resist any 
violation of free trade principles.
Schaetzel also pointed out that the US was prepared to offer compensation for the 
damage caused to HK industry by a restriction of exports. This was also rejected by 
Cowperwaite, who argued that not only direct compensation was out of the question but 
any form of indirect compensation was not viable since it was politically very sensitive 
to establish a link between limits on exports and reception of US aid.
In relation to the question of compensation for HK’s effort, the UK raised the question 
of assistance being provided to HK through a reduction of the US tariffs in items other 
than textiles. Interestingly, Cowperthwaite rejected the UK proposal, clearly showing 
disagreement and distancing himself from the UK strategy to try and bridge positions. 
Clearly, the HK negotiation strategy was different, and was aimed at resisting export 
restrictions and delay as much as possible any negotiations or agreement. This was 
another important signal of HK’s autonomy.
The meeting on the 16 May was even more interesting in terms of showing HK’s 
autonomy and relative “room for manoeuvre” to negotiate with the US. In this meeting, 
held in the Colonial Office with the participation of the UK, US and HK delegations and 
chaired by Mr Melville, for the first time substantive aspects of a possible agreement 
were negotiated04.
<>J HKPRO 1IKRS 270 5 33. CR 12 rOO? 56. doc. 39. Minutes.
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On the assumption that something should be done to regulate HK’s exports in the short 
term, the US representative, Mr Jacques, presented the broad lines of its proposal which 
included two aspects: (i) a global quota for HK textile exports to the US of 180 million 
square yards, based on average exports during the period 1958-60, which implied a 40% 
cut back compared to the 1960 exports; (ii) sub-quotas for 7 critical items of garments 
based on average 1956-60 exports.
The HK delegation reacted negatively to this proposal. Mr Angus pointed out that its 
contents was far worse than the 1959 Kearns’ proposal95 and Cowperthwaite was even 
more radical arguing that with this proposal HK would not be more damaged if the US 
took unilateral action an imposed import restrictions, thus signalling that HK was not 
desperately seeking an agreement to avoid unilateral action and could simply withdraw 
from the process leaving the US in the politically difficult position to impose unilateral 
restrictions.
Although stressing that they had no mandate to negotiate, Cowperthwaite and Angus 
presented after all an informal counter-proposal which was deemed to be nothing else 
than what they thought could be acceptable to the HK industry. This included 3 points: 
(i) quota based on 1960 figures with a 5 % annual growth rate; (ii) restrictions should be 
limited only to really critical items (rejecting a global quota and pointing to a reduction 
in the number of critical items); (iii) other items should be considered on their merits 
and objective criteria had to be defined to qualify an item as critical.
In spite of the fact the negotiation was not conclusive, the important fact was that on 16 
May a substantive negotiation occurred directly between the US and HK on trade 
matters with a view to a bilateral agreement on voluntary exports restrictions. HK was 
able to pursue its own interests and speak with its own voice. Moreover, there were also 
three important innovations of great significance.
05 HKRS 270 5 33. CR 12 5005 56. iloc 30. pp. 6.
Firstly, the UK was present at the negotiations but did not speak on behalf of HK neither 
took the lead of the negotiation process, adopting instead a passive role and allowing HK 
representatives to defend its own interests. Secondly, further stressing HK’s autonomy, 
the UK played the role of a mediator between the US and HK delegations trying to 
bridge divergent positions with a view to facilitate an agreement. Formally, the UK took 
an independent stand but if it was closer to any position it was to the American one. 
Thirdly, not only HK spoke on its own but expressed in relation to specific aspects 
disagreement with the UK and showed clearly it had its own negotiation strategy 
different from Britain’s underlying strategy in the sense it was committed to resist as 
much as possible an agreement, while Britain, under the US pressure, was trying to help 
reaching an agreement.
The motivations of HK to actively engage in this process and to take a firm position 
were obvious: save its largest industry whose prosperity was highly dependent on 
exports to the US, already then HK’s first export market.
The interesting question is what were the motivations of Britain to allow things to 
develop as they did, why did London allow HK to conduct autonomously the 
negotiations with the US in violation of constitutional rules. The answer is complex and 
involves the consideration of the interplay between three different factors.
Firstly, because of the Lancashire Agreement, London was faced with a serious problem 
of lack of credibility and morale to oppose the requests of third countries and defend 
HK’s interests that would be in clear contradiction with the protectionist measure it had 
taken against HK. Moreover, Britain felt somehow responsible for the problem HK was 
facing considering that the Lancashire Agreement set a precedent contributing to the 
pressure the US and other countries were putting on HK.
Secondly, Britain was not willing to damage its crucial relation with Washington 
because of HK and therefore tried not to get too much involved and maintain a low 
profile, fearing the risk of paying costs in terms of its own trade relations with the US if
it failed to deliver what the US wanted. So, instead of taking the lead and assuming the 
responsibility to get HK’s agreement, London opted to stress HK’s autonomy and let 
HK take the stage. This was a risk-aversion strategy. By taking a broker role Britain was 
being constructive and could not be accused by the Americans of not co-operating but at 
the same time could not be held responsible for an eventual failure of the negotiations.
Thirdly, as argued earlier, there was a precedent in British Colonial policy related to the 
Dominions’ external autonomy in commercial matters and so this autonomy was not a 
completely new thing for Britain. In addition, it had a limited scope and did not imply 
relinquishing powers in other areas of international affairs. This circumstance 
contributed to weaken the opposition of the British bureaucracy and the Foreign Office 
to this solution.
The GATT Cotton Textiles Agreements
Two months after the London meetings, HK was taking part in multilateral negotiations 
held in Geneva, under the auspices of GATT (17-21 July 1961) to negotiate a short term 
cotton textile arrangement. HK formally participated as part of the UK delegation, 
although the HK industry had tried to convince the HK government that a different 
format was required. Interestingly, the Chairman of the Federation of HK Industries, Sir 
Sik-nin Chau, in a letter sent to the Director of the Commerce and Industry, made clear 
that
“...having regard to the divergent interests of the United Kingdom and HK on the 
textile question, HK must be directly represented at the Conference, and any attempts 
for representation to be through the UK authorities must be strongly resisted..
The HK Government did not adopt this position, but caught between the pressure of the 
industry for HK to defend autonomously its interests and London’s monopoly in foreign 
affairs, did propose something else rather unusual which caused some surprise in 
London: the participation in the multilateral negotiations of a representative of the HK
UK PRO. IIK.RS 163 1 2718 (Letter of 8.5.1961 ).
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industry to accompany the HK delegate as an adviser97. London turned down this 
proposal98.
Although apparently the HK participation in the multilateral negotiations followed the 
traditional format of integration in the UK delegation, in reality the negotiations marked 
a departure from conventional practice. The HK Financial Secretary Cowperthwaite, as 
recognised in his report99, was able to intervene directly and separately from the UK 
delegate and given freedom to present HK’s specific positions and make its own voice 
heard. Furthermore, the HK representative presented, unlike the UK, specific 
reservations to the proposed text of the Short-Term agreement related on the one hand to 
the presentation of clear evidence of disruption in importing countries and the need to 
limit arbitrary requests for restrictions and, on the other, to the risk of free riding by third 
countries which were not restraining their exports. This marked a clear differentiation 
from the UK and asserted HK’s firmness in negotiations.
Finally, HK delayed for some months100 the final acceptance of the agreement by the 
UK thus conditioning its entry into force. Even more importantly, when the Foreign 
Office sent the document of acceptance both for Britain and for HK to the GATT 
Secretariat only in December 1961, there was a crucial distinction made. In relation to 
the UK the acceptance was not subject to any limitation while in relation to HK 
acceptance was subject to specific understandings on the operation of the agreement 
involving three aspects all related to obligations of importing countries101. This was an 
unprecedented public recognition by London, formally communicated to an international 
organisation, of HK’s specificity making clear the agreement’s application to HK was 
different from its application to Britain.
97 HK PRO HKRS 163/1/2718 Telegram from the Governor o f HK to the Secretary o f  State for the 
Colonies 5.7.61.
8 HKPRO, HKRS 163/1/2718 Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Governor on 7 7 1961 
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This negotiation process was also important in terms of the impact it had on HK’s 
perception of the challenges it would have to face to defend its interests internationally 
and how it had to strengthen its capacity to act externally. The reflections of 
Cowperthwaite in the Report he wrote on his return to HK are particularly interesting 
and illustrate how far he was conscious of the great difficulties HK was bound to face 
and of the need to strengthen and organise HK’s bureaucracy to be prepared for 
international negotiations
This was an extraordinary Conference which I found very exhausting, mentally and 
physically because of my isolated position. It had an unrealistic air because we were 
talking politics in the guise of economics ... I am afraid however that if our international 
trade develops its complexity we will require a considerable strengthening of our 
economic staff02.
In 1962 HK’s international participation was still a one-man show. Cowperthwaite was 
really acting alone but the transition towards an institutionalised approach and the 
creation of a critical mass to manage international matters was going to be very quick.
The Short Term Arrangement entered into force in January 1962 was going to last until 
1 October 1962 when it was replaced by the Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement. 
Its significance is not limited to the international visibility HK gained during the 
negotiations. It is also important for another reason. Bilateral agreements were 
negotiated in the framework of the multilateral instrument and were seen as a mere 
development of it, not as innovative instruments. This contributed to soften London’s 
potential opposition creating room for HK to negotiate and sign these bilateral 
agreements on its own, since the UK had signed the multilateral umbrella agreement on 
behalf of HK.
The network of bilateral trade agreements
After the entry into force of the Short Term Cotton Textile Arrangement, HK was 
naturally confronted with requests from various countries to restrict textile exports. This
"'-’ HK PRO. HKRS 163 T2718.
forced the HK Government to engage actively in detailed and difficult negotiations with 
a group of importing countries leading to the signature of various bilateral agreements 
with nine different countries: the US (1962), Canada (1964), West Germany (1966), the 
Benelux countries (1967), Norway (1963), Sweden and Australia (1968) and later with 
the EEC (1970). All these agreements were renegotiated several times'03.
Different patterns started to emerge. For example in the West Germany case, Bonn 
contacted first the HK Government directly but, as HK showed resistance, turned to 
Britain and requested the UK Embassy in West Germany a restriction of HK exports. 
Norway illustrates a different case where the whole process was conducted directly with 
HK leading to one of the first cases of exercise of “treaty making powers” by HK, as the 
agreement was directly signed by the Director of the Commerce and Industry 
Department on behalf of HK.
This impressive network of bilateral agreements developed during the 1960s was a 
crucial factor behind HK’s growing international visibility and action.
Treaty making powers
All negotiations were conducted autonomously by HK with little interference from 
London, even when there was a formal intervention of the British diplomatic 
representation like in the Italian case* 104. However, there was some degree of ambiguity 
and a mixed and contradictory practice in terms of the exercise of treaty making powers 
by HK.
The conventional practice consolidated in the 1950s was that although HK could 
participate actively in the negotiations, international agreements were always signed by
1,13 See Hong Kong Reports, front 1961 to 1970, HK Government.
104 HK PRO, HKRS 270.5'48. The 1965 negotiations with Italy provide an interesting example of the 
autonomy HK enjoyed. Italy approached the UK and presented an aide-memoire to the British Embassy 
in Rome and talks vs ere held in Rome attended by 3 HK officials who conducted the negotiations. 
Although the UK Embassy was inv olved in the follow up it w as clearly stated in a teleeram from the UK 
Ambassador in Rome to the Governor of HK on 10.3.1965 that Britain had no interference in the 
substance of the negotiations. "... 1 saw Parboni this morning. I emphasised that the purpose o f  my visit 
was not to continue negotiations on behalt of UK but to receive Italian replies to your proposals".
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Britain on behalf of HK. An example were the trade agreements between HK and 
Indonesia signed in 1956 and 1960 for HK to carry out the spinning of American raw 
cotton supplied to Indonesia under US public law 480 programme, a mechanism of US 
aid.
The 1956 Agreement was signed by the UK Charge d’Affaires in Jakarta and the 1960 
agreement by the UK Ambassador in Jakarta, who was authorised by the Foreign Office 
to sign the trade agreement on behalf of HK105. It should be stressed that London was 
eager to tightly control the exercise of treaty making powers and preserve its monopoly. 
An interesting illustration of this concern is provided by the letter of the Foreign Office 
sent to the British Embassy in Jakarta related to the extension of the 1956 agreement106 
where the question of the capacity for HK to enter into an international agreement on its 
own was explicitly addressed. It stressed the idea HK had no such capacity and 
therefore extreme care should be put in preventing HK from exercising treaty making 
powers and avoid any reference in the text that could suggest otherwise107.
The Foreign Office was particularly concerned about the international implications and 
the difficulty to justify how HK was able to sign an international agreement
“.. .as the Notes will be registered with the United Nations some explanation will have to 
be given to them to forestall any possible question by UN of the capacity of the 
Government of HK to conclude an international agreement within the meaning of article 
102 of the Charter”.
The solution to solve the problem was either to consider that the agreement was signed 
by the UK, acting on behalf of HK, or, in alternative, the HK Government acting with
105 HKPRO HKRS 163/1' 1814, Telegram from the Foreign Office to the Ambassador in Jakarta of 
24.12.1959.
1116 HK PRO file HKRS 163/1/1814 Doc 167 Letter from the Foreign Office to UK Embassy in Jakarta 
12.2.1957.
The letter mentions The main cause o f  our concent is to be found in the wording o f paragraph 3 o f  the 
notes o f July 2. 1956, referring to the HK deal which gives the erroneous impression that the government 
of HK is competent to enter into such an agreement with a foreign government on its ow n account. Notes 
exchanged last year therefore raised the question of the capacity of the Government of HK to enter into an 
international agreement w ith a foreign gov ernment." HKPRO. HKRS 163/1 1814.
the consent of the UK. These instructions were followed by the Jakarta Embassy and the 
first formula was the one used in the exchange of notes of 5 April 1957 108.
This orientation was still followed in the 1960s. The 1965 Italian case is a good example 
of this continuity. Italy approached Britain and presented an aide-memoire to the UK 
Embassy in Rome requesting a limitation of HK exports. The HK Government prepared 
a draft text of the memorandum and it was sent to the Secretary of State in London for 
consideration and possible amendments and was then presented by the British Embassy 
in Rome to the Italian authorities. This Agreement, between the Italian and HK 
Governments, would have been signed by Britain on behalf of HK if at the last moment 
the Italian Government had not decided to call off the process109. The approach taken by 
Rome to contact the UK in the first place opened the door to London’s interference.
However, at the same time a completely different practice emerged which constituted a 
fundamental innovation in the 1960s. HK was able to sign bilateral agreements on 
export limitations on its own, so a de facto autonomy in the exercise of treaty making 
powers had developed. The case of Norway, mentioned earlier, provides a clear example 
of this new phenomenon of great significance for HK’s international personality as the 
agreement was signed directly by HK in Oslo in March 1963110, without any previous 
formal authorisation from London.
During the first half of the 1960s it was possible to find a mixed picture, hardly 
surprising in a context of change where the old rules were no longer applicable but the 
new rules were not yet consolidated. In some cases HK would exercise treaty-making 
powers on its own. In others, Britain exercised greater control and signed agreements on 
behalf of HK limiting autonomy. One of the variables which tended to influence the 
practice was the initial channel chosen by the foreign country, i.e. whether it would 
approach Britain as the sovereign power formally responsible for HK’s external affairs 
(West Germany, Italy) or instead contact directly the HK Government (Norway,
Treaty Series n. 1 (1957) London. Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
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Netherlands) or in some cases both at the same time. When Britain was involved from 
the beginning, foreign countries feared direct contact with HK could generate 
misunderstandings, London would naturally exercise its formal powers of international 
representation of HK. When foreign countries contacted directly HK, as they 
increasingly realised that trade policy was really decided in HK, Britain interfered little 
and HK tended to sign the agreement on its own.
Confronted with an unorthodox phenomenon of a sovereign power with little capacity to 
impose its will on the colony, foreign countries responded in an unorthodox way 
violating international rules and practice to pursue their interests. As they realised 
decisions on trade were taken in HK, not in London, started to contact and deal directly 
with HK surpassing Britain. This had an important implication for the deepening of 
HK’s international status because these binding international bilateral agreements 
marked the origin of the emergence of HK’s international personality as they created a 
set of rights and obligations for which HK was directly responsible.
The intensification of this new phenomenon of HK’s de facto exercise of limited jus 
tractum powers was a clear violation of the constitutional rules governing HK. Britain’s 
response was to change the rules in order to legitimise the illegal practice, thus putting 
an end to a situation that could affect its prestige. So, in 1969 Britain informally granted 
devolution of powers to HK to sign international bilateral trade agreements111 
recognising HK’s autonomy in this sphere. That was the case of the 1970 bilateral 
agreement with the US on cotton textiles which was formally concluded by an exchange 
of notes between the US Consul General in HK and the Director of Commerce and 
Industry in December 1970112.
The consolidation of HK’s new international status involved not only the process of 
negotiation and formalisation of bilateral agreements, but also the process of
111 This w as not formalized in w riting but constituted an informal understanding for which evidence is 
scarce. How ever there is a credible source to this informal devolution process the Report o f the Advisory 
Committee on Diversitication. 1970, Government Printer, Hone Kong. pp. 301-302.
Annual Departmental Report C ID 1970-71. IIK. Government.
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implementation of those agreements, which contributed to the formation of HK’s 
international image.
The strategy adopted by HK was to control exports rather than have import restrictions 
imposed by importing countries which would mean loosing any capacity to influence 
events. HK developed and implemented an effective and sophisticated system of export 
control and gained relevant expertise in managing it. This implied a high level of co­
ordination between the government and the business sector for efficient quota allocation 
to firms with two objectives: ensure that quota was not exceeded which would have 
negative effects; secure that quota was fulfilled in order to avoid its reduction on the 
grounds of non-utilisation113. Undoubtedly HK gained international credit for the 
efficient management of the export control system and built an image of credibility and 
capacity to comply with obligations and to respect commitments. HK attained 
consistently a high performance rate in terms of quota utilisation114, thus being regarded 
as a trustworthy partner.
The export quota system had another important effect though less visible and generally 
ignored: the change in HK’s industry attitude which became more supportive to 
protectionism leading to a growing divergence and tension with HK Government free 
trade policy115. In fact, as a consequence of a system of quota distribution, an oligopoly 
structure emerged and industries that were granted quotas developed a vested interest in 
maintaining them as they worked as barriers to entry to new competitors. This reduced 
internal and external competition pressure and allowed the development of a profitable 
secondary market of quota sub-allocation, generating considerable rents for firms that 
got the quota initially but were unable to fulfil it. This contradiction risked undermining 
HK’s international bargaining position. Ironically, the conflict which existed earlier 
between the UK and HK on trade policy was a reality within HK by the late 1960s.
" ' Interview with William Dorward, 21.1. 2001.
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The management of this complex network of agreements made HK the forerunner of 
bilateral textile negotiations at the world level. As a consequence, HK gained relevant 
expertise in dealing with very technical and complex trade matters and showed capacity 
to manage effectively export control systems and comply with its obligations, thus 
asserting its international credibility.
The evolution since the late 1950s was remarkable and HK had moved a long way since 
the first negotiations with the UK on the Lancashire Agreement. The changes were 
striking: from an approach based on industry to industry private agreements which had 
no international dimension to govemment-to-govemment agreements implying a set of 
international obligations and rights; from a strategy to resist restrictions on exports to a 
full adherence to the voluntary export restraints model; from a process based on the will 
and capacity of a single man, John Cowperthwaite, to the creation of an institutional and 
professional structure to act internationally and the set up of a system of external 
representation; from no autonomy in external relations to an increasing degree of 
autonomy first in controlling and conducting the substance of negotiations and then by 
exercising a de facto autonomy in jus tractum, later legitimised by the 1969 devolution 
of powers act.
By the late 1960s HK had definitely gained autonomy in external affairs but only in a 
specific area -  trade -  an evolution which has a clear parallel with the experience of the 
old Dominions except the fact HK was not granted constitutional self-government. At 
the same time other areas like shipping and civil aviation were, in contrast, still under 
the tight control of London, and civil aviation international agreements continued to be 
negotiated and signed by Britain.
The multilateral phase: HK in GATT in the 1970s
The participation of HK in multilateral organisations in particular GATT in the 1970s 
gave an important boost to HK’s international image and status. This marked the 5
5 Interview with William Dorward, 21.1. 2001.
beginning of a second phase where the level of autonomy in managing external 
commercial affairs increased.
By 1969, HK was participating in different capacities in eight main multilateral 
organisations of universal and regional nature: GATT, ESCAP, UNCTAD, OECD, 
UNDP, the APO (full member), ADB (full member). Among these multilateral 
organisations the GATT was by far the most important and strategic one for HK, 
constituting one of the pillars of HK’s international participation.
The status of HK in GATT was particularly interesting and sui generis. Since 1947 and 
until 1986 HK was not a contracting party of GATT on its own. The UK was the 
contracting party that had applied the GATT rules to HK and acceded to GATT on 
behalf of HK. It must be stressed that the fact HK was not a contracting party to GATT 
did not mean it was not protected by the GATT system. By virtue of the UK 
membership and extension to HK, the Colony could legally react to the violation of 
GATT rules by third countries likely to affect its rights. This gave HK some bargaining 
power and explains why importing countries were so interested in obtaining HK’s 
agreement to restrain exports, because otherwise they had, in order not to violate GATT 
rules, to resort to anti-dumping or safeguard mechanisms under GATT.
The GATT negotiation process of the 1974 Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) marked a 
turning point in HK’s international participation and identity and made a decisive 
contribution to consolidate HK’s autonomy in external commercial affairs.
Negotiations started in 1972. HK was extremely interested in these negotiations because 
of its potential impact on the entire textile industry which accounted then for more than 
50% of HK’s exports. In these negotiations HK was represented by William Dorward, a 
HK official recently appointed head of the Geneva Trade Office. This constituted an 
important innovation as he was the first ever HK official to be allowed to hold that 
position. Dorward was a member of the “administrative officers’’ elite bureaucracy with 
a vast experience in trade matters and international bilateral negotiations. His
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designation clearly showed that the HK Government felt the need to have its own people 
in charge and has strongly pressed for his appointment to conduct the negotiations and 
defend HK interests on the spot.
HK played a high profile and very relevant role in the MFA negotiations116. It made an 
important contribution to structure and strengthen the developing countries exporters’ 
position in the negotiations, through leadership in technical matters, by providing advice 
to the developing countries group on the contents and implications of the draft 
agreement and warning against the most important threats to exporters’ interests.
Moreover, it has also actively contributed to the negotiations by playing a broker role at 
two levels. First within the developing countries group by bridging positions between 
different interests, namely between “old” and “new” exporters, a role that was accepted 
because HK was seen as more neutral than other countries, like India. This has certainly 
contributed to a greater co-ordination and a more unified stand of exporting countries. 
Second, to a lesser extent, HK has also helped bridging the differences between 
developed and developing countries, importers and exporters, taking advantage of its 
credibility and good relations with the developed group. For instance, HK gave an 
important contribution to the debate leading to the creation of a textile surveillance body 
as a control mechanism.
The high profile of HK during the early stages of the negotiations culminated in its 
direct participation in the very restricted group that conducted behind closed doors the 
final stage of negotiations and struck the final agreement. This group included six 
actors: the US, EEC, Japan, India, Brazil and HK117. The participation in the inner 
circle, where HK was the only non-sovereign entity, constituted not only a recognition 
of HK’s economic power and strong position in world textiles trade, but also an 
international recognition of its autonomy in conducting external trade relations, the more
116 Interview with William Doward. 21.1. 2001. 
11 Interview with William Dorward. 21.1.2001
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so as the UK did not attend these final meetings, because as a EEC member its interests 
were represented by the European Commission.
HK’s international visibility reached a high level without precedent in HK’s history of 
international participation, in particular in a multilateral forum. It is important to 
understand how this qualitative change came about. I would argue that three key factors 
accounted for this unprecedented role of a NCG in an international organisation.
Firstly, HK possessed a high level of expertise and technical competence in textiles trade 
which enabled HK to play a leadership role among the exporter’s group and to be seen 
as a credible interlocutor by developed countries. This was mainly the result of the 
relevant experience acquired during 10 years of intense bilateral negotiations on cotton 
textiles. Indeed, the bilateral phase was a crucial condition for the affirmation of HK’s 
influence in multilateral fora.
Secondly, the success of the efforts developed by HK, namely by Dorward, to cultivate 
ties and become accepted in the developing countries circle. In the beginning of 
negotiations HK was regarded with suspicion by developing countries, as it was seen as 
controlled by Britain and closer to the developed countries group. Dorward felt HK 
faced a problem of credibility because it was difficult to convince developing countries 
that HK’s interests were coincident with theirs.
The decisive factor for HK to gain the confidence and get accepted in the circle was the 
close relationship with Brazil. Being a large and very influential country within the 
developing group, more moderate than other leading countries like India or Indonesia, 
Brazil was chosen as a strategic “entry point” and Dorward started cultivating ties with 
the Brazilian Ambassador and chief negotiator in Geneva, Marcelo Raffaelli. Brazil 
became HK’s most important ally and the main sponsor of its acceptance in the 
developing countries circle. The perception of the G-77 on HK changed. If this 
confidence had not existed HK would have never been able to influence developing 
countries positions and through this the outcome of negotiations.
Thirdly, the UK entry into the EEC in January 1973, during the negotiations, had a very 
important effect in terms of facilitating HK’s greater de facto autonomy in conducting 
multilateral commercial negotiations in GATT. In fact, the UK became diluted in the 
EEC and lost its direct voice in GATT because of the Commission’s exclusive 
competence in trade matters. The HK representative, now a HK official, sat in the EEC 
delegation besides the Commission. Not only was he allowed to express his views in 
parallel with the Commission, but also his positions were frequently different and often 
in contradiction with the European common position.
This contrast contributed to strengthen HK’s separate identity. HK emerged therefore as 
a sui generis and unprecedented case, a non-sovereign entity which adopted positions 
different from the delegation in which it was formally integrated. The important point 
was that the international community accepted and responded with flexibility to this 
unknown situation, granting HK a new and unparalleled status of a “quasi-contracting 
party”.
The involvement of HK in the MFA negotiations had important implications for HK’s 
autonomy. On the one hand, HK’s autonomy and separate voice were strengthened and 
more than that legitimised and recognised by the international community at large. This 
implied a qualitative change because during the bilateral phase recognition of HK’s 
international personality was made on a case-by-case basis and by a limited number of 
countries, the signatories of bilateral agreements. Now this was a much broader 
recognition of HK’s capacity to act internationally.
On the other, the MFA process had a far-reaching implication for HK’s international 
identity. It added a new element to it, the developing country status, as HK became an 
active member of the developing group. Before the negotiations HK was more 
associated with the OECD Group, participated in Group B meetings in UNCTAD and 
had closer links mainly with developed countries because of the bilateral negotiation 
process.
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The MFA negotiation process represented the resolution of this ambiguity and the clear 
option for a new strategy to join the developing countries camp and side with its 
interests in order to strengthen its bargaining position. In so doing HK was adapting to 
the new challenges of a more difficult and politicised international context marked by 
the New International Economic Order debate. HK realised that in order to defend its 
interests it could no longer rely on the letter of agreements and the skills of its 
negotiators alone against the protectionism of OECD countries. It had to make alliances 
and join in with developing countries that shared similar interests, in order to reduce its 
vulnerability and enhance its bargaining position, namely by influencing the developing 
countries’ positions.
The exercise of this de facto autonomy in conducting external commercial relations, was 
a catalyst for the emergence of an international identity which was axed on four main 
distinctive traits: (i) Free trade champion against the tide of protectionism; (ii) a 
responsible and trustworthy player which respected the letter and spirit of agreements 
and complied to its obligations; (iii) a facilitator of agreements helping to bridge 
divergent positions between importers and exporters, developed and developing 
countries; (iv) a developing country identity.
2.3.TIIE EMERGENCE OF HONG KONG AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL CENTRE AND AUTONOMY IN MONETARY AFFAIRS
The main purpose of this section is to understand the factors that accounted for HK’s 
development as an international financial centre and what role did this play in the 
emergence of HK as an autonomous player in the international system. The hypothesis 
that will be tested is that the financial dimension might have been a more important basis 
than trade for the affirmation of HK's external autonomy and identity.
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After WWII HK’s financial sector experienced a considerable expansion that resulted 
from the interplay between three different factors"8. Firstly, the postwar second wave 
industrialisation started in the early 1950s18 19, has not only been supported by the 
banking sector in terms of credit but has in turn generated an increasing demand for 
banking services. Secondly, the 1949 communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the 
growing Cold War tension and instability in the region, caused unrest in many areas, 
namely in Southeast Asia, leading to large inflows of capital from China and Southeast 
Asia into HK seeking security. HK was regarded as a neutral and safe place and so 
capital, just like people, took refuge there. Thirdly, the Chinese Overseas factor and the 
fact HK developed a new role as a “financial entrepot” as the HK banks became the 
main players in channelling overseas remittances to residents in China leading HK to 
become the world capital of the Overseas Chinese businesses120.
The banking sector and banking crises
In the postwar period the financial sector was still characterised by a low degree of 
complexity and sophistication as it was limited to banks. Other financial institutions 
were underdeveloped, in particular the stock exchange. As a consequence the financial 
expansion was mainly the expansion of the banking sector which accelerated from 1954 
onwards based on the growth in size and strength of a core group of institutions rather 
than on the expansion in the number of banks. In fact, the number of licensed banks 
decreased from 143 in 1948 to 94 in 1954 and 74 in 1972 but in contrast the number of 
branches increased from 3 in 1954 to 404 in 1972121.
During this phase the sector was also characterised by the dominant position in the 
market of the British banks, in particular, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC), by far the largest commercial bank in HK. However, although
118 See Y.C. Jao, Banking and Currency in Hong Kong -  a study o f postwar financial development. 
Macmillan Press, London 1974, pp. 18, 43.
119 The beginning of HK industrialisation dates back to the early 1930s when a number of industries were 
established to take advantage of the Imperial Preference System created by the 1932 Ottawa Agreements -  
see Jao, “Financing Hong Kong's postwar industrialisation -  the role o f the Hong Kong and Shaneai
Banking Corporation" in Frank King (ed.) Eastern Banking -  essays in the history o f the H o n g  Kong and 
Sliangai Banking Corporation. Albione. London, 1983, pp. 545-596.
I_" Enright et all (eds ). The Hong Kong Advantage. Oxford Lbiiversity Press, 1997. pp. 65-70
controlled by British capital, the Bank had its headquarters located in HK and not in 
London. This implied that the HSBC was not subject to supervision of British monetary 
authorities and this constituted an interesting early sign of the autonomy of HK’s 
financial sector vis-à-vis Britain.
Another important feature of the banking system was the absence of a Central Bank and 
the unparalleled situation of having private banks performing some of its duties. 
Although public institutions retained some functions, the majority was performed by 
private banks, in particular the HSBC which had a “quasi-central bank” status, 
illustrating the considerable power private banks possessed in HK’s financial system.
In the area of monetary policy their power was further enhanced because in the absence 
of the majority of traditional instruments, the banks controlled the only instrument left, 
interest rates. In fact, under the Interest Rate Agreement established in July 1964 by the 
Exchange Banks Association, licensed banks started to co-ordinate their positions on 
exchange rates and to set the maximum rates of interest for deposits in HK dollars in 
order to curb harmful competition, in function of their short term commercial interests 
and not of HK’s economy long term interests. The Government did not possess any 
effective means to influence interest rates122 which were not in reality an instrument of 
discretionary macroeconomic policy.
However, autonomy in banking had limitations and tended to be restricted from time to 
time. In periods of banking crises the level of influence of Britain increased and 
autonomy was restrained while during expansionary periods the role of London tended 
to decline. A key area where London’s intervention was felt from time to time with 
some intensity was in banking laws. After the 1965 banking crisis, visits of experts from 
London took place to supervise the revisions of the 1964 Ordinance and, again, in 1984, 
in the middle of the 1982-86 crisis.
1:1 On the hanking structure see Jao. on.cit pp. ?2-46.
122 Interview with Lord Sandberg, former Chairman ofllK SBC, 24.4.2001.
From this perspective HK possessed a considerable level of autonomy in managing its 
financial system in relation to Britain. Interestingly, this autonomy was a consequence of 
the extensive powers gained by private banks in the management of the system and not 
of HK Government gaining autonomous powers. In fact, it was exactly the circumstance 
the HK Government had little control over the system that made possible the 
reinforcement of the role of the private sector, which in turn led to autonomy. 
Paradoxically, this also generated the seeds for restrictions to autonomy. In fact, 
successive crises caused by lack of proper supervision and the fact banks could not 
control themselves, paved the way for temporary reassertion of control by Britain. 
London was mainly concerned with the potential negative impact of HK financial 
problems on the Sterling Area and with the risk it could, as the sovereign power, be held 
internationally responsible for HK’s liabilities in case of collapse of the banking system.
However, this domestic autonomy was not translated into external autonomy in financial 
matters. One can even argue that this restriction of internal autonomy was a condition 
for the successful internationalisation of HK’s financial system as it tended to create 
pressure for HK to adapt to international standards and restore confidence in HK’s 
banking sector.
The stock exchange and capital market
The development of HK’s capital market was an important factor in the process leading 
to the emergence of HK as an international financial centre. It remained small until the 
late 1960s, with a low level of transactions, limited to domestic operators lacking an 
international dimension, justifying its qualification as “parochial”123.
1968 was a benchmark year insofar it marked the beginning of a boom period (1968-72) 
directly associated with structural changes in the market. These changes were not only 
quantitative but also qualitative and included four main aspects124. First, the remarkable 
growth of the nominal turnover started in 1968 and further expanded in the following
ir’ Jao. op.cit.. pp. 81
124 Jao. op. l it .. p.83-87
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years so that in 1972 the nominal turnover was 46 times that of 1968. Secondly, the 
sharp rise in stock prices measured by the Hang Seng Index, which rose from 107.55 at 
the end of 1968 to 843.40 at the end of 1972. Thirdly, the number of stocks listed more 
than tripled rising from 59 in 1968 to 190 in 1972, implying greater number of operators 
and greater diversification of companies. Fourthly, the internationalisation of the stock 
exchange as for the first time foreign stocks began to be quoted and overseas brokers 
were admitted, led by British and Japanese stocks looking for new opportunities.
This boom was induced by the international climate of euphoria surrounding stock 
markets as a result o f high growth rates, but there were also causes specific to HK which 
played a decisive role: China’s foreign policy reorientation and alignment with the US in 
the context of the Cold War; the stability of the HK dollar; a favourable tax system; and, 
above all, the absence of any regulation on stock market activities allowing operators to 
act freely in the market.
The unregulated nature of HK’s stock market and its low maturity was probably one of 
the key factors to explain international interest in it as doubtful players were given the 
possibility to conclude operations and commit irregularities that could not be committed 
in more developed capital markets subject to tighter supervision. So, HK became 
competitive and attracted capital because it adopted in the early stages lower standards 
than those prevailing at the international level, implying lower transaction costs.
Currency and exchange rate policy
The currency and exchange rate policy was probably the segment of the financial sector 
where traditionally HK had less autonomy and London’s influence was stronger. That is 
why the process by which HK gained considerable autonomy in managing the HK dollar 
and its external reserves had greater visibility and constituted a more radical departure 
from past practices.
In fact until 1967, the benchmark year for the affirmation of HK’s autonomy, HK had 
little room to follow its own exchange rate policy. London’s influence was very strong
'))
as the HK dollar had a fixed peg with the pound since 1935 and, as a member of the 
Sterling Area since 1941, was forced to hold its reserves exclusively in sterling125, which 
implied a very high exchange risk. In addition, HK had no autonomy in exchange rate 
policy and was bound to automatically follow the changes in the UK policy.
That was the case with the significant devaluation of the pound in 1949 by 30,5% which 
determined a devaluation of the HK dollar of the same magnitude. In November 1967 
the pound was again devalued by 14,3% and HK’s first reaction was to follow pari 
passu this devaluation. In both cases the devaluation of the HK dollar was a mere 
mechanical consequence of London’s decision geared by adjustments required by the 
British economy, not by the HK economy. This artificial decision had high costs for 
HK.
However, the 1967 devaluation was immediately followed by an unprecedented decision 
with profound consequences for the assertion of HK’s monetary autonomy. The 
sequence of events is revealing: on 18 November 1967 Britain decided to devalue the 
pound by 14,3% and gave 4 hours prior notice to the HK Government; on 20 November 
the HK dollar was devalued by the same rate; three days later the HK Government 
decided on 23 November to revise its prior decision and re-valued the HK dollar by 10 
% leaving a residual devaluation of only 5.7 %126. The first reaction on 20 November 
was still a “conditioned act” determined by past experience but mainly by the concern to 
protect HK banks’ interests and to prevent heavy losses to Banks and the Exchange 
Fund given the fact their reserves were held in sterling.
Following the negative reactions in HK, the Government decided to take a step back and 
appreciated the HK dollar against the pound because of the potential negative impact on 
prices. This was the first manifestation of HK’s autonomy in monetary affairs without 
parallel in British colonial history. It showed that HK had divergent interests and 
therefore the link with the pound was no longer appropriate for HK’s economic
1:5 HK Annual Report 1969. HK Government Press 1970. In 1967 99% of UK's external reserves were 
held in sterling.
l:<> See Jao. op.cit.. pp. 143 -144
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conditions. Furthermore, it had also a symbolic impact proving that colonial currency 
could be stronger and more stable than the currency of the colonial master.
The upwards revaluation resulted in heavy losses for local banks and the Exchange Fund 
leading HK to another manifestation of autonomy by exercising its bargaining power 
vis-à-vis Britain, forcing London to enter into negotiations to find some form of 
protection against the risks of future sterling devaluation. Not only was an agreement 
reached in June 1968, whereby Britain offered a mechanism to reduce the risk, but HK’s 
initiative was pivotal in relation to other members of the Sterling Area which, based on 
HK’s precedent, started pressing London for similar protection leading finally to the 
Basle Agreement of July 1968, a last attempt to save the Sterling Area127.
The second benchmark occurred in 1972 when, after Britain decided in June to float the 
pound, HK took the decision to break the link with sterling and peg the HK dollar to the 
US dollar. This was not a mere manifestation of autonomy but a major advancement 
towards a real monetary independence leading to an irreversible separation from 
Britain’s exchange rate policy and to greater capacity to take decisions more adapted to 
HK’s economic reality. This marked also the end of the Sterling Area and therefore the 
end of membership obligations contributing also to greater autonomy.
As a result of this evolution, a process of structural change in HK’s monetary affairs 
took place in less than a decade. By the mid-1970s HK possessed its own currency, 
independent from the UK currency, internationally credible and convertible. Moreover, 
it was internationally recognised as a strong and stable currency, contrary to other 
important currencies during this period, and would remain so until 1977, backed by 
considerable reserves. Also important, HK proved to have the capacity and will to 
manage an autonomous exchange rate policy gradually consolidated from 1967 onwards. 
The fact HK did not resort to competitive devaluations to face growing international
127 Under the Basle Agreement Britain guaranteed to all Sterling Area members, the US dollar value of all 
officially held sterling in excess of 10 % of each country's official external reserves. In exchange Sterlinu 
Area members committed themselves to maintain a minimum o f their reserves in sterliim - Jao. op cit. pp 
144-145.
competition, partly possible because of an extremely effective external trade policy, 
gained HK credibility and reinforced the image, like in trade, of a fair player.
This assertion of monetary independence, a typical area of sovereignty, by a non­
sovereign entity was unknown and without precedent in the international system. HK’s 
case was absolutely unique and had no parallel among NCGs thus contributing to shape 
HK’s international identity. This autonomy would be strengthened throughout the 1970s 
but in the early 1980s there was an interesting reversal, a temporary decline in autonomy 
as a consequence of London’s active intervention in the solution of the 1983 HK dollar 
crisis, culminating in the panic reactions of the Black Saturday of 24 September. This 
was clearly the worst ever crisis of the HK currency and a severe blow to its credibility.
This crisis was certainly triggered by the crisis of confidence associated with the 
deadlock in the Sino-British negotiations on the future of HK and the failure of the 4th 
round. It was no coincidence that the 4th round communiqué was issued on 23 
September, exactly on the eve the HK dollar collapse, proving that political tension can 
have damaging effects on markets.
The eminence of a serious financial crisis and the political repercussions on the 
negotiation process, with China accusing Britain of sabotage and deliberately provoking 
instability just to prove how indispensable British administration was for the stability of 
HK, set the stage for Britain’s strong intervention.
Pressed by circumstances and the need to find a solution, the Government asked an 
economist from the private sector, John Greenwood128 to present and explain his 
proposal of a fixed peg put forward in August 1983129 for the réintroduction of the 
system of issue-banks paying foreign currency for the issue of new HK dollars.
1:8 Interview with John Greenwood on 23.1.2001. Based in HK, he was the editor o f  a bi-monthly 
economic journal The Asian Monetary Monitor. y
Greenwood. How to Rescue the Hong Kong Dollar" in Asian Monetary Monitor Nov-Dee 1983 
pp.9-37.
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There was clear hesitation and resistance on the part of the HK Government to 
Greenwood’s proposal. Given the political context in which the crisis was taking place 
with high tension between Britain and China over the negotiations deadlock, the 
decision had important implications and so London became actively involved in the 
decision making process in two different ways. Firstly, a high level meeting was held on 
29 September in the British Embassy in Washington involving the Prime Minister and 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, senior officials of the Bank of England and Alan 
Walters, were the HK dollar crisis was discussed as well as Greenwood solution. One of 
the main concerns was that with a fixed exchange rate if an attack on the HK dollar 
would follow, the pressure on HK reserves would be severe and Britain would be 
politically obliged to cover the deficit and put her own reserves at risk.
Secondly, two British officials, Charles Goodhart a Bank of England official, and David 
Peretz, Treasury official, were sent to HK to assess locally the situation and to what 
extent the Greenwood plan could work. After making several contacts with different 
players they endorsed the Greenwood plan. Their position was crucial to break the HK 
Government resistance and was the basis for London’s approval130. Their intervention 
was decisive for the adoption of the new system of the HK dollar fixed peg to the US 
dollar. Although there was a concern to show that such an important decision on the HK 
dollar was taken in HK for political reasons. However, and unlike the decisions on 
monetary affairs in 1972 and 1974, this time London exerted a strong influence behind 
the scenes. This change, explained both by the gravity of the financial situation and the 
political sensitivity associated with the Sino-British negotiations, represented a reversal, 
though a temporary one, in HK’s autonomy in monetary affairs.
UK’s emergence as an international financial centre
The rise of HK as an international financial centre started in the early 1970s and 
involved a gradual process which was going to last almost a decade. The resolution of 
the 1983 crisis marked in a sense the consolidation of this process. This would lead HK 
to become an important financial centre, translated not only in the large number of
Interview with Charles Goodhart. 15.3.2000.
international banks and other financial institutions present in HK, but also in the specific 
functions HK plays involving 5 major aspects131: a capital exporting centre; a loan 
syndication centre; a centre of securitisation; a foreign exchange trading centre and an 
international gold trading centre.
The year of 1972 represented an important benchmark in this process because of the 
coincidence of three events: the HK dollar de-link from sterling and the consolidation of 
HK’s monetary independence; the consolidation of the internationalisation of the stock 
exchange which reached in that year a historical peak in terms of volume of transactions 
and number of stock quoted; and China realignment with the US in the Cold War 
context. Besides the autonomy of the HK dollar and the fact it was then a strong and 
stable currency, other factors have also played a role in the rise of HK as an international 
centre.
On the domestic front, three aspects seem to have been particularly relevant: (i) the 
advancement of financial liberalisation when the moratorium on the issue of new 
banking licences imposed in 1966 was lifted in March 1978 allowing the entry of large 
financial institutions as fully licensed banks; (ii) the national treatment clause meaning 
that foreign banks are treated on equal footing as domestic banks; (iii) low transaction 
costs as a result of low taxes on profits, the absence of requirement to maintain statutory 
non-interests bearing reserves deposit insurance scheme, when compared to other 
financial centres132.
On the external front, there were four fundamental causes. Firstly, the location 
economics factor, associated with the specific advantage HK possessed because it is 
located in a favourable time-zone it filled the gap derived from large time differences 
between the US Pacific Coast and Europe enabling the existence of a world-wide 24
131 For a detailed analysis o f these functions see Jao (ed.) Hong Kong banking system in transition: 
problems, prospects and policies. Chinese Banks Association Ltd, Asian Research Service,HK.,1988, pp 2- 
16.
1,2 Transaction costs for foreign banks are in general higher in other Asian financial markets namely 
Singapore. Australia, Japan and South Korea -  for a 1986 comparison see Jao (ed.) op. cit.. table 1.9 page 
22 .
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hour market in banking. Secondly, structural changes in the banking system as 
multinational banks since the early 1970s started to establish branches in all major 
financial centres as an attempt to escape the high regulation at home. HK as an offshore 
banking centre attracted the great majority of the world top banks reaching a total 
number of 116 foreign banks in 1986133. So HK benefited from the reorganisation of 
multinational banks and the beginning of globalisation in this sector closely associated 
with the functioning of offshore banking.
Thirdly, the growing importance of the China factor, started in 1972 with China’s 
realignment with the West, further intensified with the 1978 “open door policy” as the 
gradual resumption of a trade entrepot role in the China trade and the consolidation of a 
“financial entrepot” role raised international interest in HK and led many financial 
institutions and firms to be located in HK as a platform to enter the China market.
Finally, I would argue that there is another important factor which tends to be ignored, 
the increase in outward investment and the internationalisation of HK banks and big 
firms’ activities which contributed also to strengthen HK’s status as an international 
financial centre and gave a major boost to its international visibility.
This phenomenon started in the late 1970s under the leadership of the HSBC which 
initiated an internationalisation process and diversification of activities leading to its 
transformation from a regional bank into a real multinational bank. This process was 
implemented by Michael Sandberg, who became the Chairman of the bank in 1978, on 
the basis of a “three-legged” strategy pointing to a strong presence in three regions, 
Asia, the US and Western Europe, through the acquisition of large and prestigious banks 
in those markets.
The benchmark in this process was the acquisition in 1980 of the Marine Midland Bank 
from New York, then the 12lh largest American bank. This was an extremely important
The number o f foreign banks grew very rapidly from 40 in 1974 to 79 in 1980 and 116 in 1986. This 
was mainly explained by the considerable increase o f American and Japanese banks which accounted for 
40% of the total- Jao and Association of Chinese Banks (ed.), op.cit.. pp 31. table 1.15.
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and mediatic process given that it was then the largest bank acquisition in the US 
history. As a consequence, the process leading to the acquisition had a great impact and 
provoked initially a strong protectionist reaction first on the part of New York State 
authorities and then by Federal Authorities, namely the Federal Reserve, which, fearing 
the foreign control of a large American bank and the precedent it would set for other 
pending cases, tried to block the acquisition by HSBC. The decision-making process 
has even involved the Congress making this a highly visible political issue134.
This process contributed to HK’s high international visibility and also to the recognition 
by the world’s largest financial market of the power and credibility of the largest HK 
bank, at the same time it represented the birth of the first HK multinational group. This 
operation had a tremendous impact in HKSBC’s international profile: it jumped from the 
71st position in the world bank ranking in 1979 to become the 27lh largest bank in 
1983135 and became the largest foreign bank in the US. The internationalisation of the 
HSBC, the symbol of HK financial sector and the “HK Bank”, was a projection of HK’s 
economic power and an important catalyst for the internationalisation of other economic 
groups.
Implications for IIK’s international status
The rise of HK as an international financial centre contributed to boost HK’s 
international visibility and added a new dimension to HK’s international identity. In 
some aspects this new dimension was complementary and consistent with the identity 
developed in trade insofar as it projected the image of an economically powerful and 
responsible player, with autonomy in decision-making, but in others it was different and 
even at odds with the trade dimension. In fact the development of the financial 
dimension of HK’s international identity occurred at the same time HK was trying to 1
1 ’4 For an interesting and detailed account of the process of negotiations and the difficulties in obtaining 
the US authorities approval for the acquisition see Frank King. The History of the Hone Kone and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation Vol IV “The Hong Kong Bank and the period of development and 
nationalism 1941-1984: from regional bank to multinational group” , Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge. 1991, pp 807-849 w ”
assert a developing country status in trade in the mid 1970s. Clearly, the status of an 
international financial centre brought HK closer to the developed countries group 
introducing a contradiction with HK’s international identity in trade and creating a clear 
ambiguity in HK’s international image.
In addition, while in trade HK was a completely free economy with no barriers to trade 
flows, in finance the image was somehow different and less liberal because HK 
possessed barriers to entry into the banking sector, a result of the 1966 moratorium on 
bank licences. Finally, while in trade HK’s external relations were more driven by 
conflict and the need to counteract raising protectionism from developed countries 
giving rise to a more aggressive position on the part of HK, in finance relations were 
more complementary and less tense both with other developed financial markets and 
with developing countries.
The impact of the financial dimension on HK’s international status and external 
autonomy was also different from trade in three different ways. Firstly, its impact was 
mainly to cultivate the informal side of HK’s external relations. In fact the process 
involved mainly private non-state actors, private business from HK and multinational 
foreign firms, rather than ties between HK and foreign states and governments like in 
trade. The international recognition of HK status as a financial centre was 
fundamentally a process led by private financial institutions, not by governments.
Secondly, the financial dimension unlike trade did not contribute to the consolidation of 
HK’s international personality, as it did not originate international rights and obligations 
for HK or the exercise of “treaty making powers”. The process that took place was 
merely the transposition to the domestic legal system of international norms and 
standards to regulate the emerging financial sector.
\ \  oild Banking Annual Survey various issues 1073-1985 Investors Chronicle (67,d 68'1' and 7 T'd 
Annual Surveys) The Economist .
Thirdly, it had little impact in terms of the development of the multilateral dimension as 
HK did not acquire membership of international financial organisations, given the 
restriction to sovereign States, nor developed any form of autonomous participation. 
Despite the status as an international financial centre, the international system in this 
field was unable to accommodate HK’s sui generis nature. However, this did not 
constitute a significant obstacle for the consolidation of HK’s financial power, partly 
because it occurred in, and benefited from, a context of international financial de­
regulation and globalisation, exactly when the power of intergovernmental financial 
institutions and governments over financial markets started to decline.
2.4. HONG KONG EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION
The exercise of the jus legationis and the development of a system of external 
representation constituted an important manifestation of HK's capacity to act 
internationally on its own. This contributed to strengthen HK’s external autonomy in 
particular because this implied a clear recognition of its international personality on the 
part of sovereign States where representative offices were located.
HK was the first NCG to create representative offices in foreign countries and so had a 
pioneering role in the use of this important instrument of paradiplomacy. This started in 
the late 1950s and constituted a long process that took some time to consolidate. This 
section will analyse the process leading to the creation of autonomous representative 
offices and the pattern of relations between HK and London on this matter.
Origins and evolution of HK’s Economic and Trade Offices
The creation of government trade offices was a gradual process that went through four 
different phases.
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The first phase (1952-63) started in the mid 1950s involving the creation of the HK 
Office in London in 1955, the transformation of the HK Government Agency in Japan 
into the HK section of the British Embassy in Tokyo in 1952, and the creation of the 
Sydney Office in 1959. The rationale behind the last two offices was not the affirmation 
of HK’s autonomy but simply trade promotion. On the contrary, their creation reflected 
then the affirmation of the UK monopoly and control over HK external affairs. The HK 
autonomous commercial representation office in Tokyo was absorbed in the British 
Embassy and the creation of the Sydney Office was negotiated and approved by the 
British and the Australian Governments in June 1959 with no participation of HK136.
This first phase involved mainly ad hoc initiatives, exclusively directed to trade 
promotion, disintegrated from any global strategy for external relations, and therefore 
had no impact on the development of HK’s external autonomy.
The second phase (1964-1972) started in mid 1960s and involved the creation of three 
trade offices, first in Brussels in 1965, followed by Washington in 1966 and Geneva in 
1967. This marked the launching for the first time of the basic framework of a system of 
external representation and, unlike the previous phase, corresponded to the purposeful 
implementation of a HK planned strategy to respond to new international challenges.
The creation of the Offices was an initiative of the HK Government, which made a 
formal proposal to London. In the case of Brussels the Governor proposed the creation 
of a trade office in 1963 in a formal communication137 and with respect to Washington 
the proposal was presented to the British Government in 1964138. In both cases the 
proposal was inspired by the earlier creation of private representation offices in Brussels 
and New York at the joint initiative of the Federation of HK Industries and the HK 
General Chamber of Commerce.
136 Hong Kong Reports, 1955 to 1960 issues. HK Government
U7 PRO File CO 1030-1631
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However, these offices faced important limitations in their autonomy, imposed by 
London. The process of creation of the Washington Office is particularly interesting in 
this respect. In fact the Governor in his 1964 proposal139 wanted the Office to have 
some autonomy and a wide range of competencies, including the possibility to conduct 
direct official negotiations with the US Government in trade matters. For that he 
proposed the Office should have separate premises from the Embassy and the Head of 
the Office, although attached to the UK representation, should not be made a part of it 
and should enjoy full diplomatic status and privileges. In addition, he proposed to 
appoint a HK Official, Mr Barlow from the Commerce and Industry Department, to head 
the Office.
Although the London comments were in general positive, there was a strong reaction 
against two main aspects of the proposal. On the one hand, the Head of the Office 
should be fully integrated in the British Ambassador staff, a solution justified by the 
concern to avoid any divergence between UK and HK positions. On the other, the 
Officer should not be able to contact directly the US Government Departments, in 
particular the State Department, and could only do that through the Embassy. Clearly the 
Foreign Office wanted to preserve the UK competencies in managing HK’s external 
affairs. Britain’s control would be further affirmed as London rejected the designation of 
a HK official and imposed an UK official, Mr A. Hermann, a diplomatic service officer. 
The same position was adopted in the case of the Brussels Office, as London rejected 
once again the Governor’s proposal to appoint a HK Official and imposed a UK Official, 
Mr J. H. Martin, a Colonial Office official140.
So, in the second phase although the creation of trade offices in the major export 
markets (US and Europe) and in Geneva to manage the participation in GATT, 
represented a step forward in enabling HK to pursue its specific interests, the trade 
offices had still important limitations in their autonomy and capacity to project a
| ,l) PRO, file CO 1030/1633 Savingram sent to the Colonial Secretary on 6.6.1964. 
I4'’ See PRO file CO 1030 / 1631
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separate identity. This was due to two fundamental mechanisms used by London to 
preserve its control. First, the formal integration of the HK offices in the British 
Embassies meant not only that the Directors were responsible to the Ambassador more 
than to the HK Government but also there was no autonomous accreditation of HK 
representatives as such.
Secondly, the imposition of UK officials to head the HK trade offices. This constituted 
an obstacle to a more effective defence of HK’s interests, as these officials had limited 
knowledge and contacts with HK, did not identify with its objectives and followed the 
London directives.
The third phase (1973-85) started in the mid 1970s and was marked by a fundamental 
qualitative change that reinforced not only the effectiveness but also the autonomy of the 
ETOs: the designation of HK high officials to head the offices. This trend started with 
the designation of William Dorward to head the Geneva Office in 1973. The fact that the 
directors were from now on HK officials with large experience in trade and economic 
negotiations, with a better understanding of, and more motivation to pursue HK 
interests, contributed to increase the effectiveness of the offices’ action.
Moreover, although still formally integrated in the British embassies and responsible to 
the Ambassador, the Office heads started to report directly to the Trade and Industry 
Department in HK and to take HK directives as the basis for their action. As a 
consequence they started to operate separately from the embassy and in general moved 
to separate premises.
Finally, this phase was also marked by the beginning of the “rotation system” a specific 
and innovative feature of HK’s system of external representation according to which the 
elite bureaucracy moves from domestic posts in very different sectoral areas to external 
posts and back to domestic posts, which became a key factor behind HK’s success in 
international affairs as will be argued below.
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The fourth phase (1985-97), triggered by the signature of the Joint Declaration on the 
future of HK, was characterised by two aspects. First, the expansion of the system with 
the creation of six new offices: in 1986 San Francisco, to cover the West Coast of the 
US and promote ties with the 19 Western States, and New York to cover the East Coast; 
in 1988 Tokyo given the size of the Japanese economic interests in HK and the status of 
Japan as the largest Asian economy; in 1991 Toronto to deal with the Canadian 
Government but also the provinces, taking into account economic interests but also the 
growing HK immigration community; in 1995 Sydney, covering relations both with 
Australia and New Zealand, and Singapore with a more regional vocation dealing with 
relations with ASEAN and also with the APEC Secretariat in Singapore. It should be 
noted that in this phase HK adopted a more decentralised approach illustrated by the San 
Francisco and New York offices and the orientation adopted by the Toronto office, 
investing more in ties with other NCGs.
Second, trade offices gained greater autonomy in relation to British diplomatic structure 
and ceased to be integrated in the UK Embassies, being recognised as autonomous 
representations. In some cases the offices were officially accredited and granted a quasi- 
official status, in particular in Canada where it was accredited under the Foreign 
Missions and International Organisations Act141 and granted diplomatic privileges and 
immunities but also, although less explicitly, in Geneva with WTO as HK became a 
contracting party in 1986, and in Brussels with the European Union.
External representation: factors of success
The creation of economic and trade offices (ETOs) in the mid-1960s was basically a 
response to growing trade protectionism. The primary initial objective was to 
complement and provide support to the process of bilateral negotiations already in 
motion by obtaining accurate information on the strategy of HK partners, anticipating 
changes likely to affect HK and trying to soften the protectionist impetus by maintaining 
regular contacts with Governments. In these contacts the ETOs tried not only to explain
141 James Tang. “Hong Kong's international status" in The Pacific Review, vol.6, no.3, 1993, p.208.
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HK position and assess the evolution of HK trade partners’ trade policy, including 
monitoring changes in trade legislation or administrative practices likely to affect HK 
interests, but also to try and influence the decision-making process and to counteract the 
more radical protectionist positions. This was particularly important in the US where a 
complex activity of lobbying was organised mainly concentrated in the US Congress, 
rather than in the Administration, absorbing a great deal of the office’s time and 
efforts142.
The evolution of trade policies of major players, including the US and EEC, and the 
discussion of possible strategies to approach negotiations with third countries were 
somehow the object of exchanges with London through the London Office, showing that 
the growing autonomy of HK in managing external commercial relations did not mean 
complete separation from London, or absence of contacts or co-ordination with the 
British Government. On the contrary, HK continued to ask for the support and direct 
intervention of London in more complex matters and to benefit from the inputs and 
information the British diplomatic machinery could provide.
The second objective was to make sure HK specific interests were not marginalised and 
sacrificed by the British diplomacy to promote British global interests by trying to make 
the UK diplomacy more open and aware of HK’s specific economic interests. The 
factors of success of HK’s external representation system are closely associated with the 
specific features it assumed since the mid-1970s, in particular three crucial aspects 
which correspond to important innovations in relation to sovereign states external 
representation: the “rotation system”; close co-ordination between the government and 
the private sector for external action; informality and flexibility.
Rotation system
The most important aspect relates to a “rotation system” in which the members of the 
HK elite bureaucracy (administrative officers) placed as heads of the trade offices since 
the early 1970’s would move from domestic posts in very diversified departments to
l4: Interview with William Dm ward, who headed the Washington Of'fiee from 1982-88. 21.1.2001.
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external posts and back again to domestic posts. That was the case with William 
Dorward who after holding a direction position in the commerce and industry 
department was posted as head of the Geneva office, returning to HK in 1978 to become 
the Secretary for Trade and Industry and was again posted in Washington as head of the 
office between 1982-88. Other examples of this system are key members of the HKSAR 
Government in early 2002 like Chau Tak-kay, Secretary for Commerce and Industry143, 
Sandra Lee Suk-yee, Secretary for the Civil Service144, John Tsang Chun-wha, Secretary 
for Planning and Lands145 as well as many other cases, including the current heads of 
HK trade offices146.
The functioning of the rotation system implied that IIK, unlike sovereign states and 
other NCGs, did not possess a specialised body of diplomats but instead used its highly 
qualified generalist top bureaucrats to represent HK externally. This had several 
important and positive implications. First, HK representatives had an unusual high level 
of technical expertise enabling them to exert influence when discussing or negotiating 
with counterparts from other countries, generally traditional diplomats. In addition, 
given their previous domestic experience they knew precisely what HK’s specific 
interests were and so could defend them more effectively abroad. It should also be 
stressed that this system also implied less fragmentation and greater unity within the 
bureaucracy thus avoiding the dysfunctional effects of the usual conflict between 
diplomats and sectoral departments officials.
143 Chau Tak-hay was the Head of the Geneva Office and gained experience in the GATT system in the 
early 80s. After that he returned to HK to become the Director-General o f  Trade in 1990 and the Secretary 
for Trade and Industry in 1991.
144 Sandra Lee was first in the Washington office, as Deputy Director, between 1985-94, then returned to 
HK to become the Deputy Director o f  the Home Affairs Department in 1995, Deputy Secretary for the 
Civil Service in 1996. She was posted abroad again as Director o f the London Trade Office in 1999.
145 John Tsang after having been the Private Secretary to Governor Patten, was posted in the London 
Trade Office as Director-General in 1997 and remained there for two years before returning in 1999 to HK 
to become the Commissioner o f Customs and Excise.
146 Examples are Carlson Chan who after having been posted in the London Office in 1993, returned to 
HK to become the Principal Secretary for Home Affairs in 1996 and was posted abroad again in 1997 as 
the Director o f the Tokyo ETO. Clement Mak, currently Deputy Secretaiy in the Constitutional Affairs 
Bureau was posted in the Washington Office between 1994-96 returning to HK in 1996 to take his current 
post. Raymond Fan is another interesting example as he was Director of the New York Trade Office in 
1991, remmed to HK to become the Principal Assitant Secretary for Education and Manpower, moved to 
the Security Bureau and was posted a second time in the New York ETO in 1998. See Staff Biouranhies. 
The Government of the HKSAR. 1998.
Secondly, this system induced HK elite bureaucracy to acquire a multi-skill training and 
international experience and became aware of the key importance of trade and external 
economic relations for HK’s prosperity. This had important implications in terms of the 
way in which bureaucrats performed domestic posts upon their return to HK. In other 
words, the rotation system leads to establish an effective articulation between domestic 
and international affairs, overcoming artificial boundaries and giving HK a more robust 
capacity to act internationally.
Finally, there was another important objective for HK related to the continuous 
renovation of HK’s public administration147. In fact it is expected that upon their return 
to HK the officials posted abroad can contribute, on the basis of their overseas 
experiences and contacts with foreign bureaucracies, to introduce new ideas and 
solutions to improve the quality of HK’s Public Administration. External representation 
functions were also regarded as posts of observation of other countries’ experiences, and 
bureaucrats as vehicles of innovation and modernisation of HK bureaucracy by 
importing and adapting the best practices to HK’s needs.
Articulation between the private and public sectors
The second feature and strength of the HK representation system is the very close 
articulation and co-ordination between Government and the private sector, in particular 
business associations, in the management of external relations and the co-existence of 
two parallel structures the ETO and Trade and Development Council (TDC) offices. 
This co-ordination was institutionalised in the TDC regarding the definition of the global 
strategy, but manifested itself also at the level of implementation, in the articulation 
between ETOs and the semi-official TDC offices on the ground. This was clearly a 
factor of success for HK’s international activities insofar as by combining the relative 
advantages of public and private actors HK was able not only to explore simultaneously
147 This objective was pointed out to me by Ken l.euim, executive officer in charue of ETOS in the Cl 13 
interview 11.10. 2000.
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formal and informal channels, but also to ensure that external action is consistent and 
relevant to the needs of the business sector.
Furthermore, this co-ordination was also important to keep under control the 
divergences between the HK Government and the business sector on trade policy, i.e. 
the Government’s advocacy of free trade policy and an adherence to protectionism of 
many sectors of HK business, thus reducing the risk of weakening HK’s bargaining 
position.
Implications for HK’s international personality and autonomy
The creation and operation of HK ETOs contributed to project HK’s international 
identity and to consolidate its autonomy in external affairs. The impact was very limited 
during the initial years as a consequence of the formal integration of the offices in the 
British embassies and the substantive control exerted by London on their activity. The 
situation changed when the offices gained autonomy in the mid-1970s becoming more 
effective instruments of external action. The contribution of the external representation 
system was particularly relevant at four levels.
First, it gave HK external action a more permanent and stable nature in contrast with the 
transitory nature of trade negotiations and the exercise of treaty making powers, showing 
the international community that HK international participation was not an episodic 
process but a long lasting phenomenon.
Secondly, it enabled HK to develop simultaneously and in an articulated manner, formal 
official relations with foreign states and informal relations with sub-national units and 
other non-state actors, increasing the level of effectiveness of HK’s external action as it
explored the inter-linkages and complementarities between both channels in the 
domestic decision making process.
l os
Thirdly, the experience provided by trade offices together with the effect of the rotation 
system led to an almost dilution of the boundaries and greater co-ordination between 
domestic and external domains, in the sense that HK started to “think internationally” 
even when taking decisions on apparently domestic issues.
Fourthly, in terms of international identity the external representation system was crucial 
not only to assert HK’s image as a responsible international player but also to contribute 
to manage the tensions and the ambiguity of HK’s double and contradictory identity as a 
developing entity (in trade matters) and a developed entity (in financial matters). 
Finally, in a few cases where HK offices were granted formal diplomatic recognition, 
like in Canada, this contributed to enrich HK’s international personality by conferring a 
limited set of rights reserved to sovereign states.
2.5. HONG KONG BUREAUCRACY AND EXTERNAL AUTONOMY
In order to understand the gradual expansion of HK’s autonomy in external affairs and 
its emergence as an international player it is fundamental to consider a horizontal 
institutional factor, i.e. the action and interests of HK bureaucracy. The importance of 
this factor has not been fully recognised both by the literature on HK external affairs, 
which tends to see HK as a single and coherent player, and by the literature on HK’s 
administrative system, as it tends to look exclusively at the domestic process failing to 
analyse the external dimension.
The argument put forward here contains two different but complementary ideas. First, 
HK’s autonomy in external affairs would not have been possible if the HK bureaucracy 
was not such a powerful group, the dominant player in HK, possessing a large degree of 
autonomy vis-à-vis Britain. In addition, the HK civil service underwent a series of 
structural changes and reforms from the late 1960s onwards, which have contributed to 
its modernisation and prepared the stage for a more intense and purposeful international 
action.
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Secondly, the development of HK’s international participation and status was possible 
because the elite bureaucracy had an objective interest in promoting that process. Its 
corporate interests coincided with, and were best served by, an internationally active HK 
as will be demonstrated.
The HK colonial system of governance was characterised by the existence of a very 
strong and autonomous bureaucracy, which constituted the centre of power, the more so 
as local politics were virtually non-existent and elected politicians an unknown reality 
until 1985. Although formally the power was heavily concentrated in the hands of the 
Governor, appointed by and accountable to London, in reality it was to a great extent 
controlled by career bureaucrats in HK. It should not be forgotten that the Governors 
themselves were career bureaucrats from the British Civil Service and this fact has 
certainly facilitated their relations with the HK bureaucracy. Some authors have 
considered that the dominant role of the bureaucracy in HK reached such an 
unprecedented level that this could be regarded as a distinctive feature of HK. Harris 
qualified HK as one of the best examples of an “administrative state”148 and Lau as a 
“bureaucratic polity”149.
However, this power was not detained by the civil service as a whole but concentrated in 
the hands of a very limited group, the “administrative officers” which constituted the 
elite of HK bureaucracy, representing a very tiny minority, 127 officials in 1973, rising 
to 306 in 1981 and 467 in 1997 which accounts on average for less than 0.3% of the total 
civil service150. This elite was characterised by three fundamental features. First, the 
dominance of expatriates which started to decline only from the late 70s onwards. Until 
the mid-1980s administrative officers were one of the fundamental exceptions to the 
policy of localisation adopted since 1948. However, this did not mean expatriates had a 
strong loyalty to London and managed HK according to British interests. On the
148 Harris P-.Honti Komi: a study in Bureaucratie Politics . Heinemann, Hong Kong, 1988, pp. 70
149 Lau S.K., Society and Politics in Hone Korn’, the Chinese University Press, HK, 1982, pp.26-29
15(1 Ahmed Shafiqui et all(eds). The civ il sen ice in Hone Konu: continuity and chance. HK University 
Press. HK. 1998. pp. 23-24.
contraiy, as a consequence of long service periods, on average between 20-30 years as 
demonstrated by Cheng and Lee151, they identified themselves with local interests and 
became committed to enhance HK’s autonomy vis-à-vis London.
Secondly, administrative officers were generalists, not specialists, who rotated between 
different departments acquiring a varied experience in different areas of Public 
Administration, which enabled them not only to obtain a holistic view of Administration 
but also to promote better co-ordination between different departments, thus avoiding 
fragmentation152.
Thirdly, the dual function, a bureaucratic and a political one. They were top 
administrators and key players in policy implementation but also quasi-ministers since 
some administrative officers were also members of the Executive Council (others 
members of LegCo) taking part in policy decision-making. Unlike the British system 
where bureaucrats and politicians have separate roles and powers and the latter control 
the former, in HK administrative officers cumulated the two functions which contributed 
to strengthen their power the more so as they were not subject to control by elected 
politicians. Scott153 went as far as to argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the 
power in HK did not reside with the traditional Hongs but rather with the elite 
bureaucracy. This position has the merit to call attention to the real magnitude of power 
of bureaucrats in HK but can be considered as too radical as it is more accurate to 
consider there was a real share of power between the business and the bureaucratic 
elites. The alliance between the two is more fundamental to understand the HK system 
of governance than eventual competition.
151 Joseph Cheng and Jane Lee, “The changing attitudes of the senior bureaucrats in UK’s transition” in 
The China Ouaterly 147, September 1996, pp.912-937. They showed that at the level o f Directorate grade 
staff, 24.2% had a length of service between 16-20 years; 21.2% between 21-25 years; and 19.9% between 
26-30 years (table 2 pp.920). In other words 2/3 of the top civil servants had a length of service between
16-30 years and more than 50% had more than 21 years of service.
152 This question has been emphasised by Norman Miners Government and Politics in 1UC 5th edition 
Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 1991 and Ian Scott and John Burns (eds) The Hong Kona Civil 
Service -  personnel.policies and practices, Oxford University Press, London, 1984, and Ian Scott. Political 
chance and the crisis ot legitimacy in Hone Kona. Hurst and Company, London, 1989.
I:,; Ian Scott. op.cit..l9S9, pp. 65, 79
Another key dimension to understand the relevance of the bureaucratic factor for the 
expansion of HK’s international participation, is the far reaching process of reform 
which started to be implemented as a response to the 1967 riots and political turmoil. 
This severely challenged the legitimacy basis of the HK Government and its 
bureaucracy and therefore the main objective was to restore the legitimacy on a more 
robust basis and create the conditions for political stability. This response involved 
structural changes at three levels: (i) the adoption of greater social concerns and the 
active intervention of the Government in fostering social policies; (ii) improvement of 
labour conditions and revision of labour legislation, as poor working conditions were 
clearly one of the ingredients of the 1967 unrest; (iii) the reform of the Civil Service and 
the introduction of administrative innovations based on the 1973 Mackinsey Report 
recommendations154. Two fundamental aspects of the reform were “localisation”, in 
particular in directorate posts where the share of expatriates declined, and the promotion 
of good governance as a result of a determined policy to combat corruption based on the 
creation in 1973 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).
These structural changes, started in 1968 but more consistently implemented during the 
MacLehose governorship, were successful in bringing about an increase in HK’s 
Government legitimacy. An important implication of this, as rightly pointed out by 
Scott, was an expanded autonomy of the bureaucratic elite from both the HK business 
class and from Britain as well as China155. In fact, once the crisis was over and economic 
prosperity and political stability returned to HK, both London and Beijing devoted less 
attention and showed less interest in HK facilitating a further expansion of its autonomy. 
In addition, administrative reforms contributed to increase the efficiency of Public 
Administration and to consolidate the “esprit de corps” thus increasing the bureaucracy 
technical capacity to act both domestically and internationally.
The key argument put forward is that it was exactly the HK elite bureaucracy the driving 
force behind HK’s increasing international activities and expansion of external
154 For a detailed analysis o f the impact of the Mackinsey Report see Scott, op. c it . 1988. pp. 133-140 and 
Miners, op.cit.- pp.94-100.
Ian Scott, op. cit.. 1988. pp. 165.
autonomy, and its members the agents who carried out the plan. John Cowperthwaite, 
the key person who first understood in the early 1960s that in order to maintain its 
prosperity HK had to be active internationally and defend its interests on its own, was an 
administrative officer just like David Jordan, William Dorward or Chau Tak-hay, who 
made important contributions to build HK’s autonomy in external affairs. Furthermore, 
the heads of the ETOs were all administrative officers. This commitment of the HK elite 
bureaucracy to internationalisation can be explained essentially by self-interest insofar 
as the emergence of HK as an international player served the elite’s corporate interests 
in three different ways.
Firstly, it enhanced its prestige and allowed the creation of ties with other bureaucracies 
whose support could be mobilised and from whom HK could secure the transfer of 
institutional “soft technology” to improve HK Administration.
Secondly, given the nature of HK economy, HK’s international participation and 
capacity to defend its interests against protectionism became a crucial condition to 
maintain good economic performance which, in turn, constituted the new legitimacy 
basis of bureaucratic power generating a new source of pressure for the elite bureaucracy 
to act internationally.
Thirdly, the development of HK’s international identity was regarded by the elite 
bureaucracy as a leverage to increase its “room for manoeuvre” in relation to London 
and a mechanism to ensure that the growing contradiction between UK and HK’s 
economic interests did not damage HK’s specific interests. Although initially the 
bureaucracy acted pressed by the HK business elite motivated by short term interests, 
later on towards the end of the 1960s external action became the expression of the elite 
bureaucracy’s own autonomous strategy.
In short, the role of HK elite bureaucracy was decisive to the genesis and success of 
HK s participation in the international system. In contrast with the experience of other 
NCGs where the development of paradiplomacy was mainly driven by local elected
politicians against the opposition of central bureaucracies156, in HK the bureaucracy took 
the lead and pushed forward the process demonstrating a rare capacity to innovate and 
explore new channels. This is to some extent at odds with some aspects of the 
“bureaucratic politics” model analysis157. Interestingly, although in some aspects the HK 
experience is consistent and supports the validity of “bureaucratic politics” showing the 
strong influence of bureaucracy over London’s policy, in other respects the HK case 
deviates from and challenges assumptions of the model as it shows that, under certain 
circumstances, bureaucracy can be a catalyst for change.
The driving force behind UK’s emergence as an international player
After careful consideration of the three hypothesis formulated concerning the origins of 
the process of HK’s emergence as an international player and the development of 
autonomy in external affairs, evidence suggests that trade and HK’s involvement in 
bilateral trade negotiations was the critical key factor. The financial/monetary autonomy 
and external representation factors were less important to explain the genetics of HK’s 
direct participation in the international system. The creation of ETOs not only started 
later in the mid 1960s, essentially as an instrumental mechanism to complement trade 
negotiations, but remained under London’s control until the early 1970s when HK was 
able to appoint its own officials to run the offices.
Similarly, the autonomy in monetary affairs emerged also later towards the end of the 
1960s starting with the 1967 decision to adopt an exchange rate policy different from 
Britain and culminating in the 1972 historic decision to break the HK dollar link with the 
pound. A strong, stable, autonomous and convertible currency was certainly one of the 
ingredients behind the gradual emergence of HK as an international financial centre in 
the course of the 1970s.
156 Michelmann and Soldatos (eds) Federalism and International Relations -  the role of subnational units. 
1990, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 301-303,
1,7 Allison, Essence of decision : explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Little Brown, Boston, 1971. Allison 
disputes the idea that foreign policy is the result o f a purposeful decision of a united government and that 
rationality prevails. The power of bureaucracy is considerable, constraining politicians’ decisions, as it 
controls information and the implementation process. In general bureaucracy tends to be conservative and 
to favour existing precedents opposing change or innovations. Moreover, the process of foreign policy
However, the fact the monetary and the external representation dimensions did not play 
an important role in the genetics, does not mean they were not relevant for the 
development and consolidation of HK’s external autonomy and international identity. 
On the contrary, both made in different ways an important contribution to the 
consolidation and deepening of HK’s international status and autonomy in external 
affairs.
The dynamics of the process of acquisition of autonomy in running external affairs in 
trade matters has been marked by gradualism and informality and evolved in two 
different phases a bilateral phase centred on bilateral trade negotiations on textiles 
exports restrictions, where autonomy evolved from autonomy in conducting negotiations 
to autonomy to sign international bilateral agreements on its own, and a multilateral 
phase, centred around HK’s active participation in GATT and the MFA negotiations. 
HK’s international participation and autonomy in relation to Britain were recognised by 
the entire international community in GATT, granting increased legitimacy to HK’s 
external action, and allowed the emergence of a new identity of HK as a developing 
country, showing how far HK had distanced itself from Britain to the point of joining the 
opposite camp.
The emergence as an international financial centre in the 1970s contributed also to 
strengthen HK’s international status but through different channels and with different 
effects. In fact it did not have an impact at the level of HK’s international personality 
nor did it induce the exercise of treaty making powers or formal relations with foreign 
states. Its impact was concentrated on the most informal dimensions of HK’s external 
relations and involved the recognition of HK’s economic power and international 
participation by non-state actors, in particular TNCs. In the financial area HK became 
closer to developed countries’ interests in clear tension and contradiction with HK’s 
identity in the trade field.
decision-making involves constant bargaining between different domestic groups and search for 
compromise.
The system of external representation has greatly contributed to manage this 
contradiction and to grant some coherence to HK’s external relations. Furthermore it 
contributed to consolidate HK’s international participation, by giving it a more 
permanent character and introducing HK to the circles of diplomacy.
The interaction between these different dimensions led to the consolidation of HK’s 
international identity anchored in four aspects: the image of a free trade champion; a 
reliable partner and fair player which complies to its international obligations and 
international norms; a developing country which in some areas played a leading role; a 
neutral player in Asia in the context of the Cold War, where people and capital seek 
refuge playing even a mediating role in specific conflicts158.
This identity became increasingly complex and dense but also increasingly ambiguous 
which is illustrated by the coexistence and tension between a developing country 
identity, assumed in trade, and a developed country identity in financial matters or by 
the contrast between a free trade philosophy in trade and a protectionist approach in 
monetary and financial matters. This ambiguity became an important characteristic of 
HK’s international identity.
Finally, the evidence also leads us to conclude that HK’s autonomy in external affairs 
was not a generalised across the board phenomenon, on the contrary it was restricted to 
specific areas and its intensity was variable reaching the highest level in trade. There 
was a mixed picture because areas with clear and intense autonomy co-existed with 
areas with no autonomy, where London retained full control until the mid-1980s, such as 
civil aviation in relation to which Britain controlled the entire process of negotiations of 
air services agreements and managed it to the benefit of British Airways159.
158 See Dick Wilson, Hong Kong. Hong Kong!. Unwin Hyman, 1990, pp. 111-125.
159 This was one source o f  conflict between the HK Government and London as pointed out by Lord 
Wilson , interview on 21.5.2001. Also interview with Anthony Baker, Director o f  the International 
Aviation negotiations, UK Government. 18.3.2002. Before 1984, air services agreements were negotiated 
by the UK and HK landing rights were integrated in the overall bilateral agreement concluded by Britain 
with a specific country. After 1984 autonomous ASA on HK started to be negotiated by HK. with the UK
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In sum, although London’s monopoly in managing HK’s external relations was broken 
and challenged as HK consolidated a robust autonomy in trade matters, this did not 
mean Britain lost all its powers and prerogatives. On the contrary, London remained in 
control of many areas and trade became an exception to the rule. However, it set in 
motion a process that London could no longer stop. In the late 1970s autonomy would 
expand to political areas, a process further consolidated with the beginning of the 
transition process to Chinese sovereignty. The dynamics of this process and its impact 
on HK’s international status will be the subject of next chapter.
involvement, but were formally signed by the I K. Interestingly, in the 1004-06 neuotiation process with 
the PRC on HK landing rights. Beijing did not accept to negotiate directly with I IK, only with Britain.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE SINO-BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TRANSITION 
PERIOD -  IMPACT ON HK’S EXTERNAL AUTONOMY AND 
INTERNATIONAL STATUS
The rise of HK as an international player and the gradual assertion of its autonomy in 
external affairs analysed in the previous chapter, led HK to become by the late 1970s an 
unprecedented and unique case, the most powerful NCG possessing the highest degree 
of external autonomy and the most robust international status.
However, HK became also a case of high international significance for a completely 
different reason, the unprecedented process of transfer of sovereignty from a sovereign 
State to another sovereign State, unique in three different respects. For the first time 
since 1945 a colony was not going to become independent and its people denied the 
chance to exercise the right to self-determination under the UN Charter but, instead, was 
going to be integrated in a sovereign State and transformed in an autonomous local 
government. Second, in the context of the Cold War, for the first time a successful 
capitalist economy and an important regional centre for capitalist firms was going to be 
transferred peacefully to a communist State. Thirdly, the transfer and the future of HK 
was going to be submitted to an innovative formula, “one country, two systems” by 
which two contradictory economic systems, capitalist and socialist, coexist inside the 
same country, a solution without precedent in the international system.
This chapter is concerned with the impact of the process of transfer of sovereignty, 
involving both the Sino-British negotiations and the transition period, on HK’s external 
autonomy and international status. Section one provides a brief analysis of the context
and objectives of the Sino-British negotiations on the future of HK, the dynamics of the 
negotiation process and its international impact. Section two addresses the process of 
negotiation of the specific provisions on international affairs contained in the JD, 
looking at the negotiation positions of both China and Britain and their relative inputs. 
Section three deals with the new framework for HK external relations and international 
participation defined by the Basic Law, its structure and the opportunities and 
constraints it poses to HK’s international activities. Section four reflects on the 
interaction between this formal framework and the practice developed during the 
transition period, and the impact this had on HK’s international status.
3.1. SINO-BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG
Retrocession and the international status of HK
The question of the sovereignty over HK and the retrocession to China was settled by 
the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration (JD), an international treaty which introduced a 
fundamental change in HK’s formal international status, marking the beginning of a new 
phase where HK would cease to be a colony and be integrated in another sovereign state, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Since WWII, HK international legal status went through three different phases. The 
post-JD period corresponds to the third stage in this evolution.
During the first stage, despite the Chinese challenge to Britain’s legitimacy following 
the 1942 Kuomintang (KMT) Government request for the return of the New Territories 
in the context of the Chongqing extraterritoriality negotiations160, HK from a legal point 
of view was recognised internationally as a colony whose destiny was to evolve towards 
self-determination. Since 1947 HK was included in the list of colonial territories of the 
UN Special Committee on Decolonisation. Similarly, Britain was internationally
160 See Steve Tsang, Hong Kong: an appointment with China. I.B. Tauris, London, 1997, pp. 30-33. 
These negotiations were intended to end the British concessions in China but the Chinese side considered 
the situation of the leased territories to be similar to the foreign concessions. Given the British opposition
recognised as the sovereign power and in that capacity had to report to the committee on 
a regular basis on HK’s constitutional advancement towards self-government. This 
constituted a source of embarrassment for London because it could neither report any 
progress nor justify why political development could not take place. The British strategy 
was to be as discrete as possible, talk as little as possible and avoid international 
discussions about HK.
In this period there was no divergence between sovereignty and administration, 
internationally they were both concentrated in Britain161. In practice the PRC decided to 
accept the British Administration and the status quo, provided Britain did not allow HK 
to move towards self-government or to be used as a basis of destabilisation by the KMT 
as established in the 1955 understanding162.
There was a fundamental change in this situation in 1972 marking the beginning of the 
second stage. Following China’s realignment with the West in the context of the Cold 
War and its readmission in the UN in 1971, Beijing requested the UN Special 
Committee on Decolonisation, in a letter signed by foreign minister Huang Hua, to 
remove both HK and Macao from the list of colonial territories to be granted 
independence according to the 1960 UN Resolution163. The letter was clearly a 
reaffirmation of the Chinese sovereignty over HK.
There was no serious British opposition to this proposal, the maximum London did to 
safeguard its position was to send a note to the UN Secretary General where it was
to this view, both sides agreed to solve the concessions issue and defer the New Territories issue to a later 
stage. London agreed to raise and discuss the lease problem after the defeat of Japan.
161 Interestingly the Foreign Office had admitted as early as 1946 in the Kitson memorandum (PRO FO 
371/53635 The future o f HK, 18.7.1946) the separation of administration and sovereignty as a possible 
scenario. The document proposed 4 different options: (i) return the New Territories in exchange for 
Anglo-Chinese joint control over important infrastructures; (ii) turn the entire HK into an Anglo-Chinese 
condominum; (iii) place I IK under international control, with a strong role of UK and China in its 
administration; (iv) retrocede the entire HK in exchange for a new 30 year lease on the entire territory.
162 This understanding was established between Govemor.Grantham and Premier Zhou Enlai during an 
unofficial visit o f the former.to Beijing in 1955 - Flowerdew, The Final Years of British llong Konu -  the 
discourse of colonial wilhdrawl. Macmillan Press , 1998.pp.28-29 (footnote 35)
Cottrell. The Fnd of Hone Kona. John Murray. London. 1993 pp. 32
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stated that the Chinese letter “in no way affected the legal status of Hong Kong”164. In 
the absence of British opposition the Committee approved the recommendation, later on 
ratified and approved by the 27th General Assembly on November 1972165. In so doing 
it did not only approve the intended result (removal from the list of colonial territories) 
but, I would argue, also accepted the validity of the arguments China used to justify its 
request. It is difficult not to consider that there was an implicit international recognition 
of China’s sovereignty over HK.
This had three important implications for HK’s international legal status. Firstly, it 
ceased to be recognised as a colony falling into a sui generis category. Secondly, the 
international community ceased to recognise the right of HK people to self- 
determination. A key objective of China’s initiative was clearly to ensure that 
independence was definitely excluded as a scenario for HK. Thirdly, the recognition that 
HK was Chinese territory under British Administration and so the existence of limits to 
what the UK could do. The separation between sovereignty and administration emerged 
as a new feature, which had been already visible in Macao since 1967, later on 
formalised in the 1979 Sino-Portuguese secret agreement166.
The 1972 developments had profound implications for the evolution of the future 
process leading to the Joint Declaration. Before the international community China 
defined a set of political principles that would guide its future strategy (i) HK future was 
not an international question; (ii) the retrocession of the entire HK was unavoidable; 
(iii) the problem would be settled peacefully through negotiations; (iv) China would 
define the timing, thus holding the initiative.
On the British side, once the inevitability of negotiations had been accepted, the question 
was how to deal with uncertainty and to try to settle the matter as soon as possible. The
164 See Cottrell, on.cit.. pp. 33
105 UN Doc GA /RES/ 2908 (1972)
166 Tllc secret agreement signed on 8.2.1979 w as made public by an official note of the Portuuuese 
Council o f  Ministers on 9.1.1987 see Diàrio de Notieias 9.1.19X7.
question would finally be raised bilaterally by Britain in the context of Governor 
MacLehose 1979 official visit to Beijing'67.
MacLehose inaugurated a new era in the Government of HK. He had two important and 
complementary objectives on his agenda. On the one hand, to restore the legitimacy of 
British rule severely weakened after the 1967 events. On the other, being the first 
Governor to come from the Foreign Office, a diplomatic objective to promote the 
reconciliation of HK with China and the CCP and to improve co-operation following the 
1972 UK -  China rapprochement.
Britain was anxious to raise and settle the question of the 1997 lease of the New 
Territories and decided, secretly, to raise the question through an official channel and 
use the opportunity of the MacLehose visit to prepare the stage for the visit by Foreign 
Secretary, David Owen, due to take place later in April. The British motivations to raise 
the question of HK future at that time were mainly three.
First, to take advantage of China’s new climate of greater openness to the outside world 
and engagement in economic reforms under a more moderate leadership. It was also 
considered that the future of Deng was still uncertain, its leadership was not yet 
consolidated.
Second, the political concern to secure an honourable decolonisation, and avoid a 
precipitate withdrawal was not only for reasons of prestige but also to minimise the risks 
of a mass migration to the UK that could threaten domestic stability. The silence the 
Chinese maintained since 1972 on the future of HK was fuelling anxiety in Britain. The 
scenario London most feared was one in which there would be no clarification and 
simply on the eve of 1997 China would tell Britain to go. 167
167 The invitation was transmitted to Governor MacLehose by the Foreign Trade Minister Li Qiang during 
an informal visit to UK in December 1978 to ask 1IK help to speed up China's modernization programme.
Thirdly, an economic motivation related to the fact, pointed out by Cottrell, that London 
was starting to write a series of loans guarantees for the construction of infra-structural 
projects whose repayment periods were extending beyond 1997168, assuming financial 
commitments for equipment that could be under Chinese control in 1997.
There is a conventional view that the erosion of private investors’ confidence caused by 
uncertainty related to land leases and the security of their assets played an important role 
and pressed Britain to take the initiative. Indeed, this was how MacLehose presented the 
question to Deng Xiaoping for the sake of argument. However, both Cottrell and 
Tsang169 question this view and argue that this was not the real reason as there was no 
1997 related problem in the property market. Following the “open door” policy, 
investors were excited about business prospects in China and so there was an optimistic 
climate and not a real concern about a long-term problem. The issue of erosion of 
economic confidence was mainly a problem affecting Britain, not HK private investors. 
In this light MacLehose initiative has to be seen as a “pre-emptive strike to prevent a 
crisis” as Tsang puts it170, rather than a desperate response to a confidence crisis in HK 
which did not exist.
Finally, the British motivation to go ahead had to do with the evolution of the Macao 
process and the information that in the context of the 1979 restoration of diplomatic 
relations the Macao question had been discussed and settled. Although the Foreign 
Office did not know then the exact contents of the 1979 Sino-Portuguese secret 
agreement, it was considered that if China did talk about Macau it would be ready to talk 
about HK171.
With this in mind, the Foreign Office decided that MacLehose should go ahead and 
formally raise the question with an important qualification. He should not raise the
168 The best example was the project o f a complex of power stations at Castle Peak in the New Territories 
whose repayment schedules ran from 1991 to 2002. See Cottrell. op.cit., pp 43.
k* c;ee Cottrell, op. cit.. pp 41-42 and Steve Tsana. Hong Konst -  an appointment with China. I.B. Tauris. 
London. 1997. pp. 83-90
170 Jsanu. Hong Kong: an appointment with China, or cit..pp 86.
11 See David Owen Memoirs l  ime to Declare. Michael Joseph I td. London, p. 40s.
question of the main lease but of the sub-leases given to private investors by Britain172 
on the grounds that uncertainty was having a negative impact on investors’ confidence. 
In other words the question should be raised as a commercial problem and not as a 
political one.
The political question of the global lease would to be raised by David Owen, during his 
visit to Beijing due to take place in April. Because of the fall of the Labour Government 
Owen’s visit did not take place. Interestingly, some evidence points to the hypothesis he 
was intending to concede British sovereignty on the whole of HK in exchange for the 
continuation of British administration on a renewable basis173. This negotiation strategy 
was nothing else than the line traditionally favoured by the Foreign Office since the 
1946 Kitson Memorandum.
The MacLehose initiative was not successful. China was not ready to talk about HK, as 
it was still focused on the reunification with Taiwan and in the early stages of the 
construction of the “one country, two systems” concept174. The uncertainty about the 
main lease remained and the British solution for the land leases was rejected. Moreover, 
Deng reaffirmed China’s sovereignty, restating the 1972 declaration.
In spite of British pressure, uncertainty would remain for the next 3 years, as China did 
not accept to talk about the future of HK until January 1982 when Zhao Ziyang told 
Humphrey Atkins, a junior British Foreign Minister, that China was prepared to talk. 
China would make its position clear four months later when in April Deng Xiaoping in a 
meeting with Edward Heath sent a message to London that China wanted to recover
172 It has been mentioned by Cottrell, and confirmed during the interview with Lord Wilson, 21.5.2001, 
that this difference generated a problem of translation by the Chinese translator during the MacLehose -  
Deng meeting who translated the global lease question between UK-China and not the sub-leases. David 
Wilson intervened to correct the translation emphasising the difference, but this means that the British 
well thought subtlety was spoiled by a translator’s inaccuracy.
173 David Owen, op. cit.. p.407.
174 The work had already started following the secret creation in 1978 of the new I IK and Macau Affairs 
Office under the State Council. It was headed by Liao Chengzi. a Central Committee member, who had 
been the head of the CCP structure in HK before the war and a specialist of Overseas Chinese Affairs. 
Behind the scenes he was the real architect of the “one country two systems" concept -  Cottrell, op.cit. 
pp. 59-60.
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both sovereignty and administration and that the “Nine Points” proposal for Taiwan 
would be the basis for negotiations.
The context of negotiations
The official opening of the Sino-British negotiations on HK was announced on 24 
September 1982 at the end of Margaret Thatcher’s visit to China. Britain had attained 
one of its short-term objectives as defined in the Downing Street preparatory meeting in 
late July175.
At the outset the negotiation positions of each party were constrained by different factors 
which contribute to explain their negotiation strategies.
On the Chinese side there were diverse factors at play. First, domestic political 
considerations involving the conflicts between the reformist camp led by Deng Xiaoping 
and the conservative camp led by Chen Yun. Contrary to conventional analysis, 
economic reforms and the open door policy were not the sole element of Deng’s strategy 
to strengthen his position inside the CCP. There was a second and complementary 
element, reunification. In the words of Cottrell176 reunification and economic reforms 
were “twin elements” of Deng’s strategy in the sense that a commitment to reunification 
was a political tool to compensate and get some support from the conservatives thus 
moderating their opposition to economic reforms. Progress on reunification was 
therefore a necessary requirement for Deng to secure political control inside the party.
Secondly, the efforts devoted to have the reunification with Taiwan moving failed. The 
‘Nine Points’ proposal did not receive any reply from Taipei and the new Reagan 
Administration was more supportive of Taiwan and so its position more secure, in 
particular after the 1979 US-Taiwan Relations Act. It became clear that a rapid 
reunification with Taiwan was not viable leading to a change in the priorities of the
175 This meeting took place on 28 July 1982 and involved the Prime-Minister. Edward Youde, Sir Percy 
Cradock and Alan Donald - Cottrell. op.cit..pp.69-70.
176 See Cottrell, op.cit.. pp. 58-59.
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reunification policy that shifted to HK. This shift was explained by the fact Deng 
needed, for internal political reasons, to deliver a triumph on reunification quickly. HK 
was a less complex and difficult case at the same time it could work as a “show case” for 
Taiwan, thus contributing to convince Taipei of the merits of the proposed formula.
Thirdly, on the external front China was starting to readjust its foreign policy177, trying 
to adopt a more independent position in relation to the US and a more neutral position in 
the context of the Cold War, which motivated Beijing to look for a closer relationship 
with the EEC, regarded as an alternative third major player. Sorting out the HK question 
with the UK and improving bilateral relations would serve this purpose.
In addition, Beijing was eager to make sure that its gradual integration in the 
international community had to be accompanied by a reparation of the humiliations 
China suffered at the hands of Western powers in the XIX century of which HK was the 
most vivid and dramatic example. The retrocession of HK would serve this purpose by 
contributing to the rehabilitation of China’s pride and prestige.
The combination of these factors led China to adopt a hard line position and to control 
the initiative in order to get a quick result and prevent the risk of another humiliation. 
The circumstance the New Territories lease expired in 1997 and the fact that the rest of 
HK was not viable without this part of the Territory, strengthened China’s bargaining 
position and severely weakened the British one. China challenged the validity of the 
three treaties on the cession of HK island, Kowloon and the New Territories178 but, even 
if that was disputed, Beijing had still a highly powerful argument. According to 
International Law it was unquestionable that the lease was due to expire and so if China 
decided not to renew it, 93 % of HK’s territory would return automatically to China’s 
sovereignty.
177 James Tang and Frank Ching “Balancing the Beijing-London -HK “three legged stool” 1971-1986” in 
Ming Chan (ed), The HK reader -  a passage to Chinese sovereiL’ntv. M.E. Sharp, New York, 1996, p. 51
178 Duncanson argues there was also an international factor to explain China’a insistence in the thesis o f 
unequal treaties related to the USSR and the existence of unequal treaties in Central Asia, regarding the 
definition of China's borders and territorial disputes with the USSR. Beijing did not want to set a
On the British side different factors constrained its negotiation position. First, the 
change of Government and the new conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher. 
This implied the hardening of the British position and a determination to resist 
decolonisation, which represented a step back in relation to what was the state of the 
British thinking in early 1979.
Second, the links of the HK case with other colonies and the Falklands war, an act of 
preservation of British imperial remainings, contributed to fuel a harder position which 
insisted in the validity of the treaties. The similarities between HK, the Falklands and 
Gibraltar led London to resist the formal recognition of China’s sovereignty over HK. 
The perception was that if Britain accepted that the treaties were invalid in the case of 
HK this would set a precedent and have immediate repercussions in the cases of 
Gibraltar and the Falklands179, opening new fronts and providing legal arguments for 
Spain and Argentina to challenge internationally British sovereignty, making the 
Falkland war effort meaningless.
Third, the HK factor and the special responsibilities of Britain. London was concerned to 
make sure it could not be accused of betraying HK. Moreover, it had to ensure that a 
final settlement would be acceptable to HK in order to avoid a major political crisis. 
This required that HK had to be somehow consulted and involved in the process. In the 
early stages of the negotiations Britain tried to support the idea of HK involvement when 
it presented the “three legged stool”180 concept but then abandoned this strategy given 
China’s strong opposition and accepted the marginalisation of HK people from the 
process.
Finally, an economic factor related to the fact Britain was increasingly interested in 
strengthening its economic interests in Asia and China, to take advantage of the
precedent by softening its position - Duncanson, “Anglo-Chinese negotiations” in Jurgen Domes and Yu- 
Ming Shaw (eds) Hong Kong: a Chinese and international concern. Westvicw Press, 1988, pp 26-41
179 Dennis Duncanson, op.cit.. pp 26 -41
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opportunities generated by the “open door policy”. This meant that London was 
concerned to ensure that the solution of the HK question would not cause any 
irreversible damage to UK-China long-term bilateral relations which tended to 
contribute to soften Britain’s position. There was a tension with the defence of HK 
interests and the potential risk of Britain being accused of selling out HK to obtain 
economic advantages for herself , putting London in a delicate position.
As a result Britain had a weak bargaining position, derived not only from the fact HK 
was not viable without the New Territories and could not be defended if attacked, but 
also from the circumstance London had to reconcile contradictory interests being caught 
between its specific self-interests in the future UK-China relations, and the obligation to 
promote HK interests and reach an agreement acceptable to HK. The adoption of an 
inflexible position on the question of sovereignty in the early stages of the negotiations, 
for the reasons mentioned above, proved to be a “highly expensive” strategy that had to 
be finally abandoned.
The dynamics of negotiations
The Sino-British negotiations were a very complex and highly visible piece of 
international negotiations. The purpose of this section is not to analyse in detail the 
negotiation process, already analysed elsewhere180 82 but simply to identify the crucial
180 This was presented by the British Minister responsible for HK, Lord Belstead, during a visit to HK in 
1982 -  Tang and Ching, op.cit., pp. 42-43.
181 This concern explains why Britain did not accept Beijing’s invitation for Margaret Thatcher to bring 
along a business delegation to conclude contracts during her trip to Beijing to sign the Joint Declaration in 
1984, for fear it could raise suspicions in HK. It should be noted that the British delegation went 3 months 
later ... - interview with Hugh Davies, 23.5.2001
182 The best account o f the negotiation process is provided by Robert Cottrell, The end of HK -  the secret 
diplomacy o f Imperial retreat, 1993, John Murray, London, pp. 98-174. There are also other relevant 
accounts namely Steve Tsang, Hong Kong an appointment with China. I.B. Tauris, London 1997, pp.81- 
110; John Flowerdew, The Final years of British Hone Kong-the discourse of colonial withdraw! 
Macmillan Press, London, 1998, pp.32-52; Gerald Segal. The Hong Kong fate. Simon and Schuster, 
London, 1993, pp. 31-51; Joseph Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition. Oxford University Press, London, 
1986, pp. 1-14; Ming Chan, Postiglioni (eds.) The Hong Kong reader -  passage to Chinese sovereignty. 
M.E. Sharpe, New York. 1996, pp. 41-64; Percy Cradock, Experiences o f Chinn John Murray, London, 
1994. pp.159-247.
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turning points to better understand the specific negotiation of the international affairs 
section of the JD.
The negotiations developed in four different phases with different characteristics. Phase 
one was dominated by the deadlock over the question of sovereignty. There were no 
real negotiations going on and no progress between 1982 and March 1983. It has been 
described as a phase of “talks about talks”. Britain insisted on the validity of the treaties 
and reaffirmed its sovereignty over HK island and Kowloon, for reasons mentioned 
above but also to try and consolidate a bargaining position to exchange concession on 
sovereignty for a Chinese concession on the continuation of British administration. The 
problem was that China did not accept to start negotiations and demanded that the 
British concession on sovereignty had to be made before negotiations could proceed. In 
the meantime China kept on working on a unilateral solution and Liao Chengzi 
continued with its drafting of a blueprint for HK which would lead to the “Twelve 
Point” plan. Once approved by the CCP Central Committee it would be very difficult to 
change China’s position and negotiations would be irrelevant.
The deadlock was overcomed through a British initiative know as the “first finesse”: 
Prime Minister Thatcher, advised by Sir Percy Cradock183, sent a letter to Zhao Zhiyang 
suggesting that Britain could consider the possibility of accepting a transfer of 
sovereignty stating that “if the negotiations yield arrangements acceptable to the people 
of HK the Prime Minister “would be prepared to recommend to Parliament the transfer 
of sovereignty”184.
Phase two started in May 1983, when a negotiation agenda was agreed. It was marked 
by a deadlock over the question of administration. The positions of the two parties were 
irreconcilable: Britain insisted that the British Administration should continue as it was 
an indispensable condition for the future stability and prosperity of HK; China opposed
183
184
The strategy was worked out by Cradock together with Tony Galsworthy -  Cradock o n  ci. 
Cottrell. op.cit..p p .l02-IOC y c lattock. ojy.cit. p. 186
this view and insisted it would resume also administration arguing that sovereignty and 
administration were indivisible. As a consequence British withdrawal was unavoidable.
In order to prove its point Britain presented a series of papers prepared by the General 
Duties Branch of the HK Government complemented with some inputs from the Foreign 
Office and the British Embassy in Beijing. These papers covered many sectoral areas 
(such as education, health, trade, civil service, legal system etc) were aimed at proving 
the complexity of HK’s reality and show that British expertise and knowledge of the HK 
system was indispensable for its subsistence. Many negotiation rounds were dedicated to 
the extensive presentation of the papers with China taking a passive attitude. Like in the 
first phase there were no real negotiations but simply the reaffirmation of two 
irreconcilable positions.
This phase was also marked by an intensification of parallel initiatives outside the 
negotiation table aimed at increasing pressure and empty the formal negotiation process. 
There were two fundamental initiatives taken by China: the public presentation of the 
“Twelve Point” plan; the intensification of direct contacts with HK aimed at cultivating 
local Chinese support for China’s position, a strategy carried out by the new Xinhua 
Director in HK, Xu Jiatun .
The “Twelve Point” plan, a blueprint for the future of HK, was presented in July 1983 to 
a group of HK secondary school students visiting Beijing186. This was the core nucleus 
for the future Joint Declaration and constituted a crucial input to the negotiations on 
international affairs matters since it was the first document where HK international 
dimension was mentioned. In fact, as much as 3 out of the 12 points had to do with 
external affairs.
As a result Britain’s “room for manoeuvre” was severely diminished and tension 
escalated with extremely negative effects on HK. For the first time the lack of progress
ls> Cottiell.op.cit.. pp. 112-114. 
ISh Ibidem, p. 112.
in negotiations and the climate of confrontation had an impact on HK as it eroded 
confidence and triggered the September 1983 HK dollar severe crisis. Under great 
pressure London decided to give in through an initiative known as the “second 
finesse”187. The British position would be finally clarified in the 6th round when Cradock 
gave a formal reassurance that Britain would seek no “links of authority” with HK after 
1997. In the words, Britain would accept to withdraw if a good agreement was reached. 
The negotiation entered a new and more positive phase.
The third phase was marked by the start of real negotiations on specific issues. At this 
stage the major point of tension was the nature and contents of the final agreement. 
China put the “Twelve Point” plan on the table of negotiations and wanted a vague 
document containing general principles and formed by two parallel declarations. In 
addition it wanted to establish a Sino-British Joint Commission with real powers to 
oversee and interfere in HK’s administration until 1997.
In contrast, Britain wanted a more detailed and legally binding agreement, which could 
offer more guarantees to HK, and rejected the idea of a Commission with powers to 
interfere with HK Administration. With that in mind, and since the British side had to 
take the initiative and provide the contents for the detailed text, Britain started to prepare 
a second set of papers, once again prepared by the General Duties Branch the HK 
Government, but this time with a very different orientation. They were no longer aimed 
at proving that British administration was indispensable but rather to emphasise the 
current autonomy of HK, the capacity to manage its own future. This would be the basis 
for the work of the future Wilson-Ke Working Group.
This indicates there were two different perspectives on the negotiations: Britain assumed 
a more legalistic approach while China adopted a more political approach with little 
awareness of the relevance of legal questions. This difference of perspectives has 
contributed to make the negotiations more difficult and complex.
|S' Ibidem, pp 130
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Furthermore, the British position also illustrates the fact that negotiations were marked 
by a lack of trust between the two sides. Britain did not trust China to run HK and 
preserve the system and therefore insisted in having a detailed agreement and everything 
written down. China was also suspicious about the British intentions and thought that 
London would do everything to drain all the money out of HK and to undermine the 
future Chinese rule and therefore insisted in the Joint Commission. This mutual distrust 
remained an underlying factor that made negotiations more difficult.
In an attempt to put further pressure on the British side, China announced a unilateral 
deadline to conclude the negotiations for September 1984. In case an agreement could 
not be reached until then, Beijing would take unilateral action and settle the HK question 
without Britain. London understood then that if it wanted to obtain any concessions from 
Beijing it had to work within the Chinese timetable188.
The difficulties and differences were bridged through high level political intervention in 
two stages. The first one corresponded to the visit of Foreign Secretary Howe to Beijing 
on 15-18 April 1984. In the context of a meeting with Deng, the Chinese side agreed to 
the principle that the agreement would be more detailed, provided that the “Twelve 
Point Plan” remained the centre piece, and accepted a more flexible interpretation of the 
September deadline which would be for the initialling, not the ratification, of the 
agreement.
Although HK had been systematically marginalised from the process and not allowed to 
participate in the formal negotiations, the third phase was also marked by a more active 
HK as some sectors made co-ordinated attempts to influence the contents of the final 
agreement. A group of unofficials from Exco and Legco presented publicly a document 
containing their concerns and the minimum conditions of acceptability for HK, in May
l8S Cradock, op.cit. p. 197. Cradock points out that from the beginning it was felt that the deadline and its 
pressure could also work to the benefit o f  Britain, and considers that the moment w hen Britain decided to 
meet the deadline constituted the third key turning point in the negotiations.
1984189. The main concerns related to three fundamental topics: the nationality issue and 
how Britain was going to honour its obligations; the method of consultation of the HK 
people and confirmation of the acceptance of the agreement; the contents of the 
agreement, namely the guarantee of a legally binding nature, the incorporation of its 
provisions into the future Basic Law and the characterisation of HK’s future legal, 
economic and social systems. This initiative would prove to be more effective than 
initially expected as many of these points were actually taken into consideration by 
Britain and incorporated into the Agreement.
The fourth and final phase of negotiations started with the formation of the Wilson-Ke 
working group, approved during the April Howe-Deng meeting, responsible to negotiate 
the detailed text of the JD. This phase was marked by an intense and substantive work of 
detailed negotiations, clearly the most productive phase of the entire negotiation process.
This was also probably the phase where Britain scored more points and was able to see 
its proposals through. After having lost in various fronts the British strategy was one of 
damage limitation. In that Britain has ironically benefited from the deadline set by 
China, which has also put pressure and constrained the Chinese negotiation position. As 
the deadline approached, China was also forced to make concessions and accept 
compromises in order to be able to deliver the agreement on time.
The best illustration of this phenomenon was the outcome of Foreign Secretary Howe’s 
second visit to Beijing on 27-31 July aimed at solving the last blocking problems. At 
that moment China made the largest concessions ever during the entire negotiation 
process and accepted the British proposals on three fundamental issues: the JLG was 
going to be an organ of liaison not power and so would not interfere in the 
administration of HK; the JD would be a legally binding agreement for both sides, a true 
international treaty; the future Basic Law would necessarily incorporate the policies 
contained in the JD.
IS9 The initiative was aimed at lobbying the House of Commons, more specifically the 16 May debate on 
Hong Kong. For that purpose a delegation went to London, led by Sir S.Y. Chuim but was unsuccessful in 
its mission -  Cottrell, on. cit. pp. 152-153.
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However, a small group of the most intractable issues would still remain open and real 
stumbling blocks until the very end of the negotiations. The list included the issues of 
nationality (China refused to recognise BDTC citizenship and passports and to accept 
dual nationality), land leases (in particular the partition of revenues from new leases 
granted between 1984-1997), civil aviation (China wanted to take over the landing rights 
of HK, while Britain wanted to allocate them to HK), the presence of PLA troops in HK 
(China wanted troops to be stationed as they were an important symbol of sovereignty) 
and the political evolution of HK towards representative government.
After a long and exhausting process of negotiations the JD was finally initialled in 
Beijing on September 1984 and subsequently approved for signature by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress in November and the House of Lords in 
December 1984190. On 19 December Thatcher and Deng formally signed the agreement 
in Beijing. Although China wanted to avoid the internationalisation of the HK question, 
this was indeed one of the main outcomes of the Sino-British negotiations as the 
negotiation process had a high international visibility and the question was finally settled 
through an international treaty subject to International Law.
The negotiations revealed also a major paradox. Despite all the economic power and 
robust international status, HK was prevented from participating and having a say in an 
international negotiation process where its own future was being decided. This reflected 
not only the absence of democratic representative institutions in HK but also the 
limitations of non-sovereign actors to act in a system still dominated by sovereign states.
1<,n The House o f Lords approv ed the text o f the Joint Declaration for signature in the 10,h December 1984 
session on the future o f  HK -  see Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Fifth series vol CDt V II I  J  
1984-85 sessions), pp. 27-87. ' u  ' ol'
3.2.THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS CHAPTER 
OF THE JOINT DECLARATION
The existing accounts in the literature of the Sino-British negotiations tend to be 
confined to the analysis of the overall negotiations and the evolution of the negotiation 
positions of both parties. What is generally lacking is a more detailed analysis of the 
negotiation dynamics of specific core parts of the JD, what were the inputs of the two 
parties, the points of disagreement and how the final solution came about, as well as the 
inter-linkages and cross bargaining between different parts. There is no analysis 
available of the specifics of the negotiations of the parts of the JD dealing with HK 
international affairs. The purpose of this section is to make a first contribution to fill this 
gap and present an interpretation, based on interviews with some of the participants in 
the negotiation process, of the inputs made by Britain and China to this part of the JD 
and their different motivations.
Before analysing the inputs of China and Britain and their respective negotiation 
positions, it is important to place the negotiation of the external affairs question in the 
context of the global negotiation process. The part on external affairs was fundamentally 
negotiated in the fourth phase of negotiations although some initial inputs were made in 
the third phase. The details of the JD provisions on external affairs were discussed and 
agreed by the Wilson-KE working group, the negotiation body charged with the 
responsibility of drafting Annex I, in the final stages of the negotiation process.
The working group was created in June 1984 and started operating by the end of July. 
The British team was headed by David Wilson191, former political adviser to MacLehose 
and Under-Secretary of State, responsible for Asia and the Pacific, and included also 
Robin McLaren (political adviser to Governor Youde) Gerald Nazareth (HK 
Government law draftsman), Fred Burrows (Foreign Office Legal Adviser) and William
11,1 Although Geoffrey Howe wanted an eminent legal expert to lead the British side, Cradock opposed this 
and proposed David Wilson arguing that the essential thing was to have someone who understood the way 
the Chinese negotiate and politieal constraints and there was no time to train a legal expert on that - 
Cradock, op. cit. p. 199.
Ehrman (First Secretary of the British Embassy). The Chinese team was headed by Ke 
Zaizhou (deputy director of the department of international organisations treaties and 
laws at the Chinese MFA). It included Wu Jianfan, Zhang Yu, Jiang Weiping, Zhang 
Xianghin and Shi Jiuyong (MFA jurist and eminent International Law professor).
The negotiations of the external affairs provisions were fundamentally co-ordinated by 
two negotiators who played a very influential role, Fred Burrows on the British side, and 
Shi Jiuyong on the Chinese side, the two most experienced and prominent experts of 
International Law from each delegation192. This also signals that the negotiation had 
more a technical tone than a political one, reflecting the fact this was not a controversial 
issue in the context of negotiations. In short, the negotiation was highly concentrated, 
developed over a period of two months, and carried out during the most positive period 
of the Sino-British negotiations although submitted to great pressure created by the 
September deadline.
However, if it is true that the actual negotiation was carried out in the fourth phase in the 
context of the Wilson-Ke working group, there were some antecedents and specific 
inputs, which were presented at earlier stages of the negotiation. The first one, and 
probably the most important, was the “Twelve Points Plan” mentioned above. This 
document, which would constitute the centre piece of the JD, included three points 
which had to do with foreign affairs: (i) the principle that HK would run its own affairs 
with no interference of the Central Government with the exception of defence and 
foreign affairs; (ii) the provision that HK would have considerable freedom to take part 
in international activities; (iii) the guarantee HK would remain a free port and a financial 
centre. Here it was already clear that foreign affairs would be an exception to the high 
degree of autonomy and would be the Central Government reserved dominion. In 
addition, an important dimension of HK international status, its role as an international 
financial centre, would be preserved.
192 Interview s w ith David Little, head o f the HK Government International Law Division, 3.113)9 and Shi 
Jiuyong. Y'ice- President of the International Court of Justice. 6.6.2001.
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So far this was according to expectations. What was new and rather surprising was 
China’s intention to let HK have “considerable freedom”, autonomy to act 
internationally, in apparent contradiction with the first principle. Britain was certainly 
positively surprised as China’s initial position included not only a reference to external 
relations but went beyond expectations. One of the main tasks of the negotiations was 
going to be a more detailed definition of this sphere of HK’s external autonomy.
The second input was a British one. It was the preparation and presentation of the 
second set of papers during the third phase of negotiations at the start of the 8th round. 
This second set, unlike the first one, was aimed at emphasising HK’s existing domestic 
autonomy in specific areas and capacity to handle its own future. This extensive 
collection of papers was the fundamental basis for the work of the Wilson-Ke group193.
The precise content of those papers is still open to question, probably until the moment 
when the documents will be disclosed to the public. What is possible to conclude on the 
basis of the interviews conducted, is that there was no specific paper on external 
relations but only some short and dispersed references, namely in the paper on trade 
policy.
It is more difficult to assert who played a more active role in the negotiation process and 
who pushed forward the idea of HK’s external autonomy. As one could expect the 
British and Chinese accounts differ. The most likely hypothesis is that although Britain 
gave the first input and supported the idea to grant HK autonomy in specific areas of 
external relations, China exerted more influence in terms of the expansion of the 
autonomy’s scope adopting a more liberal and open approach than the initial proposal 
put forward by Britain. The interpretation proposed for the relative negotiation positions, 
inputs and motivations of China and Britain to behave as they did, takes into account 
both arguments based on the previous practice and on the specific context of the overall 
negotiation. Let us analyse in turn the negotiation position of each party.
Interview with Lord Wilson. 21.5.2001.
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Britain’s negotiation position was very careful and prudent. The British concern was 
initially restricted to trade and its initial proposal to the Chinese side was not very 
ambitious194. The question of autonomy in managing external commercial matters was 
raised in the sectoral paper on trade included in the second collection, with the intention 
to ensure HK’s continued participation in GATT. This minimalist approach can be 
explained by two good reasons. Firstly, London had low expectations on the foreign 
affairs area as this was closely linked to sovereignty and so likely to be carefully 
controlled by China. Knowing of China’s determination to prevent any limitation to its 
sovereignty and the sensitiveness of the question, Britain did not want to create more 
conflicts and tensions that could derail an already fragile negotiation process.
Secondly, trade was clearly the most developed and consolidated area of HK's external 
autonomy but this had no parallel in other areas where London was less liberal and kept 
HK’s external relations under stricter control fully exercising its sovereign rights. Such 
was the case, for instance, of civil aviation and the negotiation of air services agreements 
which were directly negotiated by London and primarily subordinated to its interests 
without any participation of HK. So, Britain’s own policy on HK external affairs was in 
some areas inconsistent with the defence of a broad autonomy.
This minimalist initial approach seems to have expanded in a second stage to include 
two other areas, shipping and civil aviation, in relation to which Britain put forward also 
proposals to allow HK to enjoy autonomy.
The Chinese negotiation position was more flexible in this area than in other areas of 
negotiation. Going beyond expectations China somehow took the lead in proposing a 
far-reaching and clearly innovative system of autonomy in external relations. The 
proposal to adopt a wider list of sectors where HK could act on its own internationally 
came from China, which added more appropriate fields to the areas proposed by 
London. Moreover, the granting of treaty making powers to HK was a Chinese input. In 
short, the Chinese contribution to the text of this part of the JD was greater than
11,4 Interview with Jutlje Shi Jitiyong. 6.6.2001.
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generally believed and more significant than the British one, exceeding initial 
expectations.
The Chinese decision was not taken at the negotiation table but much earlier. In fact, 
China had already stated in the “Twelve Points Plan” its intention to allow HK freedom 
to act internationally even before the negotiations started. Chinese officials, in particular 
Shi Jiuyong, had looked at examples of other autonomous entities in terms of degrees of 
external autonomy trying to find a source of inspiration but rapidly reached the 
conclusion that the normal formal autonomy pattern was rather limited and decided to 
advance with an innovative solution195. How can China flexibility be explained? 
Different factors seem to have been at play.
China was primarily concerned in securing HK's economic prosperity which was largely 
dependent on its ability to remain an international financial, communications and trade 
centre. This in turn was a crucial condition for HK to be able to play a supportive role to 
economic reforms and constitute China’s main gate to the world economy. For that HK 
required a certain degree of autonomy in external affairs which would contribute to 
boost international confidence in its continuity as an international centre.
I would argue that in addition to this explanation advanced by Chinese sources, there 
were two other factors at play. One was that China adopted a more liberal posture 
because Beijing saw the powers to conduct autonomous economic relations as being 
delegated powers from the sovereign, thus derived not original powers, and so this was a 
guarantee that China sovereignty would not be diminished196.
In addition, China was motivated by the fact that the granting of considerable autonomy 
in external affairs could serve as a strong political signal to the international community 
that China was determined to preserve HK's place in the international system by sending
195 Interview with Shi Jiuyong on 6.6.2001.
'l,(> See Shi Jiuyong. Autonomy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Rettion in I eidvn i n , t  „r 
International Law. 11. 190S. np. 6V70  ^ —  11111111
the message that members of the international community could continue dealing 
directly with HK.
The interaction between these different factors together with the circumstances that 
conditioned the British negotiation position, provides a sound basis to the argument that 
China’s input to the negotiation of the international affairs chapter of Annex I was more 
determinant than the British input and China exerted a greater influence on the final 
output showing a more audacious attitude. In this sense external affairs constituted an 
interesting exception to the dominant tendency in other chapters where Britain took the 
lead.
Although China adopted in general a relatively open attitude, there was an important 
exception to this, civil aviation where the two parties changed positions: Britain a more 
flexible and devolutionist approach and China a more centralist one. It is interesting to 
note that both sides regard the external affairs file as one of the least controversial parts 
of the JD where agreement was easier to reach. The most remarkable exception was civil 
aviation and air services agreements which was one of the most difficult questions in the 
entire negotiation process and one of the last to be settled.
In fact Britain pressed for some degree of autonomy for HK in this field. Ironically, 
London’s position was contradictory insofar it pushed for something which Britain as a 
colonial power did not practice. As demonstrated above, Britain kept HK landing rights 
tightly under control, trading them for the benefit of the UK in support for its economic 
interests, namely British Airways. As a consequence air services agreements were 
directly negotiated and signed by London with no intervention of the HK government197. 
In the negotiations Britain opposed China’s position to keep for itself and have full 
control over HK landing rights, which was what Britain was exactly doing as the 
colonial master.
197 This was a motif for tensions between London and I IK leading to recurrent complaints on the part o f  
the HK Government as recognised by Lord David Wilson, interview on 21.5.2001. Also interview with 
Anthony Baker, Director o f  the Internationa) Aviation Negotiations. I'K Government, IS.3.2002.
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China’s initial position was rather radical and refused any autonomy to HK in this matter 
insisting in getting full control over landing rights. This inflexibility was explained by 
two different reasons. First, the fact landing rights and control over air space was 
regarded as an important dimension of sovereignty and therefore should be controlled by 
the Central Government. Second, there were important commercial interests which led 
CAAC, the Chinese aviation company, to press strongly for an asset which could enable 
it to trade HK landing rights with third parties. It is important to bear in mind that in 
1984 CAAC was still dominated by the People’s Liberation Army, and so it was in fact 
the military, determined to obtain some tangible prize from the negotiations and with 
their strong political leverage, who were behind the Chinese hard position.
It is believed that this issue originated internal tensions and disagreements inside the 
Chinese side between the Foreign Ministry advocating a more moderate position and 
CAAC with a more hard-line position that was overturned at the end. The question was 
finally settled and Britain could claim victory. In any case the negotiation on civil 
aviation confirmed two interesting aspects. First, it was the first sign of a British strategy 
which would be developed during the transition period, to push to the limits for greater 
autonomy in areas previously controlled by London (air services agreements but also 
investment protection agreements, fugitive offenders). Second, it showed that the “one 
country, two systems” and the negotiations were not as consensual as generally believed 
inside China’s leadership as there was, like on the issue of economic reforms, an 
opposition of the conservative camp to some aspects of the concept and its 
implementation.
As a result of the Sino-British negotiations, civil aviation emerged as an important 
example of an area where there was a significant advancement of HK’s autonomy when 
compared with the pre-negotiations situation. After 1985, HK started to have a say in the 
negotiations of the air services agreements and to sign them on its own.
The main argument put forward is that the external affairs part is to some extent unique 
in the context of the overall negotiations as it runs counter the dominant trends in two
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different ways. Firstly, contrary to the majority of other issues dealt with in Annex I of 
the JD in relation to which the main concern of the two sides was to maintain the “status 
quo” and “freeze” HK’s current reality to ensure the preservation of the system, in the
field of external affairs the two sides went much further, well beyond current reality, 
introducing several innovations.
Secondly, while China is commonly seen as the side which offered more resistance to 
change that could affect its future sovereignty and Britain as the “demandeur”, pressing 
for concessions to strengthen HK’s autonomy, in the external affairs chapter evidence 
suggests it has been the other way around, China was more forthcoming and hold the 
initiative in terms of establishing an autonomy sphere for HK in external affairs.
Provisions of the Joint Declaration
The JD contains a wide range of provisions on external affairs both in the main text and 
in Annex I. The main text includes basic general principles: (i) that foreign affairs are 
the responsibility of the Central Government and an exception to the high degree of 
autonomy the HK SAR enjoys (para 3.2); (ii) the SAR retains the status of a free port 
and a separate customs territory (para.6) (iii) the SAR retains the status of an 
international financial centre (para.7) (iv) the SAR can develop autonomous relations in 
economic and cultural areas and conclude agreements on its own with foreign states, 
regions and international organisations (para. 10) (v) the SAR ability to issue its own 
travel documents (para. 10).
Annex I develops in more detail these basic principles. Chapter XI contains the general 
framework of HK’s autonomy in external affairs, including bilateral and multilateral 
spheres. This is complemented with provisions on specific areas particularly relevant for 
HK: trade and external commercial relations (chapter VI); finance and the role as an 
international financial centre (chapter VIII); shipping and HK’s role as a shipping 
register (chapter VIII); civil aviation and the role of HK as a centre of international and
regional aviation (chapter IX); travel documents and control over international 
immigration (chapter XIV).
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An integrated analysis of all these provisions leads us to conclude that there is a mixture 
of continuity, involving the formalisation and preservation of the status quo illustrated 
by the first three principles of the main text, and innovation, implying different 
conditions from the pre-negotiations situation, illustrated by the last two principles 
contained in paras 9 and 10 of the main text. The main argument is that innovation and 
change are more important in the external affairs section than in any other parts of the 
JD, and are visible at four different levels.
Firstly, the JD formally recognises a sphere of autonomy in external affairs, which was 
until then informal and fluid, with no defined boundaries and limits. All the 
manifestations of autonomy were formally in contradiction with constitutional rules 
since there was not any formal devolution of powers in external affairs from Britain to 
HK.
There is an apparent paradox inside the JD insofar as on the one hand it is established 
that foreign affairs is a competence of the sovereign and an exception to the high degree 
of autonomy of the SAR, and, on the other, HK is granted autonomy to act 
internationally in a wide range of areas. The paradox is partly resolved by a crucial 
distinction introduced by the JD between foreign affairs and external affairs whose 
rationale will be analysed below, and partly by the consideration that all powers HK 
enjoys in this field are derived powers delegated by the Central Government and 
therefore ultimately susceptible of being subject to its control198. This view held by 
China is controversial and can be challenged by the argument that the autonomous 
competencies enjoyed by HK derive from an international treaty and not from an act of 
delegation of powers.
Secondly, the JD expands the scope of HK’s autonomy into new areas both through the 
inclusion of areas previously subject to London’s tight control and areas never activated 
before. Before the Sino-British negotiations the areas where HK enjoyed a ile facto
|,'li See Shi Jiuyong. op. cit.. pp. 69.
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autonomy were basically trade, the most developed one, and to a lesser extent, financial 
and immigration issues. The JD not only provides a list which includes areas where HK 
did not enjoy autonomy such as communications or shipping, but more importantly this 
is considered, as argued below, an “open list” which might further expand to include 
other areas.
Thirdly, the JD formally grants HK explicit “treaty making powers” including in areas 
where it did not possess such powers. Basically, the only area where HK exercised 
treaty-making powers was trade, on the basis of the 1969 informal devolution, and this is 
expanded to include all areas belonging to HK’s sphere of autonomy. In addition, these 
powers were also granted in relation to areas with a more political contents, in particular 
civil aviation, immigration and visa abolition and legal and justice areas, even though 
under a more restricted system of specific prior authorisations.
Fourthly, the JD implies an international recognition of HK’s external autonomy by two 
strong and influential sovereign states through an international treaty, strengthening the 
basis of legitimacy for HK’s international participation and inviting other countries to 
interact directly with HK. It also provides an important guarantee that this autonomy 
will last and cannot be arbitrarily restricted by the sovereign power.
3.3. THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG’S FRAMEWORK OF EXTERNAL 
AFFAIRS
The Basic Law (BL) was approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1990 
culminating a 5 year process which involved the production of a Draft text by the BL 
Drafting Committee, a special body appointed by the PRC and operating under the 
supervision of the Standing Committee of the NPC. The BL has a dual character insofar 
it is the mini-constitution of HK, the SAR fundamental law occupying the apex of the 
hierarchy of laws which can not be contravened by any laws enacted by the SARIW, and
,WBL art. 11.
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at the same time an ordinary Law of the PRC without constitutional dignity, enacted 
according to article 31 of the Chinese Constitution and susceptible to be amended by the 
NPC.
Unlike other NCGs, HK’s high degree of autonomy has no constitutional status and is 
neither enshrined nor guaranteed in the Chinese Constitution, which might be seen as a 
source of fragility and as providing insufficient juridical protection. However, this does 
not mean that in the PRC context the BL is a common ordinary law. On the contrary, it 
has a very special nature and is best characterised as a “reinforced law” in the sense that 
the freedom to amend it is limited by an international treaty. In fact, until 2047 the NPC 
can not introduce arbitrary changes in violation of the principles and specific provisions 
of the JD. Thus, the BL has a unique nature in China’s legal system as its basic content 
is directly guaranteed by an international treaty binding on the Chinese State200.
The BL contains a developed and detailed framework for HK’s external affairs, 
including a clear definition of the competence of both the SAR and the Central 
Government and the contents and limits of the SAR’s external autonomy. The existence 
of explicit and detailed provisions on external affairs is rather unique when compared 
with other NCGs. Although there is a special chapter on external affairs, chapter VII, 
articles 150 to 157 of the BL, which reproduce the exact contents of section XI of Annex 
I of the JD, not all relevant provisions are concentrated in this chapter but dispersed by 
various articles throughout the BL201, namely article 13, of fundamental structural 
importance asserting the Central Government exclusive competence on foreign affairs 
and including a general authorisation for the SAR Government to conduct external
200 This limit to the amendment of the BL is indirectly recognised in art 159 which states “ No amendment 
o f this Law shall contravene the established policies o f  the People’s Republic o f China regarding Hong 
Kong”. Although there is no direct reference to the JD it is known that these basic policies are spelled out 
there.
2U1 The full list of dispositions include besides articles 150-157, the following: article 13, article 18 ( 
application to I IK of PRC laws related to foreign affairs); article 19 (SAR courts no jurisdiction over acts 
of state such as defence and foreign affairs); article 23 (prohibition of the HK SAR political organisations 
to establish ties with foreign political organisations); article 48 (9); article 62 (3); article 96 (agreements 
with foreign states on reciprocal juridical assistance); article 116; article 126 (authorisation for"access of 
foreign warships to HK harbour); art. 129 (access o f foreign states aircrafts); article 133 (air services 
agreements) and arts. 134 -135 (civil aviation); article 141 (freedom o f religious organisations); article 
149 (NGO's external relations).
affairs on its own, and articles 48 and 62, which grant the Chief Executive and the SAR 
Government explicit competence to conduct external affairs.
Foreign affairs vs. External affairs
The Basic Law system on HK external autonomy is based on a fundamental distinction 
between foreign affairs and external affairs, clearly made in article 13 (1),(3) BL as well 
as in the use of “External Affairs” as the title of Chapter VII.
This represents continuity in relation to the JD where such a distinction already existed 
(para. 2, section I of Annex I). The relevance of this conceptual distinction is related to 
the fact it is the basis for the division of competencies between the Central Government 
and the SAR Government insofar as “foreign affairs” is the exclusive competence and 
responsibility of the Central Government while “external affairs” is a competence of the 
SARG and constitutes an area where HK is formally allowed to enjoy autonomy. The 
boundaries between the two concepts set the boundaries of HK’s autonomy to act 
externally. There is yet a third category of “transnational relations”, which is also 
introduced by the BL and differentiated both from foreign and external affairs.
Even though the BL uses the two concepts it does not provide neither a clear definition 
of each concept nor spells out substantive criteria to distinguish them. However, an 
integrated and systematic interpretation of the various dispositions of the BL suggests 
two alternative hypotheses.
The first hypothesis is that the BL adopts an objective criteria related to the nature of the 
issues. The distinction between foreign affairs and external affairs would correspond, 
grosso modo to the academic distinction between “high politics” and “low politics” with 
foreign affairs equated with high politics areas and external affairs with low politics.
The second hypothesis is that the distinction is centred around a subjective criteria 
associated with the type and characteristics of players, so that foreign affairs would 
involve exclusively official relations between sovereign states, both at bilateral and
146
multilateral levels, while external affairs involves the participation of non-sovereign 
entities.
A systematic interpretation of the different dispositions of the BL leads us to conclude 
that it adopts a mixed position basing the distinction not on a single criterion but rather 
on a combination of criteria. In fact, there is an implicit articulation between three 
criteria, an objective criterion related to the nature of the issue-areas, a subjective 
criterion related to the nature of actors and a teleological criterion related to the purpose 
of the action and the interests pursued.
Firstly, foreign affairs are closer to high politics while external affairs are predominantly 
associated with low politics areas. This clearly results from the fact the issue-areas listed 
under article 151 BL that define the scope of external affairs, all pertain, probably with 
the single exception of some aspects of monetary affairs, to the domain of low politics. 
There is not a list of issue-areas falling under foreign affairs which is defined by 
exclusion. However, there is not a perfect coincidence between external affairs and low 
politics. On the one hand, there is an element of uncertainty because there are some low 
politics areas which have not been expressly listed under article 151 (namely social 
sectors like education, health, environment, technology) and it might be the case that 
some are under foreign affairs.
On the other, one should note that not only in article 151 monetary affairs, without 
restriction, have been included under external affairs although some of its aspects could 
be considered as high politics, but also outside article 151 there are areas closer to high 
politics like civil aviation and the use of air space and immigration where HK can exert 
powers and enjoy some autonomy though more limited (articles 133 and 154-155 BL).
Secondly, taking into account the nature of actors involved, foreign affairs involves 
exclusively relations between sovereign states and with International Organisations 
restricted to states, being HK interests represented by the PRC. In contrast, external 
affairs involves always the participation of non-state actors, at least one of the parties is
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a non-sovereign entity, as stated in article 151 “foreign states, regions and relevant 
international organisations”. It is possible to identify two different types of relations: (i) 
an asymmetric one between the SAR, a non-state actor, and sovereign states; (ii) a 
symmetric one between the SAR and other non-state actors, namely non-sovereign states 
like federated states, regions, which means regional governments thus covering NCGs 
similar to HK, and international organisations which has to be understood to mean 
international organisations not limited to states.
One interesting question is to know if external affairs cover relations between the SAR 
and all types of non-state actors, including private and social sectors, or only with public 
non-state actors. The interpretation of the relevant dispositions seems to suggest that 
only relations with public non-state actors, involving always relations between 
governments, are considered external affairs the implication being that relations between 
the SAR and TNCs or international NGOs fall outside the scope of this category.
Thirdly, there is a difference in terms of the purpose and scope of external action. In 
foreign affairs the purpose of external action is wider and includes not only the 
pursuance of specific interests of the State in question but also the defence of interests 
and positions of third states, for instance an ally, and even the promotion of more global 
and abstract interests of the international community as a whole (restore international 
order and peace) or contribute to the improvement of the international system through 
the definition of global rules. In the context of external affairs the scope of action is 
more limited and restricted to the promotion of specific interests of the SAR, which 
becomes both the legitimacy basis and the limit of HK’s external autonomous action. In 
other words, external action under external affairs is only justified when there is a 
specific and direct self-interest of HK and cannot be driven by the pursuance of the 
interests of a third party or abstract interests of the international community.
This teleological limit is implicit in the logic of external autonomy and can be indirectly 
derived from the dispositions of articles 150 and 152, which consider that the 
participation of HK in foreign affairs actions is only justified if the SAR is directly
affected by the matter and so has a direct interest, as well as in article 13, where the SAR 
is authorised to conduct on its own relevant external affairs, which has to be interpreted 
as relevant to the SAR’s specific interests.
The consideration of the nature of interests pursued introduces an additional distinction 
insofar as in foreign affairs related to HK, China global national interests and foreign 
policy objectives prevail over any SAR interests, while external affairs is the realm of 
HK specific interests and motivations. In this sense foreign affairs belongs to “one 
country” equation and external affairs becomes a dimension of the “second system”.
Although the distinction between “high politics” and “low politics” is the central criteria 
for the distinction between foreign and external affairs, the co-existence and interaction 
with the other two criteria generates a more complex picture and more fluid boundaries 
between the two categories. For instance, the participation HK in an international 
organisation limited to states but dealing with low politics issues (labour, health, 
intellectual property rights) which would be seen as external affairs according to the 
nature of the issue-area, actually falls under foreign affairs because of the nature of the 
actor involved.
When the nature of matters is articulated with the purpose of action one can conclude 
that a low politics issue might not necessarily be regarded as external affairs namely if 
there is not a direct interest of HK in the matter. To some extent the BL adds to the 
confusion when under chapter VII on external affairs includes issues that clearly belong 
to foreign affairs such as those mentioned in articles 150,152(1) and 157 (consular 
missions).
Finally, it should be mentioned that the BL includes a third category that can be named 
“trasnational relations”. This category emerges from article 149 of the BL, which 
regulates the external relations of HK NGOs, and constitutes an innovation in relation to 
the JD. Unlike foreign and external affairs, which involve relations at the governmental 
level, here we deal exclusively with relations at the non-governmental level, more
14‘ )
informal, between HK NGO’s and their counterparts in foreign countries, involving 
exclusively private non-state actors.
The SAR sphere of autonomy
The second structural element of the BL system which can condition the future ability of 
the SAR to engage in international relations, is the exact configuration of the SAR 
sphere of autonomy in conducting external relations on its own. The fundamental 
conclusion in this respect is that the system created by the BL does not encapsulate a 
simple and clear cut dichotomy between defined areas of autonomy and no autonomy, 
but implies a more complex four-tier structure with some grey areas.
The first tier corresponds to a more general level related to policy formulation involving 
the definition of global and long-term objectives, priorities as well as strategies for HR 
external relations. Although this is not explicitly regulated by the BL, the principles of 
“one country” imply that the broad lines of HR’s external affairs can not be in 
contradiction or open conflict with China’s global foreign policy guidelines. This 
requires a certain measure of co-ordination between the Central Government and the 
SAR Government in order to ensure a minimum level of consistency between HR’s 
autonomous strategy and national interests.
Given this requirement of consistency, the level of autonomy HR enjoys to define its 
broad external affairs policy options is not of a high degree but of a medium degree. 
Another important feature of this tier is the coexistence between separated options 
(parallel actions) and co-operation with the Central Government.
The second tier is related to external affairs policy implementation structured around the 
list of areas defined in art. 151 BL (economic, trade, financial, monetary, shipping, 
communications, tourism, culture, sports) where HR can act on its own on the basis of a 
“general authorisation” conferred by the Central Government. This authorisation 
contained in art. 13 (3) BL, has a permanent, no time limit, and unconditional nature. 
Given its latitude and wide scope, covering the management of relations, treaty making
powers and “jus legationis”, this is not a mere authorisation but a real devolution of 
powers implying that the sovereign power can no longer exercise the competencies 
which have been the object of devolution.
In this tier HK enjoys greater autonomy than in the first tier, closer to the high degree of 
autonomy it enjoys in domestic affairs though slightly more reduced because in external 
affairs the Central Government still has a formal power of ultimate supervision. 
Moreover, in this level HK can act exclusively on the basis of its specific self-interests 
not constrained by national interests.
It is interesting to note that in this tier there is a strong link between external autonomy 
and domestic autonomy. The ability to act externally is to some extent a projection of 
autonomy in domestic matters, a necessary mechanism to materialise and develop 
internal autonomy of an international city where boundaries between the domestic and 
external levels are much more blurred. This raises an interesting question about the 
limits of autonomy in external affairs and to what extent it has elasticity and can expand 
to cover all areas where HK enjoys domestic autonomy, i.e. whether external autonomy 
can match domestic autonomy.
This is particularly relevant when we consider the nature of the list contained in article 
151 BL, whether it is an open or a closed list. In other words, if autonomy only covers 
the areas expressly listed or if HK can act also in areas not expressly foreseen in this 
article. For example, it is particularly striking that social sectors such as education, 
health, labour or technical sectors such as science and technology or environment have 
not been listed. Can HK develop autonomous relations with foreign countries in these 
“low politics” areas?
The interpretation of the article points to the conclusion that it is an open list taking into 
account the use of the expression “including” which signifies that the list is not 
exhaustive and other fields can be added to it, a view also shared by specialists in China
and HK202. As a result, the autonomy in external affairs is elastic and flexible but also 
marked by some uncertainty. The acceptance of the open nature of the list does not solve 
the question to know what are the limits of its expansion. Can it expand to cover only 
other fields with an analogous nature or can it also include completely different areas? 
In other words, there is still an unresolved question, to know whether the BL allows for 
a more liberal view according to which HK can act externally under article 151 
potentially in all areas where it enjoys domestic autonomy, or a more restrictive position 
in terms of the fields that can be added. In this respect it is of fundamental importance to 
look at the practice developed after the handover, an issue addressed in the next chapter.
The third tier corresponds to a level of more restricted autonomy where HK can act only 
on the basis of “specific authorisations” given by the CPG. Unlike in the second tier 
these are authorisations given on a case by case basis implying greater control over the 
contents and purpose of the SAR action.
The BL expressly identifies 3 areas where such specific authorisations apply: air 
services agreements (article 133 and 134 BL); reciprocal juridical assistance (article 96 
BL); immigration and visa abolition agreements (article 155 BL). In all three cases what 
is at stake is exclusively the exercise of treaty making powers and not any other acts.
These are areas which have a special connection with sovereignty and so the level of 
autonomy allowed by the BL is more limited than in the second tier, probably similar to 
the first tier although the actual level of autonomy depends on the exact level of control 
exercised in the act of authorisation. I would argue that what is unique about these three 
areas is that they are neither external affairs nor foreign affairs but correspond indeed to 
a middle ground between the two.
The fourth tier, corresponds to a “negative sphere” of no autonomy which is associated 
with the areas falling under foreign affairs where the CPG has exclusive competence.
This interpretation is shared by Shi Jmyong, interview on 6 June 2001, as well as by the specialists in 
the International Law Division of the SARCi.
HK enjoys no autonomy in these matters and has no right to act. However, even in this 
sphere, participation of the SAR should not be completely excluded. In fact, HK might 
be able to act marginally if the Central Government decides, for reasons of operational 
convenience, to delegate specific functions to the SAR in the foreign affairs areas. In 
such a case an important limitation still applies: the SAR will not have decision-making 
powers, will simply execute decisions taken by others, and national interests 
predominate and prevail over specific interests in case of conflict.
3.4.THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND ITS IMPACT ON UK’s EXTERNAL 
AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STATUS
Contrary to the general orientation of the JD, which points to the maintenance of the 
status quo by freezing the existing system, external affairs constituted an exception 
incorporating innovations and allowing room for change. One of the most remarkable 
aspects was that in the field of external affairs, unlike in others, the BL provisions 
started to be de facto implemented in advance, well before this Law entered into force 
on 1 July 1997. Britain and China anticipated in several years the implementation of the 
system so that reality would be in tune with the BL at the handover, bridging the gap 
between the pre-negotiations situation and the situation encapsulated in the BL. 
Interestingly, in spite of the fact the BL did not possess a juridical effectiveness203 
during the transition, it had a political effectiveness and produced concrete effects in the 
field of external affairs.
The twelve-year transition period brought about a dcnsification of HK international 
status and personality, with the expansion and increasing complexity of UK’s 
international rights and obligations, as well as the deepening of UK’s autonomy in 
managing external relations. This process involves both quantitative and qualitative 
phenomena at different levels of UK’s international participation.
2113 The BL had a curious nature in legal terms. It was enacted as a PRC Law in 1900 and so existed since 
then in China's legal system, not in the 11K one, but was deemed to produce effects and be applied only in 
1907. It is probably a unique and unprecedented case w here a law had a 7 years “vaccatio legis” period.
First, there was a considerable increase in the number and importance of international 
multilateral organisations in which HK participates. During the transition HK joined 
many international organisations, notably what can be considered the two most relevant 
multilateral fora: GATT, later WTO, and APEC.
On the eve of the handover HK participated in a group of 31 international organisations 
including both organisations in which HK already participated before the Sino-British 
negotiations and organisations HK joined after 1985, in relation to which HK continued 
participation after the handover had to be approved by the JLG204. This list includes 
organisations in which HK participates in 3 different capacities: as a full member (6)205; 
as an associate member (7) and integrated in the sovereign power delegation (18).
In addition HK participated in many other international organisations, probably more 
than 300, as estimated by the US State Department206, where relevant organisations such 
as APEC, OECD (trade Committee, Financial Market Committee as an observer), UN 
Environmental Programme or the International Bank of Settlements are included.
As far as multilateral agreements are concerned, at the end of the transition period a 
large number of multilateral international agreements were applicable to HK. A total of 
195 international treaties and conventions, distributed by 20 different fields, covering 
not only economic and social areas but also political issues such as human rights, 
disarmament and security, applied to HK and the JLG agreed on its continued 
application after the handover. This impressive number of treaties implies for HK a wide 
range of international rights and obligations thus contributing to the densification of its 
international personality.
2114 The vast majority, 26 out o f 31, was approved between 1985 -1989 before Tiananmen. The last 5 
cases were international organisations. See Document Constitutional Affairs Bureau, December 1996, 
ww.info.gov.hk/cab/joint.html 30.10.2000.
205 The organisations in which HK has full membership are: Asian Development Bank; WTO; World 
Customs Organisation; International Textiles and Clothing Bureau; Network o f Aquaculture Centre in 
Asia and Pacific; World Meteorological Organisation.
21,6 US-Hong Kong Policy Act Report 2000, April I. US Department State 
ww w.usconnsulatc.oru.hk ushk pi 20000401 .him page 28
Secondly, on the bilateral front, the transition period had also a very significant impact 
as the number of bilateral agreements negotiated and signed by UK increased 
significantly with the signature of 50 new agreements. This was even more significant 
because these agreements went beyond the traditional trade agreements that existed 
before 1984. In fact the transition brought about an expansion of the areas in which HK 
exercises treaty making powers, in particular in three new areas: civil aviation; 
investment; legal and juridical co-operation. In civil aviation HK signed 21 air service 
agreements with foreign states between 1986-97, starting with the Netherlands based on 
the JD provisions. This represented a clear departure from the previous practice, where 
the UK had full control over HK’s landing rights and negotiated them in the context of 
UK agreements with third countries.
As far as investment is concerned HK signed 14 investment promotion and protection 
agreements between 1992-97. Unlike air service agreements, investment protection 
agreements were not specifically foreseen neither in the JD nor in the BL, and their 
signature seems to have resulted from the pressure of foreign investors associated with 
the decline in confidence after Tiananmen. The negotiation and signature of these 
agreements by HK was submitted to the prior approval of the JLG implying an 
agreement between the British and Chinese sides. This is an interesting example of the 
extent to which the practice developed during the transition conditioned the post 
handover reality. In fact, although the BL did not foresee the need for a prior 
authorisation for this kind of agreements, the practice of the sovereign power 
authorisation was introduced setting a precedent for the future.
In legal and juridical maters, HK signed 8 Agreements207 on Surrender of Fugitive 
Offenders between 1992-96, 4 Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters between 1996-97 and one Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Persons with the 
US in 1997. This represented the anticipation of the implementation of art. 98 of the BL 
dealing with agreements on “reciprocal juridical assistance” with foreign states. The
:o7 IIKSAR Government. CAB internet page www.intbmov.lik c;ih joint .In m l piu>e 4.
main reason behind this seems to have been the need for HK to respond to the 
challenges of international organised crime and drug trafficking. HK wanted to show the 
international community not only it was not an asylum for criminals but also that it was 
prepared to co-operate and fight actively the problem.
Thirdly, the expansion of HK’s external autonomy and international status during the 
transition period is also illustrated by the consolidation of HK’s external representation 
through the expansion of the Economic and Trade Offices system which more than 
doubled, increasing from 4 to 10 offices, as mentioned in chapter two, in some of the 
most important economic centres in the world.
Besides these manifestations of HK increasing participation in the international system 
the transition period was also marked by two fundamental qualitative changes with far 
reaching consequences for HK’s international status: the “personalisation” of external 
affairs; the “politicisation” of external affairs as HK’s external action expanded into 
political areas and HK gained autonomy in managing some specific matters.
Personalisation of external affairs
The personalisation of external affairs is associated with the fact the HK Governor 
became internationally active representing HK and providing a face to it in the 
international arena. This assumption of a new diplomatic role led the Governor to be 
engaged in a series of regular official visits to foreign countries during which he met 
world leaders to discuss matters of mutual concern, promote HK’s interests and 
stimulate confidence in HK’s future. These visits gave HK a new high international 
visibility and added a new instrument to the existing external representation system.
This phenomenon started as a consistent and systematic process with David Wilson in 
particular from 1989 onwards. In 1989 the Governor paid one visit to the US to meet the 
new Administration in October and this would further expand in 1990, when from a total
of 10 visits208 209, 6 were made by the Governor covering the USA, Canada, Japan and 
Europe. In 1991 the trend continued and David Wilson was engaged in 5 visits200 to 
Europe, Australia and Southeast Asia.
The main factor to explain the genesis of this new phenomenon was the negative impact 
of Tiananmen and the need HK felt to act internationally to counteract the pessimism 
about HK’s future, reassure investors and reverse the decline in confidence. In addition 
it can be argued that this represented also the adaptation of HK’s external representation 
to the trend of médiatisation of international politics.
The personalisation trend reached its climax with Governor Patten who used this 
instrument to its full potential. Being a politician, Patten used his mcdiatic and 
international image to raise HK’s international profile. Just after taking office in 1992 
he visited Canada and Japan in November. The intensity of official visits abroad 
increased in the following years. The number of visits of the three top figures of the HK 
Government (Governor, Chief Secretary and Financial Secretary) increased from 10 in 
1993210 9 in 1994211 to 15 in 1995212 and 21 in 1996213 (declining to 6 in 1997 for 
obvious reasons).
An important aspect of Patten’s strategy was to balance the protagonism of the Governor 
with the promotion of the international exposure of key members of the Government, in 
particular those considered to be the pillars of continuity after 1997, so that they could 
gain international experience, become known to the international community and world
208 In 1990 Governor Wilson paid visits to the US, Canada, Italy, France, Brussels -  EU and Japan - I long 
Kong Report, HK Government, 1990 and 1991.
209 Hong Kong Report, HK Government, 1992.
210 In 1993 Governor Patten visited Japan, the EU (Brussels), the US where he met President Clinton. 
Hong Kong Report 1993, HK Government.
211 In 1994 Patten visited Australia, the US, Japan and South Korea, llong Kong Report 1994, HK 
Government.
212 In 1995 Chris Patten made only one visit to the Philippines. The majority of foreign visits were made 
by Anson Chan (10). Hong Kong Report 1995, UK Government.
213 In 1996 Patten was much more active on the world scene and made 6 high-profile visits to the l)S, 
where he met President Clinton, Canada, the EU- Brussels, Germany, f  iance anil Japan. The majority of 
the visits abroad were made by the Financial Secretary Donald Tsang (9). Hong Kong Report 19%, HK 
Government.
leaders and cultivate their own personal ties214. This involved a deliberate move to 
promote Anson Chan and Donald Tsang’s international exposure in sequence: 1994 and 
above all 1995 were the years of the Chief Secretary’s high international visibility and 
1996 the year of the Financial Secretary intense international exposure.
It should be noted that the majority of these visits were high level and high profile visits 
where the Governor, the Chief Secretary or the Financial Secretary met on a regular 
basis the top leaders of the states they visited. This clearly contributed to strengthen 
HK’s international visibility and status and reflected the recognition of HK as an 
international player.
Furthermore, these high level visits were exclusively the Governor’s initiative and a 
manifestation of HK’s autonomy in external affairs. Both Wilson and Patten decided on 
the countries, timing and objectives of these visits on their own with no interference 
from Britain. In general the Foreign Office adopted a passive position, it did neither 
encourage nor discourage these initiatives215. So, not only when making the decision 
Patten did not seek the approval from London but also in the course of the visits the 
British Embassies were not involved in the meetings.
Finally, these visits were not merely concerned with the promotion of HK economic 
interests but had also a clear political agenda behind it. Besides explaining to key 
countries the evolution of the transition process, Patten was definitely trying to mobilise 
international support for democratic reforms in HK, strongly opposed by China, and to 
secure the engagement and continued presence of key players in HK after the handover, 
so that it would remain an international centre. In short, it was a strategy for the 
internationalisation of the HK question in order to raise international awareness and to 
ensure that influential countries would be vigilant and willing to press China if 
necessary.
214 This is clearly demonstrated by data regarding the weight of the Governor's visits in the total number
of high level visits abroad: in 1993 the Governor accounted only 30 % of visits; 45% in 1994; 7% jn 1995 
and 30% in 1996.
Politicisation of external affairs
The politicisation of HK external affairs was another crucial trend and corresponded to a 
fundamental qualitative change brought about by the transition. It was not only the result 
of this internationalisation strategy, but also of the fact that, for quite different reasons, 
HK started to develop an international action and manifest autonomy in three new fronts 
with a political nature: refugees, the Vietnamese boat people; human rights; US-China 
trade war and MFN status renewal.
Refugees and immigration
The expansion of HK external affairs into political areas started with the issue of 
international migrations and refugees, related to the Vietnamese refugees (Vietnamese 
boat people) who from 1976 onwards fled Vietnam. Their first port of call and foremost 
destination was HK where they arrived in their hundreds and later in their thousands 
reaching the impressive record figure in a single year of 34.000 people in 1989216.
Given the great relevance of Vietnam in the context of the Cold War, a very contentious 
issue between the US and the Soviet Union and since 1979 also between the Soviet 
Union and China, this was a politically sensitive question. In addition, the large numbers 
of refugees involved and the humanitarian dramas further contributed to turn it into a 
highly visible international problem. HK found itself right at the centre of it.
The first reaction of the HK Government was one of moderation, great caution and 
concern with the humanitarian question. HK accepted to play the role of the port of first 
asylum and the number of refugees coming into HK waters increased rapidly. This was 
mainly explained by the fact the HK Government was concerned that if stronger 
measures were adopted preventing refugees from coming into I IK waters or denying 
them assistance, the Territory would be seen as responsible for the aggravation of the
215 This was confirmed both by Lord Wilson, interview on 21.5,2001 and Edward Llewellyn, interview 
17.10.2001.
21(1 Hong Kong Report 1990, HK Government. See John Torgrimson, “Vietnamese boat people" in Snim 
Yun-Wing (ed.). The other 1 hum Kong Report. 1991. Chinese University Press, IIK, pp. 103-115.
humanitarian plight and this could severely damage the positive international image of 
HK with potential high costs in other areas, namely trade and investment217. In other 
words, the high dependence of HK’s prosperity on its positive international image 
imposed a clear restraint on HK authorities’ attitude. HK was facing a difficult dilemma 
between the need to continue playing the role of port of first asylum and the high costs 
for a small and already crowded territory to receive large inflows of refugees and have to 
spend large sums of public money to provide them with food and shelter.
The necessity to respond to the problem and find a way out, when a unilateral action 
involving forced repatriation was not an option, led HK to become internationally active 
and to devise a strategy to legitimise a policy in accordance with its interests by building 
a solution with different members of the international community that could be 
internationally accepted. The initiative came from HK, as Britain was still hesitant about 
the policy to be followed. Probably one of the main reasons for that was the fact there 
was an intractable disagreement between HK and the US on this subject not only 
because HK felt that the American economic embargo against Vietnam was a major 
indirect cause for the growing flow of refugees, but also because the international 
opposition to HK idea of forced repatriation was led by the US which used the human 
rights card and was intransigent in rejecting involuntary repatriation218. This was then a 
very sensitive issue and the UK was not prepared to get involved in an expensive 
conflict with the US on this matter.
The policy proposed by HK on the refugees question included two aspects219: (i) the 
people who could be considered refugees as they met the criteria had to be resettled 
overseas in other countries as HK had no physical conditions to keep them; (ii) the 
people who did not meet the criteria and are only economic immigrants must be 
repatriated and return to Vietnam. This implied an operation of scrutiny to determine 
who met the criteria and who did not as well as the organisation of an operation of 
repatriation.
217 This concern was clearly expressed by the Government in the Hong Kong Report 1900. pp. 6-8.
2IS Anthony Seldon, Maior-a political life. Phoenix, London. 1997. p. 91 
2''' See Hong Kong Report 1990. IIK Government, pp.6-8.
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Once the policy designed, HK tried to sell it to the international community and secure 
both its approval and engagement in the solution of the problem, namely in terms of 
sharing the financial burden. This was done at the bilateral level, in the context of 
contacts with foreign countries namely the US where the question was put to the 
Congress, and to European countries, and at the multilateral level involving contacts 
with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC) which in the beginning 
strongly resisted any idea of repatriation.
A benchmark moment was the organisation in June 1989 of the Geneva Conference on 
Vietnamese Refugees, attended by Governor Wilson who, in a manifestation of 
considerable autonomy, addressed the Conference on behalf of HK and presented the 
HK policy to respond to the refugee problem emphasising that there was not a real 
solution without forced repatriation.
The Conference endorsed the fundamental aspects of HK policy, namely the screening 
principle and the principle of repatriation of non-refugees, and agreed on a 
Comprehensive Plan of Action. However, it did not go as far as to agree on the principle 
of forced repatriation supported by HK, mainly because of the US opposition, leaving 
only open the option of voluntary repatriation. In this process HK showed a clear 
autonomy in relation to London (initially Britain manifested reservations and did not 
openly support the HK position) and took the lead at the international level. 
Furthermore, HK position besides its influence at the multilateral level has also 
influenced the policies of individual countries, namely Southeast Asia countries and 
Japan.
The new international consensus carefully built under HK initiative created the 
necessary conditions to start solving effectively the Vietnamese refugees’ problem. In 
order to create an operational framework, HK set in motion a new international initiative 
involving negotiations with Vietnam, a process that was also participated by Britain, to 
reach an agreement on a scheme for repatriation. As a result, the three parties reached an
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agreement on September 1990 on a scheme of voluntary repatriation managed by the 
UNHCR covering people that volunteer and those who did not oppose repatriation, a 
“second category”220. In October 1991 a formal agreement was signed between the UK 
Government and the Vietnamese Government approving an Orderly Return Programme 
to promote the voluntary repatriation of Vietnamese illegal immigrants. Although HK 
exerted great influence in the negotiations it was not allowed to exercise autonomous 
treaty making powers in this matter.
This process not only introduced a new political area but also generated institutional 
changes in HK’s external relations. In fact, traditionally the Political Adviser, although a 
diplomat, was mainly concerned with relations with the PRC and had little involvement 
in HK’s external affairs. One of the interesting institutional developments was the 
expansion of the competencies of the Political Adviser Office which started to intervene 
in and co-ordinate all the matters related to refugees unlike the majority of the other 
economic external affairs areas co-ordinated by the Trade and Industry Department221.
Human rights
The second political area where HK became active internationally during the transition 
was on the human rights front. This was a clear input of Governor Patten and a result of 
his new active role in HK’s external affairs. There were two different channels at work. 
The first was a more formal channel related to HK’s involvement in the UN system and 
the application to HK of the two fundamental Conventions on human rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural rights (ICESCR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), whose continued 
application beyond 1997 was guaranteed under the JD222 and the BL223. The UK had 
extended the application of these Covenants to HK although with some restrictions,
“ The C'eac'on or n,,s ^ co „ d  caKgory" or “grey area" repair,alio,, way proposed m a join, stale,,,™,
issued by the UNHCR, HK and Vietnam in September 1990. See John Torttrimson on cit nn ins
221 Interview with Lord Wilson, 21.5.2001. " ’ ■’ H •
222 Joint Declaration, Annex I. art.XIII, para 4.
22’ BL. article 39 (1).
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namely Britain did not extend mechanisms that allow individual complaints related to 
personal violation of human rights224.
These Conventions imply a mandatory mechanism of periodic reporting on the 
implementation of the rights in a public hearing in the international monitoring bodies, 
foreseen in art. 40 of the ICCPR and art. 16 of the ICESCR. In compliance with this 
obligation and following the British strategy to consolidate the human rights system in 
HK with the approval of the 1991 Bill of Rights Ordinance, a response to the Tiananmen 
events, the UK started to report on the human rights situation in HK from 1992 onwards.
Although HK was not allowed to formally present on its own the document, the Report 
was actually prepared in HK and reflected the Territory’s views. Moreover, the HK 
representatives attended the public session and had the opportunity to directly answer 
questions and interact with the representatives of other countries. This gave HK a 
considerable international exposure and provided an opportunity, by being subject to 
international scrutiny, to show its good record in terms of human rights protection and 
assert its credibility as an actor that met international standards in this field, just like in 
many others, thus adding a new trait to its international image.
The second channel was more informal and is related with the active participation of the 
HK Governor in the regional debate on human rights in Asia, in particular his 
controversy with Lee Kuan Yew from Singapore, one of the architects of the “Asian 
values” theory. The debate was between a universalist approach that consider human 
rights are universal and are best protected in democratic systems, supported by Patten, 
and a cultural relativism approach, which considered the existence of different regional 
and cultural understandings and supported the model of authoritarian regimes 
legitimated by economic performance, advocated by Singapore’s Senior Minister. There 
were many exchanges some in private, some in public. Patten mentions two specific
224 The UK has not ratified the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights - Roda Mushkat. One country, two international lecal Personalities. IIKU Press, I IK, 1997, pp. 126- 
128.
incidents, one during a famous public lecture at the HK University225, which clearly 
illustrated the disagreement and confrontation between the two leaders. This debate had 
a high visibility in China and in Asia due to the high profile of the two participants and 
the fact it occurred at a time when the “Asian values” approach was at its highest.
The HK Governor has openly criticised the Asian values philosophy in public 
meetings226, conferences and official visits all over the world, playing a pioneer role in 
terms of opposition to a philosophy strongly anchored in the “Asian miracle” analysis. 
In so doing HK distanced itself from some Asian countries building an image of an 
advocate of the universality of human rights and signalling its difference with China, 
hoping this would constitute another safeguard to guarantee HK freedoms after the 
handover and preserve international standards.
US-China trade conflict
The third issue which contributed to the politicisation of HK’s external affairs was the 
intervention of HK in the US-China trade conflict, where HK played a facilitator role in 
the question of renewal of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to China. Although 
apparently a mere economic issue this was in reality a matter with a high political 
contents given the centrality of the US-China relationship in the post Cold War 
international system, the underlying growing strategic competition between the 
superpower and the new emerging global power and the fact the MFN mechanism was 
used by the US as a political tool to contain China.
But this was also a political role because of the specific political objectives the HK 
Government was pursuing. In fact there was a concerted strategy to lobby in Washington 
in favour of the renewal of the MFN status to China when there was a growing pressure 
in Congress, namely on the part of the Republicans, to withdraw it on the basis of 
China’s poor human rights record and military strengthening. The strategy was executed
225 See Chris Patten, East and West, Macmillan 1998, Pan Books edition, 1999, pp. 147-148,
2:6 For example in the speech to the Foreign Correspondents Club in November 1993 where he severely 
criticised the Asian values perspective and argued that human rights “are indivisible and interdependent". 
See Dimbleby. J„ The Fast Governor. Little, Brown and Company. London, p. 251.
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by the HK Washington ETO, mainly concentrated in lobbying the US Congress, and by 
Patten himself, in the context of his official visits to the US where he met President 
Clinton, in 1993, 1994 and 1996, the Congress and business circles227.
This was motivated by two different reasons. Firstly, HK’s self-interest and protection 
of economic interests. HK was clearly interested in convincing the US not to withdraw 
the MFN status to China insofar that would mean placing higher tariffs on Chinese 
exports leading to their contraction which, in turn, would damage HK’s economy as the 
China trade became since the late 1970s one of the engines of its prosperity228.
However, there was a second objective to this external affairs initiative, a political one: 
to show Beijing that HK was not anti-China and could play a useful role to support 
China’s interests. This was then intended to be a conciliatory gesture that could 
contribute to ease the high political tension with Beijing over democratic reforms229.
Interestingly, Dimbleby suggests that the strategy was somewhat more complex than 
that, arguing that Patten was also trying indirectly to exert pressure on Beijing to be 
more forthcoming on the issue of political reforms by “...discreetly persuading the 
Americans to hint obliquely that there was a link, however slight, between the renewal 
of MFN and the enhancement of democracy in Hong Kong.”230. In other words, 
although pressing for the renewal, Patten hoped that the US could use the MFN tool to 
press China to adopt a more flexible position on HK’s political reforms.
The HK intervention proved to be effective even though it was not the decisive factor to 
explain the American decision to renew the MFN status. It has played a certain role 
because Patten’s arguments and position were seen in Washington as more credible and 
convincing than China’s own arguments. At the same time his insistence on the
227 Patten had good access to the White House and to other key players in the American system, namely 
the Treasury, the State Department and leading Senators. See Patten quoted in Dimbleby, op. cit.. p. 193.
228 According to estimates by Enright, China trade entrepot role would account in the 1990s something 
close to 30 % of HK’s GDP. HK firms handle 50% of Mainland China's exports. See Enright et all (ed) 
The Hone Kong Advantage. Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 71
Interview w ith Edward Llewellyn, adviser to the Governor, 17.10.2001.
devastating effects for the HK economy reminded the Americans that HK was the most 
important centre of US economic interests in Asia, playing a relevant role in the global 
economy and so it was in the US best interests not to damage it.
Besides proving that HK possessed the skills to act internationally, this episode also 
demonstrated how close the HK relationship with the US was. Clearly, one of the key 
strategic changes in HK’s international insertion and alliances during the transition 
period, in particular in the 1990s, was the fact the US became HK’s main partner in the 
international system, clearly replacing the UK in terms of advocacy of HK’s case and 
speaking up for HK on the international stage. This fundamental development further 
contributed to the expansion of HK’s autonomy in relation to the sovereign power but 
has also raised reservations in London and suspicious in Beijing.
From the above account it is clear that the transition period has contributed to 
consolidate and expand HK’s autonomy to act internationally and strengthen its 
international status. However, it is less clear what was the key factor behind this. Four 
different hypotheses can be considered.
First, this was the result of positive co-operation between Britain and China in the 
context of the JLG to promote HK’s international status. The two powers had clearly 
different motivations. Britain deliberately pushed to expand HK’s external autonomy as 
a security mechanism for the future, hoping that increased international exposure and the 
creation of precedents internationally would help protecting the domestic autonomy of 
the future SAR. China was mainly concerned with the preservation of HK’s role as an 
international economic and financial centre, a key asset for China’s economy and to 
prove the international community its intention to respect its commitments. In spite of 
the different motives, there was an objective convergence of interests that made such co-
230 Dimbleby, J..on.cit.. p.192
231 This was a deliberate British strategy as pointed out by Alan Paul, interview on 19.12.2001. Durine the 
last phase o f the transition London sent directives to the British Embassies for British deleaations to 
international organisations and conferences to facilitate the visibility o f the UK delegate and allow him to 
speak and present UK's specific views in order to set a precedent.
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operation possible in a context where neither party wanted to be accused of blocking the 
process.
The second hypothesis is that the key factor was HK’s proactive initiative and strategy 
taking advantage of a situation where the control of the outgoing sovereign was 
weakening and the control of the incoming sovereign was not yet established. As the 
control of the sovereign power loosened, HK gained more room for manoeuvre and 
made its way.
The third possibility is that the “China factor” was the key explanation. During the 
1990s the Chinese economy boomed and became one of the fastest growing economies 
at the same time it accelerated its integration in the world economy, becoming the 
number one priority for world FDI. Since HK was a crucial door to the China market, 
HK’s international position was enhanced contributing to expand its links with foreign 
countries.
The fourth hypothesis highlights the relevance of external factors related to the strong 
acceleration of the globalisation process in the 1990s and the strategic roles HK 
performed in the global economy as a financial centre and co-ordinator of fragmented 
production processes232. The circumstance HK was a key player in the globalisation of 
the world economy led many countries to be willing to interact with HK and to accept 
and legitimise its engagement in international activities.
It is difficult to identify what was the crucial factor but, on the basis of the evidence 
available, one can argue that rather than the influence of a single factor it was a 
combination between these four factors that accounted for the expansion of HK’s 
external autonomy and international status. The transition period generated a completely 
new framework for HK external relations but we have to look at the practical 
implementation of the system after 1997 and the SAR experience in managing external
r': Enright, op.cit.. pp. 53-83
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affairs to assess its impact on HtC’s autonomy in external affairs, a key issue which will 
be the subject of the next chapter.
1 OS
CHAPTER FOUR
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION’S 
EXTERNAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL 
PARTICIPATION IN THE POST-HANDOVER PERIOD
During the 1984-1997 transition period HK’s institutional system for external action 
went through significant qualitative changes when compared with the bureaucratic-led 
decentralised model that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s. Firstly, the institutional 
system became more complex with a greater number of actors (the Governor, the 
Political Adviser and the TID) representing the end to the bureaucracy’s monopoly in 
external affairs. Secondly, there was a politicisation of HK’s external affairs, as HK 
became active internationally in matters of refugees, asylum and human rights.
Thirdly, the system gained greater autonomy in relation to the sovereign power. There 
was, however, an apparent paradox because while HK’s autonomy increased in certain 
areas, Britain’s involvement also increased indirectly through the Political Adviser233, in 
many instances to help strengthening HK’s external autonomy. This reflects the fact 
that greater autonomy does not necessarily mean separation from the sovereign power. 
In the case of HK during the transition, autonomy was combined with co-operation with 
Britain in external affairs proving that the two can co-exist.
233 The Political Adviser was a senior diplomat from the Foreign Office posted in 1 IK to advise the 
Governor. He was exclusively in charge of relations with China and did not get involved in HK external 
relations. Basically he was the liaison officer with Beijing and the Xinhua office in HK. Besides his links 
with the FCO. he played another fundamental function in the “intelligence" area, maintaininu close 
contacts with the British intelligence sen ices and other foreign services present in UK. namely the US.
This chapter addresses the question of HK’s international participation and external 
autonomy after the retrocession to China’s sovereignty, focussing on the influence of the 
three main conditioning factors -  HK’s own action and institutional capacity; the nature 
of the HK-Beijing relationship; the policies and attitudes of external actors -  and their 
combined impact on autonomy and the level of HK’s international participation. Section 
one, looks at changes in the SAR’s institutional framework for the management of 
external relations, its nature and conditions to produce a coherent external action. 
Section two deals with the new HK-China relationship in the field of international affairs 
in an attempt to understand how rules were implemented, how HK and the PRC’s areas 
of competence have been articulated and the extent to which the SAR’s sphere of 
autonomy was respected. Section three is concerned with the experience and priorities of 
HK’s international participation and how far it had an impact on, or induced changes in 
the international system. Finally, section four analyses the perceptions and interaction of 
major external actors with HK and how far they have upheld or weakened the SAR’s 
external autonomy and capacity to act internationally on its own.
4.1. HONG KONG’S INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
MANAGEMENT OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
In the post handover period there were both elements of continuity and change in the 
institutional system that manages HK’s external relations.
As far as continuity is concerned, the bureaucratic component remained unchanged. The 
Trade and Industry Department (TID) kept intact its powers and autonomy in managing 
economic external relations. The system of external representation constituted by the 
ETOs, whose network was maintained and increased in 2001 with the creation of a new 
office in Guangzhou, remained in place with no changes in personnel and the 
preservation of the dominant position of administrative officers. There is also an 
element of continuity in the formal preservation of the role of the Chief Executive in 
external affairs despite some substantive changes highlighted below.
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We can find also continuity in the excessive govemmentalisation of external affairs and 
the fact civil society and NGOs remain excluded and have no meaningful participation 
in the institutional system. In this respect the system is unbalanced and lacks 
fundamental institutions, such as a “think-tank” capable of thinking strategically on 
HK’s external affairs and long term position in the international system. This constitutes 
an handicap for HK and is a key factor behind a major paradox that marks the SAR’s 
international status: although HK is an active international player it has a domestic 
deficit of attention for international matters and a civil society which is not fully aware 
of the relevance and complexity of HK’s international status.
The evolution of the institutional system was also marked by important changes in the 
post-handover period. Firstly, the Chief Executive was formally granted powers to 
conduct external affairs by the BL art. 48 (9) reflecting a certain tendency for 
centralisation of such functions in his hands. This power was never granted to the HK 
British Governor who developed an active role in external affairs informally, based on 
substantive elements namely, his personality, political skills and international image.
Secondly, although equipped with this formal legitimacy, in substance the Chief 
Executive’s role has lost in relevance and international visibility when compared with 
the pre-handover period. Tung Che-hwa tried to keep up the mechanism of high level 
visits abroad234 but after the initial set of visits it lost momentum and declined in 
intensity, in spite of the attempt to increase the exposure of the Chief Executive in high 
multilateral meetings, in particular through his participation in the APEC 1997 
Vancouver leaders’ summit, never attended by any HK Governor due to Beijing’s 
opposition.
234 Just after the 1997 handover the Chief Executive made 5 visits to Singapore, Malaysia, US, Brussels 
(EU) and the UK. In 1998 there was a declined with only two visits to Germany and France a tendency 
that was maintained in 1999 when the Chief Executive made only two official visits to S Francisco (US) 
and the Republic of Korea. In 2000 there was a slight increase to 3 (US, Canada, UK). I long Kong 
Reports. 1997-2001,1IKSAR Government.
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Although there was an attempt to strengthen the formal status of the Chief Executive in 
external relations and to promote some centralisation in his hands, seen by Beijing as a 
risk-reduction strategy, paradoxically the substantive role of the Chief Executive has 
declined. This is fundamentally explained by personal factors since, unlike his 
predecessor, he was not a well-known international personality, lacked charisma and 
political weight.
However, I would argue that the reduction of international exposure was also a 
deliberate risk-aversion strategy adopted by the Chief Executive. His visits abroad 
implied that he had to speak, make statements and answer questions which created a 
dilemma. The choice was between saying the same things as Beijing and risk to be seen 
as lacking autonomy and too compliant with the sovereign’s directives, or saying 
different things and risk raising doubts in Beijing about his loyalty and how far he can 
be trusted. He would be in trouble either way and therefore choose to reduce his 
international exposure in order to contain the risks of finding himself in dilemmatic and 
embarrassing situations. This option had a clear cost for the HKSAR insofar it lost its 
international face.
The third important change has been the elimination of the Political Adviser Office, 
which represented a strong link between the sovereign power and the HK Government in 
the previous institutional structure. As a consequence, in the SARG there is no longer 
the presence of an official from the sovereign power’s Foreign Service inside the 
structure of Government. The interests of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
are now represented in HK by a completely separate structure, the Office of the MFA 
Commissioner (MFAO).
This had an important implication for HK. With the departure of the Political Adviser, 
HK lost the capacity to deal with intelligence matters and maintain its links with foreign 
intelligence services. HK does not have its own intelligence services to replace the 
political adviser. Moreover, it lacks the knowledge and skills to organise and run this 
type of services. This vacuum that emerged after the handover, is a clear limitation for
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the SARG in dealing with foreign partners, with Taiwan and even Beijing, insofar HK 
lacks classified information about people and processes. This puts HK at a disadvantage, 
weakening its capacity to act internationally.
Fourthly, there was the emergence of a new player in the HK Government structure, the 
Constitutional Affairs Bureau (CAB), entrusted with a double function: on the domestic 
front to co-ordinate across departments matters related to external affairs; on the external 
front to manage relations between the HKSARG and the CPG, ensuring compliance with 
the BL provisions on foreign affairs and the necessary articulation between foreign 
affairs and external affairs .
As far as internal co-ordination is concerned, the CAB maintains permanent contacts 
with the different policy departments and bureaux advising them on the application to 
HK of international agreements as well as on negotiations of new agreements. The co­
ordination exercised by CAB covers four main areas235 36. Firstly, the establishment of 
standard procedures regarding different acts in the external affairs domain in order to 
ensure uniformity. Secondly, the study, analysis and approval of innovative solutions 
proposed by specific departments so as to ensure its compliance with the BL, crucial to 
allow for some flexibility, i.e. introduction of new wording or new clauses in standard 
agreements.
Thirdly, although policy sectoral departments are allowed considerable freedom to 
define their own specific long term goals and to manage external relations, CAB has 
tried to ensure some co-ordination between departments in order to attain consistent and 
coherent action with a foreign partner so that HK’s bargaining position is strengthened. 
The objective is to adopt an integrated view of the relationship with a specific foreign 
partner in order to avoid, for instance, that in the context of a conflict with a foreign 
partner HK does not adopt contradictory positions across sectors.
235 CAB, SARG “Confidence in the Constitutional Arrangements” policy objective for the Constitutional 
Affairs Bureau 2001, Policy Address, 2001, pp. 4-11:22-24.
2,<’ Interview w ith CAB officials on 18.12.2001.
A fourth area of CAB co-ordination is between HK’s external affairs and specific 
interests on the one hand, and China’s foreign policy and national interests, on the other. 
To this end, CAB disseminates information and advises departments about the foreign 
policy guidelines defined by the CPG and organises meetings among heads of 
department to discuss such guidelines, in order to improve consistency and prevent 
potential conflicts.
Although we find both elements of operational and policy co-ordination in CAB’s 
action, the first type is clearly dominant, driven by the objective to ensure the SAR fully 
respects the boundaries of its autonomy in external affairs so that it cannot be accused of 
being a trespasser. The component of policy co-ordination is weak and can only be 
slightly detected in the third and fourth areas. By and large the CAB does not prepare 
any policy document dealing with the global strategy and options in the area of external 
affairs and does not even coordinate the long-term policy options defined by the 
different sector departments. In fact, what still predominates is the co-existence of a 
multiplicity of policy guidelines in specific sectors, with diverse levels of sophistication 
lacking global coherence. In other words, there is not an articulated external affairs’ 
policy that sets out both the objectives and strategies for UK’s international 
participation.
Looking at the institutional system and its components one can conclude that although 
the BL points to a greater centralisation of the system in the hands of the Chief 
Executive, in practice the system did not experience a radical change and is best 
characterised as a semi-decentralised one in the post-handover period.
Unlike other NCG’s, such as Catalonia and Quebec which adopted in the 1990s a more 
centralised model with the creation of a central body responsible for the management of 
external relations, in the HKSAR sectoral departments are still the dominant players and 
enjoy considerable autonomy in conducting external affairs both in terms of policy
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making and policy implementation237. However, it should be classified as semi- 
decentralised because a new element of central co-ordination has been recently 
introduced associated with CAB’s role.
In any case the coordination developed by CAB is weak and rather limited for two 
reasons. On the one hand, it does not really cover co-ordination of policy aspects related 
to external affairs, the definition of global objectives and strategies, but deals mostly 
with legal aspects. Its dominant purpose is the management of relations between the 
SAR and the CPG to ensure that the SARG departments act within the limits of UK’s 
external autonomy and follow standard procedures in order to prevent potential conflicts 
with Beijing. In this light co-ordination is more inward than outward looking. On the 
other, what prevails is a “negative co-ordination” mode, aimed at reducing 
contradictions and limiting damage, rather than “positive co-ordination”, which implies 
building on common objectives and actions.
4.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HKSAR AND THE 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The HKSAR-CPG relationship in managing foreign and external affairs is a completely 
new experience for both sides. The last five years were clearly a learning process where 
the two sides tried to implement the system designed in the BL by interpreting the rules, 
designing procedures, establishing channels of communication and finding new 
solutions for cases not regulated. In so doing they have tested the boundaries of their 
respective spheres of competence and established modalities of accommodating their 
specific interests. Although the operational aspects of the new relation are not yet 
completely consolidated, from the experience accumulated between 1997-2001 it is 
possible to identify already some trends.
237 This idea o f the post 1997 UK system remaining decentralised was confirmed by Anson Chan, 
interview on 17.12.2001. She also mentioned that one o f the changes was that the Chief Executive has less
Institutional channels
There are different institutional channels through which the HKSARG and the CPG 
exchange information and articulate positions on external affairs. Three main channels 
coexist.
Firstly, the channel between the MFA Office and the CAB is the most important one. 
The MFAO, set up in accordance with art. 13 BL, is a representative structure of the 
CPG in the SAR in the field of foreign affairs. According to the MFAO’s own 
definition238, it performs three main functions: (i) handle HK related foreign affairs 
which are the responsibility of the CPG; (ii) assist the HKSAR in handling on its own 
the relevant external affairs in accordance with the BL or under authorisation of the 
CPG; (iii) carry out other assignments entrusted by the CPG.
The CAB has permanent direct contacts with the MFAO but also mediates between 
SARG departments and the Office in a wide range of issues. The analysis of this 
interaction reveals that there are four main contact areas: (i) the granting of CPG 
authorisations for the SAR to negotiate and conclude international agreements; (ii) the 
implementation of the CPG’s international rights and obligations related to HK, namely 
those involving submission of Reports, the enforcement of UN sanctions and provision 
of privileges and immunities; (iii) the S AR’s participation in international organisations 
limited to states; (iv) the establishment of consular missions in HK. The two first areas 
are clearly the day-to-day dominant areas of contact239.
Secondly, in trade matters and WTO-related issues there is a different channel. Contacts 
with the CPG are managed mostly by the HK Trade Office in Beijing240 directly with 
MOFTEC, the dominant player in this field.
intervention in external affairs after 1997 than before.
218 Interview with the MFAO officials in HK on 18.12.2001, Li Cluinyan and Song Ruan.
239 Interview with CAB officials on 18.12.2001.
240 Interview with the Director o f the 1IK E'l'O in Beijing, Bowen Leung, 4.12.200!, established in March 
1999.
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Thirdly, the top regular contacts between the Chief Executive and the State Council, in 
particular the Vice-Premier responsible for HK and reunification. There is a regular 
annual meeting where foreign affairs are addressed, and various ad hoc contacts. This 
level does not deal with operational and detailed management of foreign affairs but 
predominantly with global policy options, and the provision of classified information to 
the Chief Executive on the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.
Post-1997 practice
The experience accumulated and the post-1997 practice is still evolving and its analysis 
constrained by the lack of available official data and reports. Therefore this section is 
based on a series of interviews conducted with key players in Beijing and HK between 
1999 and 2002.
The section looks at the practice that has emerged at three different levels: management 
of foreign affairs; management of external affairs; the system of specific authorisation 
covering grey areas that fall between foreign and external affairs. Each level has its own 
logic and rules but there are important linkages between them demonstrating the 
complexity and density of the system of external relations.
Foreign Affairs
As far as foreign affairs are concerned, the practice has contributed to clarify what 
matters fall under this general category and what are the boundaries with external 
affairs. The MFAO has consistently managed different foreign affairs matters related to 
HK, which are of the exclusive competence of the CPG.
The first area, probably the closest one to the heart of sovereignty, includes matters 
related to defence and national security. A central issue has been the approval by he 
CPG of applications of foreign state aircraft and foreign warships to visit the HKSAR. 
The most relevant aspect, because of its high visibility, has been the authorisation for US 
warships from the Pacific Fleet and aircraft to call at HK. In the post-handover period
17
this became a highly politicised issue insofar as Beijing has denied authorisation in 
several occasions and suspended the visits for long periods as a retaliation mechanism in 
periods of high tension with Washington. This was the case after the bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, when visits were suspended for 5 months241. 
Again in 2001 after the EP-3 incident with the US aircraft over the South China Sea near 
Hainan, in April, the visits were also suspended until July242. This illustrates clearly that 
the PRC’s national interests are paramount in matters of foreign affairs and prevail in 
case of conflict with HK’s specific interests.
A second area includes the application to the HKSAR of international multilateral 
treaties limited to states. The CPG decides whether to apply or not a specific treaty in the 
SAR’s territory one of its sovereign power’s prerogatives. Since 1997 and until 2001, 
the CPG has decided to apply to HK a total of 24 new multilateral agreements, the 
majority related to political, diplomatic and defence matters243. There were also cases of 
discontinuity, 4 agreements which were applied to HK before 1997 but ceased to be 
after244.
Nevertheless this provides an important manifestation of UK’s autonomy insofar a 
considerable number of multilateral international agreements applicable to the SAR are 
not applicable to Mainland China. In fact a percentage as high as 40% of the total 
number of multilateral agreements (81 out of a total of 217 in 2001) apply exclusively to 
HK but not to the rest of China. Interesting enough the majority of these agreements are 
in labour (ILO conventions), human rights (9), customs (9) and merchant shipping (11)
241 Herald Tribune 4.11.1999. After this, the frequency o f port calls and aircraft visits returned to normal 
levels, 50-70 ships and 100 planes per year -  US Department of State, HK Policy Act Report 2000, 
www.consulate.oru.hkAishk'pi, pp.9.
242 The CPG denied authorisation for the visit o f a US military aircraft in April and to a US warship port 
call in May. Only in July the suspension was lifted. Since then and until March 2002, nearly 20 ships 
including 2 aircraft carrier battle groups of the Seventh Fleet Flagship visited I IK - US Department of 
State, US-HK Policy Act Reports 2001 and 2002 internet version (www. State.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/4465.htm)
243 The most relevant political and diplomatic multilateral treaties were: UN Convention on the Law o f the 
Sea: Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpilling and use of chemical 
weapons and on their destruction; Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties; Convention on the 
prohibition or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons.
areas24 45, reflecting the specific and differentiated identity of the SAR in relation to the 
PRC at two levels: in economic terms, HK’s unique status as a major international 
shipping centre and its condition as a separate customs territory and a full member of 
WTO; in political terms, the human rights standards, including labour rights, in HK are 
quite different from those prevailing in the Mainland and more in line with international 
standards.
The handover process has contributed to widen the gap between the sovereign power 
and HK in the post-handover period when compared with the period prior to 1997. There 
has been an evolution from a situation marked by convergence where all the multilateral 
agreements applicable to HK were also applied to Britain, to a situation marked by a 
divergence where nearly half of the agreements applicable to the SAR are not applicable 
to China, simply because the former sovereign power had an higher level of integration 
in the international system and incorporation of international rules than the new 
sovereign power. As a result, the differentiation became more evident contributing to 
reinforce HK’s formal external autonomy.
A third area concerns HK’s participation in international organisations limited to States, 
where sovereignty is a pre-condition for membership. In these organisations HK does 
not have a separate membership and can only participate as part of the Chinese 
delegation. The practice since 1997 shows that HK has enjoyed some “room for 
manoeuvre”246. HK delegates are not submitted to the CPG’s prior approval, there is a 
simple communication of the SARG informing on the identity of the delegates 
designated to attend the meeting in representation of HK. Furthermore, the SAR 
delegates have the opportunity to participate in the internal co-ordination meetings of the 
PRC delegation, present their proposals and at times influence the delegation’s final 
position.
244 The agreements were the Montreal Convention on the making of plastic explosives for the purpose of 
detection; Wellington Convention on regulation of Antarctic Mineral resource activities; ILO Convention 
n. 45 on underground work (women); ILO Convention no. 141 on rural workers organisations.
245 1IKSAR Information Department. “The HKSAR and external affairs" October 2002. 
www.info.gov.hk/info/exaffa.litm.
246 Interview with CAB officials on 18.12.2001.
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There has been an interesting development in situations of disagreement between the 
SAR and Mainland delegates inside the PRC delegation. The tendency has been for the 
PRC delegation not to express a position and to remain silent, thus showing a consensus 
not to act, until the differences have been settled internally. This has been the experience 
with technical treaties, namely the Hague Convention on Private International Law and 
the Hague Convention on indirectly held securities. In this sense, and in relation to a 
limited number of cases involving matters with no political sensitivity for China, the 
SAR has been able to use a “veto” as far as China’s position is concerned, considering 
that China has not imposed its views247. However, one can suspect that this will not be 
the case in areas where the PRC has strong interests or carry more political weight.
The process of HK participation in the PRC delegation brought about two important 
effects for China. On the one hand, it has contributed to improve China’s image in 
international fora. In the meetings HK delegates are often very active as they have great 
technical expertise and master the English language at the same time their presence give 
an image of openness and flexibility. The participation of expatriates as HK delegates, 
such as David Little or Stuart Harbinson, adds to this positive effect since their presence 
gives confidence to third countries and is the best visible sign of UK’s autonomy248. This 
experience has expanded because since 1997 the SAR started to participate on a regular 
basis in three new international organisations limited to states: the World Tourism 
Organisation (1999); the World Health Organisation (2000) and the Group of Twenty 
(1999)249.
On the other hand, it brought about the expansion of China’s international participation. 
The specific interest of HK in certain organisations led China to get involved in more
247 Interview with high HK Government officials on 17.12.2001.
248 It is interesting to note the parallel and contrast with the situation in the early 1970s, By then the 
presence o f expatriates as HK representatives was seen as suspicious and regarded by third countries as a 
sign o f HK’s lack o f autonomy in relation to London. Today the situation is exactly the opposite as the 
¡presence o f the very same expatriates is a sign of autonomy and a positive element that reinforces trust.
-49 At the end of 2002 the IIKSAR participated on a regular and permanent basis in a total o f  24 
International Organisations limited to states, under art. 152(1 ) of the BL, integrated in the I’RC delegation
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fora, namely organisations in which the PRC has not a direct interest, simply because 
HK could not participate on its own and so China had to be instrumentally involved to 
make HK’s involvement legally viable. One of the best examples of this phenomenon is 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
The fourth major area relates to consular relations and diplomatic representation, which 
is a competence of the sovereign power. This is an interesting area because the CPG 
voluntarily decided not to exert all the powers and associate the SAR in operational 
terms. China allowed HK to play a more active role in consular affairs according to the 
following division of labour: the CPG has the direct responsibility for issues of 
establishment and abolition of consular representation, approval of new consulates, 
consular appointments and control of credentials and for granting privileges and 
immunities; the HKSARG is responsible for the day to day management of the consular 
corps, namely questions of issuing consular identity cards, the actual provision of 
privileges and immunities and the security of consular premises250.
This constitutes an interesting innovation, not foreseen in the BL, of an authorisation 
given by the CPG to the SAR to exercise delegated competencies in foreign affairs 
matters. This does not strengthen the sphere of formal autonomy of HK since the 
granting and termination of the delegation of powers is arbitrary, fully dependent on the 
CPG’s will and convenience. However, it can nevertheless contribute to strengthen HK’s 
de facto external autonomy insofar it allows the system of direct contacts between the 
foreign consulates and the HK Government to continue. On the other hand, this is a sign 
of flexibility on the part of China showing that HK’s sphere of competencies can be 
expanded through this mechanism by which the CPG decides to associate the SAR to the 
exercise of specific functions in foreign affairs.
Although the dominant picture has been one of continuity, it is also true that the 
handover brought about some relevant changes in the area of consular relations which
and in a few cases more autonomously as an assoeiate member. See CAB, IIKSARG, 
w vvvv. in lb. eov. Iik cab topical ioru lis.html 8.1.2003.
See Hong Kong Report 1908.11KSAR Government, pp. 10-11.
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reflect the foreign policy orientations of the new sovereign power and the primacy of 
China’s objectives over HK interests. One relevant example has been the creation of the 
North Korean Consulate in HK in 2000251 25, traditionally rejected by HK in the past 
because of concerns about Pyongyang intelligence and other dubious activities. This was 
a PRC decision. Beijing decided that one of its closest allies should have a presence in 
the SAR, although there was an opposition of HK authorities, namely the Police, to the 
idea of opening a Consulate in HK because of the fear HK could be turned into the new 
centre of North Korea criminal activities (counterfeiting, drug trafficking and amis 
trade) given the experience of Macao, affecting HK’s internal security and international
252image .
Another example was the announced closure of South Africa’s Consulate and its 
transformation in a semi-official representation because South Africa had no diplomatic 
relations with the PRC and maintained relations with Taiwan. This possibility was 
contrary to HK interests, given the historical links with South Africa and its strong 
economic ties, but was dictated by China’s reunification policy priorities. This turned 
out to be a very interesting case in the relationship between the SAR and Beijing. South 
Africa changed its position and established diplomatic relations with the PRC, thus 
preventing the closure of the Consulate, in a process where HK played a bridge role and 
contributed positively to China’s foreign policy253.
The fifth main area of foreign affairs involves political issues. After 1997, the two main 
issues were human rights and refugees issues/ asylum policy. On the latter the HKSAR
251 The Consulate was opened on 16 February 2000. In the beginning UK was chosen to play a role as a 
neutral ground for “diplomatic contacts” between the two Koreas. Seoul and Pyonyang agreed to held in 
HK the first meeting between the North and South defence ministers since the Korean War in late 
September 2000 but at the last minute the meeting place was changed to a South Korea island- see BMC 
News, 20.9.2000 (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/933902.stm)
252 On the opposition o f the HK police see Aidan Foster-Carter, “North Korea: making up lost ground, 
Pyongyang reacts” in Comparative Connections Journal. January 2000, vol 1, n. 3, 4lh Quarter 1999, 
Pacific Forum CSIS (http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/994Qnkorea.html) and Glenn Schloss “Beijing's 
interference hurts SAR’s image” South China Morning Post, 10.6.1999. See also Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 25.10.2001, regarding the criminal activities of North Korea in Macau organised around the 
Zokwang Trading Co.
2v’ Interview with MFAO officials in 1IK. 18.12.2001.
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decided to end HK’s “port of first asylum” policy for Vietnamese in January 199 8254, 
implying in practice that any Vietnamese coming to HK is no longer entitled to a special 
treatment and will be treated as any illegal immigrant involving immediate repatriation. 
The influence of China in this decision was probably significant showing that although 
the SAR has autonomy to define and implement its immigration policy, in matters of 
international immigration and refugees with political implications, China has a say and 
the issue becomes a foreign affairs matter255.
Human Rights is a highly sensitive and politicised issue for China and so Beijing was 
very careful in handling HK related international obligations in this field. In fact, China 
allowed some autonomy for HK to prepare the Reports on the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) presented to the Human Rights Committee and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, respectively, in 1999. The Reports 
were formally presented by a Chinese delegation including various HK officials. 
Furthermore, complaints subsequently presented by the Committee about violations by 
the HKSAR of provisions of the Covenant have been addressed to the PRC Government, 
not to the SAR, thus recognising the sovereign power competence256. So, although China 
allowed HK to prepare its own Report and discuss it in Geneva, this has to be seen as 
another example of delegation of powers in foreign affairs matters and not as an 
expansion of HK’s sphere of autonomy.
More recently after September 11, the issue of terrorism and international co-operation 
to fight terrorism became increasingly seen as pertaining to the realm of foreign affairs.
254 See Hong Kong Report 2000, HKSAR Government, pp. 422-423. Since 1975 HK received more than 
200.000 Vietnamese refugees and at the end of 2000 only 97 refugees and 116 Vietnamese migrants 
remained in HK. Over 25 years HK has managed to resettle 143.000 refugees in third countries and to 
repatriate 67.000 back to Vietnam.
252 The idea that human rights and international immigration/refugees matters belong to foreign affairs was 
expressed by the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office official, Commissioner Zhang Xiao-Ming, 
interview on 30.11.2001.
226 A good example has been the complaint presented by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, through a letter sent by its Chairwoman, Mrs. Virginia Dandan, in May 2002 to the I’RC. 
The letter complaining about the removal of 10.000 abode seekers from the SAR in violation o f the UN 
recommendations, was addressed to Ambassador Sha Zukang. China's Permanent Representative in 
Geneva - South China Morning Post 15.9.2002 also cited in an interview with the UNI IRC on 21.11.2002.
Although it involves both domestic security (in relation to which HK is competent) and 
external security (for which China is responsible) making it a grey area, the fact is that 
the high level of internationalisation made terrorism an issue under Beijing control 
despite the fact the SAR security forces are involved in operational aspects. This same 
logic can easily be extended to other soft security areas strongly interlinked with 
terrorism such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and organised crime. The 
emerging orientation is that while day-to-day co-operation between the HKSAR police 
forces and other foreign police forces can be conducted by the SAR, formal agreements 
have to be controlled by the CPG.
Specific authorisations
As mentioned in chapter three, the Basic Law expressly foresees the need for China’s 
specific prior authorisation for HK to conclude international agreements in three 
different areas: juridical reciprocal assistance (art. 96 BL); civil aviation and air services 
agreements (art.133 BL); and visa abolition agreements (art. 155 BL). In spite of the 
existence of some formal differences between the three cases, namely the fact the law 
mentions “specific authorisations” in relation to air services agreements and only 
authorisations in the other two cases, it is generally recognised they are basically similar 
and follow the same regime. The way this system of specific authorisations has been 
implemented in practice since 1997, reveal an overall picture of absence of major 
conflicts and formal compliance with the rules. Yet, there have been also some 
unexpected developments and deviant practices that tend to marginally restrict UK’s 
autonomy.
The first observation is that there was a quite intense activity in terms of the conclusion 
of international agreements subject to PRC authorisation, demonstrating that the more 
intense and tight control of the sovereign power did not create obstacles or slowdown 
the level of HK’s international interaction and creation of new rights and duties. 
Between 1997-2001 more than 60 bilateral agreements subject to the PRC authorisation 
were signed by HK with foreign countries, including 26 new Air services agreements, 4
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overflight agreements, 20 reciprocal juridical assistance agreements, 8 visa abolition 
agreements and one IPPA. It should be noted that these are new agreements and not 
renewals of existing agreements.
The number of these new agreements signed by HK is actually higher after the handover 
than under British rule. More importantly, the agreements subject to authorisation are 
the dominant category of bilateral agreements signed by HK with over 50 countries, 
accounting for 2/3 of the total 100 binding bilateral agreements concluded since 199 7257.
The second observation is that China has adopted a more restrictive understanding and 
practice on the system of authorisation than Britain. In fact, in the pre-handover period 
London used to give only one authorisation to negotiate and sign and, as a rule, it was a 
general authorisation to negotiate with a group of countries and not on a case by case 
basis. After 1997 the system became more rigorous for the rule started to be a case by 
case authorisation. In addition, the mechanism after 1997 has involved in reality not one 
authorisation as before but two subsequent authorisations: an initial authorisation to 
negotiate the agreement with a specific country; a second authorisation to sign the 
agreement once the negotiation is concluded. So, there are two moments of control by 
the sovereign power which are relatively independent.
The process starts with the presentation of a written request by the HKSAR Government 
to the MFAO whose main element is the identification of the country with whom HK 
wants to negotiate and the type of agreement. In general this is the only element 
provided, as there is not the practice of providing a detailed information about the HK 
reasons to present the request. In this first stage the MFAO controls if there is any 
obstacle, namely political, to enter into negotiations with a specific country. In extreme 
cases, where China has a diplomatic conflict or a serious problem with the country in 
question, one can expect authorisation to be denied.
2571IKSAR Information Department. “The HKSAR and external affairs" October 2002. internet version 
www.info.gov.hk/info/exaffa.htm. Annex I includes the list of bilateral agreements signed as of I1).0.2002.
It should be noted that the level of control exerted by the CPG is greater than it appears 
at first sight because of the existence of an in-built mechanism. The HK.SAR is 
authorised to negotiate an agreement but its autonomy is constrained because the 
agreement is a standard one, whose model has been previously approved by the CPG. As 
a consequence its contents are somehow prefixed and clauses are not supposed to be 
changed.
As soon as the first authorisation is granted the negotiations start258. During the 
negotiation process there are no contacts with the MFAO except in cases where a new 
clause different from the standard text of the agreement is proposed and the parties want 
to introduce it. Then, the CAB consults the MFAO before the completion of negotiations 
in order to ensure there is no objection to the innovative clause.
After the negotiation is concluded the process enters into the phase of the second and 
final authorisation. Then, the SARG submits the draft agreement to the MFAO for 
approval and concession of authorisation to sign. The CPG’s control is more intense at 
this stage as the detailed text is submitted to scrutiny.
There were not many cases of denial of authorisation which remains an exception. 
Difficulties tend to be worked out by the two parties and divergences are not publicly 
discussed. However, there are references to some cases of denial of authorisation, in 
particular cases involving agreements with the US259. The case was not related to the 
signature of a bilateral agreement but rather with the implementation of existing 
agreements. This involved a request by the US Government, in the context of the 
bilateral juridical assistance agreements, for the SAR co-operation regarding evidence
258 The authorisation to negotiate is granted through a letter signed by the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs 
addressed to the SAR Chief Executive. For example, the Air Services Agreement with Sweden signed on 
14.3.2000 was authorised through the letter dated 10.12.1997 signed by Qian Qichcn, then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, where it is said “ I hereby inform you that the Central People's Government authorises 
the Government o f the HKSAR to conclude the Agreement between the Government o f the l/KSAR o f the 
People's Republic o f China and the Government o f the Kingdom o f Sweden concerning Scheduled Air 
Services”.
2y> This was addmitted by the PRC both by the MFA Office officials, interview on 18.12.2001, and by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, interview with Zhang Xinsen on 4.12.2001.
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and testimony of HK residents in connection with the 1996 Clinton-Gore re-election 
campaign financing scandal in which Chinese funds were implicated260.
In spite of these exceptional cases, there were not major open conflicts over the 
functioning of the authorisation mechanism. The most difficult question is clearly the 
fact Beijing is sensitive about the possibility of HK concluding bilateral agreements with 
countries that have no diplomatic relations with the PRC.
However, a careful and more detailed analysis reveals that the system of authorisation 
has been in practice informally extended to other areas. I would argue there was a 
tendency for the gradual emergence of a deviant practice, though still limited, which is 
not fully consistent with the rules and boundaries defined in the BL and tends to 
strengthen the CPG’s control and restrict the SAR’s autonomy. This resulted from two 
different mechanisms.
Firstly, the application of the authorisation system to acts related to international affairs 
other than international agreements, i.e. public statements, organisation of international 
meetings, joint activities or initiatives with foreign states or official visits. The SAR 
initiative to organise an international meeting in HK might have to be submitted to the 
CPG’s approval, in particular if this is a meeting of an international organisation limited 
to states. For example, in the case of the September 1997 Annual Meeting of the World 
Bank/IMF held in HK, authorisation was granted by Beijing and the international 
organisations signed parallel agreements with China and the SAR261. The intervention of 
Beijing seems to have been justified on the grounds that there was a need to confer 
diplomatic privileges and immunities to delegates.
260 The “Chinagate” involved illegal contributions in the amount of US$ 300.000 allegedly made by 
China, the head of the PLA Military Intelligence Gen. Ji Shengden, to finance the re-election campaign 
through the Democratic Party fund raiser Johnny Chung. According to the investigation conducted by the 
Congress the money originated in the PLA and was routed through HK firstly to the China Resources 
Holding Company Ltd and then through the China Bank - Los Angeles Times (4.4.1999), Washington 
Times (4.9.1999), Washington Post (21.9.1998 and 5.11.1999)
261 Interview with CAB officials on 18.12.2001. The MFAO expressed the same view even more broadly 
stating that in relation to all international meetings, disregard of its nature even if they are not restricted to 
states, when the SARG wants to organise them in HK has to obtain authorisation from the C'PG- interview 
on 18.12.2001.
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Similarly, official visits, in particular of heads of state or government, to HK have to be 
approved. In relation to official visits made by the Chief Executive or other public 
officials abroad, the rule is different as the SAR is free to choose the countries and the 
time of the visit and there is little interference on the part of the CPG.
The most notable case where authorisation was denied was the visit of the Pope to I IK in 
1999, vetoed by Beijing because of the Vatican diplomatic relations with Taiwan262. 
This was a very controversial case because of the considerable support in HK for the 
visit and the fact that China’s veto was seen as potentially contributing to undermine 
international confidence in HK and to erode its autonomy263. The SAR Government 
found itself in a very difficult position, because of internal divisions between Donald 
Tsang, who expressed support for the visit, and Tung Che-hwa, who accepted the 
Beijing logic, and finally decided to consider the visit a foreign affairs matter, because 
of the “Taiwan factor”, thus accepting the CPG’s interference264.
Some sectors of HK society challenged this position and considered it to be a religious 
question and a problem of restriction of religious freedom265. This is clearly an example 
of the restrictive impact of the “Taiwan factor” on HK’s external autonomy insofar as it 
transforms any matter in a foreign affairs issue. On the other hand, it shows how the 
PRC uses HK as a bargaining tool for its foreign policy objectives, using the prospect of 
the visit to HK to press the Vatican to cut ties with Taiwan and then blocking the visit as 
a retaliation in the absence of progress.
262 The Guardian, 10.8.1999
263 Concerns were expressed by different sectors of the political spectrum, pro-democracy politicians like 
Christine Loh and Emily Lau, but also by pro-Beijing politicians such as the Chairman of the Democratic 
Alliance for the Betterment of HK, Tsang Yukshing and Alan Lee a former leader o f the Liberal Party -  
The Guardian, 10.8.1999.
264 HKSAR Government statement, 9.8.1999, Press Release, UK Government 
http://www.info.i»ov.hk/«ia/Keneral/199908./09/0809224.1itm and Chief Executive answers in the media 
session on 11.8.1999, Press release, HK Government http://www.info.gov.
hk/gia/general/199908/11/0811258.htm.
263 This was expressed among others by the 1IK Human Rights Monitor in the 9.8.1999 statement 
http:/: wwvv.hkhrm.ore.l)k 'enelish •'reports press.hi090S99.html.
Secondly, the authorisation system has been expanded and applied to the negotiation and 
signature of international agreements in areas outside the three areas explicitly foreseen 
in the BL and belonging to external affairs where UK. can act on its own. The first 
example is the Agreements on Investment Protection and Promotion (IPPA). Although 
they are clearly an economic matter and belong to the sphere of autonomy, the IPPAs 
have been subject to the authorisation of the CPG2M>. It is true that, as noted in chapter 
three, a precedent developed during the transition period when these agreements started 
to be submitted to the joint approval of the UK and China in the JLG. However the 
question is why was this practice maintained when it is not consistent with the BL?
The answer seems to be that China considers that some aspects involved in IPPA touch 
sovereignty, namely issues related to expropriation in particular the clause related to 
compensation in case of nationalisation, which is seen as creating a potential obligation
'yc. "7for the PRC . As a result this constitutes the most obvious case of deviant practice 
implying a stronger control by the CPG and leading to a significant practical outcome: 
since the handover only one IPPA has been signed, precisely with the former sovereign. 
All the other existing 13 agreements were signed before the handover. In this case it 
seems clear that not only the authorisation system was applied but it was used to block 
the signature of new IPPAs, thus restricting UK’s autonomy of decision. One case in 
point has been the agreement with the US whose negotiations started in 1995 but so far 
was not signed suggesting that it has been put on hold because of Beijing’s influence.
Another development has been the emergence of a general criterion that if an agreement 
implies an obligation for the CPG or duties the SAR can not discharge on its own, then it 
has to be submitted to authorisation. This is a general clause which tends to be applied 267
266 HKSAR officials recognise this is a sensitive area w here the CPG exerts considerable control. The 
Agreement signed with Britain on 30.7.1998 mentions explicitly the existence o f  a CPG’s authorisation.
267 The PRC MFA went as far as to consider investment protection as an area belonging to foreiim affairs 
-  interview with Zhang Xinsen on 4.12.2001. The sensitive questions relate first to the provision on 
compensation for losses (HKSAR-Britain Agreement, art.4) resulting from "... war or other armed 
conflicts, revolution, a state o f  national emergency, revolt insurrection or riot...” with explicit reference to 
the obligation to compensate for losses caused by the forces which means in relation to I IK the PLA 
forces. Second, the obligation to compensate in case o f expropriation (art.5) and the guarantee o f  
“unrestricted transfer of investments and returns abroad” (art.6).
across the board even in areas included in art. 151 list268 *. In this case it is not only the 
specific clause dealing with an obligation for the CPG, even if indirect and however 
marginal to the structure of the agreement, that is subject to authorisation but the overall 
agreement.
A similar practice is followed whenever there is a question with a connection to Taiwan. 
HK’s autonomy tends to be somehow limited because any question, even of low politics, 
that might have a link with Taiwan justifies the intervention of the CPG and the use of 
the authorisation mechanism. In other words the Taiwan factor tends to transform 
external affairs matters into “quasi foreign affairs” thus restricting in practice HK’s 
formal autonomy as in the Asian Productivity Organisation case mentioned below.
Moreover, the scope of authorisation is larger than believed because it is not limited to 
the initial phase of negotiation and conclusion of the agreement, but covers also its 
implementation. For instance, in the context of juridical assistance agreements the CPG 
has to be notified of foreign requests for assistance as well of requests made by the SAR 
and, in practice, the CPG can interfere and block the process when it considers that 
sovereign interests and politically sensitive matters are at stake. This implies that in 
reality a system of authorisation does exist in the process of implementation of juridical 
assistance agreements .
In sum, the scope of the system of authorisation has been enlarged beyond the formal 
limits set in the BL. I would argue that the application of the authorisation system on the 
basis of criteria not foreseen in the BL introduces a restriction to the SAR’s autonomy. 
The gradual and subtle expansion of the authorisation system has the potential to subvert 
the balance between external affairs and foreign affairs and should be seen as one of the 
most serious risks for HK’s external autonomy the more so as it can maintain an 
appearance of autonomy, because on the surface it is the SAR that acts.
268 The existence o f this practice was confirmed both by interviews with HKSAR officials on 18 12 2001 
and MFAO official. Li C hunyan. on 18.12.2001.
2<,t) Interview w ith HKSAR officials. 26.3.2003.
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External Affairs
External affairs correspond to the sphere of autonomy of the HKSAR in international 
affairs defined rationae materiae on the basis of the list of areas included in article 151 
BL, where the SAR can act on its own on the basis of a general authorisation granted by 
the CPG. One of the uncertainties raised by the BL was the extent to which this was an 
open or a closed list, i.e. whether HK could act autonomously only in the areas explicitly 
mentioned there or also in other areas. The post-handover experience has demonstrated 
that although there is a general consensus on both sides that art. 151 list is an open one 
and a flexible interpretation should prevail, there are nevertheless some slight 
differences and nuances on the limits of such flexibility when we take a more in depth 
analysis of the views expressed by different actors. Two nuances came out more vividly.
The first nuance detected is that there is not a complete coincidence of views within the 
CPG itself. There are different positions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
has a more liberal and flexible approach admitting clearly that art 151 is an open list and 
HK can act on its own in other areas not explicitly mentioned, and the HKMAO, the 
guardian of the BL, which has a more conservative position and sees it nearly as a closed
list270.
The second nuance relates to the difference of emphasis between the MFAO and the 
SARG, namely CAB. Although both share the same view that art. 151 contains an open 
list, there is a difference on how to proceed and how far to go in terms of the limits of 
“implicit areas”. The SARG understands it has the legitimacy to make its own 
judgement on what falls in the logic and spirit of art. 151 and does not have to consult 
beforehand the MFAO. In the absence of an explicit legal limitation the SAR acts as a 
rule because it considers there is room for informal expansion of the list and the SAR 
benefits from a general permanent authorisation. In addition, the SAR considers that, in
270 Interviews with the PRC MFA officials, 4.12.2001 and with the 11K.MAO officials Zhan- Xiao Mint: 
30.11.2001.
principle, all areas included in its domestic autonomy are areas where HK can act 
externally on its own. In other words, domestic autonomy is a criterion for external 
autonomy, in the limit external affairs tend to match domestic autonomy271, thus 
implying a large scope for the expansion of the list.
In contrast, the MFAO seems to held the view that new areas should be the object of 
previous consultation between CAB and the MFAO, the principle of freedom to act 
should not apply automatically, on the one hand, and has some reservations to the idea 
of external autonomy matching domestic autonomy, on the other272. In spite of these 
differences, the MFAO adopts a flexible approach and clearly recognises that HK can 
act autonomously in areas not explicitly included in art. 151, namely social areas, such as 
education, labour, health, environment and science and technology. One of the practical 
examples of HK’s autonomy in these “implicit areas” are the bilateral agreements 
concluded on Cooperation in Information Technology with Israel, Australia, Canada, 
Finland, India and the UK, which were freely negotiated and concluded by the SAR 
without previous authorisation of the CPG.
During these first years of implementation of the new system, there have been 
differences of views between the SARG and the MFAO in terms of knowing whether 
specific matters falls or not under art.151. Often the difficulty lie with subjects that 
involve simultaneously matters that are within the SAR’s autonomy as well as other 
matters that fall under the CPG’s competence273. One case in point is economic subjects 
that fall under art.151 but involve a few provisions which might require juridical 
assistance. Two examples are customs cooperation and tax matters, in principle clearly 
within the SAR’s sphere of autonomy but in practice object of some CPG’s interference 
whenever they include any provisions, however marginal, which imply authorisation. In 
these mixed cases a “marginalist” principle seems to apply in the sense that these 
marginal components of the agreement determine the regime applied to the entire 
agreement.
271 Interviews w ith HKSAR officials on 3.11.1999 and 18.12.2001.
272 Interview with MFAO officials on 18.12.2001.
2/3 Interview' w ith HK Gov ernment officials on 18.12.2001and 26.3.2003.
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As mentioned earlier September 11 and the war on terrorism has contributed to change 
the way soft security questions are seen shifting them more towards foreign affairs. The 
traditional and intense cooperation between HK police and the US Law Enforcement 
authorities274 is today more subject to Beijing scrutiny and informal reporting. In relation 
to terrorism some aspects pertain to the foreign affairs domain, namely the application to 
the SAR of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Terrorism275 while others fall under 
external affairs, namely its participation in the Financial Task Force on Money 
Laundering, a transgovemmental network where the SAR has played a remarkable 
leadership role serving as President of the Group in the last few years in the attempt to 
co-ordinate international efforts against money laundering and suspicious financial 
transactions. The same applies to HK’s autonomous participation in the World Customs 
Organisation and its counter-terrorist activities.
In the external affairs sphere HK has been able to exercise its autonomy in other 
important domains. First, the participation in International Intergovernmental 
Organisations where the SAR had a separate and autonomous membership in 1997 
remained active and autonomy was not restricted. The number of organisations where 
HK participates under art. 152 (2) BL has gone up as HK joined 6 new organisations276.
In addition the SAR has also expanded its participation in non-intergovemmental 
international organisations where it has a separate membership having joined 34 new
274 Law enforcement cooperation is clearly, as recognised in the US-HK Policy Act Report o f 2000 and 
2002 (internet version www.usconsulate.org.hk/ushk/pi/20000401.htm )“a central pillar o f  US-IIK 
relations” involving cooperation in the combat to terrorism, human smuggling, trafficking in persons, 
narcotic traffic, commercial fraud, money laundering, organised crime and even illegal high-technology 
transfer.
275 The CPG decided on the implementation in HK o f the UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, calling 
for the freezing of funds and other financial assets owned or controlled by the Taliban, and 1373 which 
freezes the financial assets of Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and associates.
276 These organisations are the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (1997), the International 
Association of Film Commissioners (1999), The Financial Stability Forum (1999), the Manila Framework 
Group (1997), the Governmental Advisory Committee o f the Internet Corporation (1999), and the Study 
Group on Asia Tax Administration and Research (2000). At the end of 2002, the IIKSAR had a separate 
membership in a total o f 26 intergovernmental organisations not limited to States -- see HK Government 
CAB at www.info.gov.hk cab topical iorg lts.html.
organisations since 199 7277. There was only one case that goes in the opposite direction: 
the Asian Productivity Organisation (APO). In fact since July 1997 there was a 
suspension of HK’s participation in APO, although not a formal withdrawal as 
mentioned in the US-Hong Kong Policy Act Report of 199 9278, which has given rise to 
some speculation about the reasons why the HKSAR decided to take that step. The APO 
case is particularly interesting because it illustrates the impact of the Taiwan factor on 
HK and how far it tends to restrict HK’s international autonomy. In fact the explanation 
to the SAR’s suspension is related not to the loss of interest as officially claimed, but to 
the PRC pressure concerned with Taiwan’s participation in APO using the name of 
“Republic of China”279. Beijing has used the SAR participation to demonstrate its 
displeasure to APO for allowing the status of Taiwan to continue.
Second, the structure of external representation formed by the network of ETOs 
remained in place pursuing HK’s specific interests with clear autonomy. The network 
was recently expanded with the creation in 2001 of a new ETO in Guangdong signalling 
HK’s interest in the Pearl River Delta and its efforts to manage the sub-regional 
integration process. Besides the ETOs the SAR has also a network of 47 Trade and 
Development Council Offices and 20 HK Tourist Association Offices operating in all 
continents with a private or a mixed public-private nature280.
Thirdly, the HKSAR has been able to continue to decide and organise autonomously 
official visits of the SARG members to foreign countries. Although there was by and 
large continuity in this chapter, some changes could also be detected. The number of
277 At the end of 2002, the HKSAR participated in a total of 126 non-intergovernmental international 
organisations in a wide range o f fields. The new organisations I IK joined after 1997 are concentrated in 
two main fields: culture/education ; judicial/securiy -  see HK Government, CAB at 
www.info.gov.hk/cab/topical/iorg_lts.html.
278 US-Hong Kong Policy Act Report of 1.4.1999, Department o f State, chp.VIIl internet version 
www.state.izov./www regions'eap 990401/us-hk pol act lpt.hlinl. Interview with Yugi Yamada, Adviser 
to APO Secretary General, 7.11.2002 who confirmed the innacuracy of the US information stating that “ 
HKSAR has not officially informed APO of any withdrawal from membership so HK is still considered as 
a member”. He added that “HK has neither been actively involved in APO activities since July 1997 nor 
officially intimated the withdrawal from APO membership”.
279 United Kingdom, FCO, Six-Monthly Report to Parliament, July-December 1997, p.24.
280 See Hong Kong Report 2000. pp.462-468, HKSAR Government.
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visits of the Chief Executive abroad declined since 1997 and remained at low levels 
while the visits by other members of the Government registered an increase281.
It is also possible to detect a tendency towards greater diversification of visits. After 
1997, for the first time ever, HK officials visits to Latin America (Brazil, Chile and 
Argentina), South Africa, Eastern Europe and Nordic Countries took place282. The SAR 
has enjoyed freedom in decision-making regarding the countries and time of these visits, 
which have been subject to mere notification of the CPG but not to any authorisation. 
Moreover, although the Chinese Embassies provided protocol assistance to HK 
representatives, Chinese diplomats have not attended the high level meetings and 
discussions between the SARG members and foreign host governments nor interfered in 
the contents of this paradiplomacy activity.
In sum, I would argue that globally the level of the SAR autonomy in external affairs has 
not diminished during the 1997-2001 period. The main tendency has been one of 
stabilisation. However, a number of subtle and invisible mechanisms and procedures 
have generated some marginal restrictions and can become, if uncontrolled, potential 
factors of erosion of the SAR’s autonomy in external affairs in the future. First the 
existence of standard texts of agreements previously approved by the CPG, even in areas 
falling under art. 151, tends to reduce the SAR’s “room for manoeuvre” in negotiations 
of international agreements, namely because changes in clauses or innovative clauses 
have to be submitted in principle to the MFAO approval.
Secondly, the expansion of the authorisation mechanism covering informally areas under 
external affairs as mentioned earlier, constitutes a limitation to HK’s external autonomy. 
The IPPAs, the “Taiwan clause” and “CPG obligations clause” are examples of this 
informal trend.
281 The total number o f visits made by other SARG members went up from 3 in 1997, to 10 in 1998, 12 in 
1999 and 17 in 2000 -  see HK Reports 1997-2001, HKSAR Government.
282 The Financial Scretary Donald Tsang visited Brazil, Argentina and Chile in May 1998 and South 
Africa in July 1999. Again, Chief Secretary Anson Chan visited Brazil in May 2000. The Financial 
Secretary paid an official visit to I lungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in September 2000 and to 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland on May 1999.
Features of the HKSAR-PRC relationship: separation vs. cooperation
The relationship between the HKSAR and the new sovereign power in international 
affairs has been a new experience for both China and HK, requiring a continuous 
learning process. Three underlying factors have conditioned the development of the 
relationship.
First, the difference in the starting positions of the two players. In fact, while the SAR 
had a practical experience and memory of the previous relation with the former 
sovereign power, the PRC had no previous experience of this kind with any autonomous 
region, no precedent to follow. This gave HK a certain advantage since it could adopt a 
more relaxed and flexible approach than China.
However, it should be noted that there were also negative aspects of the colonial legacy, 
which created a disadvantage for HK. In fact, because under British rule London 
monopolised relations with China, there was a deficit of direct interaction between HK 
and China, which led key players in HK, including the bureaucracy, to have little 
experience of, and not knowing China in depth. This constituted a handicap for HK that 
was not really prepared to handle directly the relationship with Beijing.
Second, the limitations of the BL. The new relationship was supposed to be a rules- 
based one, built on written rules enshrined in the BL. The problem is that in practice this 
is partly an illusion because this, as any other law, can not provide an exhaustive 
regulation of all situations. The BL should be seen more as creating but a framework 
within which understandings and courses of action are consolidated and legitimised. As 
a consequence, the SAR and the PRC did not only follow the existing rules but had to 
forge solutions for new situations not foreseen in the BL.
Third, international surveillance and monitoring of UK’s international participation 
carried out by interested members of the international community. The levels of UK’s
l‘H,
international participation and external autonomy are certainly a good test to China’s 
respect for the SAR’s autonomy status and can be easily assessed by external players. 
Both China and HK know this is an area where they are under permanent scrutiny and so 
are particularly careful to respect the rules and avoid any accusation of deviant 
behaviour.
After the first years of the SAR existence, the relationship with the sovereign power in 
international affairs is not yet consolidated, as practices and procedures are still 
evolving. However, it is possible to identify already some basic features that, so far, 
have characterised the relationship.
Firstly, it has been a highly formal relationship based on detailed rules, close observation 
of the BL and respect for the boundaries. This contrasts with the previous HK-Britain 
relationship which tended to be more informal as there were no written rules on HK’s 
autonomy sphere nor on the relative competencies of the two parties283. In the pre­
handover period the logic was, as much as possible, to test the limits and see how far 
HK’s autonomy could go, but since 1997 the main logic has been the preservation of the 
established limits .
Secondly, the relationship has been asymmetric in a double sense. On the one hand 
while the CPG’s foreign policy had an impact on HK’s external affairs and influenced 
the SAR options, the opposite was not true. The SAR was not allowed to give inputs to 
the national process and had little impact on China’s foreign policy. On the other hand, it 
was asymmetric because the relationship was much more concentrated on HK’s bilateral 
relations than on multilateral participation.
Thirdly, the relationship has been marked more by a logic of separation with little co­
operation. This is somehow paradoxical because in international affairs one would 
expect to see more co-operation developing than in areas where HK has greater
283 Interview with I I K S A R  officials. 18 .12 .2001 .  
:8'1 Interview with A la n  Pau l ,  19 .12 .2001 .
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autonomy. In this the reduced level of conflicts and tension experienced so far is more 
explained by a low level of interaction than by a successful conciliation of divergent 
interests.
This separation has been seen by many as the legacy of the transition process and the 
prevailing logic that, in order to preserve the second system and its identity, HK had to 
insulate itself as much as possible from entanglement with the Mainland to avoid 
contamination and risks of interference. The way in which the “one country, two 
systems” was conceived and incorporated in the JD and the BL has created a “tight 
corset of non-conjugal relations” , an artificial separation which hamper normal 
contacts.
In addition, the high international visibility of this area and the great concern of China 
not to be seen as interfering or limiting HK’s autonomy, leads Beijing to be 
overcautious, reducing interaction to the minimum, sometimes ignoring issues and not 
doing what one would expect a sovereign power would do. For different reasons the 
SAR is also overcautious not to be seen as giving in. The outcome of the convergence of 
the radical risk-reduction strategies of both HK and the PRC is an artificial reduction of 
bilateral interaction.
There are interesting examples of this separation. One was the low level of interaction 
during the crucial phase of China’s WTO accession negotiations in spite of the fact HK 
is one of the most experienced members. Another example is the fact HK gets little 
strategic inputs from China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not provide HK with 
general diplomatic restricted information regarding global issues as London used to do, 
but transfers only, from time to time, specific information that directly concerns the 
SAR286.
2S5 US House o f  Representatives, Report on “Hong Kong's ongoing transition: implications o f Chinese 
sovereignty .23.3. 2001, Kerry Dumbaugh, pp.9-10 (mimeo).
:Xb Interview s with HKMAO officials. 30.11.2001, and Alan Paul. 19.12.2001
This unexpected silence and passivity of Beijing in matters of international affairs, the 
fact the CPG does not make its views known, creates a disturbing situation for the SAR. 
In fact, as HK does not know what Beijing thinks and wants, the SAR’s external affairs 
options tend to be formulated in a “vacuum”, generating anxiety and uncertainty, 
sometimes refraining the SAR from acting fearing tensions with Beijing. Paradoxically, 
the silence of the sovereign power, when it should exercise guidance, can be as 
problematic as excessive interference287.
The other side of the coin of this separation is the fact there is little reporting from the 
SAR to the CPG. This can be interpreted in two different ways. A positive one which 
sees this as a sign of increased autonomy, particularly when compared with the pre­
handover situation when there was an intense reporting and considerable number of 
telegrams were sent, and phone calls made to London everyday288. There is also an 
opposite interpretation, more negative, which argues that less reporting does not mean 
necessarily more autonomy but can mean rather more solitude and a sense of being cut­
off289.
There is clearly a danger for HK’s future autonomy associated with this more negative 
view. The argument put forward is that the way in which the relationship has evolved 
suggests that the autonomy of HK in external affairs is equated with isolation, to use the 
words of Thynne290, who, looking at the SAR global autonomy, contrasted this 
hypothesis with the scenario of autonomy as “dynamic self-governance”. This scenario 
of “autonomy with isolation” is seen as the most negative one where the formal 
autonomy to decide freely could have the cost of cutting off the SAR from crucial 
sources of information and to exclude it from the networks and processes necessary to 
maintain its voice and influence. In this context, autonomy would not have any utility
287 This relevant but invisible phenomenon and this hypothesis were discussed with Alan Paul, interview 
on 19.12.2001, and Bowen Leung, Director of the SARG Office in Beijing, interview on 4.12.2001.
288 The intense reporting to London was confirmed by Bowen Leung, interview on 4.12.2001, who before 
1997 worked in Governor Patten's Cabinet.
289 Interview with Alan Paul, 19.12.2001.
290 Ian Thynne “One country” or Two systems? -  Integration and autonomy in perspective” in Ian Scott 
ipt\ t Institutional chance and the political transition in Hone Kona. Macmillan Press in association with 
the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 1998. pp.235-247
and would operate only as the seed of the SAR’s waning. Autonomy is not a 
homogeneous reality, there can be different modalities of autonomy, some working to 
the advantage of the autonomous entity but others to its disadvantage.
In the post-handover experience there are some signs of the realisation of this scenario. 
However, it is too soon to know whether this phenomenon of separation is only a 
transitory feature that emerged in this initial phase or a long lasting feature of the 
relationship. One of the consequences of this separation has been the HKSAR’s 
impossibility to participate and give inputs to the process of formulation of the PRC’s 
foreign policy. However, despite the absence of a formal participation, there remains an 
interesting question to be researched, to what extent did the HKSAR’s action in external 
affairs had in practice any impact on, or added value to China’s foreign policy, even if 
indirectly. Existing evidence, although scarce, suggests that despite the SAR’s little 
influence on China’s foreign policy orientations, in specific areas there was some impact 
which should not be overlooked291.
Firstly, China started to have to think about and be concerned with HK interests when 
negotiating an international agreement in order to know if it is relevant to HK and 
whether it should be applied to the SAR or, on the contrary, a reservation should be 
made for HK.
Secondly, China had to assume new responsibilities in terms of the consular protection 
of HK residents implying sometimes considerable additional work such as in the case of 
HK citizens in South Africa because of the high number of road accidents292. In the 
beginning this gave rise to some misunderstandings. One can cite the incident of the HK 
workers trapped in a factory in Jakarta during the May 1998 riots and violence against 
the Chinese community in Indonesia, basically explained by the fact Chinese authorities 
were not yet fully aware of their new responsibilities293. Equally interesting due to its
291 Interviews with UK Government officials, 18.12.2001, and MFAO in IIK, 18.12.2001.
2V2 Interview with the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4.12.2001.
2<>:' SCMP, 15.5.1998. It was reported that the 80 IIK workers trapped in a factory in Jakarta contacted the 
Chinese F.mbassy in Jakarta for assistance but w ere told that the F.mbassy could not help. As a
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unique and unprecedented nature is the special and unique regime China accepted to the 
protection of Chinese nationals resident in HK when they are in the Mainland294.
Thirdly, China’s image and activity in certain international organisations changed as a 
result of HK’s participation in the Chinese delegation. Sometimes the delegation became 
more active because of HK’s input. In general the presence of HK delegates, some of 
them expatriates, gave a new image of openness and flexibility, as they have been able 
to speak freely to defend HK’s interests. This has contributed to boost China’s image. In 
some organisations where HK participates on its own, the perception that China had two 
voices and sometimes HK expressed different positions from China, added to the 
credibility of the PRC295.
In addition, because of HK, Beijing expanded its international participation and was 
exposed to areas where it did not use to be involved. In fact, because of the SAR interest 
in specific organisations where it can not participate on its own, China had to become 
involved and to assure an instrumental participation. Two relevant examples have been 
the International Maritime Organisation (international conventions on oil pollution and 
oil pollution damage) and the Hague Conventions on Private International Law296.
Finally, there was an impact on China’s bilateral relations with third countries. In fact, 
HK played a facilitator role between China and other countries, helping bridging
consequence they phoned the RTHK reporting about their situation. The Chinese Embassy in Jakarta at 
first seemed not to be aware of its responsibilities in relation to HK residents. The SARG had to contact 
the MFAO which intervened to overcome the problem and reverse the Embassy initial approach. This was 
not openly discussed but several HK officials statements issued between 15-20 May have strongly 
emphasised the liaison and coordination between the SARG, the MFAO and the Embassy in Jakarta. The 
SARG was obviously concerned with the situation and this explains why it decided to send two 
Immigration officers on 16 May, to the Embassy in Jakarta in order to make sure protection and assistance 
to HK residents was effectively delivered -  Daily Information Bulletin, IIK Information Service, 15-20 
May 1998, www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199805/15-20/0515268.htm.
294 Interview with Bowen Leung, 4.12.2001. The protection of HK residents in the Mainland although not 
foreseen became a function o f the SAR office in Beijing as a result o f  the pressure o f  HK population.
295 The “one country, two systems” and the HKSAR status were new for members o f  international 
organisations who raised doubts about HK’s personality and the continued application o f international 
rights and obligations. Some organisations have asked for clarification like IMO, in the context o f the 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, and the OECD, in relation to the Paris Convention on 
Nuclear Third Party Liability. Their questions were answered by the JLG - FCO, UK Six-monthly Report 
to Parliament, Jnly-December 1997. pp.24
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differences and overcoming tensions. Besides the US-China relations and HK’s role in 
the approval of the PNTR status to China by the US Congress, the most clear example 
was the South Africa case, which can be seen as the first example of a contribution made 
by the SAR to China’s foreign policy, insofar as it helped establishing diplomatic 
relations between China and South Africa. It is believed that the HK factor and the 
relevance of South Africa economic relations with the SAR led South Africa to revise its 
policy, cut ties with Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC in January 
1998296 97. This capacity of the SAR to add value to China’s foreign policy is recognised 
by the Central Government298. Yet the South Africa case should not be overstated and 
we have still to wait and see whether this was only an isolated case or the manifestation 
of a long-term trend.
Although there are not yet many examples of this, I would argue that building ties with 
other NCGs of foreign states can be another potential strategic area where HK can add 
value to China’s foreign policy considering the political sensitiveness and limitations the 
PRC faces in dealing directly with sub-national governments of foreign states. The ties 
HK can easily establish with its fellow NCGs can be useful for China and for the 
diversification and decentralisation of its external relations.
4.3. HK’s INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND IMPACT ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The international participation of the HKSAR occurred both at the multilateral and 
bilateral levels. One striking feature of this participation is the priority attached to, and 
intensity of participation in multilateral organisations. This is a major difference with the 
great majority of other NCGs, which have minimal multilateral involvement and centre
296 Interview with HK Government officials on 3.11.1999 and 18.12.2001.
297 The Joint Communique on the establishment o f diplomatic relations was signed by the Chinese Foreiun 
Minister Qian Qichen and the South African Foreign Minister Alfredo Nzo in December 1997 - PRC 
Foreign Ministry (www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/30772.html)
29S The relevance of the South Africa case was recognised by the MFAO which mentioned that UK's 
network of international contacts could be useful to China.- interview with l.i Chunyan, 18.12.2001.
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their external relations on the bilateral domain. Multilateralism is clearly the strongest 
dimension of HK external affairs and an important characteristic of HK’s international 
identity, further accentuated after the handover.
Trade and investment
At the multilateral level the SAR’s priorities were clearly trade and investment areas and 
the participation in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at the global level, and APEC 
at the regional level299.
WTO is by far the number one priority, not only because HK is basically a global trader 
which finds its interests best protected by multilateral trade rules, but also because in 
WTO the SAR has a separate membership and can therefore exercise fully its autonomy. 
In fact HK, together with Macao, are the only NCGs that are members of WTO which 
can be seen already as a manifestation of the “one country, two systems” at the 
international level.
The contribution of HK to the development of WTO and commitment to multilateral 
rules contributed over the years to build HK’s prestige and high visibility as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter. This status has been further enhanced in the post­
handover period as a result of HK’s contribution to the launching of the Doha Round in 
2001 .
As far as APEC is concerned, HK has mixed feelings towards it. On the one hand, it has 
an interest to be involved and participate in regional economic co-operation with its 
major trade partners and have a separate membership, as APEC is not limited to states. 
On the other, HK has a clear commitment to multilateral trade rules and regards regional 
arrangements as problematic and a potential factor that can weaken WTO. So, as long as 
APEC is an instrument to push forward further liberalisation of trade and investment at
299 The SAR has been active also in a third organisation the World Customs Organisation (WCO) aimed at 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of Customs administrations and facilitating trade throimh 
harmonisation of procedures. HK has been since July 2000 Vice-Chairman of WCO. The priority status of 
the three organisations results clearly from HK statements - see Hong Kong Report 2000 pp. 118-119.
the regional level HK sees it as a positive factor, but if APEC would evolve to a 
preferential regional system HK would change its view.
The SAR has been actively involved in the three areas of APEC’s activity -  trade and 
investment liberalisation; trade and investment facilitation; economic and technical 
cooperation -  and gained visibility through its forward looking proposals to speed up 
liberalisation and the assumption of high level functions. HK has been the Vice-chair of 
the Committee on Trade and Investment since 1996 and was the Chair of the 
Government Procurement Experts Group from 1995-1999. More recently in 2000 the 
HKSAR was the Convenor of the ad hoc Task Force for the Development of Trade 
Facilitation Principles where it played a decisive role in the formulation and approval of 
the “Nine Principles”.
Financial area
HK has been also internationally active in the financial area. In this field the most 
relevant aspect has been HK’s participation in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
where it has asserted its credibility in terms of its commitment to fight money 
laundering. This is an important soft security issue that gained high visibility after 
September 11 given its linkages with terrorist groups financing. HK’s reputation and 
practical actions were the main factors behind the SAR’s election as President of FAFT 
in 2001-2002 exactly one of the most challenging periods in the organisation’s life. The 
SAR leadership in such a key area in the fight against terrorism gained HK widespread 
international recognition.
In the financial area the HKSAR has been active also in the area of co-operation among 
central banks in Asia, in particular in matters concerned with banking supervision. The 
SAR has played a leadership role by chairing the working group on banking supervision 
of the Executives Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) since 1996. 
Furthermore, HK has participated actively in international fora of banking supervision 
namely the Core Principles Liaison Group set up by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors and the South East Asia New
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Zealand and Australia Forum of Banking Supervisors300. This prominent role in the area 
of banking supervision contributed to maintain HK status as an international financial 
centre.
Moreover, HK’s participation in these bodies is particularly relevant because it confirms 
HK’s involvement in a new and fundamental trend in the international system. Both the 
FAFT and the Basel Committee are not traditional multilateral organisations but 
transgovemmental networks, which involve bureaucrats, international organisations, 
private and NGO sectors301. These networks, partly a response to the overload and 
politicisation of multilateral organisations, have gained increasing influence in policy 
agendas and rules setting and constitute a new channel which enhanced the opportunities 
for HK, as well as other NCGs, to expand their international participation.
Human Rights
The third area of great visibility in terms of HK’s international participation has been 
Human Rights and HK’s involvement in the ICCPR and ICESCR processes. Its 
relevance, unlike the other two, does not derive from the fact it is an area of external 
autonomy, but from the fact it has a high international visibility given the concern of the 
international community that human rights standards in the SAR might decline.
One of the main implications of the application of the two covenants to HK is the 
submission of HK to an international monitoring system operated on the basis of a 
Report on the human rights situation which is assessed and discussed by the other 
members302. At the handover there was a problem regarding the functioning of this 
monitoring mechanism, i.e. who was going to prepare and present the Report. One of the 
possibilities was for the HKSAR itself to present it in Geneva. Since HK was not a 
sovereign entity and membership of the Human Rights Committee is limited to states, 
this was not legally possible. The other possibility was to allow China, which at the time
300 Hong Kong Report 2000 pp.78-79, IIKSAR Government
Tbis " ’ » » ¡« '""8  mechanism is foreseen in art. 40 o f the ICCI'R an,I a,is. |6  a,„| , 7 lh,  ICESCR
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was not a signatory of neither of the covenants, to present the reports on behalf of HK. 
This would be also a strange solution because China had no link with the system, was 
not a party and non-members could not legally participate in the process.
The second solution was the one finally adopted. The decision was to allow China, 
although a non-member, to present the Report on HK as the sovereign power and on 
behalf of the SAR on the basis of the succession principles303. This was in itself a 
completely new and unprecedented situation for the Organisation304.
So, for the first time since the handover China submitted the Report on HK to the 
Human Rights Committee on January 1999 thus securing the continuity of the practice 
initiated by Britain before 1997305. The Report was prepared in HK by the SARG 
allegedly without any interference or formal approval by the CPG, which has been 
interpreted internationally as a sign of autonomy306. However, taking into account the 
sensitivity of this matter, one can suspect that despite the absence of any formal 
approval, the contents of the Report has been the object of consultations and even 
submitted informally to Beijing’s clearance.
Another interesting innovation came later during the discussion of the Report in 
November 1999. Although the delegation was chaired by the PRC’s Permanent 
Representative in Geneva, Zonghuai Qiao, he has only formally presented the HK 
delegates and left the room leaving to the HK officials, led by the Secretary of Home 
Affairs, David Lam, the responsibility to discuss directly the Report and answer 
questions307. The discussion took place without the presence of the sovereign power
303 China as a successor state to the UK and considering the existence of the previous UK and China 
communications to the UNHCR. In the introduction to the Report, the UN states that “although China is 
not a state party to the ICCPR, the Government notified the Secretary-General o f the UN o f the continuing 
application o f the covenant to the HKSAR by a letter dated 4.12.97’’.
31,4 Interview with Markus Schmidt, Secretary o f the Human Rights Committee on 21.11.2002.
3115 Human Rights Committee, Report on HK.China, CCPR/HKSAR/99/1 o f 16.6.1999. The previous 
Report on HK had been submitted by Britain in July 1995.
31,6 See US State Department, Hong Kong Policy Act Report, 1.4.1999 which states that the Report was 
transmitted to the UN through Beijing but “unedited by the Central Government” p.25, internet version at 
www.state.gov/www regions eap/99040 l_us_hk_pol_act_rpt.html.
307 UN. Minutes o f the Meetings, Press releases Doc. HR/CT'99/47 o f 1.11.1999. 11R CT '99.48 
IIR CT 99 4.
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representative, responsible for submitting the Report and the final receiver of 
recommendations, which constitutes another unprecedented practice, used by Beijing to 
show that HK was free to discuss openly the Report and express its views.
The Human Rights Committee chaired by Medina Qiroga, expressed some concerns on 
the human rights situation in HK and put forward recommendations308. The main 
concerns were related to the failure to implement previous recommendations, in 
particular the creation of an independent body to investigate and monitor human rights 
violations in HK as well as the problems of independence of the judiciary related to the 
reinterpretation of art.24(2) BL, rules of deportation, limits to the freedom of 
association. One of the key recommendations was the creation of a Human Rights 
Commission in HK, an independent body to monitor human rights status, promote and 
protect human rights309, a proposal taken up again by Mary Robinson in her 2000 visit to 
the HKSAR which encountered resistance from the SARG310, and still has not been 
implemented to date.
The Report on the ICESCR under arts. 16 and 17 of the Covenant, was also presented by 
China in 1999 and discussed in April 2001 in the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights311. The PRC Ambassador followed the same procedure as in the ICCPR 
case.
There is an interesting aspect related to the uncertainty on whether these procedures will 
continue in the future not only because of some curious statements made during the 
discussion of the ICCPR that “ China might not be under the obligation to continue the 
reporting procedure”312, but above all because China became a party to the two 
Covenants and will start reporting on its own. The practice of an autonomous Report and
308 UN, doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 117 of 12.11.1999.
309 This idea was initially put forward by Brian Burdekin, Special Adviser on National Institutions to the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, and later included in the Committee recommendations. What was 
envisaged was a model based in the Paris Principles defined by the Commission on Human Rights, 
resolution 1992/54 of 3.3.92, the UNGA Resolution 48/134 of 20.12.1993.
3111 Interview with Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, China Desk Officer, Office of the HOIR, 21.11.2002.
,n Report, UN doc E/1990/5/Add.43 of 20.9.1999 and Summary Press release documents o f the CESCR 
25'h session 27-30 April 2001 (conclusions).
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separated presentation and discussion of the HK Report might change and HK might 
become a mere section in the PRC’s national report. If HK becomes absorbed in the 
national Report, this will significantly reduce the visibility of the discussion on HK’s 
human rights as well as HK’s limited autonomy in this field.
HK Non-Governmental Organisations
Another important dimension of HK’s international participation is external relations at 
the non-govemmental level, developed by HK NGOs. This is a more informal channel, 
which is particularly useful for a non-sovereign entity like HK. The HK situation in this 
area is characterised by a paradox.
HK has a large and very active NGO sector and is the regional headquarters for many 
International NGOs. Yet, the level of international action and links of many HK NGOs 
is still modest, as they tend to concentrate their activities more in the domestic arena. 
Being a very heterogeneous sector, there are certainly exceptions, NGOs that adopt a 
mixed orientation, both internal and external, although their main concern is 
concentrated in international issues that have a direct domestic relevance for HK, 
namely human rights issues312 13. The explanation seems to lie more in the attitude and 
deficit of co-ordination among NGOs, as there is no NGO platform in HK, a crucial 
condition for an effective international action. The ad hoc and uncoordinated initiatives 
of HK Human Rights NGOs in the Committee on Human Rights in Geneva regarding 
the debate on the HK Reports under ICCPR and ICESCR, provides a good example of 
the limitations affecting their international action314.
In HK there is not a single example of an NGO that concentrates its attention and 
activities on international affairs. In fact, there is not a private “think-tank” that reflects
312 UN doc HR/CT/99/49 of 2.11.1999, pp.2.
313 A good example of a NGO with a mixed orientation is Civic Exchange, headed by Christine Loll, a 
former LegCo Member and vocal supporter o f  democratic reforms, which is active in international 
projects, mainly with US NGOs. Interview with Christine Loll, 10.4.2002.
314 In 1999 several I IK NGOs submitted reports on UK's human rights situation criticising the SARG 
Report. The problem was that these parallel reports contained conflicting information and"positions 
between them, undermining their credibility and the effectiv eness and impact of their initiativ es - 
interview with Markus Schmidt, 21.11.2001.
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strategically on HK’s external affairs policy, how should HK respond to the challenges 
arising from the evolution and changes of the international system and what might be the 
SAR’s long term position in it. For an entity that is an important international city and an 
active player in the international system, this is a striking paradox with two main 
implications.
First, the absence of long term strategic thinking which, in turn, reduces the capacity of 
HK to act proactively. The Chief Executive tried to overcome the problem through the 
creation of the Council of International Advisers315 but so far this has failed to have a 
major impact.
Second, the govemmentalisation of the SAR’s external affairs, dominated by the 
Government’s action and perspective with little space for NGOs’ participation in 
decision-making and external activities, as civil society lacks a credible interlocutor to 
the SAR Government. As a consequence the HKSAR lacks an alternative perspective to 
the governmental one and a meaningful debate on external affairs options. In addition, it 
is more dependent on formal channels and can not explore “track two” channels.
A certain awareness of this problem is gradually emerging in the NGO sector. An 
interesting example is the innovative project set up by Civic Exchange in 2001 to run an 
“International Affairs Salon”316. The project is aimed primarily at promoting a public 
debate on international affairs in HK and to facilitate interaction between government 
officials and NGOs on these matters. To some extent this can become the seed of the 
creation of a real “think-tank”, a credible civil society interlocutor on international 
affairs, which is still lacking.
315 This advisory body includes mainly corporate leaders of major international TNCs and has a dominant 
business approach -  HK Government, Press releases, “CECIA provides advice on global economy”, 
8.12.2001 (www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/htm)
310 Interviews with Yan Yan, Project Coordinator o f Civic Exchange, 19.11.2001 and Christine Loll, 
10.4.2002. For Christine I.oh one of the ob jectives o f the project is to create the conditions for the Salon to 
evolve into a “think-tank”.
Impact on the international system
Besides the specific impact of the HKSAR international action in specific/oro, there has 
been a more general and structural impact of the HKSAR on the international system 
with very interesting long-term effects, particularly for NCGs and other non-sovereign 
players. This impact has manifested itself at two different levels. The first is an 
innovation introduced by the HKSAR model in international treaties. It has a legal 
nature and is related to the insertion in several international treaties of the so called “HK 
Clause”. The second has a more political nature and is related with the “demonstration 
effect” exerted by the HKSAR and its considerable external autonomy on sovereign 
states and other NCGs in the international system.
The “HK Clause”
The “HK Clause” is a completely new clause without precedent in the international 
system that provides for the possibility of differentiated application of an international 
treaty to different parts of the same state. It has an interesting title “States with more 
than one system of law” and the following contents
“If a state has two or more territorial units in which different systems of law are 
applicable in relation to matters dealt with in this convention, it may at the time of 
signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession declare that this Convention 
shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one or more and may modify this 
declaration by submitting another declaration at any time.”317
The application of this clause is based on a fundamental condition, i.e. the existence 
within a state of two or more legal systems. In the international system this is an 
exceptional situation since the unity of the legal system, even allowing for legislative 
autonomy, is the rule in sovereign states. China is today an unprecedented case because 
it has three different legal systems coexisting within its territory, the Mainland, HK and 
Macao systems. In the case of the HKSAR and the PRC, the legal systems are not only
Article 56 o f the Convention for the Unification o f certain rules for International Carriaue bv Air 
Montreal, May 1999 in the context o f ICAO. The clause has a similar contents in other international’ 
treaties, for example article 13 of the 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Hanker Oil 
Pollution Damage in the context o f IMO.
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separated but they belong to completely different families, HK possessing a common 
law system and Mainland China a Continental system.
This clause confers China a high degree of flexibility in the sense that it can choose 
between three options: apply the treaty to the entire territory, both to the Mainland and 
the HKSAR (and MSAR); apply the treaty to Mainland China but not to the HKSAR; 
apply only to the HKSAR and not to the rest of China’s territory. This is a powerful 
instrument to preserve UK’s autonomy and safeguard its interests in the sense that it 
allows to break a potential deadlock in areas where, because of international rules, HK is 
not able to conclude agreements on its own and has therefore to rely on China’s 
intermediation. Because the traditional rule is a uniform application of a treaty to the 
entire territory of a state, China would be unwilling to play the intermediation role if the 
price to pay for applying it to HK would be the automatic application of a treaty to the 
Mainland when Beijing did not want the application of that specific treaty. This would 
block the whole process and damage HK interests.
By the same token, the clause allows HK to reject the application of a treaty in which it 
is not interested but China is. It is interesting to note that this clause can also protect HK 
from an invisible effect that other NCGs, namely Quebec, have protested against which 
can indirectly restrict de facto domestic autonomy. The argument was that the 
interference in areas of domestic autonomy protected by the Constitution which could 
not be done directly by the Central Government was finally achieved through the back 
door when Central Governments sign international agreements in areas belonging to the 
NCGs’ sphere of autonomy, generating obligations mandatory for NCGs which they 
have to implement even against their will. This restricts NCGs’ own autonomous 
policies in those fields, thus restricting domestic autonomy through an international 
process318.
3IX Institut de Sociologie Belgique, Les Etats Fédéraux dans les relations internationales. Actes dcolloque 
de Bruxelles. Editions Bruylant. Université de Bruxelles. 1082. pp. 505-510.
The “HK clause” represents a clear repercussion of the “one country, two systems” 
model in the international system, demonstrating that the model means more and more 
“one country, two legal systems” than anything else and that this dimension is the key 
one for the international system. Moreover, the clause demonstrates unequivocally not 
only the international recognition for the specificity of the “one country, two systems” 
model, but also the capacity of the international community to deal with and adapt 
flexibly to a new situation.
It should be stressed that the clause has a general nature and therefore is potentially 
applicable to other states, namely the UK and Canada. The HKSAR and China created 
an innovation that can have a wider application with potential impact in the future 
relationship between Central Governments and NCGs in other states. Although before 
1997 there were states possessing more than one legal system, they never pressed for a 
similar solution because they were not really interested in it, as there was resistance to 
allow greater external autonomy for NCGs. The HK specific situation created the 
conditions for the innovation to be accepted.
It is particularly important to stress that the introduction of the clause was a consequence 
of HK’s action and represents a concrete contribution of the SAR to the international 
system through an innovation that introduces flexibility and potentially strengthens the 
interests and positions of NCGs. Although the proposal was formally presented at the 
negotiation table by the PRC, in fact the clause was conceived by the HKSAR, which 
took the initiative and persuaded the CPG319.
The “HK clause” was introduced in an international treaty for the first time in 1999, with 
the International Convention on Arrest of Ships in the context of IMO/UNCTAD but 
expanded rapidly to other treaties, namely to ICAO Conventions, IMO Conventions and 
all the Hague Conventions in the context of the Hague Conference on Private
’ |l' In t e r v ie w  with I IK Government officials on 3.11.1999 and 17.12.2001.
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International Law320. In the future it is likely that this clause will further expand to other 
areas of the international system.
Demonstration effect
The second major impact of the HKSAR at the international level is the “demonstration 
effect” it exerts over other NCGs and the relationship between Central Governments and 
autonomous entities in third states.
Third countries tend to fear that the HK example might contaminate their own NCGs 
and stimulate them to demand more autonomy in external affairs and similar powers to 
those enjoyed by the SAR. This concern is greater in the post-handover context than 
before 1997 because under British sovereignty rules were informal and implicit, there 
were no legal guarantees of HK’s autonomy. After 1997 the new system became 
permanent, more formal and with explicit rules. In addition, its international visibility 
increased significantly as the HKSAR experience has so far proved that a system where 
a NCG enjoys a considerable level of external autonomy has worked smoothly, did not 
generate many conflicts between the autonomous entity and the Central Government 
and, more importantly, did not undermine or weaken the sovereign power’s foreign 
policy, on the contrary had a positive impact on it. The HKSAR experience seems to 
support Soldatos’ argument mentioned in chapter one that paradiplomacy strengthens, 
not weakens, national foreign policy, thus questioning the validity of the traditional 
argument that NCGs’ external autonomy jeopardises the unity and coherence of national 
foreign policy, widely used by states to resist granting more space for NCGs.
As a consequence third countries face a dilemma in relation to HK. On the one hand 
they see it as a special case and have a clear advantage in dealing autonomously with 
HK. In this context they are prepared to accept to create conditions for HK to participate
320 In the context of ICAO the examples are the 1999 International Convention for the Unification of 
certain rales for International Carnage (ICAO) and the 2001 Convention on International Interests in 
Mobile Equipment. In the context o f IMO the 2000 Protocol on Preparadness Resnonse and Pn 
to Pollution Incidents, the 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability foV Banker Oil ”
damage and the 200, I „ ,™ „ „ a ,  Convention „„ „ „  Con,to, „r i,a„„A ,U * 2 »  £  , “ i, «  
International Law Division, Department o f Justice of the HKSAR Government, intemew on 1712 2001.’
on its own in organisations until now restricted to states. On the other, some states resist 
this because they fear it could set a precedent for their own NCGs to seek greater 
autonomy in those organisations. There have been already some practical examples of 
reactions of third states in the context of international negotiations which demonstrate 
their recognition of the powerful “demonstration effect” exerted by HK321.
The first example in the multilateral context was provided by the 1999-2001 
negotiations of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and effects of Foreign 
Judgements where the US manifested concern about the HK Clause and tried to restrict 
the possibility of application of the clause to a certain group of countries -  China, 
Canada and the UK -  in order to avoid its application to the US itself. This position was 
explained by the fact one of the US Federated States, Louisiana, was interested in 
pressing for the use of the clause in order to be able not to apply the Convention in its 
territory, an outcome the Federal State wanted to prevent.
A second example relates to the Convention on Children Adoption, also in the context of 
the Conventions on Private International Law, where the UK demonstrated interest in 
using the clause in order to apply the Convention first to Scotland but not to the rest of 
the UK territory. This suggests Scotland might be using the HK autonomy model to 
press London for greater autonomy in specific areas of external affairs.
The third example is particularly powerful to illustrate the impact of HK’s 
demonstration effect. It involves the relations between Spain and the HKSAR regarding 
the possibility of signing an Air Services Agreement. HK was interested in signing such 
an agreement with Spain because Cathay Pacific wanted to establish some presence in 
the Spanish market. It was also known that Catalonia was also interested in developing 
the airline business with HK.
The Madrid Government had a negative reaction and refused to negotiate and conclude 
the Agreement directly with HK on its own, in spite of the fact HK has signed more than
521 Interviews with HKSAR officials, 17.12.2001 and 18.12.2001.
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50 of such agreements with various sovereign states. The arguments invoked by the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were constitutional constraints arising from chapter 
III of the 1978 Constitution which foresees that only the Central Government, but not 
any of the Spanish Autonomous Regions, can conclude binding international 
agreements, and from art.2 (1) of Decree 801/72 which defines the meaning of 
international agreements under Spanish Law, according to which they can only be 
concluded with states or international organisations. In other words, Madrid did not 
recognise the legitimacy and powers of HK to negotiate on its own and conclude binding 
international agreements.
As an alternative Spain proposed two ways of dealing with the question: the first option 
was for the PRC, on behalf of HK, to negotiate directly with Spain; the second was for 
the agreement to be negotiated by the HKSAR but representing the PRC. Both these 
alternatives are in contradiction with the BL, violate HK’s sphere of autonomy and seem 
therefore unacceptable to HK.
This is an extremely relevant case insofar as more than constitutional rules, what seems 
really to worry Madrid is the potential demonstration effect on Catalonia, the most 
powerful NCG in Spain which has been increasingly active externally. If Madrid would 
conclude an air services agreement directly with the HKSAR, recognising the legitimacy 
of a foreign NCG to exercise treaty making powers, in clear contradiction with its policy 
in relation to Catalonia, it would be extremely difficult to resist Barcelona’s pressure to 
be given the right to conclude international agreements on its own.
This is a vivid example of the concerns the HKSAR participation in the international 
system raises for states eager to protect their monopoly in external relations which leads 
an active and well know member of the international community to go as far as to ignore 
and negate HK’s well established international autonomy. Objectively, Madrid 
contributed to strengthen the Central Government’s position and to weaken HK’s 
autonomy, paradoxically in contradiction with the EU policy.
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If Spain’s position would be adopted by other states, this would severely undermine 
HK’s autonomy. This reminds us that HK’s effective level of autonomy does not depend 
only on written rules, HK-Beijing relations or the CPG’s behaviour, but also upon a 
critical external factor, i.e. the recognition by other members of the international 
community, their policies towards, and interaction with HK.
4.4. EXTERNAL ACTORS PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES TOWARDS THE 
HKSAR
The actual level of autonomy in external affairs enjoyed in practice by the HSAR does 
not depend exclusively on the SAR’s own dynamism and activity or on the evolution of 
HK-Beijing relationship and intensity of the sovereign power control. The behaviour and 
attitude of external actors in relation to HK is a third key factor that conditions external 
autonomy in two different ways. First, the recognition by foreign states and International 
Organisations of HK’s capacity to act internationally constitutes one of the pillars of the 
external legitimacy basis of HK’s autonomy that complements the domestic sources of 
legitimacy i.e. the Basic Law. Second, the willingness of external actors to interact with 
HK not only provide the opportunity for the formal autonomy powers to be exercised 
and materialised but also the intensity of that interaction determines the direction in 
which external autonomy will evolve, whether it will decline, expand or stabilise.
One of the first signs of foreign states’ recognition of HK’s international status is the 
fact that a very large number of countries, over 90, have an official or semi-official 
presence in HK either a diplomatic representation, consulates, or honorary consuls. 
Actually, the number of foreign consulates has increased after the handover with the 
creation of 7 new consulates322. 2
2 The new consulates created in the HK.SAR after 1.7.1997 arc North Korea, Hungary, Kuwait (Consul- 
General) Tanzania, Guinea. Estonia, Niger (Honorary Consul).
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The recognition is not only from states but as well from international organisations. This 
phenomenon has been translated for many years in HK’s participation in International 
Organisations but after the handover a new manifestation has emerged; a significant 
increase in the number of international organisations that opened representation offices 
in the HKSAR, chosen as the regional headquarters for their operations. One relevant 
example was the Bank of International Settlements which opened in HK the 
representative office for Asia and the Pacific, the first office ever to be opened outside 
Europe, due to HK’s status as one of the leading international centres for banking323. 
There are another 4 major international organisations that have set up offices in HK after 
the handover: the IMF represented by a resident representative; the International Finance 
Corporation and the World Bank Private Sector Development Office set up a joint 
regional office for East Asia and the Pacific; the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
established a sub-office.
The HKSAR has remained an important centre for international conferences becoming 
one of the top international meeting cities ahead of cities like Madrid, Lisbon, Tokyo or 
S. Francisco324. Since the handover the HKSAR has hosted various large scale 
international Conferences, including intergovernmental ones such as the 1997 
IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting, the 2001 World Fortune Forum and the 2001 PECC 
meeting.
These are certainly visible signs of the recognition of HK’s international status by the 
international community but tell us little about external actors’ perception of the scope 
and degree of HK’s external autonomy and their willingness and motivations to interact 
with, and engage the HKSAR, essential to assess the sustainability of the SAR’s role as 
an international player. For that it is necessary to go more in depth in the analysis of 
perceptions and motivations of the three major external players, the US, Japan and the 
EU and its Member States.
323 At the end of 2000 there were 138 foreign owned banks in the 1IKSAR, including 79 of the world top 
100 banks -  I IK Report 2000, HKSAR Government.
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Japan
As far as Japan is concerned HK is perceived as an important regional economic centre 
for Japanese interests in terms of trade but mainly as a destiny of foreign investment. 
There are a total of 18.000 Japanese citizens living in HK and over 2000 companies, 
which manage more than 3000 factories in the Pearl River Delta Region324 25. Although 
HK share in total Japanese FDI has declined since 1997 from an average of 3% of total 
outflows to 1,9%, the Japanese FDI in HK is still relevant being concentrated in three 
main sectors: retail trade, finance and real estate326. However, although economics has 
been traditionally the dominant dimension of HK-Japan bilateral relations, political 
issues became increasingly visible since the mid-1990s with the proximity of the 
handover327 *, involving the territorial disputes between Japan and China on the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands in late 1996, when protest against Japan in HK gained
328momentum .
This new tension scenario continued and was even reinforced after the handover though 
with a different format. It ceased to manifest itself through street demonstrations and 
became more institutionalised through the Legislative Council resolutions. In an 
unprecedented move LegCo approved a motion in January 2000 demanding a written 
apology from Japan, compensation for wartime atrocities and recognition of China’s 
sovereignty over Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands329. In December 2000 a second motion 
demanding compensation for the Nanjing massacre was also endorsed by LegCo330.
324 In 2001 HK occupied the 16th position with more than 80 meetings organised in a list headed by Paris, 
London and Brussels, and close to the position of Rome, Washington and Barcelona - Statistics of the 
Union o f International Associations 2002 (w ww. statistics@uia.be).
325 Umezu Itauru, Consul-General “Japan and Hong Kong: a dynamic partnership for the future” speech to 
the Japan Society, HK on 27.9.2000 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan “The visit to Japan of Chief 
Executive of the HKSAR, 27.3.2001 ( \vw\v.mofa.t>o.in/reuion/asia-naei/eliina/sarv.htmh.
326 Brian Bridges “Japan and Hong Kong: commerce, culture and conflict” 2003, in The China Ouaterlv 
(forthcoming)
327 Bridges, op.cit.p.l
32S South China Morning Post, 27.9 and 8.10.1996
32l) LegCo Proceedings, 12 January 2000
330 South China Morning Post, 14.12. 2000
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To some observers this reflects a new role HK started to play in Sino-Japanese relations 
as a “safety valve allowing some of the political tensions between Tokyo and Beijing to 
be expressed through HK people and institutions”331, thus sparing China-Japan direct 
relations from suffering further damage.
Partly as a result of this tension, Japan has adopted a low-key approach in assessing and 
monitoring the SAR’s evolution. Tokyo adopted a very careful approach due to its 
concern to prevent HK becoming another source of tension. In official statements Japan 
has expressed a positive assessment through the mantra that “one country, two systems 
principle can in general be said to be functioning smoothly”, repeated in every edition of 
Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook, and went as far as to consider that, given the positive 
experience, the HK model was appropriate to Taiwan332. Besides this general and vague 
assessment, there were no specific comments made on the HKSAR’s international status 
or external autonomy.
The main interest of Japan in the SAR’s external affairs is HK’s participation and policy 
in WTO. This is explained by the fact Japan has a strong convergence of interests with 
HK as a strong supporter of the primacy of WTO and multilateral rules in the world 
trading system and a critic of the proliferation of regional agreements. During the Chief 
Executive’s visit to Japan in March 2001 the only international issue discussed with the 
Foreign Minister Yohei Kono was WTO and the exchange of information about the 
exploratory negotiations for the possible creation of FT As in which both Japan (with 
Singapore) and HK (with New Zealand) are engaged333.
Japan’s main concern is that HK can operate as an “international economic centre", as 
expressed by Foreign Minister Ikeda to his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichcn during the
331 Brian Bridges, op.cit.p.12.
332 MFA of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 1998-2002 editions
tvvww.mofa.eo.ip/policv'other'bluebook/'1999,111-a.html.) There was an interesting statement made by 
Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka in December 2001, so far the most positive assessment made by a 
Japanese official who commended the UK model to Taiwan as a future blueprint for reunification with 
Mainland China -  Agence France Press, 25.12 2001, cited in Bridges, op. cit.
333 Japanese MFA document, “ The visit o f Chief Executive of the HKSAR", 27.3.2001 (www. 
Mofa.go.jp'region/asia-paci/china/sarv 0103.html).
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handover ceremony334. Paradoxically, although the Japanese approach to HK is strongly 
determined by economic interests, Tokyo has been increasingly dragged into political 
rows, related to hot issues in Sino-Japanese relations and nationalist manifestations. This 
has two main implications as far as HK’s autonomy is concerned. Firstly, it contributed 
to neutralise Japan and weaken its potential role as an active supporter of HK’s external 
autonomy leading to a decline in Japan’s interaction with the SAR at the international 
level, translated, for instance, in the reduced number of bilateral agreements Japan has 
with HK335 and the fact there was not one single agreement signed with the HKSAR.
Secondly, it indirectly reveals a de facto limitation to the SAR’s autonomy. The SAR 
institutions (LegCo) have clearly interfered with matters pertaining to the realm of 
China’s foreign policy and its bilateral relations with Japan. Under normal 
circumstances this would have induced a strong reaction from Beijing and an accusation 
that the SAR was trespassing its competencies. Surprisingly, because this was an 
expression of nationalism that served the interests of the sovereign power, there was no 
reaction. Beijing has implicitly given its approval to acts that are seen as useful to 
national interests. The LegCo 2000 motions are not a manifestation of HK’s autonomy 
and ability to influence China’s foreign policy but, on the contrary, a sign of limitation 
of its autonomy.
European Union’s perception and attitude
Besides the human links associated with the fact over 41.400 EU citizens are currently 
living in HK, the European Union (EU) has relevant economic interests in HK both in 
terms of trade and investment flows. Total EU trade with the SAR amounted to Euro 
31.3 billion in 2001 making the EU the third trading partner of HK accounting for 12% 
of its total trade, after China (42%) and the US (14%).
J’4 South China Morning Post, 7.7.1997.
335 Japan has only two bilateral agreements with UK in economic matters (air services ameement and 
IPPA). both signed before the handover -  UK Information Note. Information Services Department 
HKSAR Government “ The HKSAR and external affairs” April 2001.
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Although for the EU the importance of HK as a trade partner is much more limited (15th 
largest partner), the SAR is still the third most important market for the EU in Asia 
absorbing 2.2% of total EU exports after Japan (4.8%) and China (2.7%)336. EU exports 
to HK are highly concentrated in 3 countries, Germany, UK and France.
As far as FDI is concerned, HK is an important destination for EU investment in Asia, 
although the region as a whole is a low priority in EU global investment. During the 
second half of the 1990s HK absorbed on average 1.3% of the EU total FDI outflows, 
ranking second in Asia after Japan and well ahead of Mainland China (0.8%). In 2000 
the EU was the third largest source of investment, accounting for 9% of total external 
investment in HK. The number of EU firms in HK has increased sharply and in 2001 a 
record level of 299 EU companies used HK as their regional headquarters and another 
598 had regional offices in the SAR337.
Just before the handover the EU has explicitly defined its main interests in HK in the 
1997 Commission paper : economic interests, human links, common values, political 
interests. As far as political interests are concerned, HK was regarded as possessing a 
strategic position in the region due to its “democracy and freedom of expression” 
implicitly assuming it could have an important demonstration effect not only on China 
but also on the region. Although the document highlighted a diversified and apparently 
balanced set of interests, the analysis of subsequent documents and practice reveals that 
in reality economic interests are by far dominant and the EU engagement in other areas 
has declined overtime.
With respect to the SAR’s external relations, the EU adopted in the 1997 document two 
significant decisions. Firstly, to carry out a monitoring process of the SAR evolution and 
respect for the “one country, two systems” through the publication of an annual report.
336 European Commission, Communication on “Europe and Asia : a strategic framework for enhanced 
partnership” 4.9.2001 COM (2001) 469 final (annexes) and EU Commission, External Relations 
Directorate, “The EU's relations with HKSAR” internet version at http:
//europa.eu.int'comun'external relations hong kong/intro/'index.htm 7.2.2002.
337 European Commision. Fourth Annual Report on Hong Kong, COM (2002)450 final. 5.8.2002, pp.9.
Secondly, to adopt proactive consistent actions in order to upheld HK’s external 
autonomy and contribute to maintain the SAR’s international status through dealing 
directly with the SAR in autonomy areas, maintaining the intensity of high level visits to 
HK and concluding bilateral agreements.
This strategy was strongly supported by other EU institutions, namely by the European 
Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy38 39.
The EU has exercised a regular international monitoring role. Unlike the US, the EU has 
performed this not through one but two different Reports: the EU Commission Annual 
Reports, started in 199 8340; the UK Six-monthly Reports on Hong Kong prepared by the 
Foreign Office and submitted to the British Parliament341. Although the Reports have 
different timings and contents they have also some common ground. Over the years 
there has been a certain convergence between them. By and large both the EU and the 
UK make a positive assessment of the implementation of the “one country, two systems” 
model stressing that the SAR’s autonomy has been respected342 even though there are 
clearly differences of tone between the two Reports343 34. On the external front there is also 
a positive assessment of HK’s international participation and the recognition of its 
autonomy in external affairs .
338 European Commission Communication to the Council on “The European Union and HK: beyond 
1997”, COM (97) 171, 23.4.1997, endorsed by the EU Council conclusions o f 3.6.1997.
339 Report on the Communication from the Commission to the Council on “The European Union and HK : 
beyond 1997” Rapporteur John Cushnahan PE 226.790/fin, 7.9.1998, p. 15.
340 Up to now 4 Reports have been published the First Annual Report on the SAR o f Hong Kong COM 
(98) 796 final, 1998 ; Second Annual Report COM (2000) 294 final on 18.5.2000; Third Annual report 
COM (2001) 431 final o f 25.7.2001; Fourth Annual Report COM (2002) 450 final o f  5.8.2002.
341 Since the handover the Foreign Office has published 11 Reports presented to the Parliament by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, from July-December 1997 to July-December 
2002.
342 In the Six-monthly Report of July-December 2001, the UK states that "... our overall assessment 
remains that the “one country, two systems” is working well in practice... the SAR Government has by 
and large exercised the high degree o f autonomy promised under the JD and the BL ...” pp. 11. The EU 
Commission, in the 2000 Report considers that the “one country, two systems” principle remains intact 
and is generally working well.”.
343 The UK Reports have a more critical tone and are more assertive, making clear what the british 
position is on a specific question and in which direction Britain would like to see things evolve, while the 
Commission's reports tend to be more descriptive.
344 For example in the July-December 2001 Report, the UK recognises that “ HK continues to play an 
active role in the international stage” pp. 8.
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The EU perspective on HK as an international player is very much dominated by trade. 
HK’s independent participation and active role in WTO is strongly underlined in the EU 
Reports, while other dimensions of HK’s international status deserve less attention. To 
some extent this is explained not only by the fact EU-HK relations are driven by 
economics, but also because of the projection of the EU’s own international identity. 
Like the HKSAR, the EU identity is closely associated with trade, where traditionally it 
speaks with a single voice.
The UK perspective is somehow different and more complex as the perception of HK as 
an international player also includes political and strategic aspects, emphasising for 
instance the role of HK in the control of trade of strategic goods and proliferation of 
sensitive technology, in the fight against terrorism, namely through its involvement in 
the FATF, and its model role in terms of human rights standards and practice in Asia.
Beyond the overall positive assessment, both the EU and the UK expressed concerns 
regarding the SAR evolution in two main areas: (i) legal questions and potential 
restrictions to HK’s legal autonomy raised above all by the Right of Abode issue 
initiated in January 1999 with the two judgements by the Court of Final Appeal against 
HK Immigration Ordinances 2 and 3345, but also by the 1999 “Desecration of Flags” 
case346 and the Rendition of Offenders issue347; (ii) limitations to the freedom of 
expression, press freedom and freedom of religion, raised by events like the statements
345 The 29.1.1999 Court o f Final Appeal judgements initiated the case which granted the right of abode to 
all children bom in Mainland China to at least one parent with the right o f abode in HK even if the parent 
had become a HK permanent resident after the children was bom. Concerned with the risks o f massive 
immigration, the SAR Government requested the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
to interpret articles 23 and 24 of the BL. In June the Standing Committee endorsed the interpretation 
sought by the SARG making more restrictive the right o f abode that one of the parents had to be already a 
permanent resident at the time of birth. This undermined the authority o f HK’s judiciary and confidence in 
the rule of law, since the SARG could seek to overcome judicial decisions it considered unfavourable by 
asking interpretations of the sovereign power, thus weakening autonomy.
346 The Court o f Appeal considered in March 1999 that parts o f the National and Regional Flags 
Ordinance that created the offence o f desecration of flags were unconstitutional because they violated the 
ICCPR, namely the right o f freedom of expression. The CFA has overturned this ruling following the 
SARG appeal.
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of the PRC Liaison Office officials regarding Taiwan-HK relations347 48 , the Robert 
Chung case349, the Catholic Church case350 and Falun Gong351 *35. In this there has been a 
coincidence of views with the US, which has expressed similar concerns.
The UK has even established an important link between the domestic autonomy and the 
external autonomy of the SAR, noting that “ HK’s success as a city with an international 
status and personality depends directly on the SAR’s continued autonomy and on 
preservation of HK’s freedoms” . This idea, also expressed by the US, constitutes a 
key component of external actors’ perception of HK’s status. It means that for external 
actors the domestic and external spheres are closely interlinked. Their willingness and 
interest in interacting with HK does not depend exclusively on HK’s formal autonomy 
and capacity to act externally but also on the existence of a real domestic autonomy. The 
autonomy of the legal system, the maintenance of the rule of law and respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms are not only elements of HK’s international image but 
condition directly HK’s credibility as an international actor, insofar as they are crucial 
for HK to comply with its international obligations (turning these into domestic 
legislation for example), and to protect external actors’ interests and foreign property in 
the SAR.
347 This was raised by two main cases in 2000 when people, including UK residents, were tried and 
executed in China for crimes committed in HK. What concerned some observers was that the HKSAR did 
not call for jurisdiction when it had a clear competence to judge these cases.
348 In April 2000 Wang Fengchao, Deputy Director o f the PRC Liaison Office, said publicly that the 11K 
media should not disseminate views advocating the independence of Taiwan. In May 2000, He Zhiming, 
another official o f  the Liaison Office, said HK businessmen trading with Taiwan firms that supported 
Taiwan’s independence, should observe the PRC policy o f absolute prohibition of trade with such firms 
and not take a risk - EU Third Annual Report, ot>. cit.. p.3.
349 This occurred in July 2000 and involved a HK University academic Prof. Robert Chung who received a 
message, through the Vice-Chancellor, from the Chief Executive to stop carrying out opinion polls on his 
popularity. This case raised concerns about academic freedom in HK.
j5° This case occurred in September 2000, involved the pressure exerted by PRC officials in 1IK on the 
Catholic Church Head, Bishop Joseph Zen to keep low key the celebrations of the October 1 Vatican 
canonisation of 120 foreign missionaries and Chinese catholics martyred in China.
351 Since 1999 the Falun Gong organisation was banned and prosecuted in the Mainland but authorised to
continue to operate in HK as long as they do not break local laws, on the basis o f freedom of religion. This 
is seen as a manifestation o f UK's autonomy and difference as well as the existence o f a rule o f law 
system. However, the CPG has strongly pressed the SARG to restrict and control Falun Gong activities 
but pressure was resisted.
353 UK. FCO. Six-monthly Report. July-December 1999. p.7.
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In the efforts to fulfil the initial objective to upheld HK’s external autonomy, the EU and 
its Member States have used two other mechanisms besides the monitoring one. Firstly, 
the mechanism of high level visits to HK by European leaders. Since the handover there 
has been a reasonable flow of European visitors to HK, including UK Government 
Ministers and the delegations of the British Parliament on a regular basis353, the EU 
Commissioners for External Relations, Leon Brittan (1998) and Chris Patten (2000), 
delegations of the EU Parliament in 1998 and 2000, and Government members of other 
EU states, namely the Prime Ministers of Spain and Denmark in 2000, the German 
Interior Minister and the Portuguese Foreign Minister in 2001.
Secondly, the negotiation and signature of bilateral agreements, by far the most 
important mechanism used by the EU. In fact, the EU, partly as a consequence of its 
legalistic tradition, has been the most important external player having signed the largest 
number of new international agreements with the HKSAR, thus contributing to exercise 
and consolidate its treaty making powers. Overall the EU, and its Member States, is the 
most important HK partner in terms of bilateral agreements accounting for more than 
36% of the total 126 agreements signed by HK before and after the handover35 54. If we 
consider only the bilateral agreements signed by the HKSAR since July 1997 until the 
end of 2002, the EU position is even stronger accounting for 41% of total agreements355.
However, not all the EU states are equally actively engaged with HK. There is a leading 
core group formed by 5 countries the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and surprisingly 
Portugal and Finland, which were responsible for nearly 2/3 of the new agreements 
signed by the EU Member States with the SAR. This clearly reflects the great diversity 
of positions and levels of engagement that exist inside the EU in relation to HK. The EU 
approach is therefore very heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory. It is possible to
353 The Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister o f Agriculture visited 
HK in 1998, FCO Ministers in 2000 and 2001. British Parliament delegations, namely the All Party China 
Group and the Foreign Affairs Committee visited HK several times in 1998, 2000 and the House of 
Commons Committees on Transport and on Trade and Industry in 2002.
3,4 Hong Kong SAR Information Department, “The HKSAR and external affairs” October 2002,
ww w,info.eov.hk inlo exalla.htm 8.1.2003. With the exception of Air Services Agreements (12 out of 55),
the EU states have a dominant position in all other areas.
distinguish between four different groups. The first group includes the most active 
players, clearly the EU Commission and the UK, which registered the highest level of 
interaction and engagement with HK at the international level.
The second group includes countries that have been moderately active namely in the 
sphere of the exercise of treaty making powers such as Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and some Nordic countries. The third group, France and Germany, has strong economic 
interests in HK but has adopted so far a rather passive attitude which contrasts with the 
size of their interests and seems to show a deliberate decision to adopt a low key 
position justified by a risk-aversion strategy aimed at preventing any collateral damage 
to their central bilateral relations with China. It is particularly significant that Germany 
has not signed one single agreement with HK after the handover, and more than that has 
avoided any reference to the HKSAR in its policy documents. A good illustration of this 
benign neglect is the May 2002 German Strategy Paper on East Asia, where there is not 
a single reference to the HKSAR despite the fact that one of the key focal points of the 
strategy is democracy, the rule of law and human rights and there is abundant reference 
to the political dialogue with the PRC356.
The fourth group includes Spain which has adopted in practice a negative position in 
relation to the SAR’s external autonomy when, as mentioned above, it refused to sign an 
Air Services Agreement with HK, proposing instead it should be signed with Beijing, a 
solution that not only would be inconsistent with the BL but would also weaken HK’s 
external autonomy.
In sum, the dominant EU perception of HK as an international player, with the exception 
of the UK, is that of a separate customs territory possessing a separate trade policy and 
voice in WTO. This reflects not only the core of EU interests in relation to HK but also 
the new leadership role of the Commission assumed since 1997 inside the EU in terms
335 If we exclude Air Services Agreements, the EU states were responsible for 20 out of 37 agreements, 
i.e. 54% of the total, signed by the SAR since 1997.
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of bilateral relations with HK. The European perception and attitude, despite its 
heterogeneity, made a positive contribution to upheld HK’s international status and 
external autonomy, although below the expectations created by the 1997 statements, 
particularly by stimulating the exercise of treaty making powers.
The US approach
The US is clearly the external actor that has the more complex, dense and 
multidimensional relationship with HK. Unlike other players, American interests are not 
restricted to the economic and commercial areas. Economic interests are obviously of 
great significance for the US. In 2001 the SAR was the US thirteenth export market 
absorbing US$1 billion of American exports and over 1,100 resident US firms operate in 
the SAR where American FDI through 2000 amounted to over US$ 23 billion357. 
However, the US combines economic dimensions with political and even security 
interests in its approach to the SAR.
A crucial area in the US-HK bilateral relation touching soft security issues is law 
enforcement co-operation and the fight against organised crime. HK’s role is so relevant 
for the US that HK has been explicitly recognised as the US leading law enforcement 
partner in the Asia-Pacific region358, namely in the international fight against drug 
trafficking through extradition of drug-trafficking fugitives and share of evidence, 
money laundering and income tax evasion and more recently on terrorism. The 
American interest is clearly illustrated by the presence of the seven major US law 
enforcement agencies in HK and their intense interaction with the HK police and 
security forces.
356 Strategy Paper “Tasks of German Foreign Policy East Asia -  Japan, South and North Korea, Mongolia, 
China including Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan -  at the beginning of the 21s' Century”, Federal Foreign 
Office, Berlin, May 2002, pp. 6.
337 US Hong Kong Policy Act Report 2002 o f 31.3.2002, pp. 8, Department of State,
(www. state, gov 'p./eap/rls/rpt/0319.htm)
338 US Consul General in HK, Speech “ A tale of two cities: the image and reality of I IK today” Asia 
Society. Houston, Texas. 15.2.2001. p. 6.
The US has supported and acknowledged HK’s international role and participation in 
multilateral fora namely the active contribution to enlist the Financial Action Task Force 
on Money Laundering in the international anti-terrorism efforts, and to set good 
international examples of effective domestic mechanisms to control suspicious 
transactions, namely the underground “hawala” banks, widely used by terrorist 
networks, in relation to which HK was one of the first to regulate their activities.
A second area relates to defence and strategic affairs. Firstly, the US has an interest in 
maintaining routine port calls of US navy ships and aircraft in the HKSAR not only for 
re-supply but essentially to maintain a sign of continuity and affirmation of the US 
strategic dominance in Asia. Washington has been concerned that the reversion of HK to 
the military control of the PRC could disturb the overall balance of forces in East Asia 
considering that Chinese military forces gained unprecedented control over one of the 
major ports in the Pacific Rim359.
It is interesting to note that, although HK has ceased to be a relevant strategic and 
military centre in the late 1950s, 1997 was seen as having a potential strategic impact. 
Continuity of port visits was maintained but this question gained greater visibility after 
1997 when the PRC, using authorisation of ship visits as an instrument to show its 
positive or negative assessment of the state of US-PRC relations, has suspended 
temporarily visits in 1999 and 2001 as mentioned above360. Another case of strategic 
concern for the US involving HK and the PRC was the control gained by the HK firm 
Hutchison Wampoa, through Panama Ports Company, over the navigation in the Canal 
of Panama, by controlling the Cristobal and Balboa ports in the two sides of the Canal,
3,9 This concern has not been expressed openly very often but there is a reference in some Congress 
documents namely in the Report prepared for the House o f Representatives international Relations 
Committee, Asia Pacific Subcommittee, by Kerry Dumbaugh “Hong Kong’s Reversion to China: 
problems and remedies for the United States", 3.3.1997, pp. 19-20.
36l> US Congress, Speaker's task force on the HK Transition, 9,h Report, 30.1.2001. The US considered that 
the denial of authorisation for visits of US navy ships and aircrafts to HK has “negatively affected HK’s 
reputation as an open, cosmopolitan and internationally connected city” US UK Policy Act Report 2001, 
31.7.2001, p.2 ( www.state.gov. 'p/eap/rls'rpt/4465.htni).
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awarded by the Panama Government in 1999 on the basis of a 25 to 50-year lease 
contract. This implied the end of the US control361.
In this field the US attaches great relevance to HK as one of the largest ports in the 
world, in its role of export control of trade in strategic goods, namely exports to 
countries of special proliferation risk. Although HK is not a member of the various 
international control regimes, it has adopted the substantive rules of these regimes and is 
committed to maintain its standards, namely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
Missile Technology Control regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar 
Arrangement362. The US Government and Congress have expressed concerns over the 
possibility of decline of the HK strong and credible export control system because of the 
PRC and the difficulty to control PLA vehicles, but so far consider that the HKSAR 
maintains a credible system363. This is an interesting case where a NCG although not 
being able to be a party to international control regimes reserved to sovereign states, can 
play a relevant international role in the control of arms proliferation by voluntarily 
adopting in practice international rules, through their incorporation in domestic 
legislation.
361 This question gained great visibility at the political and military levels. Two Resolutions of the US 
House o f Representatives, no. 186 (17.9.1999), and of the Senate, no. 61 (19.9.1999), expressed concern 
that the close ties between Hutchison Wampoa and Beijing could mean a strong presence o f China and 
ability to monitor shipping in the area and therefore pose a long-term threat to US security interests 
(htpp:www.usconsulate.org.hk/ushk/bills/l999/09¡7.htm). The military perspective was expressed by the 
US Southern Commander in Chief, Gen. Charles Wilhelm in his statement on the issue before the US 
Senate Armed Services Committee on 22.10.1999, who argued that “...the impact of Chinese commercial 
interests in Panama is less a local threat to the Canal and more a regional threat posed by expanding 
Chinese influence throughout Latin America.” (www.usconsulate.org.hk/ushkyothers/1999/1022a.htm)
362 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Amis and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies, is a multilateral accord which has replaced CoCom, the Cold War organisation for 
controlling sensitive exports to the Soviet bloc with some differences: broader membership and a smaller 
list of controlled goods. Under CoCom HK had the status o f a “cooperating country”. Although HK 
participated in Wassenaar after 1994 because the UK was a participating state, the SAR ceased to 
participate in any capacity after the handover because China is not a member -  Dumbaugh, op, cit.. 1997.
363 This concern was expressed in 1999 by the US Congress Fox Commission that raised the question of 
the risk of transhipment of sensitive technology via 1IK because of the failure o f  HK Customs to control 
PLA vehicles that cross the border. Confidence was reestablished when HK authorities proved in practice 
to carry out the control namely in March 2000 when they held 5 armoured vehicles assembled in Ukraine 
and loaded in Naples destined to the port of Tianjin in Northern China -  Dumbaugh. op.cit. 2001.
A third area is related to human rights, individual liberties and the consolidation of rule 
of law and democracy. The US interest is justified not only by the concern to protect US 
economic interests in HK, which depend on the existence of a rule of law system and an 
independent judiciary, but also of the potential demonstration effect that the SAR’s high 
human rights standards and rule of law can have on the PRC, thus contributing to bring 
about changes in the Mainland system through contagion364. In this field it is important 
to note that besides the action of US Government Agencies, the US NGOs, clearly the 
most active foreign agencies in HK, play a very active role through their interaction with 
HK NGOs.
The US is the external player that has the most complete and integrated perception of 
HK as an international actor, capturing the complexity and density of HK’s international 
status. It goes beyond HK’s trade identity and covers HK’s role in international security 
and political dimensions, namely political change in China, and HK’s contribution as a 
broker between the US and China, illustrated more recently by its contribution to the 
approval by the US Congress of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status 
that paved the way to the US final approval of China’s WTO accession365.
The US, like the EU, has made a positive assessment of the evolution of HK’s external 
autonomy, stressing the absence of signs of CPG’s efforts to limit HK’s autonomy and 
the fact HK and Beijing at times pursued different agendas in multilateral economic 
fora366. However, this has to be qualified as the US, more than any other external player,
364 US Consul General in HK, Michael Klosson, Speech “ A tale o f two cities: the image and reality of 
HK today” Asia Society, Houston Texas, 15.2.2001. On the political demonstration effect see Michael 
Yahuda “A catalyst for change? The HK Special Administrative Region and Chinese Politics” in Leung 
,P. and Cheng Hong Kong SAR: in pursuit o f Domestic and International Order. The Chinese University 
Press, HK, pp.25-35
365 US Consul General Michel Klosson Speech “ The US and HK: turning challenges into opportunities” 
Chinese manufacturers Association in HK (28.9.2000), where he acknowledges the relevant role HK 
played in the US debate stressing that the fact that both Tung Che hwa and Martin Lee, coming from very 
different positions, have both supported the granting of the PNTR status during their visits to the US 
“helped to reach persons across our political spectrum” thus contributing to the positive outcome of the 
May 24 vote in the House of Representatives.
366 US-HK Policy Act Report 2000, Department of State. Also in the 2002 Report it is stated “UK's 
autonomy as an international economic actor remained intact as it actively and independently participated 
as a full and active member of numerous international economic organisations such as WTO, APLC, and 
FATF..." p.2.
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expressed concerns over specific developments regarded as potentially undermining 
autonomy in the future. Three main issues were raised. Firstly, the consideration that 
complex legal requirements for “sovereign assent” by the CPG have in some cases 
“hindered timely cooperation”367. This is a reference to the operation of the system of 
authorisation and sovereign power control, which raises some concerns that this might, 
if excessively bureaucratic and slow, limit in practice HK’s international participation.
Secondly, a more structural question related to the trend of HK closer economic 
integration with Mainland China. This has been perceived by the US as presenting risks 
in terms of affecting HK’s autonomy as a separate customs territory and erode HK 
status. There was a clear reference to the FTA process between HK and China, the “ 
Closer Cooperation Partnership Arrangement”, and to the proposal of co-location of 
customs and immigration officials on the PRC side of the border for simplification of 
procedures, both seen as initiatives that can call into question HK’s autonomy. By 
becoming more interlinked with China, HK might weaken its international ties and 
become less relevant to the international community, if the SAR does not manage the 
process carefully and strikes “ a proper balance between deeper economic 
interdependence with China on the one hand and HK’s autonomy and international 
connections, on the other”368.
Thirdly, the US has also identified a weak link that in the long term can weaken HK’s 
international role, i.e. the deficit of domestic attention in HK for international matters 
and the fact that both HK’s international personality and active participation are 
somehow overlooked in HK itself by major civil society actors369. As argued earlier, 
this is the paradox of HK being an active and robust international player but with a low 
domestic awareness of the relevance and complexity of its international role.
3<’7 US-HK Policy Act Report 2000, p.9.
’,,s US Consul General in UK , Speech “One country, two systems: Five years -  US perspectives on I IK” 
American Chamber of Commerce. 6.6.2002.
w' Ibidem.
Since the handover the US has actively upheld HK’s external autonomy in different 
ways. In this respect the US has an unique position among major external players for it 
has formally recognised HK’s autonomy through a legal instalment that makes the 
support for HK’s external autonomy a binding obligation for the US Government and 
not a mere option or declaration of foreign policy. In fact, the 1992 US HK Policy Act370 
not only presupposes HK’s autonomy but allows the US to treat HK differently from the 
way it treats China in US law as a perfectly separate territory in economic and trade 
matters (sec.103), in cultural matters (sec.105) or in legal matters, namely bilateral 
binding agreements.
However, this special treatment accorded to HK is reversible and can be halted if the US 
Government considers that the substantial autonomy that justified it in the first place is 
eroded as a consequence of PRC’s illegitimate interference in HK’s affairs. In fact 
under sec. 202 (a) of the Act, the President can suspend the application of a specific law 
if it considers HK is not “sufficiently autonomous”. So far this provision has not been 
used which shows that until now the US did not consider that a major crisis has 
occurred, but constitutes the most powerful potential red card that can be used in case of 
violation of the “one country, two systems” model.
In the last five years and according to the spirit of the HK Act, the US has upheld the 
SAR’s external autonomy using different mechanisms. There are two main features that 
are unique to the US and differentiate it from the EU approach. Firstly, unlike the EU, 
which has been very active in the exercise of treaty making powers, the US has not 
signed any bilateral agreement with the HKSAR371 and adopted a more pragmatic 
approach putting the emphasis on the development of concrete bilateral co-operation 
actions, namely in law enforcement 372 (including the provision of training for HK
370 Public Law no. 1 0 2 -383 , 5.10.1992
371 The six US -HK bilateral agreements have been all signed before the handover in 1996 and the first 
half o f 1997 - HKSAR Information Department, “The HKSAR and external affairs” October 2002, 
(www.info.gov.hk/info/exaffa.htm. Annex 1)
372 For example the US -  I IK extradiction treaty is certainly the most operational one and co-operation has 
been robust. Since the handover HK has processed 36 US requests for provisional arrest and extradiction 
and the US has processed 10 HK requests - US Consul General Speech, 6.6.2002, op. cit.
police), financial, trade export control (including international control regimes briefing 
HK on the Missile Technology Control Regime), academic and cultural areas.
The second aspect was that the US interaction with HK has been intense at the non­
governmental level, using more informal channels and not only at the governmental 
level. Besides the American NGO’s initiatives, the US Government supports the 
development of close ties between American NGO’s and its counterparts namely 
between universities as a way of strengthening the civil society in HK.
There has been no fundamental contradiction between the US Administration and 
Congress positions in relation to HK but a large convergence of views if we compare the 
Reports from the State Department and the Speaker’s Task Force on HK. However, this 
recognition and support to HK’s external autonomy has not been fully shared by all US 
institutions, namely by the judiciary. This was an interesting exception pointed out by 
some authors who argued that US courts have adopted in specific cases, for instance the 
Matimak Trading Co. vs. Albert Khalily and Jerry Lui cases, a negative position denying 
HK the capacity to act internationally and considering the SAR as a “stateless entity”, 
thus undermining in practice its autonomy* 374.
However, I would argue that Hsiung overstated the case and neglected other important 
facts that point in the opposite direction. Even in relation to the cases mentioned, the 
Courts made wrong decisions from a legal point of view by violating the letter and spirit 
of the 1992 HK Policy Act. More importantly, the US Government responsible for 
foreign policy disagreed and attacked the ruling of the extradition case. It presented an 
appeal arguing that the US-HK extradition agreement was a legally valid and binding
3 73 Instruments like the Fulbright Programme on the Department o f  State International Visitor Programme. 
It is estimated that around 8 000 students are studying in the US at any given time and approximately 
60.000 graduates o f  US institutions live in UK — US-HK Policy Act Report 2000 p. 16 
www iisconsulate.org.hk/ushk/pi/20000401/htm.
374 James Hsiung (ed) Hong Hong the super paradox: life after return to China. St. Martin’s Press, New 
York, 2000, pp.171-199. In the Matimak case (1997) involving a breach of contract by the US firm, the 
District Court decided in 1996 to dismiss the complaint arguing that HK was not a foreign state and so 
Matimak was not a subject of a foreign state. The ruling was appealed to the US Court of Appeals, second 
circuit which decided that Matimak could not sue because the 1992 US I IK Act did not regard 1 IK as an 
independent sovereign state.
agreement and the Court had illegitimately interfered in the conduct of foreign affairs375. 
These cases seem to be exceptional and not the expression of a dominant trend, although 
they show that we are far from an unanimous view on HK’s external autonomy and 
legitimacy not only between states but also within specific states.
In spite of the overall positive contribution to upheld HK’s autonomy, the US attention 
for HK has declined in the course of the last few years because of the absence of major 
problems in HK but also because the US policy towards China has changed under the 
Bush Administration, becoming more pragmatic and constructive, particularly after 
September 11. As a result there is a lower pressure for political change in China and this, 
in turn, tends to weaken the US concern for political development in HK376. 
Nevertheless, the US remained the most vigilant and vocal external player as well as the 
most active HK partner.
The most important external actors for HK, the US, EU and Japan, made a positive 
assessment of the evolution of HK’s external autonomy since 1997, considering that it 
was not diminished by the sovereign power and recognised the SAR capacity to act 
internationally on its own. However, their level of attention and engagement with HK 
has been gradually declining since the handover because of the evolution of their 
bilateral relations with China and of the absence of major problems in HK. This decline 
so far has not been sufficient to affect structurally the international recognition of HK as 
an autonomous international player insofar it has not reduced the level of interaction 
below a minimum critical level.
This chapter addressed the question of the evolution of HK’s external autonomy and 
international participation in the post-handover period and provided evidence that 
validate the hypothesis that autonomy was a function of the interplay between three 
major factors: HK’s own strategy and dynamism in international affairs; the new HK-
375 US- HK Policy Act Report 2000, p.9 (www.usconsulatc.org.hk/ushk/pi/20000401.htin.)
376 See Dumbaugh, 2001, “Hong Kong ongoing Transition”, on, eit. The author considers that “ issues 
involving HK largely have ceased to command much attention in the United States” pp. C'RS-15. Robert 
Sutter. China specialist at Georgetow n University, in an interview on 10.7.2002 expressed a similar view
Beijing relationship and the level of control exercised by the sovereign power; the 
attitude and interaction of major external actors. Three main conclusions should be 
underlined.
Firstly, HK’s external autonomy in the post handover period has experienced neither an 
expansion nor a decline but rather a tendency for stabilisation, also helped by the new 
set of written rules contained in the BL. To this outcome contributed the fact that the BL 
rules on external affairs were respected by Beijing and there was not any major crisis or 
conflict in the relationship.
However, it is argued that two less visible risk factors have emerged which might affect 
negatively external autonomy in the long term. One is the informal expansion of the 
mechanism of specific authorisation covering acts and certain types of agreements that 
under the BL were not subject to that control, which have been used to justify a stronger 
control by Beijing and a transformation of external affairs into foreign affairs matters. In 
contrast with the pre-handover experience, informality tends to work to the disadvantage 
of the SAR since written rules are an important guarantee of its autonomy.
The other risk factor is related to the paradox of HK as an active international player to 
have a rather passive civil society in international affairs and no “think-tank” to deal 
with the long-term position of HK in the international system.
Secondly, the HK-CPG relationship in foreign affairs has so far been marked not only by 
compliance with the BL rules but also by separation and a scenario of “autonomy cum 
isolation”, with little co-ordination and co-operation between the sovereign power and 
the SAR, which in the long run can prove as damaging to HK’s external autonomy as 
abusive interference.
Thirdly, the evidence analysed suggests that the external actors’ attitude towards the 
SAR has overall contributed to upheld HK’s autonomy, despite the considerable 
diversity of positions and degrees of involvement among members of the international
community. There has been a tendency for decline in the level of attention and 
engagement with the SAR on the part of many external actors, partly explained by the 
centrality of their relationship with China. Yet, this has not been dramatic enough as to 
bring about a major change and so the level of interaction remained above a minimum 
critical level.
Nevertheless some signs emerged that perceptions of external actors might be changing 
and a new dilemma is facing them. On the one hand, they kept on showing the 
willingness to accept HK’s international participation thus showing that the international 
system is more flexible and able to accommodate unorthodox phenomena than generally 
believed. On the other, some states show concern over the potential demonstration effect 
that HK’s robust international status and external autonomy might have on their own 
NCGs encouraging them to press for more autonomy, leading external actors to become 
less supportive.
However, the positions of external players and the evidence discussed in this chapter do 
not provide a clear answer regarding the identification of the HK’s legitimacy basis to 
act internationally and the sources of influence the SAR uses to pursue its interests. The 
analysis of these two important dimensions of HK as an international player will be 
carried out in the following chapter based on HK’s experience in WTO.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE HKSAR IN WTO: AUTONOMY BASIS AND INFLUENCE
The HKSAR’s international participation and patterns of interaction with major 
international players is better understood in the context of the experience and practical 
interaction in a specific organisation. The case study allows us to capture not only the 
complexity of HK’s behaviour but also the essence of the underpinnings of its external 
autonomy and international status as well as the challenges for its future sustainability.
The WTO is the obvious choice for different reasons. On the one hand it is the first 
priority forum for HK given the relevance of trade for HK’s economy. WTO is exactly 
at the core of HK’s interests, where HK can enjoy a high degree of autonomy, have a 
separate identity and its own voice. On the other, given the fact China joined WTO in 
December 2001 and became one of its high profile members, the WTO is also relevant 
to assess the sustainability of the SAR autonomy.
This chapter is organised in four sections. Section one analyses the status of HK in WTO 
and its main characteristics as a member. Section two looks at the SAR’s participation, 
key interests and priorities in WTO and enquiries into the existence of any limitations 
arising out of HK’s non-sovereign nature. Section three considers the pattern of 
interaction between HK and major players, the areas of convergence and divergence of 
interests, and HK’s sources of influence in the Organisation. Finally, section four deals 
with the impact of both the handover and China’s accession on HK’s autonomy in WTO.
5.1.HK’s STATUS IN WTO: THE DUAL PERSONALITY SYNDROME
The historical evolution of HK’s participation and status in GATT and later in WTO, is 
an impressive story of gradual affirmation and consolidation of HK’s autonomy and
separate identity in the multilateral trade system, leading up to full membership, a 
completely unique and unparalleled situation among NCGs.
Historically HK’s status in GATT / WTO has gone through three different stages as seen 
in chapter two: “ dependent colony” HK’s participation integrated in the UK delegation 
with no formal status in GATT; “quasi contracting party” stage after 1972 as a result of 
Britain’s accession to the EEC; “full member” stage following HK’s accession in 
198 6377. The accession was a direct consequence of the retrocession process to Chinese 
sovereignty and of the joint political impulse of Britain and China translated in the 
parallel declarations issued to GATT378 supporting HK’s membership and guaranteeing 
that substantive conditions and autonomy would be preserved. The second pillar of 
accession was a technical one, the fulfilment of three substantive conditions for 
membership i.e., an independent trade policy, different tariffs and trade regulations from 
the sovereign power, a separate customs administration (art. XXIV of GATT) and 
autonomy in the conduct of external commercial relations.
This stage was marked by this change in the formal legal status but also by another 
crucial change in HK’s substantive status and identity in GATT. HK’s accession 
coincided with the beginning of the Uruguay Round where for the first time services 
were introduced in the agenda and subject to GATT rules. This caused a major split in 
HK’s identity introducing the conditions for the emergence of a dual identity. Whereas 
in trade in goods HK’s interests converge with developing countries, in trade in services 
HK is closer to developed countries’ interests and positions and more distant from
377 This was achieved under article X X V I:  5 (c) of GATT on the basis of the Declaration of Britain as the 
sovereign power complemented by a PRC declaration. This was an automatic procedure which did not 
involve any negotiation with, or approval by GATT members. Some members expressed doubts about the 
procedure and the lack o f consultation, namely because of the risk o f creating a strange situation if the 
PRC would not be a member in 1997. This did really happen and created an unprecedented situation in 
GATT/WTO, because GATT was only applicable to two small parts o f the Chinese territory, I IK and 
Macau - see htpp://www.sunsonline.org/trade/process/during/86/04260086.htm.
378 The United Kingdom declaration of 23.4.1986 notified the GATT Director General that I IK had full 
autonomy over its external commercial relations and should be considered a contracting party to GATT. 
This was complemented by China’s communication to the DG on the same date by which Beijinu 
informed the GATT that under the JO 1 long Kong would become a SAR on 1.7.1997, returning to Chinese 
sovereignty, and would retain its autonomy in commercial matters -
ww w'.sunsonline.org trade process during '86'04260086.hint.
developing countries. As a consequence HK gained, in contrast with the previous stage, 
a dual identity, simultaneously as a developing country and a developed country. This 
has created a serious challenge for HK. in terms of its ability to manage the inherent 
contradictions and tension encapsulated in the new situation.
I would argue that this duality and ambiguity is the main characteristic of the IIKSAR. as 
a member of WTO. The crucial question to the present research is what arc the 
implications of this duality both for HK, whether this is an asset or a liability, and for 
WTO, if it has any impact on the functioning of the Organisation.
For that we have to consider the wider context and look first at other characteristics of 
HK as a WTO member. I would argue there are four main characteristics.
Firstly, HK is a big trading power with a significant weight in world trade, which 
constitutes an important substantive basis for its participation, and influence in WTO. In 
2001 HK accounted for 3,1% of total world trade and was the 10th largest exporter in the 
world with a total export value of US$ 91 billion. If intra-EU trade is excluded the 
position of HK is even stronger accounting for 4 % of world trade and becoming the 6,h 
largest exporter and the 6th largest importer in the world merchandise trade379. HK’s 
position is strong not only in terms of trade in goods but also in trade in services, being 
the 10th largest exporter of commercial services and accounting for 2,9 % of total world 
exports of services in 2001380.
One of the consequences of this big trader status is the fact HK is currently the 9th 
largest contributor to the WTO budget and the Appellate Body budget, accounting for 
3.3% of its total value in 2002 ahead of countries like Spain, Singapore, Mexico or 
China381. Moreover, HK is one of the major contributors to extra-budgetary funds for
379 WTO, International Trade Statistics 2002, Geneva Table 1.5 leading exporters and importers in world 
merchandise trade in 2001 and Table 1.6 excluding intra-EU trade.
3s" WTO. International Trade Statistics 2002, Geneva Table 1.7.
3SI WTO Annual Report 2002 Table V.5.
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technical co-operation together with the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, US, Sweden, and 
Germany382.
Secondly, HK is a pro-system member meaning it is strongly committed to strengthen 
the multilateral trade system and the WTO organisation. As a small and vulnerable non­
sovereign entity, lacking political bargaining and instruments of retaliation, HK has long 
decided that the only protection it can have in a system dominated by sovereign states is 
a rule-based system and multilateral norms. In this context, HK is committed to 
contribute to the success of negotiations and avoid major failures that can reduce WTO 
credibility and undermine its role. This was the main motivation for HK to join and play 
a leading role in the “De La Paix Group”, in the context of the Uruguay Round, whose 
intervention was of critical importance. The Group was responsible for the breakthrough 
text for Punta del Este, and for the successful conclusion of the final stage of 
negotiations383. Similarly, in the launching of the Doha Round in 2001 HK played an 
important role in creating common ground. HK’s motivation was, in the face of the 
sense of danger and great fragility after the Seattle disaster384, to do something to 
strengthen the system and recover its credibility, as WTO would not survive a second 
disaster385.
Thirdly, HK is a “living example”, a “model to be emulated ” in terms of compliance 
with WTO rules. The key point is that HK has a coherent position not only because it 
supports liberalisation in all sectors, both in goods and services, contrary to the great 
majority of WTO members who advocate liberalisation in some areas but protectionism 
in others, but also because its deeds are consistent with its words insofar as HK is a real 
free trade practitioner. This contributes to HK’s credibility and prestige and to upheld its
382 WTO Annual Report 2002 Table V.6 pp 168
383 Besides HK the group included Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Korea, Switzerland, Hungary, the 
Nordic Countries and Columbia - John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System -  a history of the 
I frmniav Round. Kluwer Law International, WTO, 199, pp 37 and 298-300.
384 The failure of Seattle has been very much explained in the media as the result of the strong protest of 
anti-globalisation groups and riots in Seattle. However, the key explanation is internal and less visible and 
is related to the existence o f considerable divisions and the lack o f common ground between the WTO 
members, partly because the meeting was not carefully prepared based on a “Christmas Tree” 
methodology which proved unmanageable.
3S’ Interview with Stuart Harbinson, 20.11.2002.
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role model as a reference to be emulated as explicitly recognised by the other WTO 
members in the conclusions of the Trade Policy Reviews of 1998 and 2002386.
Fourthly, HK is a non-sovereign member of WTO which integrates a very small group 
of four exceptional cases: HK; Macao; the Customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu; and the European Communities (EC). Although theoretically 
sovereignty is not a pre-requisite for WTO membership, in practice it is paradoxically 
nearly restricted to sovereign states.
At present HK, together with Macao, which is really a by-product of HK’s status given 
the linkages in the context of China’s reunification process, are the only NCGs in the 
world that are members of WTO. Furthermore, given the very special nature of the EU 
whose Member States are sovereign members of WTO, and the controversy over 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, one can argue that HK and Macao are the only genuine non­
sovereign members of WTO.
In theory the non-sovereign nature of HK does not have any implications as the SAR 
enjoys formally the same rights as any sovereign member of WTO. However, a more in 
depth analysis reveals that in practice HK faces some subtle and less visible limitations 
which derive from the lack of sovereignty, as will be demonstrated below.
Dual identity
Formally, HK is a developing country within WTO. It should be noted that in WTO the 
status of developed or developing country is not imposed on the members on the basis of 
any objective criteria, on the contrary a self-election system applies as each member is 
free to choose what status it considers more adequate to its specific condition. UK has 
elected itself a developing country which has a major consequence, the fact it is entitled 
to enjoy special and differential treatment according to WTO rules.
386 WTO, Trade Policy Review -  HK China 1998, Bernan Associates pp. ix-xi. In the concluding remarks 
by the Chan-person in the Third policy review on 7-8 December 1998, it was stated that I IK demonstrated 
its “continuing commitment to the primacy o f WTO...” and that "...members looked forward to seeing
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This formal status has not been in general questioned by other members, but since the 
early 1990s some criticisms started to be expressed, namely by the EU, which tried to 
get support for its view that HK, Korea and Singapore should be graduated and 
considered as developed countries387. More recently in the 1998 TPR of HKC, the issue 
of the developing country status was again raised by the second discussant who 
confronted HK with the contradiction and double standards between UK’s position and 
status in APEC, where it considered itself a developed country accepting the 2010 
deadline, and in WTO where it continued to consider itself a developing country388.
In any case HK’s formal status is not yet openly challenged in WTO although criticisms 
are expressed in private by both developed and developing countries389. This is partly 
explained because in practice HK has not used the privileges of differential treatment or 
taken illegitimate advantage of its status. In recent years the only exception has been the 
adoption of the TRIPS regime for which HK requested the transition period and more 
time for implementation390. However, the pressure for graduation of HK and other high 
income countries is mounting and is likely to increase further in the near future because 
of OECD countries’ demands in the context of the DDA negotiations391.
In spite of the formal status as a developing country, in reality HK identity is less clear 
cut and much more ambiguous. I would argue it has a dual identity both as a developed
HK China continuing to contribute by its example and leadership at the WTO, to the further strengthening 
of the multilateral trading system.”.
387 John Croome op.cit. p. 326.
388 WTO, Trade Policy Review, HK China 1998, Bernan Associates WT/TPR/M/52 pp 161-162.
389 For example India, interview with Deputy Permanent Representative, I laran, 20.11.2002, Brazil 
interview with Brazilian mission officials, 18.11.2002, and Japan, interview with Permanent Mission 
Official responsible for WTO, Shingo Yamagami, 20.11.2002
390 HK had the chance to postpone implementation of the TRIPS agreement taking longer to review and 
adapt domestic legislation completed in 2000. In addition HR benefited from technical assistance from 
other WTO members, Australia, UK and the EU Patent Office - Council for Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights meeting of 6.3.2001 Minutes IP/C/M/29, p.8.
391 There is an intention in the Doha agenda to tighten up the special and differential treatment system by 
making it mandatory, more precise and robust. Many developing countries are pressing for greater 
concessions but for OECD countries this would only be possible if the group of developing countries is 
narrowed down which means applying more restrictive criteria. T his w ill create further pressure for UK 
to graduate and cease to have a developing country status - interviews w ith Stuart llarbinson, 20.11.2002, 
and WTO Director General. Dr S u p a c h a i ,  26.11.2002.
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and a developing country, which emerged since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
when services were included in the WTO regime. In trade in goods UK shares many of 
the concerns of developing countries, particularly in textiles supporting the idea of 
termination of the MFA regime and the full integration of textiles in WTO rules. UK is 
an active member of the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau (ITCB), an 
international organisation composed exclusively by 20 developing countries exporters of 
textiles, and played a leading role in its creation together with Brazil and India in the 
mid 1980s.
The ITCB has played a crucial role in terms of the co-ordination of positions among the 
three different groups of developing countries that co-exist inside the organisation'192 
which enhanced the bargaining capacity of the exporters in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations where ITCB participated directly in the negotiations and was able to 
introduce the idea of gradual phase-out of the MFA leading to the effective approval of 
the phase-out plan until 2005, when textiles will be fully integrated in the WTO
393system .
HK position is also closer to developing countries positions in other areas, namely in 
“rules”, particularly the strong opposition to anti-dumping arbitrary regimes, and in 
competition, where it is closer to more radical developing countries’ views like India, 
opposing a structured competition policy.
In contrast, HK is closer to developed countries and shares their views in specific areas, 
namely in services, supporting liberalisation with the exception of professional services, 
in TRIMS, trade facilitation and in many issues related to the institutional system. 
Moreover, HK participates as an observer in OECD Groups (the Committee on Financial 
Markets, Trade Committee, Committee on International Investment and Multinational 392
392 John Groome op.cit. 90 -91.
393 The 1995 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing aims at the full integration of the textiles and clothing 
sector into normal GATT rules by 2005, involving a gradual process to bring products under GA IT in 4 
phases: 1995-97, 16% of products; from 1998-2001 a further 17%; from 2002-04 a further 18%; on 
1.1.2005 quotas have to be eliminated in relation to the remaining 49% of products, only tariffs can apply 
and importing countries will no longer be able to discriminate betw een exporters.
Enterprises) where the SAR has the opportunity to know better the developed countries 
positions and concerns, in particular the differences among EU Member States, which 
are not visible in Geneva where they act with a single voice. This gives UK a foot in the 
developed countries camp.
Finally, there is a third situation where HK takes a middle ground position, equidistant 
from developed and developing countries, in areas such as TRIPS and even more clearly 
in agriculture where HK has a perfectly neutral position having no interests whatsoever 
in this sector.
Although the dual identity that has emerged since the mid-1980s is still strong, changes 
might occur pushing HK closer to the developed camp. One is graduation and the 
reform of the preferential treatment system under discussion in the Doha Round. 
Another crucial factor will be the full integration of textiles in the WTO system and the 
termination of the MFA in 2005, which can weaken UK’s strongest link with developing 
countries and the crucial basis of its developing country identity in GATT since the 
1960s.
One of the main concerns of this research is to understand the implications of this dual 
identity for HK and the WTO and to what extent this is an asset or a liability for the 
HKSAR.
This could indeed be a liability for HK if its split identity was perceived as an expression 
of incoherence and a mere opportunistic mechanism to maximise gains. In a system 
where clear cut categories and black and white logic prevails, there was a potential risk 
for HK to be considered an abnormal case consequently marginalised by both camps and 
lost in the middle. This would severely undermine UK’s credibility turning it into a 
minor and isolated player, with no influence in WTO.
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However, this is not the case, HK’s dual identity is respected, understood and even seen 
as positive by other members. Firstly, they realise this position is brought about by the 
incoherence of other members (developed countries support liberalisation in services but 
try to impose protectionist measures in goods and vice-versa for developing countries) 
than by HK which maintains a coherent position supporting a global liberalisation in all 
areas. Secondly, HK’s positions derive from the substantive nature of its economy and 
concrete interests and are not determined by artificially fabricated strategics or games to 
gain advantages or by political motivations. Thirdly, HK docs not discriminate against 
any member, treats equally all trade partners thus inducing an idea of impartiality.
HK as a bridge builder
In this context my argument is that HK’s dual identity is on the whole an asset for HK 
and one of the most robust basis for its affirmation in WTO, insofar as it paves the way 
for HK to be able to perform a bridge builder role between developed and developing 
countries inside WTO.
In fact, exactly because HK has a foot in each camp the SAR has good conditions to 
bridge positions thus contributing to the advance of negotiations. The good access HK 
has to the inner circle of each camp, together with the technical expertise of its 
negotiators, enables HK to better understand the contents and grounds of different 
positions, to assess their respective degree of flexibility and eventual fall back positions, 
and their systemic impact, all essential tools for any broker.
This bridge builder role does not cover all areas, certainly not areas where HK takes 
more radical and firm positions like textiles, anti-dumping or RTA’s, but has 
consistently manifested itself in a considerable number of fields and in different 
occasions. There are plenty of examples. In the context of the Uruguay Round the role 
of HK inside the “De La Paix Group”, already mentioned, helped in creating a common 
ground for the success of the final stage of negotiations through their initiative to send a 
letter to major players (US, EU and Japan), crucial to overcome problems derived from 
the change in the US Administration and the French opposition to the Blair House
Agreement394. Another case in point was HK’s role in the negotiation group on 
TRIMS395 *.
More recently, in the context of the Doha process, HK’s role as a bridge builder gained 
considerable visibility. Firstly, HK’s role as Chairman of the General Council in 2001 
and the key contribution Stuart Harbinson made to secure the success in Doha and 
enable the Round to be effectively launched, by bridging positions between the radicals 
that resisted the idea of a new round like India and the African Group, and the supporters 
of a new round, including OECD and some developing countries.
Secondly, the selection of Stuart Harbinson in 2002 as Chairman of the Committee on 
Agriculture in charge of managing one of the most difficult and hot negotiations 
between the EU on the one side, and the US and the Cairns Group, on the other. HK was 
deliberately chosen because of its guarantee of impartiality, since it has no interests in 
the agriculture sector, and its established credentials as a bridge builder.
There are also manifestations of this broker role at the level of sectoral negotiations. A 
good example is provided by the negotiation on TRIPS, the question of TRIPS and 
public health. This was discussed for the first time in the TRIPS Council of June 2001 
and concerns the problem that patents on medicines have created obstacles to the access 
to medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS and other pandemics, preventing the most 
affected developing countries from solving public health problems. HK has clearly held 
a position to balance and reconcile interests, namely intellectual property protection 
essential for the development of new medicines on the one hand, and the need to support 
the combat to pandemic diseases, on the other 3%.
From HK’s point of view the TRIPS should be part of the solution for major pandemics 
and not a problem for public health and therefore the TRIPS Agreement should be
394 John Croome, op. cit., pp 299-300
yb Ibidem, p. 223
Statement by Secretary of Commerce and Industry, Chau Tuk Hay, at the Ministerial Conference 
10.1 1.2001 WT/MIN(01)/ST/18 ontctcncc
interpreted in a flexible way. This is a middle ground position between a group of 
countries with strong interests in the pharmaceutical industry, led by the US and 
including Switzerland, Japan, Canada, which take a more conservative position, and 
another group of developing countries, led by Brazil involving many Latin American 
and African countries, which push for greater flexibility which risk to subvert rules397.
Another example has been in the context of the Council of Trade in Services where I IK, 
although advocating liberalisation alongside developed countries, considered that it 
would be important to involve developing countries, otherwise negotiations would he 
meaningless. For that and in order to bridge positions and respond to developing 
countries’ concerns, HK proposed an “emergency safeguard” for developing countries 
so that they could feel more comfortable and confident to open their services markets398.
Still another illustration of HK’s effort to play a bridge role concerns the area of TRIMS, 
namely in terms of the definition of the scope and possible contents of a multilateral 
investment agreement which OECD countries want but many developing countries, 
namely India, Indonesia resist and have strong reservations against. IIK has proposed 
the adoption of a narrow approach to the definition of investment limiting it to FDI and 
excluding other forms because it could “command greater support among the wider 
membership”399. Moreover, although supporting transparency as the basic principle for a 
favourable environment for investment400, HK also acknowledged the constraints 
developing countries face in fulfilling its obligations and so proposed that an eventual 
multilateral framework should promote a balance between pursuing more transparency 
and avoiding the imposition of burdensome obligations on developing countries.
An interesting question arising from this is to know whether HK is a “systemic broker” 
or rather a mere “single issue” broker performing that role on a non-permanent basis. 
The evidence available seems to support the idea that there was an evolution from a
397 WTO, Minutes o f the Council on TRIPS meetings IP/C/M/33, 2.1.2001, pp. 62-63
398 Interview with Stuart Harbinson on 21.11.2002
399 WT/WGTI/M/12, pp. 21-22 of 31.10.2000.
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status of a single issue broker to a condition closer to a systemic broker in more recent 
times, insofar as HK has been called upon to intervene in global processes such as the 
Doha Round, its role is unanimously recognised by other WTO members and HK 
assumed this as one of its strategic objectives in WTO40 01.
This condition of a bridge builder has several consequences. Firstly, HK is regarded as a 
more neutral and impartial member, despite the fact it takes strong positions on specific 
issues. As a result it gets often chosen to act as panellist in the Dispute Settlement 
panels, in particular in very sensitive cases like the Banana Panel involving a dispute 
between the US and the EU which was chaired by Stuart Harbinson402. HK is not the 
only member recognised as a bridge builder, other examples such as Norway, New 
Zealand, Singapore get often cited. What is different and specific about HK is the fact it 
is the only systemic broker and the only that derives its influence from the dual identity.
What is unique and paradoxical about HK is how the SAR, despite being a big trader is 
still regarded by the majority as impartial and neutral. It is difficult to fully explain this 
paradox but I would argue it is explained primarily by the dual identity but also by two 
other factors. One is the fact HK is not aligned with any of the major players, the EU, 
US, Japan, Canada or big developing countries, but shows an independent stand. It can 
side with the US on liberalisation of financial services but simultaneously take a firm 
and critical position against the same US on anti-dumping. This autonomy in pursuing 
its specific interests helps maintaining an image of impartiality showing that for UK’s 
high profile in WTO autonomy in relation to the sovereign power is not the only one that 
matters, autonomy in relation to major players is also relevant.
400 Minutes of the meeting of the working group on the Relationship between trade and investment 
WT/WGTI/M/17, 31.5.2002, p. 19.
401 Interview with Stuart Harbinson on 21.11.2002.
402 The panel was established in June 1996, chaired by Stuart Ilarbinson based on a complaint presented 
by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the US against the EC - WTO, DSR 1997, vol III. Stuart 
Harbinson was also selected to chair other panels such as the India -  Patent protection for pharmaceuticals 
and Agricultural chemical products established on 16.10.1997 on the basis o f a complaint presented by the 
EC -  see WTO. DSR 1998, Vol. VI, pp. 2199 -2752.
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The other factor is HK’s non-sovereign nature and its low political weight which fuels 
the perception that HK’s positions are not determined by complex political and strategic 
interests, but driven by economic interests. Although this is not necessarily the case, the 
international community tends to perceive HK as an apolitical actor which conditions 
HK’s behaviour. HK has rejected any change that could lead to the “politicisation” of 
WTO using this argument to oppose the idea of greater participation of NGOs in 
WTO403, thus upholding the myth that WTO is a mere economic and technical forum 
and that politics stay outside. This clearly shows that HK is conscious of the risks that if 
it is seen as actively involved in more politicised issues its status might be severely 
weakened. The lack of sovereignty works in this respect as an advantage to HK insofar 
it contributes for HK to be seen as neutral thus enabling it to play the bridge builder 
role404. However, the lack of sovereignty presents also limitations in other respects 
which will be analysed below.
Secondly, HK has to devote a lot of effort and resources to play this bridge role, as this 
is not a process of spontaneous generation. This is a deliberate investment made by HK 
to uphold its prestige and position in WTO which does not generate immediate but only 
long term benefits, although it has short term costs. In this context HK has been facing a 
trade-off between playing this systemic role and pursuing its own commercial interests, 
as both compete for limited resources. The trade-off was more visible when Stuart 
Harbinson became Chairman of the General Council in 2001. Then the HK Government 
had to decide to reduce the workload from HK so that Harbinson would have more time 
and space to perform his high functions. This meant that for a while HK specific 
interests were less intensively pursued and attached a lower priority405. So, in the limit, 
the performance of a bridge role might be at the expense of HK’s own interests.
403 This was expressed by HK in a specific communication to the 2000 General Council debate on 
external transparency WT/GC/W/418, p.2, 31.10.2000, WTO.
41,4 The relevance of the a-political stand o f HK came out implicitly in the interviews carried out with some 
of the most influential WTO members, namely the EU - interview with Carlo Trojan 1C Representative 
to WTO, 19.11.2002
4"' Interv iew with Stuart Harbinson. 21.11.2002.
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Thirdly, this bridge builder role contributes to strengthen UK’s influence in the 
organisation because this is what makes HK relevant both to developed and developing 
countries. For the latter HK's ’capacity to turn the real developing countries in the right 
direction and moderate the positions of the most radical ones, is an asset. For the former, 
HK provides relevant technical expertise and finances technical assistance at the same 
time as, because of its links with OECD countries, confers more credibility to 
developing countries’ views thus contributing to moderate developed countries’ 
positions. So, both camps see HK’s role as constructive and useful406.
HK’s dual identity and the performance of a broker role are the primary factors that 
account for HK’s influence in WTO. I would argue that in its absence HK would 
probably be a tiny player. Furthermore, the level of HK influence in the future is tied up 
to the effective capacity to preserve this feature and perform the role407. There arc of 
course other factors that account for HK’s influence. In general it is mentioned that the 
quality and expertise of HK personnel and negotiators, the fact HK sets a good example 
in terms of fulfilling WTO obligations and its active support to WTO development, are 
among the most important ingredients but they should be seen as second level factors.
The influence of HK is primarily materialised in its active participation in the core 
decision-making group that dominate the Organisation (between 25-30 members), the 
so-called “green room” group408. These are informal and off-the-record meetings 
involving a restrict group, whose composition vary partially with the matter, which 
addresses the most difficult issues, negotiates behind close doors and takes the final 
decisions on the core issues, subsequently submitted for formal approval to the plenary. 
HK has been involved regularly in the “green room system”. Just to cite two examples, 
HK was involved in two crucial “green room” meetings. One was the final negotiations 
for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993 which settle the last
406 This view was confirmed by the WTO Secretariat, interview with Keith Rockwell, WTO Director of 
Information, 18.11.2002.
4I’7 Interview with Andrew Stoler, former Deputy Director-General of WTO, and former member of the 
US representation, 18.2.2003.
41,8 The “green room” meetings became an essential element in the Uruguay Round promoted by IKi 
Dunkel - John Croome, on.cit.. p. 138.
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sensitive issues, where HK was seating with another 11 countries, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, the EC, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan and the US409. 
More recently in the final Ministerial Green Room in Doha where HK was represented 
by the Secretary for Commerce and Industry, Chau Tak Hay, seating with another 20 
Ministers including the “Quad” countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Kenya, South Africa, 
Chile, Egypt, Singapore, Switzerland and Tanzania410.
5.2. HK PRIORITIES AND PARTICIPATION IN WTO
HK has a diversified and active participation nearly in all areas of WTO work. However, 
HK has specific priorities that we have to take into account in order to belter understand 
the pattern of participation.
Sectoral priorities
Besides the general systemic objectives of HK, the SAR has specific priorities in 
relation to the issues included in the WTO agenda. In this respect it is useful to take the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) as a reference and see how HK positions itself in 
relation to the issues that are at the centre of the new round of negotiations. In global 
terms HK considers the DDA to be “balanced and manageable”411, basically because it 
combines further trade liberalisation and new rule-making at the same time it allows 
some flexibility to deal with the specific conditions of developing countries.
I would argue that HK has four major priorities: trade in services; industrial tariffs; trade 
rules, in particular anti-dumping, RTAs and dispute-settlement; and trade facilitation, 
transparency and government procurement412.
4H9 Marcelo Raffaelli and Tripti Jenkins, The Drafting o f  the Agreement on Textiles and Clothim». I I C M, 
Geneva, 1995, p. 85.
410 Interviews with Chau Tak Hay on 19.12.2001. and UK ETC) official in Geneva on 19.11.2002.
411 Trade Policy Review,.HK China, Report hy the Government WT/'I PR G/109 18.11.2002. pp. 20-21
4i: Interview with officials of the HK l:TO in Geneva on 19.11.2002.
Trade in Services is becoming a key priority area because HK’s economy is 
overwhelmingly dominated by services and HK is a strong exporter of service trade. 
HK supports the idea of progressive liberalisation in a wide range of service sectors, 
particularly in financial services, telecommunications, audio-visual services and 
maritime transport. The only major exception is professional services (legal, medical 
services) where, because of pressures by HK major professional groups, the SAR is 
more protectionist.
As far as industrial tariffs are concerned HK pushes for substantial reduction and 
elimination of tariffs. HK’s ultimate goal is tariff zero, which HK actually practices in 
relation to all imports entering the SAR, although in terms of legal obligations the 
situation is different because as of 2001 only 42 % of all HK’s tariff lines were bound at 
0 %413. In this respect HK supports a comprehensive coverage and a formula approach to 
tariff cuts and is keen to deal with issues like high tariffs, tariff peaks, tariff escalation 
and nuisance tariffs in the current negotiations.
In what concerns strengthening trade rules, HK holds the view that they should be 
clarified and reviewed. The first key area for HK is anti-dumping rules which HK 
considers have been used in such a protectionist way that it has subverted WTO rules. 
This requires urgent review in order to ensure that progress in trade liberalisation is not 
eroded through the back door by an abusive use of anti-dumping actions.
The second area concerns RTAs, which HK sees as a potential risk to WTO and 
multilateral rules given the present proliferation of agreements, with some countries 
participating in several uncoordinated processes simultaneously. HK is also particularly 
concerned that rules of origin might create barriers to trade thus subverting the rules, 
since RTAs serve to facilitate trade between members but can not raise barriers to trade
413 This is the difference between legal obligation and actual practice meaning that I IK is being more 
liberal than it was legally obliged to. In fact, HK is committed to bind tariffs only to a certain percentage 
of goods which means that it can legally resort to tariffs, in other categories of goods, for example, a s \  
retaliatory measure. This is maintained as a bargaining tool for IIK - WTO Secretariat I IK Trade Policy 
Review 2002 Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S 109, pp. 19-24 table III.2.
with third parties. In this HK considers that the present rules can not ensure the 
consistency of RTAs with WTO rules and therefore have to be made clearer and stricter.
Thirdly, HK attaches relevance to the review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) in order to improve it, namely by enhancing the rights of third parties, although 
HK practice has been contradictory. This derives from the fact HK’s use of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is very rare as will be demonstrated below.
In a second level of priority we find the issues of trade facilitation and transparency. 
Here HK is at the forefront of the debate, given the credentials and innovative work it 
has developed in APEC in the late 1990s regarding the “Nine principles” on 
transparency. HK supports the principle of transparency in government procurement 
policies, laws, regulations, procedures, crucial to create a fair and predictable market 
environment and foster competition as well as the conclusion of a multilateral agreement 
on transparency in government procurement. In addition, HK supports a simplification 
and reduction of trade procedures, which can enhance efficiency in trade and reduce 
costs not only for business but also for consumers and governments
In contrast, there are areas that attract little attention on the part of HK. Among the most 
important issues in the DDA, HK has little enthusiasm for two issues, trade and 
environment and competition issues. On competition HK disagrees with the idea that a 
horizontal competition policy and a global competition law are needed, contrary to the 
EU position, arguing that competition policy is sector specific and that the existence of 
an open economy exposed to external competition is sufficient to ensure it414.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, HK has absolutely no interest in agriculture which is 
somehow a non-issue for HK. The fact HK has no agricultural sector clearly enhances 
HK’s impartial image and facilitates its ability to play a bridge role, exactly what the 
SAR is currently performing between the US, the Caims Group and the EC.
414 See discussion in the 1998 Trade Policy Review session \VT/'l PRM /52, pp. 160 - 166
UK’s participation: formal and informal levels
This set of priorities explains the pattern of participation of the HKSAR in WTO 
institutional bodies. Actually, HK’s participation occurs at two different levels: the 
formal institutional structures; the informal negotiation groups, the so-called “groups of 
friends” which are specific to the culture of GATT/WTO, introducing and important 
element of flexibility inside the organisation that goes beyond traditional UN groupings.
On the formal level, HK participates actively in several sectoral committees and working 
groups in accordance with the set of interests mentioned above. HK’s participation 
covers all the three main areas of WTO activities: goods, services and intellectual 
property.
In the area of trade in goods HK participates in the Council for Trade in Goods and has 
particular interests in some of the bodies operating under the Council namely the 
Committees on market access, anti-dumping practices, subsidies and countervailing 
measures, rules o f origin and TRIMS and obviously in the Textiles Monitoring Body 
which supervises the implementation of the 1995 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.
In services HK participates actively in the Council for Trade in Services and has a 
particular interest in some of the bodies under it, namely the Committee on Trade in 
Financial Services and the working party on GATS rules.
As far as intellectual property is concerned, HK participates in the Council on TRIPS. 
This is the area where HK progress was slower towards meeting WTO standards and has 
used developing countries’ preferential treatment to benefit from a transition period.
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The Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Besides the participation in bodies concerned with sectoral negotiations HK participates 
in a horizontal area, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM)415. This new system is a 
structural and fundamental mechanism to secure the enforcement of WTO rules and to 
ban unilateral action thus limiting arbitrary exercise of power by the powerful and 
protecting the weakest members.
Despite the relevance of this mechanism to strengthen WTO, paradoxically UK’s 
participation in the DSM has been minimal. In fact, since 1995 there is not any 
complaint filed against HK and more significantly HK has not requested the creation of 
any panel against other members, with one single exception, a complaint against Turkey 
in 1996.
This is a very relevant case to understand HK’s policy regarding dispute settlement. The 
complaint was about the quantitative restrictions imposed by Turkey on textile and 
clothing products as a consequence of the conclusion of a customs union agreement with 
the EC. HK claimed this constituted a violation of GATT articles XI and XIII and 
requested consultations, the first stage of the mechanism, which were effectively held416. 
HK’s motivation was not only to react to unilateral action that directly damaged its 
interests, but also to pursue a systemic concern related to the consequences for third 
parties of RTAs, and the need to clarify art. XXIV implications.
The consultations did not settle the dispute but HK decided not to pursue the case and 
did not request a panel. The situation is even more bizarre as HK decided to participate 
as a third participant in a panel established in March 1998 to settle the dispute between 
India and Turkey following a complaint presented by India on exactly the same
.. 417question .
4,5 This mechanism to settle disputes was set up by the Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes in all areas of the Uruguay Round package.
416 WTODS29 case Turkey-restrictions on imports o f textile and clothing products W IVDS OV/5 p.47.
Subsequently India has explicitly criticised HK on this matter complaining there was no 
information about the outcome of the HK-Turkey consultations and considered this 
served to undermine the efficacy of the DSU and the multilateral trading system...urge 
HK, China to appropriately rectify the situation”417 18. It is interesting to look into the 
reasons why HK decided not to confront directly Turkey in a panel but instead 
indirectly, through another WTO member panel where the same issue was being 
discussed.
I would argue that although the uncertainty on whether the panel would rule in favour of 
HK might have played a role, the real and decisive explanation is more complex and less 
visible. What is at stake is HK’s fear of a potential hostile bilateral response or a 
“retaliation measure” on the part of the EC which was strongly involved in this 
dispute419. This case clearly illustrates the reluctance of HK to be directly involved in 
open disputes with other WTO members. The fact HK did not requested the creation of 
panels does not result from the absence of violation of rules that affect HK interests but 
rather from a deliberate policy not to use the mechanism, although not assumed by I IK 
which justifies its conduct with the absence of complains by firms back in HK420.
The key point is that HK, as a non-sovereign entity fears the potential damaging effects 
of open confrontation with sovereign states for two basic reasons. Firstly, because of the 
power gap and greater vulnerability of HK as it lacks the means of retaliation, including 
political ones, which states possess and can use against the SAR outside the context of 
WTO. Secondly, the systemic concern that HK’s involvement in many disputes could 
damage the image of impartiality and thus undermine the SAR’s ability to perform the 
bridge builder role, one of the pillars of its status in WTO.
417 The panel was established on 13.3.1998 and decided in May 1999 in favour of India. I IK participated 
as a third party -  WTO, DSR 1999, vol VI, pp. 2095-2556,1 IK statement p. 2351.
418 WTO, Trade Policy Review', HK China 1998, WT/TPRM. 52, p. 158.
419 I n t e r v i e w  w ith HK ETO officials in Geneva, 18.11.2002.
4211 In te rv iew ' w ith Stuart Harbinson. 20.11.2002.
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In this context HK’s option is for a low profile. The maximum it has done was to be 
involved as a third party in some panels but even so in only four cases421. Interestingly, 
HK’s justification has been the “systemic relevance” of the cases and not its own 
interests, thus suggesting that the sole motivation is to upheld the system, namely the 
consistency between RTAs and WTO in the Turkey-textiles case or the DSM in the US- 
301 Section case. The DSM clearly creates a dilemma for the HKSAR, between using 
the system whenever necessary to enforce rules and upheld WTO on the one hand, and 
the performance of a bridge builder role, on the other. This tension has been so far 
resolved in favour of the second objective.
The HKSAR not only participates actively in these bodies but plays also a leading role 
being regularly elected Chairman of some of them. Since 1997 the HKSAR has been the 
Chairman of 6 main bodies, including the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(1997), the Council for Trade in Services (1999), the Dispute Settlement Body (2000), 
the General Council (2001), the Committee on Agriculture Special Session (2002) and 
the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration (2003). In this period HKC was 
among the top ten WTO members, being the second most elected member to perform 
high level functions after France (7), with 6 elections, a similar record as Costa Rica, 
and ahead of high profile members like Canada (5), Japan (5), New Zealand (5), Brazil 
(4) or Korea (4)422. This is clearly another manifestation of HK’s high profile in WTO 
and the inherent recognition by the other WTO members.
Informal dimensions
In parallel with the participation in institutional bodies, there , is another important 
dimension of HK’s participation, more informal, related to its involvement in various 
“groups of friends”. These are informal groups organised around a specific issue and 
composed of members that share similar interests and positions and try to co-ordinate 
their action in order to enhance their bargaining power in the formal negotiation process.
421 HK has participated as a third party in the following panels, the majority against the US: (i) the US- 
Shrimp WT'DS58, DSR 1998 vol VII pp. 2753-3324; (ii) Turkey-textiles and clothing WT'DS 3 4 .DSR 
1999 vol VI pp.2095-2556 ; (iii) US-Section 301-310, DSR 2000, vol II pp.573-1 185.1IK's arguments 
pp. 1068-1077 (iv) US-Byrd Amendment.
These groups, which are specific to GATT/WTO culture, introduce an important 
element of flexibility insofar as their composition is variable and cuts across the 
traditional rigid groupings in the UN system, bringing often together developed and 
developing countries. This flexibility presents an important advantage for a non­
sovereign actor like HK and helps the SAR managing the tensions arising out of its dual 
identity.
There are many informal groups, probably one of the best known is the Cairns Group, an 
heterogeneous alliance of 17 countries, involving OECD, middle-income, and even 
Least Developed Countries, from 4 continents, with a common goal: press for 
agricultural trade liberalisation.
Naturally HK is not involved in this group given the absence of interests in the 
agricultural sector, but participates actively in as many as 14 “groups of friends” in five 
different areas42 23, including: the Anti-Dumping friends group424; the group on Trade 
Facilitation, the so called Colorado Group425; the group on Non-Agricultural Market 
Access, integrating the pro-liberalisation core group426; the group on Transparency in 
Government Procurement427; and various groups on Services, such as financial services 
or maritime transport428. In the Services area HK has played a particular leadership role 
by taking the initiative to organise the groups on audiovisual, MFN exemptions and 
GATS-art VI.
422 WTO, Press Releases WTO Chairpersons 1997-2003 wtVNVAVto.orirenelish'news enres97 03e.html
423 HK ETO in Geneva, interview on 18.11.2002.
424 This group involves influential members o f WTO such as Brazil, Chile, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and Chinese Taipei and basically takes a position against 
the US policy on anti-dumping.
425 This group includes the Quad members, Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Hungary, Korea, Morocco, New 
Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland.
426 This core group includes besides HK Australia, New Zealand and Singapore.
427 This group involves the EC, Canada, Japan, the US, Australia, Hungary, Czech Republic. Korea, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Singapore and Switzerland.
42,< The HKSAR is a member o f a total o f 10 groups of friends on Services, including financial services, 
telecommunications, maritime transport, aviation, logistics, audiovisual, computer and related services.
Perceptions on UK’s participation and contribution to WTO
HK’s high profile and contribution to WTO has been acknowledged by the other WTO 
members. This recognition is implicit in HK’s involvement in the core centre of 
decision-making or on its election to chair major bodies of the Organisation. Moreover, 
there has been an explicit recognition of HK’s role on the occasion of the periodic 
evaluations of HK’s trade policy carried out under the trade policy review mechanism429 
in which a large number of WTO members are involved. Both positive aspects and 
criticisms are expressed in the reviews, thus providing a comprehensive and balanced 
view of WTO Members’ perceptions on HK.
So far HK has been subject to four reviews, two before the handover, in 1990 and 1994, 
and two after the handover, in 1998 and 2002. The two most recent reviews deserve 
particular attention. Overall both projected a highly positive assessment of HK’s trade 
policy and of its role in WTO. An in-depth analysis of the minutes of discussion and the 
statements of members and discussants allow us to capture a more accurate overview of 
the dominant aspects of WTO members’ perception on HK’s membership.
Firstly, HK is seen as a key supporter of the multilateral trade system highly committed 
to the primacy of WTO as expressed in the concluding remarks of the Chairperson of the 
1998 Review430, and in the statements of various members with very heterogeneous 
profiles such as India, the EC and Canada431. Besides stressing the exemplary 
implementation of WTO commitments in various areas, members also noted the efforts 
made by HK to improve its record in less strong areas such as protection of intellectual 
property rights, by taking steps to implement the TRIPS Agreement, or by acceding to 
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.
429 The Trade Policy Review Mechanism is a product o f the Uruguay Round, approved on a provisional 
basis and later made permanent as an annex to the WTO Agreement (annex 3).
4311 WTO, Trade Policy Review, HK.China. 1998 WT'TPR 52, p.ix.
431 WTO, WT/TPR/52, pp. 156-159.
Secondly, HK is seen to set the example and exercise leadership in WTO by being a 
“free trade champion”432 and one of the most open and liberal economies in the world433. 
However, there are also some points of criticism, weak aspects in relation to which HK 
is seen as not fully meeting WTO standards. This was the case with the import regime of 
two products, fish and rice, which have some import controls and therefore constitute an 
exception to openness434, and the consideration that the current level of “bound tariffs” 
is low and therefore it was felt that HK should made further progress in terms of binding 
more its industrial tariffs435, although it was recognised that HK does not apply tariffs in 
practice.
Thirdly, there is a sense that HK is a model member to be emulated by other WTO 
members not only because it is a free trade practitioner, but also because of its non- 
confrontational attitude towards other members. Interestingly, HK was seen as a model, 
a “perfect WTO member” because it has no conflicts with other members and “its 
recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism was rare” as expressed by the first 
discussant during the 1998 Review436. In the same session India expressed an opposite 
view, considering that HK’s non-use of the DSM is a negative sign likely to undermine 
WTO.
However, there are a few exceptions to this model role, three areas in relation to which 
WTO members have expressed concerns. This is the case of trade and competition, 
where some members, particularly developed members437 consider that HK’s resistance 
to adopt a general competition law, cartel law or any mechanism to sanction restrictive 
business practices, do not guarantee a full competitive environment. Another less robust 
area is intellectual property rights, where issues of enforcement are still seen as 
problematic, despite the progress made by HK, in particular the issue of copyright
432 The expression was used in the context of the 1998 Review by Hungary which stated that I IK was “one 
o f the most committed champions of free trade” WT/TPR/M/52, p. 157.
4,3 WTO, TPR, HK, China, 2002, concluding remarks by the Chairperson 
www.wto.org'english traton e l nr etp20S crc e.htm.
434 WTO, Trade Policy Review 1998, WT/TPR/M/52, p. 151 (comments by Mr. Yoichi Suzuki)
435 See TPR 1998, WT/TPRM/52 p.163 and TPR 2002, the concluding remarks o f the Chairperson.
43(1 Terje Johannessen statement in the discussion WTO, WT/TPR/M/52. p.149.
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piracy437 38 439. The third area of concern is the environment where HK is not perceived as a 
very committed member to upheld sustainable development as a major goal of the trade
439system .
In the context of the 1998 and 2002 reviews, the role of HK as a bridge builder in WTO 
was not explicitly mentioned. However, several influential countries tend to recognise 
HK’s role as a broker, a member that takes in many occasions a middle ground position 
and helps moving things forward in a pragmatic way, fundamentally because it does not 
stick to rigid positions and does not have neither an ideological bias nor strongly 
politically motivated positions440. The “political-neutral HK” emerges clearly as a 
powerful image in WTO Members’ perception of HK.
This consensual positive perception of HK’s role is an important factor to upheld HK’s 
autonomy and the maintenance of a high profile. WTO members recognise HK’s 
separate identity and its condition as a full member of WTO, with exactly the same 
rights and obligations as any other member. The non-sovereign nature is not seen as 
posing any obstacle or constraint to HK’s participation.
However, I would argue that, contrary to WTO members’ perception and formal WTO 
rules, which grant formal equal status to sovereign and non-sovereign members, there 
are some substantive differences. HK’s lack of sovereignty generates indeed some 
limitations to its participation in WTO.
Firstly, the non-use of the DSM, as noted earlier, is to a certain extent explained by the 
concern to avoid direct confrontations with sovereign members. This is partly a 
consequence of the lack of sovereignty and the fact HK does not possess the political
437 The criticisms were expressed by Japan, the EU and the two discussants in the context o f the 1998 
Review WT/TPR/M/52 , pp. 150-166.
438 WTO Secretariat 2002 TPR, WT/TPR/S/109, p.47. This concern was also voiced by the US and Japan 
in the 1998 TPR, WT/TPR'M/52, pp. 154-156.
439 See the First discussant comments 1998 Review, Mr. Terje Johannessen, WT/TPR'M/52, p. 149.
440 This was explicitly recognised by India, interview with V.P.] laran, 20.11.2002, by Japan, interview 
with Shingo Yamagami, 20.11.2002, and by Brazil, interview with Vera Thorstensen, 18.11.2002, The
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bargaining and means to respond to the risks of retaliation or hostile action by states 
with which HK has a trade conflict.
Secondly, HK faces limitations in terms of its involvement in more political aspects of 
WTO’s institutional life. One example is the admission of new members, an area that 
tends to be highly politicised because some powerful members have blocked in the past, 
and will continue to block in the future, the accession of some candidate members for 
political reasons, as a way to gain political leverage in a complex bargaining that goes 
beyond WTO. China’s accession provides a good example when we consider the attitude 
of the US in the accession process. In this context HK restrains itself from being 
involved. It is highly unlikely that we see HK either giving strong support or opposing 
the admission of a specific candidate441. Another example is the fact it is almost 
impossible for HK to aspire to a candidature to the post of Director-General given the 
heavy requirements of political backing and alliances involved, even though it is a big 
trader and an influential member. So, HK faces a practical obstacle to exercise its right 
to present its own candidate to Director-General.
Thirdly, HK’s participation in sectoral negotiations involving political issues is also 
constrained by its non-sovereign condition. This would be the case with issues such as 
the control of trade of strategic goods, issues related to labour standards and 
fundamental rights or aspects of the foreign investment regime with sovereignty 
implications.
The analysis of WTO members’ perception suggests there is an informal code of 
political-neutrality for HK which is positively valued by WTO but which imposes a 
structural constraint on HK. The SAR is aware that the violation of this code would 
bring about harmful consequences for its status and weaken its influence in the 
organisation. China’s accession is likely to have a significant impact and further
same view was expressed by the former deputy Director-General o f WTO, Andrew Stoler, interview on 
18.2.2003. '
441 This hypothesis was tested with Stuart Harbinson who recognised the existence o f hmiruiom' h
o f UK’s lack of sovereignty-interview on 20.11.2002. ‘ ' "
contribute to strengthen this code and reduce HK’s “room for manoeuvre”, as will be 
analysed below.
5.3. HK’s INTERACTION WITH MAJOR PLAYERS
The contribution of major external actors to the sustainability and consolidation of HK’s 
external autonomy has been stressed in the previous chapter. The WTO experience 
provides an opportunity to look at the practical interaction of HK with the US, Japan and 
the EC and see whether there is a strategy of alignment with external players.
The US
The dominant aspect of US-HK relationship in WTO is the active advocacy of trade 
liberalisation and free trade at the global level. This shared goal together with the fact 
HK is an active advocate and practitioner of free trade principles, accounts for the 
American interest in interacting with HK both in WTO and other fora like APEC and the 
recurrent declaration that the SAR is a natural and the most reliable US partner in 
pursuing that goal.
Despite the convergence of positions in relation to global liberalisation and the 
philosophy of the international trading system, the US-HK relationship is also marked 
by contradictions. In fact we can find both areas of convergence and divergence between 
the two.
As far as convergence is concerned, services are a crucial area where I IK and the US 
hold similar positions supporting further liberalisation. But even here, there is 
disagreement on some specific issues, namely the US insistence to maintain some MFN 
exemptions in services while HK wants its full elimination, and divergences over 
maritime transport in relation to which the US has a more conservative position. 
Similarly, HK’s resistance to open up professional services markets is also a cause of 
criticism by the US.
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The areas of divergence are numerous and of considerable significance. The area of 
greater divergence, where the US and HK held completely antagonistic positions is anti­
dumping. HK considers that the US has an unacceptable position and is, in practice, 
undermining the advances in trade liberalisation and WTO rules taking with one hand 
what it had given with the other.
Secondly, although both agree with the free trade principle, they have different views on 
the method to achieve it. Whereas HK supports the idea of primacy of the multilateral 
system as key to achieve free trade and sees many risks in RTAs, the US attaches more 
relevance to regional liberalisation. In fact, Washington has promoted since the end of 
the Cold War a complex network of FTA Agreements seen as crucial to achieve the 
economic goal of free trade but also a political goal, the creation of security and 
stability, somehow substitutes for the old bilateral defence treaties.
Divergence also includes tariffs, textiles, competition and some institutional matters. On 
this last area, it is relevant to refer to the DSM and the divergence over opening the 
system to the participation of external civil society actors, namely NGOs, in the panels 
through the submission of the “amicus curiae briefs”. The US supported this change and 
played a pivotal role in specific cases such as the “Shrimp-Turtle” and “Carbon Steel” 
panels and in the General Council debates442, while HK took a conservative position and 
opposed this change and other ideas of direct participation of civil society in WTO443.
Japan
As far as HK-Japan interaction is concerned the dominant aspect is the fact both share a 
strong commitment to the primacy of WTO as the priority organisation for their
442 WTO, “United States -  imposition o f countervailing duties on certain hot-rolled lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel products originating in the UK” Report o f the Appelate Body WT/DS138/ABR of  
10.5.2000, para. 38. Also US support for greater transparency in W TO dispute settlement WT/GC7W/413 
of 11.10.2002 and Rev.l of 13.10.2000.
443 “External Transparency, General Principles” communication from Hong Konu, China WT'GC/W/418
of 31.10.2000.
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international participation. Japan’s limited international political voice led Tokyo to 
elect WTO as the most important forum to build its international influence. The 
similarity with HK strategy shows how far sovereign and non-sovereign members may 
share in practice similar constraints in terms of their participation in the international 
system.
As a consequence of this concern with WTO primacy, both HK and Japan converge in 
terms of adopting a critical approach to RTAs as a potential threat to WTO. Recently 
HK adopted a more flexible position but the basic concern remains valid and therefore 
the SAR advocates with Japan and others the need to clarify and tighten up the rules of 
article XXIV of GATT. There is also convergence in relation to services, as both support 
liberalisation and oppose MFN exemptions444.
On the divergence side we find some areas. One is competition in relation to which 
Japan supports the idea of creating multilateral rules of competition and adopts an active 
stand, although more moderate than the EC, while HK opposes any specific measure. 
Divergences exist also in the areas of investment and TRIMS, namely with respect to the 
question of national treatment where HK has a more liberal attitude, and on environment 
where Japan supports the clarification of the relationship between trade and 
environmental rules with a view to ensure the consistency between the two.
The EC
The relationship between HK and the EC in WTO is particularly interesting given the 
similarities as they share two important features. Firstly, both are non-sovereign 
members and so, as noted earlier, exceptional cases in the multilateral trading system. 
This condition creates expectations of closer co-opcration not necessarily in sectoral 
negotiations where positions are dictated by specific interests, but in horizontal matters 
related to the philosophy of the Organisation, its institutional setting and opening up to
444 Council o f Trade in Services, Minutes of Meetings. S C M 30 o f 1 5 . 1 0 . pp.  5-11 S C /M/45 of 
18.8.2000. and S/C/M/54 o f 27.8.2001. pp.1-2.
265
the participation of other non-sovereign actors to prevent an excessive 
govemamentalisation and resolve the “legitimacy gap”445.
Secondly, the EC like HK is a non-typical and unique international actor profoundly 
characterised by its dualism in external relations: in economic and commercial matters, 
“low politics” areas, the EU acts with a single voice in a coherent and cohesive manner 
under the co-ordination of the Commission; in political, security and defence matters, 
“high politics” areas, the EU lacks co-ordination and coherence and is hostage of 
divergent interests of Member States. As a result the EU has a dual and contradictory 
identity as an external actor, being in low politics a robust and credible actor, a 
characteristic HK shares, but a weak and non-robust actor in “high politics” areas.
In this context WTO is a priority forum for the EU, just like for IIK, insofar as it is a 
space where the EU can affirm and consolidate its international identity and project its 
soft power. Moreover, given its overall external relations framework, the EU tends to 
adopt a political neutral approach and resist any trend of politicisation of WTO, 
considering that it is, and should remain, a strict economic forum446.
This common ground is a structural aspect that influences the EC-HK relationship. 
However it is not the only one. The unique historical ties between HK and the EC, with 
no parallel with any other major player, is a second structural factor. In fact since 1971 
and until 1986 HK has participated in the GATT integrated in the EC delegation and 
consolidated its own identity in the multilateral trading system by marking the 
difference with the EC. As a consequence, historically relations between HK and the EC 
were tense and problematic, almost as a “family row”, and this contributed to keep the 
two members apart for long periods. The relationship improved in recent years447, partly
445 Rubens Ricupero, “Rebuilding confidence in the multilateral trading system: closing the “legitimacy 
gap”” in Gary Sampson (ed), The role of the World Trade Organisation in Global Governance. United 
Nations University Press, New York, 2001, pp. 37-58.
446 Interview with Carlo Trojan, F.C Representative to WTO, Head of the Commission's Office in Geneva, 
on 19.11.2002.
447 This was recognised both by Stuart llarbinson, former UK Permanent Representative, and by Carlo 
Trojan, TC Permanent Representative, in the interviews held on 20.11.2002 and 19.11.2002 respectively.
as a result of HK’s sound and moderate positions and partly as a consequence of the 
handover.
There is a convergence between HK and the EC on a number of areas, particularly in 
services (both support liberalisation although with some divergences in relation to the 
audio-visual sector in relation to which the EC is more protectionist and MFN 
exemptions) in trade facilitation (supporting simplification and transparency of trade 
regimes and administrative procedures) and in government procurement and 
transparency. There is also convergence on some aspect of institutional matters, 
particularly on the election of the Director General and the role and preparation of 
Ministerial Conferences.
In contrast, there are important areas of divergence. The most significant one is 
competition policy in relation to which HK rejects the foundations of such a policy, a 
position strongly criticised by the EC. Furthermore, the traditional areas of divergence 
remain, such as textiles, tariffs and RTAs while new areas emerged, namely on 
investment, environment and some aspects of the institutional format, mainly in relation 
to the external transparency issue supported by the EC but opposed by HK.
The question of external transparency is particularly relevant in the analysis of the EU- 
HK relationship. The central question is whether WTO should open up to the 
participation of NGOs and other actors, or should be kept closed. Being two non­
sovereign members, one would expect they could develop a special relationship in 
systemic matters and converge in opposing a state-centred perspective, as their interests 
would lay in greater participation of other non-sovereign actors likely to dilute the 
sovereignty element and enhance their positions.
Contrary to expectations, HK and the EC adopted divergent positions. Surprisingly, HK 
held a rather conservative position and objectively supported a statist perspective, which
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rejects the idea of opening up the WTO to NGOs’ participation448. There was an 
important debate on external transparency E-Transparency, in the General Council in 
November 2000, where HK opposed the direct participation of NGOs and civil society 
organisations in WTO because of the “risk of politicising the operations of the 
Organisation”449. HK draw a clear distinction between enhancing transparency to civil 
society and making provisions for their direct participation, and considered that the 
adequate level for dialogue with the civil society is the domestic context of each 
Member.
The EC took a different position, closer to the idea of increasing E-Transparency, 
although less affirmative than other OECD countries, like Canada, which proposed 
opening WTO trade policy reviews to external observers450 451, or the US. However, the EC 
recognised that the monopoly of government in setting the international trade agenda no 
longer existed, thus implicitly suggesting this should have implications for the WTO 
operation .
A related question was the debate on the possibility of submission of amicus curiae 
briefs by NGOs in the DSM and their participation in the judicial body of WTO. 
Following the decision of the Appellate Body to admit amicus curiae briefs in the case 
of “EU-Asbestos” (WT/DS 135) and to establish a procedure to consider briefs by 
private individuals or groups, a special meeting of the General Council discussed the 
matter in November 2000452. HK took a position against both the procedure and the 
admission of the briefs, arguing that the admission was a substantive issue and therefore 
the Appellate Body had no competence to decide on this, only members could do so. In 
addition, it rejected the possibility of NGOs involvement in the dispute settlement on the 
basis that this would give non-members more rights than members that are not parties or
448 Steve Chamovitz, Trade Law and Global Governance. Cameron May, London, 2002, pp. 516-529. The 
author contrasts this statist view with the individualist perspective as the two sides o f  the debate.
449 WTO: External Transparency -  General principles, communication from I IK. China Doc.
WT/GC/W/418 of 31.10.2000, p.2.
450 WTO External Transparency, Informal paper by Canada, doc. WT/GC/W/415 o f 17.10.2000,pp.l-2.
451 Pascal Lawy, Speech on “WTO Challenges confronting the world trade system today", in European 
Foreiim Affairs Review Nov 8. 2000.
442 WTO General Council. Minutes of Meetings. VVT GC/M 60 of 23.1.2001.
third parties to the dispute at the same time this would “create an impossible burden on 
developing countries members” who could not respond to large number of briefs 
submitted because of time and resources constraints, putting them at a disadvantage453. 
On this question HK expressed a similar position to developing countries, namely 
Brazil, India and Egypt.
In contrast, the EU although conceding that the decision had to be made by Members, 
clearly stated that a re-negotiation of the DSU agreement was needed to change the rules 
given that “...a civil society had a clear interest in some issues relating to the work of 
WTO and in particular to that of the Dispute Settlement Body...”454. The EU favoured 
the admission of briefs together with Canada, the US, the most active supporter of this 
change since 1999. This constitutes a change in the EC position. In fact, in 1999 the EC 
coincided with HK’s position and opposed the admission of briefs by the Appellate 
Body in the US-Carbon Steel case, considering NGOs intervention as “inadmissible” 
and contrary to WTO rules455. The Asbestos case marked the turning point as the EC, 
against whom the complaint was made, changed its mind and submitted two briefs 
attached to its submission to the Panel.
HK’s current conservative position and objective support to the “statist perspective” is in 
striking contrast with HK’s earlier positions. Long passed are the days when HK dared 
to propose London that a member of HK industry should attend GATT negotiations 
together with a HK official. As time went by and HK consolidated its position as a full 
member of GATT/WTO, it seems to have lost the will to push for changes and be at the 
forefront of institutional innovation. Somehow, we can argue that HK has been infected 
by the “sovereignty logic”, accepting to be an exception and unique actor in an 
organisation dominated by states, rather than attempting to subvert that logic and 
promote the extension of its own status to other non-sovereign players, including NCGs 
and NGOs.
453 WTO General Council, Minutes o f Meetings, WT/GC/M 60 of 23.1.2001, pp. 5-7.
454 Ibidem, pp. 24-26
453 WTO, Report o f the Appelate Body, WT DS/138/AB R para.36
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On NCGs there is an interesting discussion in WTO on trade rules implementation in the 
context of Federal States. On this the EC and HK share the same position: that WTO 
rules bind not only Central Federal Governments but also sub-national governments, 
federated states, otherwise WTO rules could be easily circumvented. The question of 
subsidies is one of the concerns because subsidies granted by a NCG to firms, although 
less visible, violate exactly in the same way WTO rules as subsidies granted by the 
Central Government. Recently in the debate on transparency and government 
procurement, HK, together with the EC, Norway, Malaysia and Switzerland, argued that 
rules of transparency should apply not only to Central levels of Government but also to 
sub-national levels otherwise a considerable part of government procurement would 
escape the rules. An opposite view was expressed by Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, India 
and Egypt that considered the scope of the agreement should be limited to federal 
governments thus allowing for more flexibility456.
One can understand that sovereign states, particularly developing countries, have 
resisted NGO participation because they fear this can weaken their position, not only 
because national NGOs can challenge the coherence and unitary nature of the state 
position, but above all, as putted by Brazil, because the change would further strengthen 
the position of strong states whose NGOs are better funded and more able to exert 
influence, thus widening the gap between weak states with weak NGOs and strong states 
with strong NGOs457.
However, the factors that account for the paradox associated with HK’s support to the 
statist view are certainly different and less obvious. I would argue that there are three 
different reasons behind HK’s option. Firstly, resistance to change. If HK has done well 
in the current system of a closed WTO, there is no pressure to change which necessarily 
involves uncertainty and risks. Secondly, HK fears that opening WTO will negatively 
affect and diminish its role as a bridge builder as the negotiation process would become
456 Working Group on Transparency and Government Procurement, Minutes o f Meetings, 
WT/WGTGP/M/10 of 1.8.2002 pp. 4-5.
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more complex and above all more politicised, thus creating constraints to UK’s 
participation.
Thirdly, and probably the most important reason, there is a reaction of the elite 
bureaucracy that has controlled HK’s external participation since the 1960s, which fears 
that the participation of HK NGOs, even business associations or professional groups, 
would challenge its monopoly and weaken its power basis.
Being two major players in WTO the EC and HK maintain relevant and intense 
relations. However, contrary to expectations and despite historical links, HK has not a 
special relationship with the EC457 58, even in areas where their common non-sovereign 
nature would suggest a greater articulation of positions would be possible. In other 
words, HK relates to the EC in the same way it relates to other major players such as 
Japan or the US.
In sum, the analysis of the pattern of relations between HK and major players leads us to 
reach two important conclusions. Firstly, bilateral relations reveal a common pattern: 
HK has both points of convergence and divergence with each one of the three actors, in 
different matters.
Secondly, because of this pattern HK is not aligned with any of the major players in 
WTO, on the contrary follows a “variable geometry” approach which contributes to 
consolidate its image as an independent player. This explains why HK is sometimes 
called upon to play a broker role between some of these major players, such as recently 
between the US and the EC in the context of the negotiations on Agriculture.
457 WTO, General Council, Minutes of Meetings, WT/GC/M/GO, pp.l M 2 . Interesting enough Brazil's 
v.ew seems to confirm Keohane and Nye argument on the co-operative relations between states and non­
state actors mentioned in chapter one.
458 Interviews with Carlo Trojan. 19.11.2002, and the Geneva I IK ETO officials on 18.11.2002.
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The argument put forward is that this substantive autonomy in relation to the three major 
players is as important as the autonomy in relation to the sovereign power for the 
affirmation and sustainability of HK’s identity, credibility and influence in WTO.
5.4. HK’S AUTONOMY AND CHINA’S ACCESSION
The main challenge for HK’s autonomy and its sustainability in WTO has not been the 
handover as expected but is, and will be, China’s accession to the Organisation.
The handover impact
The impact of 1997 on HK’s status and participation has been minimal. Besides a few 
formal changes such as the name, changed to HK,China, there was by and large 
continuity in terms of policy and even personnel. The best symbol was the fact that an 
expatriate, Stuart Harbinson, remained until 2002 the HKSAR representative, a strong 
sign of continuity that reinforced the confidence of, and reassured other WTO members.
It is true that in the first months after July 1997 there was some scepticism about HK’s 
capacity to remain autonomous and freely determine its trade policy. WTO members 
kept HK under close scrutiny, looking for signs of China’s interference, i.e. co­
ordination with the PRC mission in Geneva or a change in HK’s positions in WTO. As 
time went by, and in the absence of hard evidence, the suspicions started to dissipate and 
gradually WTO members began to believe that “one country, two systems” was really 
working.
This probation period lasted for some time. The key moment that marked the end of this 
transition was the Third Trade Policy Review, in December 1998, when WTO members 
collectively recognised that there were no changes in HK trade policy and that HK was
effectively autonomous in its definition, as clearly stated in the statements of the “Quad” 
members and several developing countries459.
This overall picture of continuity does not mean there were no changes at all. Changes 
did occur in HK’s attitude and strategy although they were less visible. As a result of the 
handover and because of the initial scepticism of other WTO members, UK felt, more 
than ever, a greater pressure to constantly demonstrate that its autonomy remained 
untouched and it was in control of decisions and could pursue its own interests. This 
produced two side effects.
Firstly, the intensification of HK’s participation in WTO recognised as the anchor of its 
autonomy and international identity, namely through a greater investment in its bridge 
builder role also facilitated by the launching of a new round of trade negotiations.
Secondly, and paradoxically, the reduction of its participation in other UN bodies, in 
particular UNCTAD and the World Health Organisation. This is an interesting process 
by which the affirmation and preservation of HK’s autonomy in WTO in the post-1997 
circumstances was made at the expense of its participation in other international 
organisations.
In fact, after 1997 HK has avoided as much as possible participating in meetings of UN 
bodies where it participates integrated in the Chinese delegation460. This is explained 
because of the concern that the sharp contrast between WTO, where it has a separate 
identity and enjoys ample autonomy, and other organisations, might undermine its 
autonomy in WTO insofar as this dualist status is not only embarrassing but can also 
confuse other WTO members and fuel misperceptions. The risk is even greater in
459 WTO, HKC TPR 1998, WT/TPR/S/52. The Chairperson summarised WTO members’ assessment 
“ ...there is no indication that HK’s traditional openess to trade and foreign investment has been affected 
by reunification and as such the present economic regime may be broadly characterised as business as 
usual” (p.xix). The US statement went as far as to recognise that “the concerns prior to the handover that 
the system of openess, predictability and transparency might be compromised had proved to be 
groundless" (p.153). In the same line, the EU, Japan and Canada praised 1 IK for the continuity of its trade 
policy and several developing countries, like India and Turkey expressed similar view s (pp.155-159).
400 This phenomenon w as pointed to me by Geneva HK ETO officials, interview' on 1 S. 11.2002.
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Geneva because in general the same diplomats cover simultaneously WTO and other 
UN economic organisations. In other words, HK has been concerned to avoid that its 
lack of autonomy in intergovernmental organisations restricted to states could “infect” 
its status in WTO and undermine its autonomy and credibility.
The decline of HK’s participation in UNCTAD, an organisation with close links with 
WTO where HK used to be active, is probably the best example and represents a clear 
cost HK had to pay in order to preserve its autonomy and image in WTO. This clearly 
demonstrates that HK has been faced with trade-offs between quantitative and 
qualitative participation and tended to resolve them in favour of quality and at the 
expense of quantity.
China’s accession to WTO
More than the handover it is China’s accession to WTO in December 2001, after 15 
years of hard negotiations, that creates the most important challenges for the SAR’s 
autonomy in WTO. We will see then what challenges the interaction with China might 
generate for HK’s substantive autonomy in WTO.
Since December 2001 there is a completely new and unprecedented situation for HK. In 
fact for the first time ever HK has to interact with the sovereign power in WTO as a full 
member and equal partner. It should be recalled that as a consequence of Britain’s 
accession to the EEC in 1972, the UK did not have a separate voice and an autonomous 
participation in GATT, which meant that HK never had to deal directly with the conflict 
of interests and divergences with the sovereign power. Moreover, the dilution of the UK 
in the EC delegation was one of the crucial factors behind the affirmation of HK’s own 
identity and autonomy in GATT as argued earlier. After 1997, because the PRC was not 
yet a member of WTO there was no change in the situation. The absence of the 
sovereign power for more than 30 years has been an exceptional circumstance which has 
undoubtedly made life easier for HK and facilitated the consolidation of its autonomy.
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This has now changed and the context in which the HKSAR has to operate is 
substantially different and more complex. The complexity is further aggravated if we 
add another factor, the importation into WTO of the political confrontation concerning 
China’s reunification as a consequence of Taiwan’s accession in January 2002. Taiwan 
adopted a strategy of open confrontation with the PRC to affirm its political separation 
and tried to use WTO as an entry point to other UN organisations, namely WHO, and 
expand its international status.
The HK-China interaction in WTO will be a crucial test to the robustness of HK’s 
autonomy and demonstrates that challenges to autonomy do not arise solely from 
deliberate actions and violation of rules in the context of the HK-PRC relationship, but 
might result from factors related to the mere HK-China interaction in the international 
system, beyond their control, which can affect autonomy even though autonomy rules 
are respected.
HK has been very careful to show independence whenever possible and to exercise its 
autonomy by adopting positions different from China. This concern has existed since the 
handover and during the last phase of China’s accession negotiations. It partly explains 
the fact that, contrary to expectations, HK did not play a direct and active role in China’s 
accession, either providing advice to the PRC or supporting actively China’s bid inside 
WTO461, clearly showing it did not want to be seen as an instrument of China’s policy. 
The other key reason was the fact China did not request support, despite HK’s solid 
know-how and experience of WTO, given the tensions and suspicions in relation to HK 
and Governor Patten in the last phase of the pre-handover period462.
However, I would argue that despite this apparent no role, HK did play an indirect role 
in China’s accession although it was not the result of any deliberate action. The fact 
China has respected HK’s autonomy status and the JD has certainly created confidence
461 This was confirmed by the former IIK Secretary for Trade and Industry, Chau Tak hay, interview on 
18.12.2001 and by Stuart Harbinson, interview on 20.11.2002.
in WTO members and proved China could be a responsible member of the international 
community. So, the post-handover SAR experience has been a good test of China’s 
ability to comply to its international obligations and contributed to China’s credibility 
indirectly facilitating the approval of the PRC’s accession462 63.
The experience of interaction between the SAR and China in WTO is very recent and so 
it is too early to reach conclusions about its impact on HK’s autonomy. Nevertheless, so 
far there were no signs of major constraints to the SAR autonomy. The coexistence and 
interaction between HK and the sovereign power has been useful to demonstrate in 
practice that they have both differences and common positions in different areas and, 
above all, that their trade and economic interests are not coincident.
In fact, as far as the positions of HK and China on the key issues are concerned, there 
are three different situations. Firstly, areas of convergence, particularly textiles and anti­
dumping issues. Secondly, grey areas of indefinition where China is still in the process 
of decision and has not yet taken a definitive position, like investment or competition, 
and therefore it is impossible to know whether HK and the PRC positions diverge or 
converge. Thirdly, areas of divergence particularly on industrial tariffs and services, 
where China is less liberal, and interestingly in some institutional issues. One case in 
point has been the procedures for appointment of future WTO Director-Generals, 
discussed in late 2002 in the General Council. The first point of disagreement was that 
while China wanted a system of rotation between developed and developing countries to 
the post, HK considers rotation is not the best system because it introduces rigidity and 
can prevent WTO from picking the most able person to run the Organisation. The 
second point of disagreement was on the preferred voting method as a last resort 
solution in case no consensus is reached. China supported a simple majority method 
while HK preferred a system of qualified majority 3A or double majority, on the basis
462 Recently there were signs of change in attitude as China has taken advantage o f  UK's expertise by 
privately hiring retired HK high officials with great expertise o f  WTO like the case o f Chau Tak Hay hired 
by MOFTEC as a consultant in mid-2002.
4(13 The negotiations on China's accession were concluded on 17.9.2001 when the 18lh Meeting o f the 
WTO Working Party on China approved all remaining issues. Later the Doha Ministerial Conference
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that the Director General requires the widest possible support to perform its role and the 
fact the prospect of a simple majority could discourage WTO members from seeking 
consensus in the first place464.
These areas of divergence are of strategic importance for the HKSAR insofar as they are 
a clear demonstration of HK’s own specific identity and substantive autonomy in 
relation to the sovereign power. Moreover, this is the last frontier to HK’s autonomy in 
the sense that the ultimate test to its robustness is exactly whether UK will be able to 
maintain a divergent position dictated by its own substantive interests and oppose 
Beijing’s position, when an issue of fundamental importance for China is at stake.
The short experience of HK-China interaction in WTO also reveals that there have been 
no formal co-ordination meetings or initiatives between the two aimed at building 
common positions, contrary to what some observers could expect465. The dominant 
aspect has been “separation” rather than “co-operation”. HK held only, from time to 
time, informal talks with the PRC, namely on services and anti-dumping, to exchange 
ideas just like with any other WTO member. For HK the priority has been the 
preservation of its separate identity.
The expression of views similar to China on specific issues is not in itself a factor likely 
to weaken autonomy. HK’s position and policy are well known in WTO and asserted 
well before China’s accession. In this context the convergence is likely to be seen as a 
coincidence and not interpreted as an expression of HK’s getting closer to China, if 
anything it will be the opposite, China seen as converging with HK’s long established 
positions. Only in extreme cases where HK would adopt a position similar to the PRC 
but in contradiction with HK’s policy in WTO, could other WTO members perceive the 
change as being induced by China and reflecting an erosion of HK’s autonomy.
ratified on 10 November China's accession to WTO and China signed the Protocol the next day becaminu 
officially a member on December 11, 2001 after 14 years of negotiations.
J<’4 Interview w ith Geneva I IK F.TO officials on 19.11.2002 and 7.3.2003.
Interview with Geneva HK LfiO officials on 19.11.2002.
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From the above account it is possible to conclude that so far UK’s autonomy has not 
been limited by China’s accession. Probably the only exception has been UK’s low 
profile and silence in the monitoring process of China’s compliance with accession 
obligations, which suggests that HK felt practical limitations in criticising directly the 
sovereign power performance466. Even so this had a minor impact because WTO 
members did not expect HK would play a key role and so its silence has been seen as 
understandable467.
In this context it is possible to argue that in some respects China’s accession and 
interaction with HK can have a positive impact on autonomy insofar as it provides an 
excellent opportunity for other WTO members to become more aware and get a more 
vivid picture of the differences between HK and China positions, experiencing first hand 
the practical manifestations of HK’s autonomy.
However, China’s accession and HK-China interaction present also potential risks for 
HK’s autonomy in the long run. There are three main potential constraints.
Firstly, the impact of the Taiwan factor and the limitations HK is likely to face in terms 
of its relations with Taiwan or any issue involving Taiwan in WTO. There are several 
areas of convergence with Taiwan, but HK knows it will have to be very careful given 
the sensitiveness of PRC-Taiwan relations and the politicisation strategy adopted by 
Taiwan inside WTO. In other words, HK will be constrained in its relations with a 
specific WTO member and is not free to have the same kind of relationship it has with 
any other member. Up to now HK has interacted with Taiwan and there have been no 
signs of concern or tension on the part of China. However, a considerable convergence 
of positions with Taiwan in the future would certainly raise Beijing’s eyebrows.
466 There is a limit to silence. If UK keeps permanently silent on China's implementation of obligations 
and does not react if  things go wrong, this might affect UK’s credibility. There is a potential dilemma for 
HK: be passive in order to prevent tensions with China and loose credibility and seen as lackinu 
autonomy; or be more vocal and risk conflicts with the sovereign power.
J<’7 Interview with the EC Representative. Carlo Trojan, on 19.11.2002.
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Secondly, China’s announced strategy to WTO might compete with and reduce UK’s 
“room for manoeuvre”. China defined that the core of its strategy to gain influence in 
WTO is the performance of a broker role between developed and developing countries 
in WTO468. This means China has appropriated part of HK’s agenda and is planning to 
perform exactly the same function HK has been performing for the last two decades in 
WTO. This option, clearly inspired in the SAR experience, implies China is going to be 
a competitor for HK’s space, which might weaken one of the fundamental bases of the 
SAR’s influence, indirectly eroding autonomy. Of course it is still uncertain whether 
China will be able to attain that goal. Initial conditions are not very favourable because 
China is still too engaged and identified with developing countries and therefore lacks at 
present the required impartiality to perform effectively that role. For the moment, HK 
has a strong comparative advantage and is better positioned to play this broker role, but 
conditions might change in the future.
Thirdly, the impact of China’s accession might have also negative indirect implications 
for HK in terms of potentially contributing to limit HK’s participation in the core 
decision-making centre, translated in a decline in HK’s involvement in the “green room” 
mechanism. Because of China’s big trader status, weight and trade engine potential, it is 
already considered to be one of the key players in WTO and is rapidly being integrated 
in the “green room” group as a permanent participant.
The risk for HK is that, because the “green room” is restricted and there is a concern to 
avoid over expansion and representation and keep it within manageable limits, the SAR 
might get less often invited to the “green room” as other members might feel that as 
China is already there HK’s interests are being taken care of409. The possibility that other 
WTO members might play down HK autonomous voice and think it is enough to have 
China in the inner circle, can clearly reduce HK’s role and influence in WTO in the long
468 This goal was mentioned by the PRC Ministry o f Foreign Affairs official, interview on 4 12 2001 
Some statements of PRC Foreign Trade Minister, Shi Guangsheng. pointed out implicitly in that direction 
for example the speech of 10 November 2001 
http://engli.sh.moftec.gov.ca,artic)e/200211/2002 ]] 00050101 l.xml.
4,’y This potential effect was discussed with Stuart Ilarbinson, interview on 20.11.2002, who admitted this 
was a possible scenario which somehow could concern the 1IKSAR.
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run, which in turn will contribute to erode UK’s autonomy and influence at a more 
global level given the significance of WTO for UK’s international status.
Yet, there is a variable that can influence or even reverse this scenario: China’s own 
attitude. If China decides to uphold HK’s autonomy, even for the sake of its 
international image and credibility, and press for HK to continue to be involved in the 
inner circle, then it might sustain the process and prevent other WTO members from 
eroding HK’s autonomy.
This is probably the most important and structural challenge to HK’s autonomy. 
Contrary to expectations it does not derive from any direct deliberate intention or 
deviant behaviour on the part of the PRC to restrict HK’s autonomy, but rather front the 
mere presence and the sheer size and influence of China in the international trade 
system. Interestingly, there would be a potential decline in substantive autonomy 
although formal autonomy remained intact, caused by third countries actions and not by 
the sovereign power.
Finally, there is a potential risk factor outside WTO, which can have a significant impact 
on HK’s autonomy in WTO, related to the process of economic integration between HK 
and the PRC. This process received a major impulse with the presentation of a proposal 
in late 2001 for the creation of a Free Trade Area between IIK and the Mainland, known 
as the “Mainland-Kong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement” (CEPA).
This was an initiative of HK’s business sector, which was then formally presented by the 
HKSAR Government to the CPG in Beijing. Consultations started in early 2002 and it is 
already clear that the FTA arrangement will be comprehensive covering trade in goods, 
trade in services and trade and investment facilitation470. It should be noted that the 
engagement of HK in FTA negotiations with China and also with New Zealand,
47,1 HKSAR Report to the 2002 1 PR. WTO, WT/TPR'G 109pp. 11-12.
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represents the most important change in HK’s trade policy since the handover, translated 
in a more flexible and open-minded attitude in relation to RTAs471.
The negotiation and eventual signature of an agreement with China can be seen as 
strengthening the exercise of formal autonomy powers. However, an opposite effect can 
also be produced. In fact, the risk for HK is that this closer economic integration raises 
doubts in WTO members’ minds about the effective degree of autonomy enjoyed by HK 
in defining its trade policy. The problem is twofold. Firstly, this might be seen as 
potentially calling into question HK’s status as a separate customs territory, the 
substantive basis for its separate membership of WTO. Secondly, if the FTA induces an 
even greater dependence of HK on China’s market and reduces the level of 
diversification of HK’s economic relations leading potentially to a decline of 
international ties472, there will be a perception that HK’s substantive autonomy is 
inevitably affected. So, the way HK manages the CEPA process and balances tics with 
China with international ties, is critical to see whether HK’s autonomy status in WTO 
will be eroded or not.
In sum, this chapter addressed HK’s participation in WTO where HK enjoys a very 
special status being the only NCG, together with the MSAR, that is a member of the 
Organisation. Four fundamental conclusions emerge from this analysis.
Firstly, HK’s lack of sovereignty, despite the formal equality with sovereign WTO 
members, implies some vulnerabilities and practical limitations to HK’s participation, 
namely its de-politicisation. HK responded with two different but complementary 
strategies: developed a dual identity which enable HK to become a systemic bridge 
builder between states helping to create common ground and moderate conflicts;
471 WTO, 2002 TPR, HK, China, WT/TPR/G/109 p.l 1, para 41. The first FTA process in which UK got 
involved was with New Zealand whose negotiations started in May 2001.
472 Some observers have criticised HK's strategy of closer integration considering that I IK is not becominu 
a “w'orld city” as the Chief Executive announced but risking of becoming another Chinese city. Gordon 
Chang argued that closer integration is a “loser's game for IIK” Far Eastern Economic Review, 30.1.2001. 
The US has also expressed concerns through the statements of the former US Consul General, Michael 
Klosson, speech at the American Chamber of Commerce of 6.6.2002 (www.
usconsulate.org.hk/cg'2002 060601 .htni.
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unconditional pro-system stand, being the most active supporter of the primacy of WTO 
and multilateral rules, which generated widespread recognition and prestige.
The performance of these two roles was not automatic or cost free, HK had to mobilise 
resources and people to do that, which generated trade-offs between the performance of 
public interest functions and the pursuance of its own interests. Furthermore, the 
performance of these public interest functions is an important element of UK’s 
legitimacy basis as an international player.
Secondly, HK is an influential member of WTO. For that is has used its economic power 
and big trader status but also a sophisticated combination of other sources of influence 
which include technical expertise, the access to the informal “green room” core 
decision-making circle, rigorous compliance and enforcement of multilateral rules and 
most importantly, the performance of a systemic bridge builder role between developed 
and developing members.
Thirdly, the existence of a “variable geometry” matrix of positions and the non- 
alignment with major players is a crucial ingredient to upheld HK’s autonomy and 
preserve its image of neutrality. In this context it seems that the preservation of 
substantive autonomy requires not only autonomy in relation to the sovereign power, but 
also autonomy in relation to dominant actors in the international system.
Fouthly, the major challenge to HK’s autonomy in WTO is China’s accession and not 
the 1997 handover, which did not bring about any significant change. Historically, the 
consolidation of HK’s autonomy and robust status in GATT and WTO were greatly 
facilitated by the absence of the sovereign power as an autonomous player. China’s 
accession changed the context and created an unprecedented situation where the SAR 
has to interact directly with the sovereign power and carefully address their mutual 
differences. The most significant potential risk for HK’s autonomy in WTO is associated 
with the possibility of HK’s gradual and invisible exclusion from the inner circle of
2 S2
decision-making, an outcome which does not result from China’s purposeful action but 
rather from China’s sheer size and influence and the own dynamics of the WTO process.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE HONG KONG CASE AND NCGs IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
SYSTEM: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF
RESEARCH RESULTS
This chapter is concerned with the discussion of the research results and evidence 
provided by the case of HK trying to contrast them with the experience of other NCGs 
analysed in the literature. This comparative perspective allow us to better capture the 
significance of the HK case to understand the role of NCGs in the international system, 
namely whether it is an exceptional case marked by unique circumstances which can not 
be replicated or, on the contrary, provides elements to understand the dynamics and 
implications of a wider phenomenon.
The analysis focus on five main aspects: (i) the genesis of the process of emergence as 
international autonomous players and the factors that facilitated it (ii) the 
institutionalisation of external relations; (iii) the pattern of relations with the Central 
Government (iv) the attitude of the international community and the legitimacy basis of 
NCGs international activities; (v) the impact of their action on the international system 
and implications for their future role as international players in the context of 
globalisation.
6.1. ORIGINS AND FACILITATING FACTORS OF NCGs’ EMERGENCE AS 
INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS
As far as the origins of the process of NCGs participation in the international system arc 
concerned, the HK case is clearly a relevant one insofar it is a pioneer among NCGs. 
UK’s external activities started in the early 1960s being the critical benchmark the May
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1961 London negotiations with the US on textile exports restrictions. This was followed 
by a series of bilateral negotiations with various OECD countries regarding voluntary 
restrictions of cotton textiles exports and the signature of bilateral agreements under the 
Long Term Textile Arrangement, as analysed in chapter two.
However, HK was not the only pioneer, there is an interesting parallel with another 
NCG, Quebec, which started also to be active internationally around the early 1960s, 
following the famous 1960 meeting with De Gaulle, marking the start of a special 
relationship with France and the subsequent creation of representative offices in Paris 
(1961) and London (1962). Yet, these were exceptions because the majority of NCGs 
started to be internationally active in the late 1970s and 1980s with the acceleration of 
the phenomenon of economic interdependence and globalisation. In the cases of 
Catalonia and Greenland there was also an important political change in the late 1970s 
critical to explain the beginning of their international activities, the granting of domestic 
autonomy status: the 1979 “Estatut de Autonomia” of Catalonia473, a consequence of the 
Spanish transition to democracy; the 1979 Home Rule Act by which Denmark granted 
autonomy to Greenland and changed the status of the colony.
As far as the origins of the emergence of NCGs as international players are concerned, 
the HK case is consistent with the analysis carried out on the causes of paradiplomacy, 
associated with the process of globalisation and the interplay between two processes 
“from within out” and “from without in”, combining external and internal factors.
In the case of HK the critical factor was a major conflict of interests with Britain on 
trade combined with the emergence at the international level of protectionism against 
textiles on the part of major OECD importers. In this context Britain had no conditions 
to defend HK interests against arbitrary measures adopted by third countries. This 
combination of internal and external factors led HK to go international, in order to 
defend its textile industry and ensure the survival of its economy.
4,5 The statute of autonomy was approv ed by l ei Organica 4'1079 of 18 December.
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Yet, because HK was motivated exclusively by economic objectives, it distances itself 
from other NCGs, such as Catalonia or Quebec, for whom political factors and the 
affirmation of specific cultural identities were the main driving force.
On the economic front, HK confirms the importance of globalisation as a causal factor 
of paradiplomacy but introduces a new perspective. While in general the literature sees 
paradiplomacy as a defensive response of NCGs to minimise potential negative effects 
of globalisation, the HK case shows there is another side where paradiplomacy results 
from a more proactive strategy in the context of which NCGs take advantage of 
opportunities.
This is associated with the process of regional clustering and the creation of SMEs 
clusters. Globalisation of economic activity has coexisted with an apparently competing 
tendency, the localisation of industries and comparative advantages474. HK has 
supported the emergence of sectoral clusters475 (like other NCGs such as Baddcn- 
Wurttemberg, Catalonia or Emilia Romagna), which are a major basis of UK’s 
economic power and competitiveness in the global economy. In this context 
paradiplomacy becomes a complementary instrument of the development of clusters and 
affirmation of their competitiveness in the global economy. It is no coincidence that the 
most active NCGs correspond to the most prosperous regional clusters, showing that 
NCGs are placed at the intersection between globalisation and localisation.
Furthermore, the HK case reveals the importance of an historical factor that has been 
neglected in the literature but is important to understand the emergence of 
paradiplomacy, in particular why it was tolerated by some Central Governments. This 
factor is the historical precedent of the British Dominions which after WWI, and until 
independence in 1931, gained limited autonomy in the sphere of foreign affairs, as
474 OECD , Enhancing SME Competitiveness -  the OECD Bologna Ministerial Conference 2001. 
Background paper for workshop 2, Michael Enright and others, pp. 115-150. One of the fundamental 
explanations of the importance of localisation is that, unlike information, knowledge and innovation 
requires face-to-face interaction and geographical proximity. Globalisation made information diffusion at 
long distances easier and cheaper, but did not change the nature of the diffusion o f know ledge which is the 
basis o f  innovation, in turn the key factor of competitiveness.
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mentioned in chapter two. These were the first cases of non-sovereign public entities 
that were allowed to act in the international system. This precedent is extremely 
important to understand why London tolerated and did not react strongly against UK’s 
de facto international participation in the early 1960s and why Britain granted infonnally 
powers for HK to negotiate and sign commercial agreements on its own in 1969.
I would go further and argue that the Dominions precedent was also important to explain 
the paradiplomacy of other NCGs, in particular the cases of the Australian States and the 
Canadian provinces, since Australia and Canada were exactly former Dominions. This 
effect was certainly important in the emergence of Quebec in the international system 
insofar as Ottawa demonstrated some flexibility and tolerated the creation of 
autonomous representative offices from 1961 onwards and a closer relationship with 
France, including the signature of the 1965 Franco-Quebec cooperation agreement on 
education475 76. This would not have been possible in the absence of such a precedent.
There is an interesting commonality between HK and the Quebec, the two pioneers, in 
the sense that for both the beginning of their direct participation in the international 
system was clearly facilitated by the Dominions precedent. In other words, I would 
argue that the British de-colonisation policy is a crucial factor in the emergence of the 
phenomenon of paradiplomacy and paved the way for NCGs international participation 
by introducing an element of flexibility in the international system. Britain helped to set 
these new rules that allowed non-sovereign governments to act internationally. 
Furthermore, because Britain was then a big power and a dominant player the rules were 
not disputed and got accepted by the international community.
However, the analysis of the emergence of HK as an international player reveals also 
interesting differences with the majority of NCGs in three different respects.
475 Enrieht et all., The Hone Kong Advantage. Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, pp. 95-107.
476 The importance of the Dominions precedent in relation to Quebec is recognised by Jean Cloutier. "I.e 
Quebec a l'etranger” in L'Action Nationale vol 85 -  n 8. Oct 1995, pp. 204-205.
Firstly, the genesis and consolidation of the process of HK’s participation in the 
international system was led and implemented by the HK elite bureaucracy starting with 
the seminal contribution of John Cowperthwaite. As argued in chapter two, in the 
beginning the bureaucracy responded to the pressure of the business community but later 
it took external affairs in its own hands as an autonomous project and an instrument to 
consolidate and legitimise its power.
This critical role played by the bureaucracy has no parallel among NCGs. In the vast 
majority of cases paradiplomacy was launched and led by politicians and the political 
elite of specific regions, either the Prime Ministers of Quebec, the President of the 
Generalitat of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol or the former Premier of Greenland Home Rule 
Government, Johnathan Motzfeld. The absence of elected politicians and a political elite 
in HK until the late 1980s accounts to some extent to the specificity of HK’s experience. 
In any case the hypothesis that paradiplomacy is strongly associated with democratic 
states and presupposes the existence of elected local politicians is only partially 
challenged by the HK case. In fact, although HK’s emergence as an international player 
was not led by democratically elected politicians there was still a democratic element 
insofar the sovereign power, Britain, was itself a democracy.
In this context, the HK case suggests that the bureaucracy can be more innovative and 
less conservative than generally believed, thus questioning some of the assumptions of 
the “bureaucratic politics” model. Moreover it proves that bureaucracy is not an unitary 
actor, relations between different levels of bureaucracy within the state, namely the 
divergence of interests between central and local bureaucracies, have to be looked at in 
order to understand the process of foreign policy and its articulation with paradiplomacy.
In addition, although the experience of other NCGs highlights the importance of the 
“personalisation” of external affairs and the leading role of politicians that give a face to 
it internationally, the HK case shows that in order to be a robust and effective 
international player, the role of local politicians might not be sufficient. The existence of 
a dynamic and competent bureaucracy is also a key condition for success, not only
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because of the direct support it provides to politicians, but also because of the strategic 
ties it creates with central bureaucracies of foreign states. In other words, the HK case 
points to the need to have a right mix between “personalisation” and 
“institutionalisation” of external affairs. Although during the transition period HK 
achieved a good balance between the two, the irony is that in the post-handover period 
the balance was broken as the “personalisation” dimension has declined and HK started 
experiencing the negative effects of not having a strong face to represent and speak for it 
internationally. The challenge for HK now is to try and re-establish that balance.
Secondly, from the outset HK’s paradiplomacy has been almost exclusively 
concentrated in relations with foreign states in distant continents. As a consequence HK 
practised “global paradiplomacy” and relations with other NCGs have been, and still are, 
marginal. This contrasts with the great majority of NCGs which started by developing 
“transborder regional paradiplomacy” involving relations with other NCGs from 
neighbour countries and later evolved into “transregional paradiplomacy”, with NCGs 
from distant countries. By and large this is still the dominant dimension of their external 
relations, eventhough in some cases elements of “global paradiplomacy” and relations 
with states have also emerged.
For example, Catalonia started by cultivating relations across the border with the French 
regions of Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrennees, which has resulted in the creation 
of the Euroregion Catalonia/Languedoc-Roussillon/Midi-Pyrenees and later expanded its 
relations to other NCGs in Latin America, US, Eastern Europe and Asia. Of the total 
bilateral agreements signed by Catalonia with public foreign entities between 1983- 
1999, 82% were signed with other NCGs and only 18% with states477. Greenland has 
also strong links with a limited number of NCGs, concentrated in Nordic countries and 
Canada (Quebec, and Northwest Territories) and a few bilateral agreements with 3 
states, Canada, Russia, and Norway restricted to the fishing sector. Quebec is a slightly
477 Interview w ith the Director General for Relacions Exteriors of the Government of Catalonia, Joaquim 
Limona, on 22.11.1999. Between 1983-99 there were 44 agreements signed with other NCGs such as 
Quebec, Badden-Württemberg. Province of Buenos Aires, states o f California, Massacluisscts. f  lorida and
different case as it has a greater balance between transregional and global 
paradiplomacy. Quebec’s paradiplomacy was built on the relationship with a single 
state, France, which is still today the first pillar of its international strategy, and later 
with the Francophone states. In parallel the Quebec has developed an extensive network 
of relations with other NCGs which until the mid-1990s accounted for around 50% of 
Quebec’s bilateral agreements478.
In contrast, HK has not explored so far, with the exception of some US states, the 
horizontal paradiplomacy, i.e. relations with other NCGs. This is undoubtedly a deficit 
area and constitutes an interesting opportunity for the HKSAR to further develop its 
external relations for two reasons. On the one hand, it provides an opportunity for UK to 
strengthen its position in the globalisation process given the fact that many of these 
NCGs are powerful economic actors and represent the interests of some of the most 
dynamic clusters in the global economy. On the other, this is an opportunity for HK to 
add value to China’s foreign policy and be more relevant to national objectives.
Thirdly, the dominant and critical instrument in the genetics of HK’s international 
participation has been the exercise of “treaty making powers” which has simultaneously 
contributed to build HK’s international personality. The experience of other NCGs is in 
general different. The jus tractatum has been the least accessible and more problematic 
instrument. The Quebec started to affirm its external autonomy by creating external 
representations in the early 1960s. The exercise of treaty making powers was seriously 
restricted. Even the most important international agreement signed by Quebec, the 1965 
Franco-Quebec education agreement, was an exception for many years and led Ottawa 
to dilute its significance by signing an “umbrella agreement” with France to cover 
Quebec-France relations479. Similarly, the creation and action of representative offices, 
economic and trade offices, was also the critical instrument for the emergence and
Illinois and various French regions, and only 9 agreements with 7 states, Israel, Japan Mexico Tehee), 
Republic, Tunisia, Marroco and Argentina.
"  Ministry o f  International Relations o f  Quebec, - U  Quebec elans u„ ensemble i,„„national en 
mutation- plan strategique 2001-2004
^  Belanger, T. “ La politique etrangere quehccoise" in Alain Gagnon (ed) Ouehee -  ro.u W i l .fn 
Editions Quebec, Quebec. 1994. pp. 255-281. U ^ ------- K U-lL--
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consolidation of Catalonia’s international participation, with its COPCA offices4*0 on the 
basis of a strong partnership between the Government and the business sector, as well as 
for Greenland with the offices in Ottawa and Brussels.
HK’s experience of a relatively intense and continuous exercise of treaty making 
powers, initially in external commercial matters and later in areas such as legal and 
juridical matters, has a major implication insofar as it contributed to build a dense 
international personality involving a large and diversified set of international rights and 
obligations, a crucial pillar of a robust international status. In contrast, many NCGs still 
have a precarious and fragile international personality480 81.
6.2. INSTITUTIONALISATION OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
For the large majority of NCGs the early stages of international participation is a non- 
structured, open-ended process where there is neither a specific institutional structure to 
deal with, nor a strategy for external relations. HK was not an exception and so its 
international participation was initially based on “ad hoc” initiatives that lacked 
coherence. In a second phase there was an effort to promote the institutionalisation of 
external relations by defining some rules and procedures and creating permanent 
instruments like external representations. The dominant feature of this fragile 
institutional system to deal with external relations is its decentralised nature, reflecting 
the circumstance that various government departments in different areas develop 
external actions according to their specific needs, and the absence of any co-ordination 
body.
480 In 2000 Catalonia had a total of 33 offices o f the Consorci de Promocio Comercial de Catalunya 
(COPCA) in all continents, the majority in Europe (14) and Asia (9), including one in I IK and another in 
Beijing. The COPCA is a partnership between the Generalität of Catalonia, the Chambers o f Commerce, 
Industria y Navigacion de Catalunya and sectoral industrial and exporters associations -  interview with 
Joaquim Limona on 22.11.1999.
481 The precarious nature of Quebec's international personality was openly recognised by the former 
Minister o f International Affairs. Bernard Laundry, one of the main architects of Quebec's external 
relations, in his speech of 12.10.1995 “ La personable internationale du Quebec: bilan et perspectives" 
Ministry of International Relations, Quebec (no reference).
In HK the system has been largely decentralised involving an active intervention of three 
main bodies: the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Secretary for Trade 
and Industry. From the late 1980s onwards the Governor also became increasingly active 
in external affairs. This was also the dominant model for other NCGs like Quebec and 
Catalonia which had decentralised systems. However, they introduced earlier than HK, 
changes in the system in the direction of a more centralised model, which could ensure 
greater coordination of external activities. The Quebec created in 1985 the Ministry of 
International Relations in an attempt to improve coordination and structure a policy, but 
in spite of these efforts, coordination is considered to be poor482. Catalonia has also 
created in 1997 a Directorate General for External Relations under the Presidency of the 
Government with exactly the same objectives of attaining greater co-ordination and 
coherence in external action.
This trend has manifested itself in HK more recently with the new CAB competencies, 
but as argued earlier, coordination is rather limited, with the focus put on “negative” co­
ordination and with a predominantly internal orientation. This leads to the conclusion 
that the system remains in essence decentralised with some attempts to introduce 
elements of central co-ordination.
This demonstrates how far NCGs are concerned with the costs of the lack of co­
ordination and coherence of their external action. Consequently, they are trying to 
respond to the pressures for greater coherence, brought about by the increasing 
complexity of the international system in the globalisation era. It is true that sovereign 
states are also struggling with similar difficulties. However, I would argue that because 
of its non-sovereign nature, the lack of coherence in external action is more costly and 
problematic for NCGs than for states because the former have no formal legal basis to 
legitimise their international participation and therefore have to conquest that legitimacy 
by proving their capacity and effectiveness.
4!i~ Luc Bernier De Paris a Washington -  la politique internationale du Quebec. Presses tie I'Universite ilu 
Quebec. 1996. p. 28
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The analysis of the HK case reveals also an important difference in the institutional 
system. In general NCGs have created a specialised bureaucracy to deal with external 
affairs, a diplomatic corps, thus importing the conventional state model. In contrast, HK 
does not have a specialised body of diplomats as the management of external relations is 
carried out by the generalist bureaucratic elite, according to a rotation between 
performance of external representation posts followed by domestic posts and vice-versa. 
This enabled HK to enjoy several benefits: (i) ensure greater coherence between the 
external and domestic plans because those who lead government departments have 
international experience and those posted abroad know the technical dossiers and 
domestic priorities (ii) have a group of international negotiators and representatives with 
a greater technical expertise than traditional diplomats which has been instrumental for 
HK to assert its influence, (iii) reduce the level of conflicts between sectoral departments 
that act externally which tend to undermine the effectiveness of external action as a 
result of a more integrated and holistic view of HK’s interests.
Because the elite bureaucracy rotates between domestic and external posts as well as 
between different domestic departments, they have a more holistic view of the 
Administration, which makes co-ordination easier to achieve. In this context, because of 
the “rotation system” the absence of a formal mechanism of co-ordination of external 
affairs in HK has been less problematic than for other NCGs. To some extent the 
rotation system constitutes an in-built informal mechanism which helped attaining 
reasonable coherence in external action. The HK experience seems relevant to other 
NCGs the more so as efforts to create a specialised bureaucracy have proven not very 
successful in terms of improving co-ordination and coherence.
Finally, the HK experience reveals, in line with other NCGs, the excessive 
govemmentalisation of external affairs and the deficit of civil society involvement in the 
debate and decision-making on paradipiomacy. As mentioned in chapter four, the 
absence of a think-tank on international affairs in the HK institutional system is worth 
noting. This is clearly a handicap for NCGs and places them at a disadvantage in relation
to states for two basic reasons. Firstly, because it limits the possibility of NCGs to 
participate in “track-two” initiatives which are increasingly useful to address conflicts 
and tensions internationally. Secondly, because it means HK has no instrument to reflect 
on a long-term perspective on the evolution of the international system and its own 
future position in it.
Interestingly, the role “think-tanks” can play in strengthening NCGs capacity to act 
internationally and introducing innovation in paradiplomacy, starts slowly to be 
recognised by some NCGs, namely by HK’s civil society, Quebec483, and Greenland. 
Catalonia went as far as to create recently in 2001 a group of specific “think-tanks” to 
deal with various regions, the Mediterranean and Asia484. In spite of this progress it is 
clear that although NCGs are non-sovereign players they experience barriers and 
problems of dialogue and articulation with civil society on international affairs similar to 
those experienced by Central Governments.
6.3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NCGs AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
The pattern of relations between NCGs and Central Governments in international affairs 
is a key factor that influences the level of NCGs’ autonomy in external affairs. In 
general the literature on paradiplomacy considers that conflict is the dominant feature of 
these relations but recognises there is also a pattern of co-operation, as discussed in 
chapter one. For the great majority of NCGs these are not really alternatives as in 
practice conflict and co-operation tend to coexist although in different proportions in 
different NCGs. Even in the context of the most conflitual relationship, Quebcc-Ottawa, 
there are manifestations of co-operation, either moments of greater flexibility, such as in 
the mid 1980s which produced the 1985 agreement for Quebec’s participation in the
48j Ministry o f International Relations o f Qtæbec, “Le Quebec dans un ensemble international en 
mutation- plan stratégique 2001-2004” pp.54 -57
484 The “Casa de Asia” and the “Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània"were created in 2001 as a consortium 
between the Government of Catalonia, the Barcelona City Council and the Spanish Ministry o f  Eoieien 
Affairs and combines both catalan specific interests and Spanish global interests with respect to Asia and 
the Mediterranean regions (htpp;//\v\v\v.casaasia.org/index2.html ; w ww .iemed.org cmenus.htm)
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Conference of Heads of State and Governments of the Francophonie, or areas where a 
more co-operative behaviour exists such as immigration.
The HK case is not completely consistent with this analysis for various reasons and 
introduces new elements into the debate.
Firstly, the relation of HK with the sovereign power has been shaped by a very special 
circumstance which can not be replicated in the cases of other NCGs, the transfer of 
sovereignty from one sovereign power, Britain, to another sovereign, China. In this 
respect HK experience is rather unique. This process produced two fundamental effects, 
which have been highly beneficial to the affirmation of HK’s external autonomy. On the 
one hand, the competition and mutual control between the outgoing and the incoming 
sovereign powers produced a loosening of central control allowing more room for HK to 
expand its external activities. Moreover, the retrocession led the outgoing sovereign 
power to proactively support the expansion of HK’s international status and autonomy 
as a “security” mechanism in relation to the risks of violation of HK’s domestic 
autonomy by China in the future. This is absolutely unprecedented in the relations 
between Central Governments and NCGs.
On the other hand, the specific nature of the transference of sovereignty led to an 
internationalisation of HK’s transition and a considerable international interest for, and 
monitoring of HK’s external autonomy to check whether the PRC respected the rules. 
No other NCG has ever seen its own relation with the Central Government being subject 
to such an intense international scrutiny by key players in the international system. This 
has clearly helped HK protecting its sphere of external autonomy.
Secondly, the existence of a formal and relatively detailed regulatory framework for the 
relations between HK and the Central Government on international affairs is an 
innovation that differentiates HK experience from that of other NCGs.
HK’s initial experience in the 1960s and 1970s was similar to the standard experience of 
NCGs: it developed a de facto autonomy in limited areas but in violation of 
constitutional rules that conferred Britain the full control and monopoly over foreign 
affairs. HK was clearly a trespasser that started to develop some “illegal” international 
activities, tolerated by London.
However, since 1984 with the JD, later developed by the BL, the relations between HK 
and the Central Government in international affairs started to be regulated by a set of 
written rules which recognise HK’s autonomy and ability to act internationally on its 
own in specific areas (art.151 BL). As a result, HK was granted the stronger and most 
developed de jure external autonomy status among NCGs, which contributed to close 
the gap and reduce the contradictions between the practice and outdated formal rules.
It is interesting to note that, for many NCGs, the persistence of rigid formal 
constitutional rules lacking realism, flexibility and denying them autonomy to act 
externally at odds with practice, is a fundamental cause of conflict with Central 
Governments.
In the case of Catalonia, the Spanish constitution considers all international relations as 
being of the exclusive competence of the Central Government (art. 149 no. 1(3)). The 
wide scope of this definition creates considerable constraints to the external activities of 
the “Comunidades Autonomas” and led the Constitutional Court to consider it excessive 
and to introduce some flexibility by adopting a more restrictive concept of international 
relations, closer to the idea of foreign affairs485. Interestingly, the Court has recognised 
the legitimacy of external action of the Comunidades Autonomas in certain 
circumstances and tried to set the limits of such action. In addition, the Statute of
485 The fundamental decision w as the Constitutional Court ruling regarding the establishment of an 
external representation office of the Basque Region in Brussels w/hich Madrid considered a violation of 
art. 149.1 (3) of the Constitution. The Court ruled against the Central Government and addmitted that in 
order to fulfill their functions the Comunidades Autonomas “might have to carry out activities outside the 
Spanish territory”. The Court has also set the limits of the Comunidades’ external action: it cannot imply 
the exercise o f  treaty making powers: origin obligations tow ards foreign states or affect the foreiun policy 
of the State; create responsabilities for the State in relation to other states; the exercise of jus leuationis” 
SeeSTC 1651994.26.5.1994 (Pleno) in BCJ 158(1994). ' ' ^
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Autonomy does not recognise any autonomy to Catalonia to act externally and deals 
only marginally with international affairs foreseeing that Catalonia can ask Madrid for 
central authorities to negotiate international agreements on cultural relations with 
foreign states where Catalan communities reside486. This framework has generated 
recurrent tensions between Catalonia and Madrid, with other organs of the state 
attempting to moderate conflicts.
Similarly, in the case of Greenland foreign affairs are reserved to the sovereign power, 
Denmark. The Home Rule Act487 did not recognised Greenland any capacity to act on its 
own internationally. The most it did was to create some co-operative procedures to 
accommodate Greenland interests in Danish foreign policy: Greenland has to be 
consulted before treaties likely to affect its interests directly are concluded by Denmark 
(section 13); the possibility to integrate Greenland officials in Denmark embassies 
(section 16.1); the possibility of Greenland to participate in Danish delegations to 
international negotiations (section 16.2); the possibility of Greenland to be given a 
specific authorisation by the Central Government to negotiate directly international 
agreements (section 16.3). This last aspect, involving the possibility of delegation of 
powers to exercise treaty making powers, although exceptional and granted on a case by 
case basis, is clearly the most important power attributed to Greenland with similarities 
with the HK experience.
There have been tensions between Greenland and Denmark on foreign affairs, namely in 
security and environmental affairs (whaling), leading Greenland political parties to 
request a change in the Home Rule Act in order to grant greater autonomy in foreign 
affairs and security matters. A particularly controversial issue has been the 
contradictions regarding the use of the Thule Base in Greenland by the US and its 
integration in the American National Missile Defence plan. Greenland opposes this 
project and has prevented Denmark from giving the green light to Washington, thus
4S(’ Article 27 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia.
4S7 Greenlandic Home Rule Act. Act no. 577 of 29.11.1978 approved by the Danish Parliament.
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showing its autonomy and capacity to influence Denmark foreign policy decisions in 
relation to a highly visible “high politics” international question488.
The case of Quebec is slightly different and more complex because the 1867 Canadian 
Constitution is silent and does not regulate the question of external affairs and the 
division of competencies between the Federal Government and the Provinces, as it was 
then still under British sovereignty. There has been a high level of conflict between the 
Quebec and Ottawa on this issue. The main basis Quebec has used to legitimise its 
external action has been the “Gerin-Lajoie doctrine”489, according to which all 
international action is justified by the logic of external extension of domestic 
competencies. This is a legal construction that has arisen out of the necessity to tackle 
the problem of the absence of any formal rules and constitutes certainly the most 
ambitious formulation of the scope of external autonomy490 491. There is an interesting 
parallel with the debate in HK as the position supported by some sectors that external 
autonomy could in principle match internal autonomy is nothing less than the 
application of the Guerin-Lajoie doctrine.
This construction is rejected by the Canadian Central Government. A clear 
demonstration of the high level of conflict reached, is the fact that the Central 
Government has actively obstructed Quebec’s initiatives and done what it could to 
undermine Quebec’s strategy, for instance by blocking the opening of representative 
offices, by prohibiting the creation of a general delegation in Washington, by pressuring 
foreign governments not to interact with Quebec or by trying to dilute its status in 
international fora supporting other Canadian Provinces to participate in the same fora4'n.
488 The US has formally requested Denmark to allow the Thule Base to be used in the NMD project in 
December 2002. Greenland has demanded to be involved in the negotiations and in December 2002 Vice- 
Premier Josef Motzfeldt participated in the meeting between the US State Secretary Colin Powell and the 
Danish Foreign Minister in Washington -  see BBC News 19.12.2002.
489 The doctrine was formulated by the Quebec Minister Paul Gerin-Lajoie in 1965 in a speech on the 
international personality o f Quebec.
4W This doctrine is still the main basis o f  Qebec’s international action as recognised in the Plan 
stratégique 2001-2004, op. cit.. p. 66.
491 The best example was Ottawa's support to the participation of the Nouveau-Brunswick Province in the 
Ministerial Conference o f the Francophonie after Quebec's accession in 1986 -  see Jean Philippe Therien 
and Louis Belanger “ La politique étrangère québécoise” in Alain Gagnon (ed.) Htat et Société, Lditions 
Quebec/Amerique, 1994, pp. 255-281.
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The HK experience suggests that the definition of a formal framework to regulate NCG- 
CG relations in external affairs has certainly contributed to keep conflict with the new 
sovereign, China, at low levels. The regulation of these relations, involving the 
definition of areas of autonomy and its limits not only moderate conflicts but can 
provide a positive basis for better co-operation insofar it offers guarantees for both sides. 
The insistence on a rigid and outdated set of rules, constantly violated, tends to 
stimulate, not contain, deviant behaviour and lead NCGs to constantly test the limits. 
The majority of NCGs and their respective Central Governments have not yet made the 
transition to meet the challenge. The adoption of a better, more balanced and realistic 
regulatory framework is probably the way forward and the HK. experience provides 
useful insights.
Thirdly, the HK case, particularly the post-handover experience, contributes to deepen 
the analysis of the pattern of relations between NCGs and CGs by introducing a third 
scenario. In fact the HK case shows that these relations do not revolve exclusively 
around the dichotomy conflict/co-operation but can involve a third hypothesis, 
separation. As argued in chapter four, the relations with Beijing have been marked 
essentially neither by conflict nor co-operation but by separation.
For many NCGs the scenario of “autonomy as separation” might be regarded as the ideal 
situation that could allow them to insulate themselves from the interference of Central 
Governments and strengthen autonomy. However, this also presents risks and 
disadvantages. Separation can turn autonomy in an illusion in the long term as it 
generates the seeds likely to undermine the autonomy and cause the decline of the NCG. 
The cost of this separation is that the NCG has no chance to participate in the national 
foreign policy decision-making process and influence the Central Government’s options, 
although it has to suffer the consequences of those options. For HK the major challenge 
remains to break the dangerous logic of isolation and separation and promote greater co­
operation with Beijing. As argued in chapter one, meaningful autonomy does not 
involve only a dimension of separation -  non-interference and complete control over
domestic options -  but has also to include the dimension of “inclusion”, participation in 
the national project and in foreign policy making. In the light of this more 
comprehensive concept of autonomy, HK presents a structural limitation to its external 
autonomy.
6.4. NCGs LEGITIMACY AS INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND THE 
ATTITUDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The legitimacy of NCGs’ international participation is a critical question insofar as it is a 
determinant factor of the sustainability of their external action and of the robustness of 
their international status. In the literature on paradiplomacy the question of legitimacy 
tends to be seen essentially as a domestic question, whether the NCGs have been granted 
or not the powers to act internationally on their own by the state and if the effects of that 
action are recognised as valid. If such powers have been granted, on the basis of 
devolution, it is assumed that legitimacy exists. This is a rather legalistic and simplistic 
position that fails to grasp the essence of the legitimacy basis of NCGs as international 
players.
The HK case clearly challenges this perspective insofar it demonstrates the key 
importance of the external basis of legitimacy, related to the attitude and recognition of 
members of the international community, particularly states. So, the legitimacy of NCGs 
as international actors has to be analysed in the interplay between the domestic and the 
external foundations. Furthermore, the early stages of HK as an international player 
suggest that external foundations are the most relevant component, namely when the 
NCG acts in violation of domestic constitutional rules but its external autonomy is 
nevertheless recognised by members of the international community.
In the case of HK its legitimacy derives primarily from the fact sovereign states 
recognise HK’s autonomy to act on its own. This recognition is firstly granted by the 
Joint Declaration. In fact, unlike all other NCGs, since 1984 HK’s international
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participation is legitimised by an international treaty. This constitutes also an important 
limit to the sovereign power, which can not unilaterally decide to reduce or eliminate 
HK’s degree of autonomy. Secondly, recognition also derives from the fact foreign 
states deal directly and sign binding bilateral agreements with HK. Indeed the exercise 
of treaty making powers is probably the most important formal recognition of UK’s 
legitimacy. In this respect HK is in a particularly strong position because all its bilateral 
agreements are signed with more than 70 different states, whose validity and binding 
nature as international instruments, unlike the agreements signed between NCGs, are not 
questioned.
Thirdly, HK benefits from an unprecedented circumstance which no other NCG has 
experienced, the formal recognition of its external autonomy and legitimacy by the 
superpower, the US, through a binding law, the 1992 US-HK Policy Act, which creates 
a legal obligation for the US Government to interact with and uphold HK’s external 
autonomy.
However, the research reveals, as discussed in chapter five, that HK’s legitimacy as an 
international player is based not only on formal elements, but also on informal and 
substantive factors. A key aspect is HK’s performance of a useful role in the 
international system namely as an international financial centre and a model of a “free 
trade champion”. Probably the most relevant aspect was the fact HK played a bridge role 
between sovereign states in various areas, in particular in the area of international trade 
as shown in the WTO experience.
This was clearly a strategic dimension of HK’s affirmation as an international player. 
HK’s legitimacy is strongly associated with the fact that besides pursuing its own 
interests HK has also accepted to pursue the “public interest” of the international 
community and push forward systemic collective interests. This second dimension tends 
to be absent in the international participation of other NCGs which see the international 
system in a naiTower perspective, exclusively in function of their specific interests. The 
HK case raises the question of the need for NCGs to adopt a different and forward
looking perspective and change the traditional logic of “what can the international 
system do for me” for “what can I do for the international system”, if they wish to 
strengthen their legitimacy.
Another element that plays an important role as a legitimising factor is HK’s de- 
politicised nature, the political-neutral. The international community seems to value 
positively the non-involvement of NCGs in political issues. In addition, HK adopted a 
non-confrontational approach, which tends to be valued positively by the international 
community while conflictual players are de-valued.
A third fundamental substantive element that constitutes an important foundation of 
HK’s legitimacy is its strict adherence and full respect for, and compliance with 
international rules, namely in trade, financial systems and more recently human rights 
fields. The respect for International Law norms that are binding for HK, and even the 
voluntary adoption of international rules which are not binding by incorporating them in 
domestic legislation, is a crucial basis of HK’s prestige and legitimacy as an 
international actor.
The widespread understanding of NCGs that international rules can be somehow 
circumvented at the sub-national level, as demonstrated in the WTO context by the 
debate on enforcement of trade rules, runs exactly in the opposite direction of the 
evidence provided by the HK experience and is likely to undermine, not strengthen, 
NCGs’ capacity to act internationally. Sometimes NCGs tend to think they are exempted 
to comply with international rules that are fundamentally seen as binding for Central 
Governments. However, the question of compliance at the sub-national level is 
becoming increasingly important and so NCGs can consolidate more effectively their 
credibility as international players by choosing to comply and enforce international 
rules, sometimes moving faster than CGs, instead of hiding behind CGs that fail to 
enforce.
Finally, HK legitimacy seems to be based, as argued in chapters four and five, on a non­
exclusive approach to its bilateral relations and the absence of a strong alliance and 
dependence in relation to a single sovereign state. The maintenance of a diversified set 
of relations and autonomy vis-à-vis major external players is a key element. This 
contrasts with the experience of other NCGs which followed a strategy of strong alliance 
and association with one state, or groups of states, to affinn their international identity 
and compensate for the pressure and hostility of their own Central Governments. This 
was the case of Quebec which built its external relations on a key alliance with one state, 
France, which has been crucial to recognise and legitimise Quebec’s international 
participation. Similarly, Greenland has concentrated its relations with Nordic countries 
and Canada, countries that have “Inhuit” minorities. This “exclusive” approach 
necessarily excludes some members of the international community and therefore 
fragilises the legitimacy basis.
6.5. IMPACT OF NCGs ON THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND 
CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGE
As far as the impact and implications of paradiplomacy are concerned the literature 
adopted a domestic perspective and restricted the analysis to the impact of NCGs’ 
external relations on national foreign policy as seen in chapter one. The basic concern 
has been to assess whether paradiplomacy constitutes a derogation of state power and 
contributes to undermine the coherence of foreign policy, or, on the contrary, has a 
positive impact and contributes to rationalise and strengthen foreign policy.
What has been missing is the consideration of the impact of paradiplomacy on the 
international system, to what extent NCGs made any contribution to change the system 
or introduce new practices. The problem is that it was assumed that, because of their 
fragile position and weak international status, NCGs lack the capacity to have any 
impact on an international system still dominated by sovereign states. Even when they 
are seen as capable of some influence it is seen as being exerted indirectly by inducing
changes in their Central Government’s foreign policy. A good example would be 
Greenland’s influence in Denmark’s international position and policy on indigenous 
peoples’ rights, leading the central government to take relevant initiatives in UN/ora492, 
or Quebec’s influence on Canada’s policy towards the Francophonie and UNESCO with 
respect to cultural diversity.
The HK case challenges this view and assumptions. What is new about HK and contrasts 
with all other NCGs, is the fact it had a direct impact on, and contributed to innovations 
and change in the international system. This impact is particularly relevant at three 
different levels.
Firstly, HK has actively contributed to international multilateral rulcs-making in two 
relevant fields, international trade and the financial sector, something which is in general 
seen as restricted to states. As demonstrated in chapter five, UK’s action in WTO, its 
participation in the core decision making group, provide strong evidence of UK’s 
effective contribution and influence over the process of production of multilateral trade 
rules. Similarly, HK’s leadership action in the FATF group and in various organisations 
dealing with financial matters, show the active contribution of HK in the establishment 
of a new regulatory framework for international financial operations.
The interesting point about HK is that besides participating actively in globalisation its 
external action has contributed to the regulation of globalisation itself. This suggests that 
NCGs’ commitment to a better regulation of globalisation and capacity to influence the 
process of rules-making might be a better strategy to preserve their own interests and 
sphere of autonomy than to take advantage of the failures of an unregulated globalisation 
process.
- Greenland convinced Denmark, a member of the UN Human Rights Commission to launch the project 
of a universal declaration o f the rights o f indigenous peoples in 1982 and to introduce in the I hum,
R.ghts Commission agenda the issues of the Universal Declaration of the rights of the indmenous'neonle 
and the UN decade for indigenous peoples in 1996. " I I * -
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Secondly, HK introduced an important innovation in the international system, the 
differentiated application of international treaties to different parts of the territory of a 
state. The manifestations of this innovation include both the WTO case, as in 1997 
GATT and the other multilateral agreements were only applicable to a part of China, the 
HKSAR, but also the insertion of the “HK Clause” in various international multilateral 
treaties, as a result of HK’s purposeful action.
This constitutes a far-reaching innovation in the international system and a change in the 
principle that international treaties apply, once signed by states, to their entire territory. 
Furthermore this has introduced greater flexibility in the international system that might 
have relevant and positive implications for NCGs should the “HK clause” further 
expand into new areas.
Thirdly, HK’s international participation and specific circumstances associated with the 
handover induced also changes in the attitudes and policies of states towards NCGs, 
translated both in more tolerance and willingness to accept direct interaction. HK 
exercised for many years treaty making powers and signed an unprecedented number of 
bilateral agreements with sovereign states. The change in states’ attitudes is clearly 
demonstrated by innovations such as the 1992 US-HK Policy Act, a benchmark in terms 
of the recognition of the legitimacy of a NCG as an international actor by a state, or the 
unprecedented process of international monitoring of the sovereign power’s respect for 
HK’s autonomy, carried out by the US and the EU through periodic official reports. A 
key aspect of this change is that influential states in the international system are no 
longer simply tolerating HK’s paradiplomacy, they are proactively supporting and 
upholding HK’s external autonomy and direct participation in the international system.
While it is clear that HK had an effective impact on the international system, the 
question that remains to be addressed is what factors account for that. The analysis of 
the HK experience leads us to conclude that the crucial factor is multilateralism, 
associated with the use of a sophisticated combination of different sources of influence 
that go well beyond economic power. In fact, UK’s capacity to influence the process of
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international rules-making and to change the scope of international treaties are both 
strongly associated with HK’s participation in multilateral organisations as well as in the 
informal new transgovemmental networks. It should be noted that the multilateral 
system is HK’s first priority in external relations and the core element of its external 
strategy.
In contrast, other NCGs tend to attach priority to bilateral relations and build their 
paradiplomacy around links with specific states, hoping to gain some kind of protection 
or sponsorship. Their participation in multilateral organisations and transgovcmmcntal 
networks is minimal partly because of obstacles imposed by the international system, 
and partly as a result of NCGs’ own options. For instance, Quebec has a very limited 
participation in multilateral organisations being nearly restricted to Francophonie 
organisations, particularly the Agence Cooperation Culturelle et Technique. Similarly, 
Greenland multilateral participation is also minimal and is restricted to sub-regional 
organisations, the Nordic Council, where it has a separate membership, and the Arctic 
Council, founded in 1996 by the eight Arctic countries. Catalonia has a similar
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The strong commitment of HK to multilateralism and its active participation in various 
universal multilateral organisations, particularly WTO, is unique among NCGs. This 
indicates not only that multilateral rules are the best protection for NCGs rights and 
interests, compensating for their vulnerability, but also that multilateralism is the best 
channel for NCGs to have an impact on structural aspects of the international system. 
For many NCGs the only option open to them is the participation in the national 
delegation, not necessarily an autonomous participation in multilateral organisations. 
Even so, a greater priority to multilateralism should be seriously seen as an opportunity 
to enhance their influence over the design of the new international regimes for the 
regulation of globalisation. HK validates the argument that one of the fundamental basis 
for the affirmation of non-state actors’ influence in the international system is their
4‘'3 Interview with Joaquim Molina on 22.11.1999.
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capacity to exploit the space between multilateral organisations that are providing 
regimes of global governance and their member states4 ’4.
The strategic importance of multilateral organisations derives from the fact they are 
precisely the key actors in the process of regulation of globalisation and are at the centre 
of the production of new regimes of global governance, which necessarily affect NCGs 
both domestically and as international actors.
Interestingly, in turn NCGs are very important for the success of this process of 
regulation of globalisation, an aspect that has been largely neglected. The effective 
implementation and enforcement of multilateral rules require a greater involvement of 
NCGs so that rules are also enforced at sub-national levels and deviant practices do not 
prevail. One should not forget that in many areas, namely in economic and social areas, 
international rules have ultimately to be implemented by NCGs because of their 
domestic competencies as these issues fall within the sphere of their autonomy.
Central Governments alone can not ensure the effective implementation and 
enforcement of many international norms, be it WTO rules or environmental norms, at 
the domestic level. In this context, the fact NCGs have little say in the process of rules 
making induces alienation and little commitment to international rules, thus being a 
factor of fragilisation of the multilateral system. Opening WTO and other multilateral 
organisations to NGOs and other non-state actors, including NCGs, is of great relevance 
for the future credibility of the multilateral system. HK has adopted a conservative 
position on this matter but this might change. HK is undoubtedly the best placed NCG to 
take the initiative and lead an innovative process of greater participation of NCGs in the 
multilateral system.
Globalisation has reinforced the trend towards universal rules. However, these rules 
have still to be implemented locally and coexist with local rules and a diversity of 
regional identities that press for flexibility in order to adapt universal rules to specific
4,4 Josselin anil Wallace (oils.) Non Slale Actors in World Politics. Palurave, London. 2001, p. 3.
regional and local circumstances. To overcome potential tensions and reconcile interests, 
the new international rules have to possess in-built flexible mechanisms and overcome 
the traditional rigid model of legal norms. The model of the EU directive, where the 
objectives and principles are clearly defined but some freedom is allowed for states to 
choose the path and the concrete measures to reach those objectives, is probably a useful 
model for the International Law in the globalisation era. If this is not achieved, then the 
risk of violation and non-compliance with international rules is very high, making them 
of limited relevance.
Besides the potential contributions of NCGs to the globalisation process and their crucial 
role in harmonising globalisation and localisation, one should also consider a 
complementary aspect, the impact of globalisation on NCGs’ ability to act as 
international actors. Once again UK provides a useful example. The effects of 
globalisation on HK play out in a complicated and contradictory way, involving both 
opportunities and constraints.
As far as opportunities are concerned, globalisation brought about higher priority and 
concerns for “low politics” and “soft” security issues. This enhanced UK’s relevance for 
the international system because those arc areas where UK can act on its own and has a 
strategic position.
Secondly, globalisation contributed to increase the relevance of the multilateral system 
and multilateral rules, crucial to regulate the process and ensure its sustainability. For a 
long time UK has been active in multilateral font and so this change has contributed to 
create new opportunities for UK to influence the process of rules-making. Moreover, the 
coexistence between universal rulcs-making and local rulcs-cnforcement has contributed 
to enhance UK’s position and of other NCGs.
Thirdly, globalisation created a new opportunity for UK to expand its external relations 
into other areas, namely in security areas, which before were closed to UK’s 
intervention.
However, globalisation has also created challenges for HK. The first effect was that it 
made states more eager to reassert control given the sense of loss of power associated 
with the growing influence of non-state actors, which tends to induce limitations to HK 
and other NCGs external autonomy. State power has not been necessarily weakened 
across the board as a consequence of globalisation. We have to differentiate between the 
impact on strong and weak states. When it is said that globalisation has weakened the 
state power, this is probably true for weak states which further lost influence, but not for 
strong states which have probably strengthened their positions. The capacity of strong 
states to further add to their power is explained not only by their structural position in 
the international system but also by the fact they have strong non-state actors, NGOs, 
NCGs and firms, with whom they co-opcrate, articulate positions and forge alliances to 
pursue common interests.
Secondly, the management of external relations became much more complex and 
demanding for HK. This created pressure for better institutional organisation, for 
personalisation of external affairs and for greater financial resources, as external 
participation became increasingly costly. One good example was that HK has been 
forced to balance activities aimed at pursuing its own specific interests with systemic 
activities of public interest.
Moreover, this complexity has created pressure for greater co-opcration with the 
sovereign power, namely with China. In a globalised system an autonomous HK has 
more difficulty than in the past, in standing alone and isolated, which generates the 
necessity to develop more co-operative relations with China. This poses an important 
challenge to HK because it requires a skilful balance between autonomy and co­
operation with Beijing, so that co-operative relations do not undermine autonomy. One 
of the problems HK faces in striking the right balance is the fact the JD and the BL are a 
rigid framework with no flexibility to respond to the new challenges. This framework 
was approved in the Cold War period but is being implemented in the post-Cold War 
era, in a completely different context. As a consequence, the existing framework,
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namely when it tends to emphasise insulation and boundaries, is not adapted to the new 
realities and might pose obstacles to HK’s international participation in the future.
Thirdly, globalisation created new sources of potential tension between I IK. and Beijing 
insofar as high politics and low politics issues become much more entangled and 
interlinked. Boundaries became less clear, such as between soft and hard security issues, 
generating more grey areas. In this context, the risks of politicisation of “low politics” 
issues increase, which tends to pave the way for Central Governments to interfere in 
NCGs’ sphere of autonomy.
In conclusion, the impact of NCGs on the international system has been limited and 
manifested itself mostly in an indirect way, through their impact on national foreign 
policies. However, the HK case demonstrates that they can have also a direct impact. 
Furthermore, the acceleration of globalisation contributes to increase, not reduce, the 
chances that the role of NCGs in the international system might be further enhanced in 
the future. The main argument is that this results from the complex interplay between 
globalisation and localisation of comparative advantages and the fact NCGs arc likely to 
be strategic facilitators between the global and the local levels in the process of 
globalisation, balancing different interests, organising local actors to participate in the 
global system, providing some legitimacy to the process and ensuring the 
implementation and enforcement of global rules.
The capacity and will of NCGs to promote changes and have a greater say in rulcs- 
making is still to be seen. So far, it is interesting to note that one of the fundamental 
findings about the nature of HK as an international actor is that it docs neither contest 
the rules and logic of the international system nor proposes radical changes. On the
contrary, it tends to accept the logic and tries to strengthen its position within the
system, not working against the system. This seems to be a common feature with other 
NCGs which suggests that NCGs arc more pro-system and tend to be more moderate
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than other non-state actors, such as NGOs and TNCs, which seek more actively to 
change the structure of the international system.
CONCLUSIONS
The research of the HK case developed in this thesis provides useful insights to better 
understand the nature of NCGs as international actors despite the existence of some 
unique conditions that are not replicable to other NCGs. The evidence discussed in the 
different chapters regarding the research questions identified in the introduction points to 
five main conclusions.
Firstly, HK’s emergence as an autonomous international player in the early 1960s, 
making HK a pioneer among NCGs, was driven by trade and led by the elite 
bureaucracy. It shows that the international system in spite of the state-centric features is 
more flexible than generally believed insofar it was able to accommodate such an 
unorthodox phenomenon. This flexibility and acceptance by influential states of the 
international community was explained by two key factors: the existence of precedents 
associated with the British Dominions’ autonomy in external economic matters set in the 
early XX century by the then dominant power; more importantly, the pragmatic interests 
of specific members of the international community who saw the possibility of dealing 
directly with HK as useful to pursue their own economic and political interests. In this 
light the consideration of the factors that eased the international community potential 
opposition and led it to accept NCGs activities are as important to understand the 
genesis of paradiplomacy than the factors that pushed NCGs to go out on their own.
Secondly, NCGs have specific characteristics that differentiate them from other 
categories of NSAs as international players. The analysis of HK’s international status 
leads to the conclusion that HK is a robust actor based on its dense international 
personality and medium level of autonomy, and suggests that NCGs, namely those that 
can be regarded as robust actors, present three specific distinctive features: they enjoy 
international personality of a special kind, qualified personality, with a permanent and 
more or less diversified nature strongly associated with their capacity to exercise treaty 
making powers; their international activities are more constrained by domestic legal 
rules and international norms than other actors, and have frequently to face and manage
the contradictions arising out of overlapping jurisdictions considering they control local 
rules; enjoy a stronger legitimacy basis, many of them electoral, to act and arc subject to 
accountability and therefore are less affected by the problem of lack of accountability 
and representation associated with other NSAs, namely NGOs and TNCs. However, 
these differences are not sufficient to qualify NCGs as a tertium genus as suggested by 
Hocking. NCGs should be seen as a special category of non-state actors, since 
sovereignty is still the determinant differentiation factor.
Thirdly, the external autonomy of NCGs, crucial for their credibility as international 
actors, has an important foundation in domestic autonomy. However, as the HK case 
demonstrates, domestic autonomy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition and the 
degree and dynamics of substantive external autonomy is fundamentally determined by 
the complex interplay between three different factors: NCGs own institutional capacity 
and strategy to act internationally; the pattern of relations with the Central Government 
and the mechanisms and level of control exerted by the former; the attitude and 
recognition of external players and willingness to interact on the international stage. In 
the HK case the role of external players and international monitoring has been 
particularly relevant not only in upholding directly UK’s autonomy but also indirectly 
by moderating Beijing’s temptation to cross the boundaries of autonomy.
Fourthly, the HK case demonstrates that NCGs can have, using different sources of 
influence, a direct impact on the international system and even introduce innovations, 
contradicting conventional analysis which considered they could only have an indirect 
impact by influencing Central Governments’ policies. In fact HK has a direct 
participation in the process of international rulcs-making in trade (WTO) and financial 
areas (FAFT and Basle Committee), exerts a “demonstration effect” on other NCGs and 
relations with their respective CGs and has even introduced innovations, particularly the 
“HK clause” which tends to reinforce the flexibility of the international system which 
allowed HK to become an international actor in the first place.
In this process HK has used not one but a combination of different sources of influence, 
namely professional expertise, financial and economic strength, access to international 
organisations and networks of foreign bureaucracies and more importantly its role as a 
bridge builder between states, as demonstrated by the research on WTO, exploring its 
ambiguity of both a developed and developing country. This ambiguity emerges as a 
strong and distinctive trait of HK as an international actor contributing to strengthen its 
influence in the international system.
Fifthly, although globalisation poses challenges to NCGs’ paradiplomacy it presents also 
opportunities and on the whole creates a favourable environment for NCGs to expand 
their international activities and strengthen their influence in the international system in 
the future as a consequence of two different processes. On the one hand, the localisation 
trend associated with the clustering-innovation complex, which coexists and is in several 
respects complementary to globalisation, enhances the position of NCGs in the 
international system. On the other, the process of global governance, the other side of 
globalisation, opens new opportunities for NCGs international participation insofar it 
implies the coexistence of different levels in a multilayered system, overlapping 
jurisdictions and rules at the global, regional, national and sub-national levels. As shown 
in the HK case, NCGs can play a relevant potential role both in international rulcs- 
making - not only through their participation in multilateral bodies (WTO) but also 
through the new transgovemmental networks (i.e. FAFT) which have a growing role in 
policy formulation and rules and are more accessible to NCGs -  and in international 
rules implementation and enforcement. Because of domestic devolution, the effective 
implementation and enforcement of global rules depend ultimately in some areas more 
on NCGs than on Central Governments.
In short, a central argument of the thesis is that I IK is a robust international player and 
the sustainability and effectiveness of its paradiplomacy and international participation 
is determined by the triangle “external autonomy-legitimacy-inilucncc” which arc inter­
related but different variables. External autonomy is a complex variable with a triple 
dimension: separation from the Central Government (negative autonomy), participation
in national policy-making (positive autonomy) and autonomy in relation to external 
players. Legitimacy is associated not only with a democratic basis of the NCG but also 
formal recognition by external players linked with a dense international personality and 
the performance of substantive and useful functions to the international system. 
Influence depends mainly on the way NCGs mobilise support and use different sources 
of influence to pursue their goals. In the UK ease the three sides of the triangle arc 
relatively strong and balanced although some weaknesses exist, namely in the external 
autonomy side, as far as positive autonomy is concerned, and the legitimacy side, as far 
as democracy is concerned. This allowed I IK not only to have a direct impact on the 
international system by inducing innovations, participating in the making of 
international rules and exerting a demonstration effect on NCGs and foreign stales, but 
also to preserve, so far, the core of its external autonomy under Chinese sovereignty 
although there are risks to its future sustainability.
In this context the research results confirm only partially the initial hypothesis insofar 
they show that although external autonomy is a central question, the sustainability of 
UK’s position and status as an international actor depends also on other determinant 
variables, legitimacy and influence, whose basis and contents are not coincident with 
autonomy.
The progress of globalisation and more importantly the coexistence between 
globalisation and localisation creates favourable opportunities for 11K and other NCGs 
to consolidate their positions as international players in the future. The asymmetries, 
overlapping of jurisdictions and multilayered governance that characterises the current 
international system, imply contradictions and the need to define what rules prevail in 
which circumstances. NCGs can play a strategic role in contributing to manage and 
smooth these contradictions and bringing about greater coherence between the different 
levels, namely by flexibly adapting global rules to local circumstances. However, it 
remains to be seen whether NCGs will translate this potential into reality, thus 
contributing to belter global governance or, on the contrary, if they become hostages of 
parochial interests and obstacles to that process.
ANNEX I
The methodology of interviews
The thesis research included a series of interviews which constituted one of the most 
important primary sources. These 45 interviews were conducted between August 1999 
and April 2003 in Britain, Hong Kong, Beijing, Geneva, Brussels and The Hague with a 
diversified range of people.
The interviews were carried out with three main purposes. Firstly, to obtain original 
information, data and insights in relation to specific research issues that had not been 
researched before and in relation to which no secondary sources or official documents 
were available. Secondly, they were intended to confirm information and data obtained 
from secondary sources as well as to clarify or complement information or test 
hypothesis formulated on the basis of the analysis of documents and other primary 
sources. Some interviews were specifically aimed at cross checking and validating the 
information and views obtained in the context of other interviews.
Thirdly, they seek to identify further questions not foreseen at the outset which arc 
inevitably brought about by the contact with people who are involved in the practical 
implementation of policies and the daily operation of institutions.
A diversified group of people ranging from government officials and retired officials, 
representatives of NGOs, to scholars and politicians was interviewed. The selection of 
interviewees was made on the basis of different criteria. In some cases the direct 
involvement, specific responsibilities and contribution to particular historical processes, 
such as the Sino-British negotiations or the initial stages of UK’s international 
participation was the key factor. Others were interviewed because of their present 
institutional functions, i.c. HK and PRC officials or WTO officials. What was selected 
was the institution and this led logically to interview the individuals who presently hold
the posts. Finally, other interviewees were selected because of their particular 
knowledge and qualifications as observers and commentators of UK’s affairs.
The methodology of preparation of the interviews was similar in all cases. The people 
selected to be interviewed were approached in the same way. There was a preliminary 
formal contact to request the interview by fax, in a few cases by letter, where the main 
aspects and objectives of the research were explained as well as the specific issues 
which would be addressed in the interview. A letter signed by the supervisor was 
attached to the fax to confirm the academic interest of the interview and ensure the 
credibility of the process. In case of acceptance this contact was then followed by one or 
more contacts by telephone or e-mail to arrange the date and time of the interview.
The great majority of interviews were oral interviews involving personal contact and 
interaction. Consequently, this implied the organisation of several field work trips, 
involving four trips to Hong Kong (June 1998, November 1999, October 2000 and 
November-December 2001), two trips to Beijing (January 1999 and November 2001), 
one trip to Geneva (November 2002), one trip to Brussels (October 2001) and one trip to 
the Hague (June 2001) as well as several trips inside the UK, to make the interviews and 
carry out other research activities. There were, however, a few exceptional cases of 
written interviews where the questions were sent in writing by e-mail or fax and written 
answers were provided, namely the cases of the interviews with the Directors of 
International Relations departments of the Governments of Catalonia, Quebec and 
Greenland, with Christine Loh, Andrew Stolcr, Nick Starling and Kerry Dumbaugh.
As far as the nature of the interviews is concerned, the majority were directive 
interviews conducted on the basis of a list of previously defined and precise questions 
with a logic sequence. There were, however, some cases of semi-directive interviews, 
more open, where due to the profile and experience of the interviewee more space was 
granted to an open-ended discussion of the general theme.
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In the case of oral interviews a specific set of questions was prepared beforehand for 
each interview. The list included both general questions common to other interviews as 
well as specific questions tailored to the interviewee. In a few cases, when the interview 
was aimed at merely clarifying a specific issue only the second type of questions was 
formulated. Common questions were instrumental in capturing and comparing the 
perceptions of different players on the same issue, i.e. the views of the HKSAR and the 
PRC on the evolution of the SAR-CPG relationship or on UK’s external autonomy.
The interviews were not recorded given the initial resistance of various interviewees and 
the potential constraints recording would create for a more free expression of ideas. 
Only a few notes were taken in a notepad in order to disturb as little as possible the 
normal flow of the conversation. A detailed account of the interview was elaborated 
immediately after the interview to ensure an accurate registration of details and nuances, 
later analysed in more depth individually and on a comparative basis with other 
interviews’ accounts. In some cases, particularly in relation to UK officials, there was a 
follow-up to the interview involving further contacts in writing by e-mail intended to 
clarify specific points or to obtain further details and evidence to substantiate the 
arguments and key ideas expressed during the interview.
In global terms there was a positive reaction of the people interviewed. In all but 3 cases 
the request for an interview was accepted. Moreover, all interviewees were happy to 
talk, provide information and materials and share their views. Some have even showed a 
special interest in the global theme of the research and in getting access to the final 
results. In general the interviewees agreed to be quoted but in a few cases objections 
were presented and specific requests not to be quoted made. These requests were fully 
respected, in accordance with the code of conduct on social science research ethics, and 
consequently some restrictions were introduced in terms of quotation and detailed 
identification of the source.
The interviews earned out provided in general valuable and relevant inputs to the thesis 
research at the same time they constituted a rewarding personal experience. The
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interviews had some points in common: they had a qualitative rather than quantitative 
nature; and provided a direct contact with practical aspects of UK’s external relations 
and the complex network of interactions between different players.
However, there were also important differences. Firstly, while a group of interviews 
focused more on the past and the historical process of UK’s emergence as an 
international player and interviewees tended to emphasise achievements and 
opportunities, another group looked mostly oriented into the future and tended to 
emphasise more the challenges HK faces in the international system. Secondly, in some 
interviews only official information was transmitted and sensitive or difficult issues 
were avoided. In contrast, in others interviewees talked more openly, expressed views 
different from the official line and addressed sensitive issues. Finally, there were 
“restrictive interviews” driven by a single issue with a more technical nature (air 
services agreements or WTO participation) and “global interviews”, where the overall 
position of HK as an international actor was addressed in its different dimensions, with a 
more political nature.
These differences resulted in an interesting and complementary mix that stimulated and 
enriched the research process, facilitating a better understanding of the complex nature 
and diversity of views on UK’s status as an international actor.
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